LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




Q0QE0131.3t.b 



?M^ 



mm. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



S]ielf/.P2.../P2. .. 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 



THE STORY OF THE NATIONS 

12MO, ILLUSTRATED. PER VOL., $1.50 
THE EARLIER VOLUMES ARE 

THE STORY OF GREECE. By Prof. Jas. A. Harrison 

THE STORY OF ROME. By Arthuk Gilman 

THE STO;iY OF THE JEWS. By Prof. Jas. K. Hosmer 

THE STORY OF CHALDE.A. ByZ. A. Ragozin 

THE STORY OF GERMANY. By S. Baring-Gould 

THE STORY OF NORWAY. By Prof. H. H. Boyesen 

THE STORY OF SPAIN. By E. E. and Susan Hale 

THE STORY OF HUNGARY. By Prof. A. V.iMBfiRV 

THF. STORY OF CARTHAGE. By Prof. Alfred J. Church 

THE STORY OF THE SARACENS. By Arthur Gilman 

THE STORY OF THE MOORS IN SPAIN. By Stanley Lane-Poolk 

THE STORY OF THE NORMANS. By Sarah O. Jewett 

THE STORY OF PERSIA. By S. G. W. Ben'jamin 

THE STORY OF ANCIENT EGYPT. By Geo. Rawlinson 

THE STORY OF ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. By Prof. J. P. Mahaffy 

THE STORY OF ASSYRIA. By Z. A. Ragozin 

THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Hon. Emily Lawless 

THE STORY OF THE GOTHS. By Henry Bradley 

THE STORY OF TURKEY. By Stanley Lane-Poole 

THE STORY OF MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PERSIA. By Z. A. Ragozin 

THE STORY OF MEDIAEVAL FRANCE. By Gustave Masson 

THE STORY OF MEXICO. By Susan Hale 

THE STORY OF HOLLAND. By James E. Thorold Rogers 

THE STORY OF PHCENICIA. By George Rawlinson 

THE STORY OF THE HANSA TOWNS. By Helen Zimmern 

THE STORY OF EARLY BRITAIN. By Prof. Alfred J. Church 

THE STORY OF THE BARBARY CORSAIRS. By Stan-ley Lane-Poolk 

THE STORY OF RUSSIA. By W. R. Morfill 

THE STORY OF THE JEWS UNDER ROME. By W. D. .Morrison 

THE STORY OF SCOTLAND. By John Mackintosh 

THE STORY OF SWITZERL.AND. By R. Stead and Mrs. A. Hug 

THE STORY OF PORTUGAL. By H. Morse Stephens 

THE STORY OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. By C. W. C. Oman. 

THE STORY OE SICILY. By E. A. Freeman 

THE STORY OF THE TUSCAN REPUBLICS. By Bella Duffy 

THE S 1 ORY OF POLAND. By W. R. Morfill 

For prospectus of the series see end of this volume 

G. p. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON 



lh\t llorg of the Rations 



THE 



STORY OF PARTHIA 



GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A., F.R.G.S. 

LATE CAMDEN PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ; 

CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF TURIN ; AUTHOR 

OF "the FIVE GREAT MONARCHIES OF THE ANCIENT EASTERN 

WORLD," "the STORY OF ANCIENT EGYPT," ETC. 




NEW YORK 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

LONDON : T. FISHER UNWIN 

1S93 






copyright, 1893 
By G. p. Putnam's Sons 

Entered at Statioiiers^ Hall^ London 

By T. Fisher Unwin 



fS 






F.leclrotyped, Printed, ami Rnund l>y 

C^bc Iknicfeeiboclscr Iprcss, 1Hc\v l^ork 

G. P. Putnam's Sons 



CONTENTS. 



I. 

PAGE 

Geographical — Parthia Proper, and the Par- 
thian Empire ...... 1-26 

Dimensions of Partliia Proper, i, 2 — General character of the 
region, 2, 3 — Rivers, valleys, and mountain tracts, 3, 4 — ■ 
Climate, 5 — Products, 6— Countries included in the Parthian 
Empire — Hyrcania, 6, 7 — Territory of the Mardi, 8, 9 — Media 
Rhagiana, 9, 10 — Western Bactria, 10, 11 — Media Magna, 
II-13 — Elam or Susiana, 13, 14 — Babylonia, 14, 15— Persia, 
15-17 — Assyria, 17, 18 — Eastern Bactria, 18, 19 — Margiana, 
19 — Aria, 20 — Drangiana orSarangia, 20, 21 — Saca^t.ma, 21 — 
Arachosia, 21 — Sngartia, 21, 22 — Chorasmia, 22 — Mesopo- 
tamia Proper, 22, 23 — Media Atropatene, 24 — Armenia, 24, 
25 — Dimensions of the Empire, 25- Boundaries ,25, 26. 



IT. 

Ethnographical — ^Turanian Character of the 

Parthian People 27-35 

First appearance of the Parthians in history, 27 — Connection 
with the Persians, and supposed Arian character, 27, 28 — 
Statements of ancient writers, Arrian, Trogus Pompeius, 
Stral)o, 28-30 — Close connection with the nomadic races of 
Central Asia, 30,31 — These races Turanian, 31, 32 — Turanian 
character of the Parthian names, 32 — Their physical and mental 



VIU CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

type, Turanian, 32-34 — Resemblance of the Parthians to the 
Accadians, Mongols, and Turks, 34, 35 — Their other con- 
geners, 35. 

III. 

Condition of Western Asia in the Third Cen- 
tury B.C. — Origin of the Parthian State. 36-62 

Disruption of the Empire of Alexander, 36, ^7 — Formation 
of the Four Great Monarchies, 37 — Kingdom of the Seleu- 
cidte, 37-39 — Mistaken policy of the Seleucid princes — Trans- 
fer of capital to Antioch, 39, 40 — Entanglement in Western 
wars, 40 — Weak organisation of the kingdom, 41, 42 — Atten- 
tion concentrated on the West — Commencement of disorders, 
43, 44 — Weak character of the second Antiochus, 44 — Ex- 
amples of successful revolt, 44, 45 — Revolt of Bactria, 45, 
46 — Revolt of Parthia, 47-49— The first Arsaces, 50— The 
first Tiridates, 50, 51 — Ptolemy Euergetes and Seleucus 11. , 
52, 53 — Tiridates occupies Hyrcania, 53 — His war with 
Seleucus, 53-56 — His new capital, 57 — Accession of Arta- 
banus I., 58 — His war with Antiochus .the Great, 59-61^ 
Peaceful reign of Priapatius, 61 — Reign of Phraates I. — Con- 
quest of Media Rhagiana, 62. 



IV. 

First Period of Extensive Conquest — Reign of 

MlTHKIDATES I. . . . . . . 63-76 

Accession of Mithridatcs I., 63 — His physiognomy and cha- 
racter, 63, 64 — Condition of Western Asia at his accession, 
64-68— Attack of Mithridates on Western Bactria, 69 — War 
with Eupator, 69, 70 — Conquest of Media Magna, 70 — Re- 
volt and reduction of Hyrcania, 71— Conquest of Elymais, 
71, 72 — Submission of Babylonia and Persia, 72, 73 — War 
with Heliocles, and conquest of Eastern Bactria, 73, 74 — War 
with Demetrius II. of Syria, 74, 75 — Capture of Demetrius, 
and death of Mithridates, 76. 



CONTENTS. IX 

PAGE 
V. 

Governmental System of ^ Mithridates I. — 

Laws and Institutions .... 77-90 

Origin of Parthian society: Tribes, Chieftains, Great Chief or 
Monarch, 77, 78 — Power of the chieftains — The Two Coun- 
cils: the "Sophi," the "Magi," 78— The Surena or Com- 
mander-in-chief, 79 — Power of the monarch, 79, 80 — Govern- 
ment of the provinces by Vitaxse or subject kings, 8c, 81 — 
vSemi-independence of the Greek cities, 81, 82 — Position of 
the Jewish communities, 82, S^ — Organisation of the Parthian . 
Court, 83, 84 — Titles assumed by the monarch : his dress, 84, 
85 — Migrations of the Court, 86, 87 — Pomp and grandeur of 
the nobles, 87, 88 — Rudeness of the mass of the people, 88, 
89 — Mithridates J . as organiser, 89, 90. 

VI. 

Last Struggle with Syria — Defeat and Death 

OF Antiochus Sidetes .... 91-103 

Accession of Phraates II. : War threatens with Syria, 91. 92 
■ — Inaction of Phraates, 93 — Parthia invaded by Antiochus 
Sidetes, 94 — Size of his army, 94, 95 — Force collected to meet 
him, 95 — Equipment of the Syrians, 95, 96 — Advance of 
Phraates, followed by three Syrian victories, 96, 97 — Despe- 
rate position of Phraates, 97 — He sends Demetrius to stir up 
revolt in Syria, 97, 98 — Goes into winter quarters, 98 — Plans 
a massacre of the invaders, 99 — Negotiates with Sidetes, 99, 
100 — Great rising — Battle and massacre, 100, loi — Death of 
Sidetes, loi — Rapid decline of Syria, loi, 102 — Proceedings 
of Phraates, 102, 103. 

VIL 

Pressure of the Northern Nomads upon Parthia 
— ScYTHic Wars of Phraates II. and Arta- 

BANUS II. . IO4-I16 

Frequency of barbaric inroads from the North, 104, 105 — 
Character of such inroads, 105, 106 — Constant danger to 
Parthia from the Trans- Oxianian region, 106 — Great move- 



X CONTENTS. 

FACE 

ment among the Northern Asiatic hordes at this period : the 
Yue-chi, the Su, 106-108 — Inroads of the Scyths into Dactria 
and Ariana, 108, 109 — Occupation of Sacastana, and lodg- 
ment in Cabul, 109 — Settlement in India, no — Principal 
tribes of the Scythians, no — Character of their barbarism, 
no, III — Danger which threatened Western Asia, 111-113 — ■ 
Scythian War of Phraates II., 1 13, 1 14 — Accession of Arta^ 
banus II., 1 14 — His war with the Tochari, 115 — His death, 
n6. 

VIII. 

MiTHRIDATES II. AND THE NOMADS — WaR WITH 

Armenia — First Contact with Rome . 117-131 

Accession of Mithridates II. : Meagre accounts of his reign, 
117— Mithridates checks the advance of the Scyths, 118 — 
Takes territory from them in Bactria, 118, 119 — Crushes the 
revolt of Hymerus, 119 — Attacks Armenia, 119 — Dimensions 
and physical character of Armenia, 119-121 — Character of the 
Armenian people, 121, i22^Previous history of the country, 
122, 123 — Armenia under the Persians, 123, 124 — Conquered 
by Alexander the Great, 124 — Revolts from Antiochus III., 
124 — Wars of the Armenians with the Syrians, 124, 125 — 
War of Mithridates II. with Ortoadistus, 125, 126 — First con- 
tact of Parthia with Rome, 126 — Previous relations of Rome 
with Asia, 126-129 — Mithridates II. sends an embassy to 
Sulla, 129 — Establishes a friendly understanding, 130 — Loses 
territory to Tigranes : Dies, 130 — His appearance and cha- 
racter, 130, 131. 

IX. 

Dark Period of Parthian History — Accession of 

Sanatrceces — Phraates III. and Pompey 132-146 

Civil war in Parthia : Time of general disturbance, 132 — 
Struggle of Rome with Mithridates of Pontus, 133, Con- 
quests of Tigranes, 133, 134 — Accession of Sanatrceces to the 
Parthian throne, 135 — His policy of abstention, 126 — Sana- 
trceces succeeded by Phraates III. : Overtures made to him by 
Pompey lead to an alliance, 136-138 — War between Phraates 
and Tigranes, 138, 139 — Settlement of the East by Pompey: 
Discontent of Phraates, 139, 140— Phraates comes to terms 



CONTENTS. XI 

PAGE 

with Tigranes, 141, 142 — He is murdered by his sons, 143 — 
Short reign of Mithridates. III., 144, 145 — Accession of his 
brother, Orodes. 

X. 

Great Expedition of Crassus against Parthia, 
AND its Failure — Retaliatory Raid of 
Pacorus 147-184 

Antecedents of Crassus, 147, 148 — His appointment to the 
Prefecture of Syria, 149 — His wild ambition, 149, 150 — He 
starts for the East, and reaches Antioch, 150, 151 — Prepara-. 
tions made to meet him by Orodes, 151, 152 — Crassus wastes 
time in plundering expeditions, 152, 153 — Holds a conference 
with ArtavasdeS, 153, 154 — Receives an embassy from Orodes, 
and insults him, 154, 155 — Resolves on an invasion, 156 — 
Possible lines of route, 156, 157 — Line of the Euphrates 
chosen, but given up at the suggestion of the Osrhoenian 
sheikh, Abgarus, 157, 158 — March begun through Mesopo- 
tamia, 158 — Disposal of his forces made by Orodes, 158-160 
— The Surena's army : the light horse, the heavy horse, 161, 
162 — Disadvantages under which the Romans laboured, 162- 
164 — Treachery of Abgarus, 164, 165 — Meeting of the two 
armies, 165, 166 — Parthian tactics and great Roman loss, 166, 
167 — Charge made by Publius Crassus, 167 — Its failure and 
his death, 168 — Renewed attack on the main army, 168, 169 — 
Retreat of the Romans during the night, 169, 170— Carrhse 
reached, but retreat continued, 170, 171 — More fighting at 
Sinnaca, 171 — Conference, and death of Crassus, 172, 173 — 
Estimate of the Roman loss, 174 — Causes of the failure of 
Crassus, 174-176 — Treatment of the body of Crassus, 177 — 
Farcical ceremony at Seleucia, 177, 178 — -Slight effect of the 
disaster, 178, 179 — Death of the Surena, 180, 181 — Raid of 
Pacdrus, 181-183 — Pacorus recalled by Orodes, 184. 

XI. 

Second War of Parthia with Rome — Parthian 
Invasion of Syria, Palestine, and Asia 
Minor 185-202 

Negotiations between Orodes and Pompey, 185-187 — ^Julius 



Xll CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Ctesar in the East, 187, 188 — His supposed intention of invad- 
ing Parthia, 188— His death, 189 — Parthia's part in the War 
of the " Liberators," 189, 190 — The situation after the Battle 
of PhiHppi, 190, 191 — Orodes determines to invade the Roman 
territory, 191 — Great invasion under Pacorus and Labienus, 
191, 192— Fall of Antioch, 192— Reduction of Syria, Phoe- 
nicia, and Palestine : Parthian occupation of Jerusalem, 193 
— Asia Minor overrun by Labienus, 193, 194 — Turn of the 
tide : Successes of Ventidius, 194-196— Renewed attack by 
Pacorus, 106 — His defeat by Ventidius, and death, 197 — 
Final failure of the invasion, 198 — Reflections on this first 
period of struggle, 198-200 — Grief of Orodes at the death of 
Pacorus, 200 — His abdication in favour of Phraates IV., 201 
— His death and character, 201, 202. 



xn. 

Expedition of Mark Antony against Parthia 
— its Failure — War between Parthia and 
Media ....... 203-218 

Accession of Phraates IV., 203 — His cruelties, 204 — Intrigues 
of Monieses with Antony, 204-206 — Resolve of Antony to 
attack Parthia, 2o5, 207 — His preparations, 207 — His junction 
with Artavasdes, and attack on Media Atropatene, 208 — The 
march to Praaspa, 209 — The siege, 209-211 — Commencement 
of the retreat, 211 — Antony's heavy losses, 212, 213 — Quarrel 
of Phraates with the Median subject-king, 213, 214 — Alliance 
between that king and Antony, 214 — Antony seizes the person 
of Artavatdes, and occupies Armenia, 215 — Arranges matters 
with the Median king and quits Asia, 216, 217 — Phraates 
recovers Media Atropatene, and Armenia regains her indepen- 
dence, 217 — Result of the expedition of Antony favourable, 
rather than the reverse, to Parthia, 218. 

XIII. 

Internal Troubles in Parthia — Her Relations 

with Rome under Augustus and Tiberius 219-245 

Troubles in Parthia : Revolt of Tiridates, 219 — Negotiations 
between Phraates IV. and Augustus, 220, 221 — Later years of 



CONTENTS. Xlll 

PAGE 

Phraates, 221, 222 — He sends four of his sons to Rome, 222, 
223 — Revolution in Armenia, 223, 224 — Phraates takes Ar- 
menia under his protection, 224, 225 — Caius sent by Augustus 
to settle the affairs of the East, 225, 226 — Revolution in 
Parthia : Phraates murdered and throne seized by Phraataces, 
226 — Negotiations between Phraataces and Augustus, 227, 
228 — Conference between Caius and Phraataces : Submission 
of the latter, 228, 229 — Difficult position of Phraataces : 
his deposition by his subjects, 229, 230 — Short reign of 
Orodes II., 230 — Accession of Vonones, 230, 231 — His vic- 
tory over the pretender, Artabanus, 232, 233 — His later for- 
tunes, 233, 234 — Reign of Artabanus III. : Visit of Ger- 
manicus to the East, 234-236 — Peaceful interval, 236, 237 — 
Ambition of Artabanus : he occupies Armenia, 237 — Tiberius 
stirs up fresh trouliles in Parthia, 238-241 — Flight of Artabanus 
to Hyrcania, 241 — Tiridates III. made king by the Romans, 
241, 242 — Return of Artabanus and expulsion of Tiridates, 
243,244 — Peace concluded between Artabanus and Rome, 245. 

XIV. 

ASINAI AND AnILAI — An EpISODE OF PaRTHIAN 

HlSTORV ....... 246-256 

Important Jewish element in the population of Parthia, 246, 
247 — Freedom allowed the Jewish communities, 247, 248 — 
Early history of Asinai and Anilai, 248 — Their first successes : 
Asinai made satrap of Babylon, 249 — Fresh outbreak on the 
part of Anilai, 249, 250 — He supersedes his brother as satrap, 
250 — Anilai's misgovernment, 250 — His quarrel with Mithri- 
dates, and cruel treatment of him, 250, 251 — Mithridates re- 
venges himself: Defeat and death of Anilai, 251, 252 — Attack 
on the Jewish population of Babylon, 252, 253 — Flight to 
Seleucia, 253 — Massacres of Jews in Seleucia and Ctesiphon, 
254 — Reflections on the occurrences, 254-256. 

XV. 

End of the Reign of Artabanus III. — Gotarzes 

AND HIS Rivals 257-269 

Further troubles in Parthia — Death of Artabanus, 257, 258 — 
Revolt of Seleucia, 258, 259 — Succession disputed between 



xiv CONTENTS. 

I'AGE 

his sons — Vaidanes and Gotarzes — First reign of Gotarzes, 
259 — Gotarzes driven from his throne by Vardanes, 260 — Ar- 
rangement made between the brothers, 261 — Quarrel of Var- 
danes with Izates, 261, 262 — Gotarzes attacks Vardanes, but 
without success, 262, 263 — Vardanes murdered by his subjects, 
263 — Second reign of Gotarzes : discontent of the Parthians 
with his government, 263, 264— Appearance of a pretender in 
the person of Meherdates, 264 — Support lent him by the 
Roman Emperor, Claudius, 264, 265 — Invasion of Meherdates, 
and its faikire, 265-267 — Monument set up by Gotarzes to 
commemorate his victory, 267, 268 — Death of Gotarzes, and 
decUne of Parthia under him, 268, 269. 



XVI. 
Parthia in the Time of Nero — Vologases I, 

AND CORBULO 270-290 

Two-months' reign of Vonones II. and accession of Volo- 
gases I., 270 — His brothers, Pacorus and Tiridates, 271 — His 
first attempt upon Armenia fails, 272, 273— His quarrel with 
Iztites, 273, 274 — His Scythian war, 274 — His second attack 
on Armenia succeeds : Tiridates established there as king, 274, 
275 — Rome threatens war, but at first only negotiates, 275- 
277 — Civil war for three years between Vologases and his son, 
Vardanes II., 277 — Negotiations between Vologases and Cor- 
bulo, 278 — Corbulo recovers Armenia and dismembers it, 279 
— Vologases occupied in Hyrcania, 279, 280 — War with Rome 
renewed: Campaign of A.D. 62, 281, 282 — Arrival of Pfetus 
in the East : his relations with Corbulo, 282-284 — Successes 
of Vologases against Psetus, 284, 285 — Re-establishment of 
Tiridates in Armenia, 285 — " ilirenicon " proposed by Volo- 
gases to Nero, 285, 286 — "Eirenicon" accepted, and peace 
made, 286, 287 — Journey of Tiridates to Rome, and his in- 
vestiture by Nero with the crown of Armenia, 287-290. 

XVII. 

Vologases I. and Vespasian — Pacorus II. and 

Decebalus of Dacia .... 291-298 

Little light thrown on Parthian history by Roman writers for 



CONTENTS. XV 

PAGE 

the next fifty years, 291, 292 — Friendly relations of Vologases 
I. with Vespasian and Titus, 292 — Attempt made by Psetus to 
trouble the relations fails, 292-294 — Invasion of Parthia by 
the Alans ; application to Rome for aid refused ; coolness 
between the two powers, 294-296 — Accession to the throne of 
Pacorus II., 296 — Negotiations between Pacorus and the 
Dacian monarch, Decebalus, 297, 298 — Pacorus troubled by a 
pretender, named Artabanus, 298. 

XVIII. 

Chosroes and Trajan — Trajan's Asiatic Con- 
quests — Relinquishment of these Conquests 
BY Hadrian ...... 299-317 

Accession of Chosroes : Trajan's designs against the East, 
299-302 — His march to the Euphrates, and seizure of Partha- 
masiris, 302-304 — Armenia made a Roman province, 305 — 
Parthia invaded by Trajan : Mesopotamia conquered, and 
made a province, 305, 306 — Advance from Nisibis to the 
Tigris, and passage of the Tigris, 307, 308 — Conquest of 
Adiabene, 308 — Fall of Hatra and Babylon ; submission of 
Ctesiphon, 309 — Trajan's pleasure voyage, 310 — Revolts in 
his rear, 310, 31 1 — His retreat, repulse p.t Hatra, and death, 
312, 313 — Trajan's conquests relinquished by Hadrian, 313, 
314 — Friendly relations between Chosroes and Pladrian, 315 
— Later years of Chosroes, 316 — Troubles caused him by 
Pretenders, 317. 

XIX. 

Vologases II. and Antoninus Pius — Vologases 

III. AND VeRUS 318-330 

Accession of Vologases II., 318 — Alanic war, 319 — Hadrian 
and Pharasmanes, 319, 320 — Vologases II. and Antoninus, 
320, 321 — Reign of Vologases III. ; he invades Armenia, 322 
— Defeats Severianus and attacks Syria, 323 — Verus sent to 
the East : Armenia recovered, 324 — Great expedition of Avi- 
dius Cassius, 325-327 — Results of the expedition, 327, 328 — 
Later years of Vologases III. : His relations with Marcus 
Aurelius and Commodus, 328-330, 



XVI CONTENTS. 

XX. 

PAGE 

VoLOGASES IV. AND Severus .... 33^-345 

Reign of Vologases IV. : Death of Commodus, 331, 332 — 
Pretensions of Pescennius Niger : His struggle with Severiis, 
332-334 — Mesopotamian expedition of Severus, 335, 336 — . 
His recall to the West : Parthian successes in his absence, -36, 
337 — Great expedition of Severus against Parthia, 337-339— 
Sack of Ctesiphon, 339 — Return of Severus through Meso- 
potamia ; Siege of Hatra, 340-343— Failure of the siege, 343, 
344 — General results of the expedition, 344, 345. 

XXI. 

Artabanus v. and Caracallus — The Last War 

WITH Rome — Defeat of Macrinus . . 346-357 

Parthian throne disputed between Artabanus and his brother, 
Vologases ; Artabanus holds the Western provinces, 346, 347 
— Mad project of Caracallus, 347, 348 — His negotiations with 
Artabanus, 348-350 — His peaceful journey to Ctesiphon, and 
Festive Meeting with the Parthian monarch, 350, 351 — His 
cruel massacre of the unarmed multitude, 352— His violation 
of the Parthian Royal sepulchres, 352, 353— His lion-hunting, 
353 — His murder by his guards, 354 — Difficulties of his suc- 
cessor, Macrinus, 354, 355 — Three days' fight at Nisibis, 355, 
356 — Macrinus forced to purchase a peace, 357. 

XXII. 

Revolt of the Persians — Downfall of the 

Parthian Empire 358-370 

Tendency of the Parthian Empire to disintegration, 358, 359 
— Frequency of revolts, 359, 360 — Grounds of the general 
discontent, 360-362 — Special grievances alleged by the Per- 
sians, 363, 364 — Other probable causes of dissatisfaction, 364, 
365 — Revolt of Persia, and struggle between Artabanus and 
Artaxerxes ; Artabanus defeated and slain, 366, 367 — Last 
efforts of Artavasdes, 367, 368 — Duration and character of the 
Parthian Empire, 368-370. 



CONTENTS. 



XVll 



XXIII. 

Parthian Art, Religion, and Customs 



PAGE 
372-419 



Parthian architecture, 372, 373 — Buildings at Al Hadhr, or 
Hatra, 373-383 — Architectural fragments at Warka, 383-385 
— Parthian fictile art, 385-388— Parthian resthetic art, 389 — 
Parthian reliefs, 389-393 — General estimate of their art, 393, 
394 — Parthian religion, 394-396 — Customs in war, 396-404 
— Customs in peace, 404-407 — Seclusion of women, 407 — 
State and pomp of the king, 408-410 — Power of the nobles, 
410-413 — Ordinary Parthian food, 413 — Degree of civilisation, 
414-418 — General survey, 418, 419. 



Appendix 
Index 



420 
421 




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



ROCK SCULPTURE OF GOTARZES AT BEHISTUN 

MAP OF PARTHIAN EMPIRE 

COIN OF TIRIDATES I. 

COIN OF ARTABANUS I. 

COIN OF PRIAPATIUS 

COIN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

COIN OF PHRAATES II. 

COIN OF ARTABANUS 11. 

COIN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

COIN OF SANATRCECES 

COIN OF MITHRIDATES III. 

COIN OF ORODES I. . 

COIN OF PACORUS I. 

COIN OF PHRAATES IV. 

COIN OF TIRIDATES II. 

COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MUSA 

COIN OF ORODES II. 

COIN OF VONONES I. 

COIN OF ARTABANUS III. 

COIN OF VARDANES I. 

COIN OF GOTARZES . 



Frontispiece 
facing p. I 

5° 
58 
61 

63 

91 

115 

130 

144 

151 

181 
204 
220 
227 
230 
232 

260 
263 



XX 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



PAGE 

COIN OF VOLOGASES 1 271 

COIN OK VARDANES II. ..... . 277 

COIN OF PACORUS II. ..... . 297 

COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. . . . . . . 298 

COIN OF CHOSROES 299 

COINS OF VOLOGASES II. . . . . . . 316 

COIN OF MITHRIDATES IV. . . . . . 316 

COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. . . . . . . 316 

COIN OF VOLOGASES III 322 

COIN OF VOLOGASES IV 33 T 

COIN OF VOLOGASES V 346 

COIN OF ARTABANUS V. . . . . . . 346 

COIN OF ARTAVASDES . . . ' . . . 367 

MAP OF PARTHIA PROPER . . . . -37' 

GROUND PLAN OF THE CITY OF AL HADHR . . 374 

PLAN OF THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA . -376 

FRIEZE IN THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA . . 378 

STONES OF ARCHIVOLTS ...... 379 

PIL.'VSTER AT HATRA, WITH CORNICE AND CAPITAL . 380 

PROPOSED RESTORATION OF THE HATRA BUILDING . 38 1 

ARCHITECTURAL FRAGMENTS AT WARKA . . . 384 

PARTHIAN JUGS AND JARS 386 

PARTHIAN SLIPPER-COFFIN ..... 387 

PARTHIAN PERSONAL ORNAMENTS .... 389 

PARTHIAN HELMET ....... 398 

ORDINARY DRESS OF PARTHIAN MONARCH . . 406 

COIN OF KAMNASCIRAS 42O 





ts e 















SACAST-ANAl..: 




36 



THE STORY OF PARTHIA. 



I. 



GEOGRAPHICAL — PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE 
PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

PARTHIA Proper, the earliest home (so far as our 
knowledge extends) of the Parthian people, was, like 
Persia Proper and Macedonia Proper, a tract of some- 
what scanty dimensions. From the south-eastern 
corner of the Caspian Sea there extends, in a direc- 
tion a little south of east, a narrovvish mountain 
region, connected at one extremity with the lofty 
Elburz range, which skirts the Caspian on the south, 
and, at the other, with the Paropamisus, or Hindu 
Kush. On either side, northwards and southwards, 
stretch for hundreds of miles extensive sandy or 
gravelly deserts, that to the north known as the 
desert of Khorasan or Khiva, and that to the south 
as the Great Salt Desert of Iran. Between these is 
a comparatively rich and productive tract, reaching 
from the fifty-fourth to the sixty-first meridian, a 
distance of some seven degrees, or about three hun- 
dred miles, with a breadth varying from two to three 
degrees, and averaging about one hundred and 



2 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

seventy miles. This region, in the earliest times of 
which we have any distinct historical knowledge, was 
parcelled out into two countries, belonging to two 
different peoples, and known respectively as Parthia 
and Hyrcania. The exact line of demarcation which 
separated the two, it is impossible to trace ; but there 
is sufficient proof, that, while Hyrcania lay towards 
the north and west, the Parthians held the districts 
towards the east and south. The valleys of the Ettrek 
and the Gurghan belonged to the former, while the 
regions south and east of these valleys, the skirt of 
the southern mountains from Damaghan to Shebri- 
No, and the valleys of the Tejend and the river of 
Nishapur, constituted the country of the latter, 

If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it 
will have corresponded nearly to the modern Persian 
province of Khorasan — that is to say, it will have 
extended from about Damaghan (long. 54° 20') upon 
the west to the Heri-rud, or river of Herat, upon the 
east, and have comprised the modern districts of 
Damaghan, Shah-rud, Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, 
Tersheez, and Shebri-No. Its length from east to 
west will have been about three hundred miles, and 
its average width about a hundred or a hundred and 
twenty. It will have contained an area of about 
33,000 square miles, being thus about equal in size 
to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo. 

The general character of the region is, as has been 
observed, rich and productive. The mountain forma- 
tion consists of four or five distinct ranges, having 
between them latitudinal valleys, with glens trans- 
verse to their courses. The valleys are often well 



SIZE AND CHARACTER OF PARTHIA PROPER. 3 

wooded ; the flat ground at the foot of the outer 
ranges of hills is fertile ; water abounds ; and the 
streams gradually collect into rivers which are of a 
considerable size. Of these the principal are the 
Tejend, or river of Meshed, and the river of Nishapur. 
The Tejend rises from several sources in the central 
mountain range, anciently known as Labus or Labuta, 
and now as Alatagh, and runs with a course con- 
siderably south of east, past Meshed, to a point 
a little beyond the sixtieth meridian, where it de- 
flects towards the left, and runs east and a little 
north of east to the Heri-rud. Having absorbed the 
Heri-rud, it makes a second, and still sharper, turn to 
the left, and flows with a northerly and north-westerly 
course past Sarrakhs — now a Russian post — along the 
foot of the northern Parthian range, now known as 
' the Hills of the Kurds," to a marsh, in which it is 
swallowed up, between the fifty-seventh and fifty- 
eighth parallels. The river of Nishapur is a smaller 
stream. It rises from the mountains which on three 
sides enclose that city, and flows southwards and 
south-westwards towards the Iranian desert. At times 
the water is entirely absorbed in the irrigation of the 
fertile plain immediately south of Nishapur, but the 
channel is always traceable, past Tersheez into the 
desert, and in some seasons it carries a certain quan- 
tity of water into that parched and arid region. 

The valleys of these two streams are among the 
most fertile and productive portions of the entire 
territory ; but anciently the tract which was most 
valued, and which supported the largest population, 
seem to have been that which is now known as the 



4 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

" Atak," or" Skirt " — the low cultivable country at the 
foot of the southern hills, intervening between them 
and the desert. Along this whole region, from Dama- 
ghan to Tersheez, the mountains send down a con- 
tinued succession of rills, rivulets, and rivers, which 
make it easy, at the expenditure of a little care and 
labour, to carry the life-giving element to a distance 
of four or five miles from their base. Some hus- 
banding of the water may be needed, together with 
the creation of a system of reservoirs and kanats, or 
underground channels ; but, if these be provided, the 
return is ample. The abundant remains of large 
cities, crumbled into dust, along the entire " Atak " is 
a sufficient indication of the beneficence of nature in 
this tract of country, if it be only seconded by a fair 
amount of human industry and skill. 

On the other hand, the mountain tracts, of which 
the country so largely consists, offer a strong contrast 
to the valleys of the main streams, and to the southern 
strip of territory. They are for the most part barren 
and rugged, very scantily supplied with timber, and 
only in places capable of furnishing a tolerable pas- 
turage to flocks and herds. This is the more remark- 
able, as they do not attain any great elevation. 
While Mount Demavend in the Elburz range south of 
the Caspian exceeds 20,000 feet, and the same eleva- 
tion is reached, or exceeded, by many peaks in the 
Paropamisus, the greatest altitude of the Parthian 
ranges does not exceed ten thousand, or, at the utmost, 
eleven thousand feet. The northern range, called now 
the Daman-i-Koh, is the loftiest and the least known, 
the rudeness of the Kurdish tribes by which it is in- 



CLIMATE OF PARTHIA PROPER. 5 

habited repelling travellers : the central range, called 
towards the west Alatagh, and towards the east Mac- 
rabea, is considerably lower ; while the southern 
range, called indifferently Djuvein and Jaghetai, is of 
about the same elevation. 

The climate of Parthia Proper, according to ancient 
writers, was an extreme one, exceedingly hot in the 
low plains, and exceedingly cold in the mountains. 
But modern travellers are inclined to modify both 
statements. They tell us, that the winters, although 
protracted, are nowhere very inclement, the thermo- 
meter rarely sinking below ten or twelve degrees of 
Fahrenheit during the nights, and during the day- 
time rising, even in December and January, which 
are the coldest months, to forty or fifty. The winter, 
however, sets in early. Cold weather commences in 
October, and continues till nearly the end of March, 
when storms of sleet and hail are usual. A consider- 
able quantity of snow falls in the earlier portion of the 
winter, and the valleys are scarcely clear of it till 
March. On the mountains it remains much longer, 
and forms the chief source of supply for the rivers 
during the spring and the early summer time. In the 
height of summer the heat is undoubtedly great, 
more especially in the region known as the " Atak," 
or " Skirt " ; and here the unwholesome wind, which 
blows from the southern desert, is felt from time to 
time as a terrible scourge. But in the upland country 
the heat is at no time very intense ; and the natives 
boast at the present day that they are not compelled 
by it to sleep upon their house-tops more than one 
month during the year. 



6 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

The country, though reported by modern travellers 
to be only scantily clothed with wood, is still found 
to produce the pine, the walnut, the sycamore, the 
ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mulberry, the 
apricot, and numerous other fruit trees. There is 
reason to believe that, in ancient times, if the variety 
of trees was not so great, the number of them was 
very much greater. Strabo calls the territory Saaeia, 
or " densely wooded." Among indigenous plants are 
saffron, the assafoetida plant, and the gum ammoniac 
plant. Wheat, barley, and cotton are capable of being 
raised in large quantities ; and the fertility is such 
that the ordinary return on wheat and barley, under 
a bad system of cultivation, is reckoned at ten for one, 
while instances are said to have been known of the 
return of a hundred for one. The return from rice, 
according to one witness, is often four hundred for 
one ! Game abounds in the mountains, and fish in 
the underground watercourses. Among mineral pro- 
ducts may be mentioned salt, iron, copper, and lead. 
The mountains contain precious stones of several 
kinds, especially that delicate and valuable gem, the 
turquoise. 

Starting from this narrow, but fairly productive 
region, the Parthians gradually brought under their 
dominion the greater portion of Western Asia. Very 
soon after establishing their own independence, they 
made an attack on their nearest neighbour to the west, 
Hyrcania. Hyrcania was a country geographically 
connected, in the closest way, with Parthia, very 
similar in general character, but richer, warmer, and 
altogether more desirable. It occupied the western 



PARTHIAN CONQUESTS — HYRCANIA. 7 

half of the mountain region already described (p. 2) 
— extending from the Caspian Sea to the Heri-rud — 
whereof the eastern half was Parthia. Mainly com- 
posed of the two fertile valleys of the Gurghan and 
Ettrek, with the mountain chains enclosing and 
dividing them, it was a picturesque and richly wooded 
district almost as large as Parthia itself, and con- 
siderably more productive. Here, on the slopes of 
the hills, grew the oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, 
the wild cherry ; here luxuriant vines sprang from 
the soil on every side, raising themselves aloft by the 
aid of their stronger sisters, and hanging in wild 
festoons from tree to tree ; beneath their shade the 
ground was covered with flowers of various kinds, 
primroses, violets, lilies, hyacinths, and others of un- 
known species ; while in the flat land at the bottom 
of the valleys were meadows of the softest and ten- 
derest grass, capable of affording to numerous flocks 
and herds an excellent and never-failing pasture. 
Vast quantities of game found shelter in the forests, 
while towards the mouths of the rivers, where the 
ground is for the most part marshy, large herds of 
wild boars were frequent, and offered a variety to 
sportsmen. Altogether Hyrcania was a most valu- 
able and desirable region, and well deserved Strabo's 
description of it as " highly favoured of heaven." Its 
fertility was extraordinary. We are told that a single 
vine in Hyrcania produced nine gallons of wine, and 
a single fig-tree ninety bushels of figs, while corn 
did not require to be sown by the hand, but sprang 
sufficiently from the casual droppings of the last 
year's crop. 



8 PART HI A PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

Not very long after the absorption of Hyrcania, the 
Parthian arms were directed against the country of 
the Mardi. This region adjoined on Hyrcania towards 
the west, and consisted mainly of the mountain tract 
which shuts in the Caspian on the south, forming a 
continuation of the most southern of the three 
Parthian chains, and generally known under the 
appellation of Elburz. It is uncertain how far the 
Mardian territory extended towards the west, but 
probable that it was comprised within about two 
degrees, reaching from the neighbourhood of Dama- 
ghan to the great mountain of Demavend, or from 
E. long. 54° to 52° nearly. It is generally described 
as wholly rough and mountainous, but probably in- 
cluded the tract between the foot of the mountains 
and the Caspian — the eastern portion of the modern 
Mazanderan. This is a rich flat plain of alluvial soil, 
but little raised above the level of the neighbouring 
sea, from which rise gently-swelling hills, gradually 
increasing in elevation, and forming the supports of 
the lofty range, which was the heart of the Mardian 
territory. Here high rocky summits alternated with 
dense pathless woods, the mountains being clothed 
on their northern flank nearly to the top with dwarf 
oaks, or with shrubs and brushwood ; while lower 
dov/n their sides were covered with forests of elms, 
cedars, chestnuts, beeches, and cypress-trees. At the 
present day, the gardens and orchards of the natives, 
interspersed among the masses of primeval forest, are 
of the most superb character ; the vegetation is 
luxuriant ; lemons, oranges, peaches, pomegranates, 
besides other fruits, abound ; rice, hemp, sugar-canes 



THE MARDIAN COUNTRY — MEDIA RHAGIANA. g 

mulberries, are cultivated with success ; vines grow 
wild ; and the valleys are strewn with shrubs and 
flowers of rare fragrance, among which may be noted 
the rose, the honeysuckle, and the sweet-briar. Nature 
however — inexorably just, as usual — has balanced 
these extraordinary advantages with peculiar draw- 
backs ; the tiger, scarcely known in any other part of 
Western Asia, here lurks in the jungles, ready to 
spring at any moment on the unwary traveller ; inun- 
dations are frequent, and carry desolation far and 
wide ; the waters, which thus escape from the river- 
beds, stagnate in marshes, and, during the summer and 
autumn heats, pestilential exhalations arise, which 
destroy the stranger, and bring even the acclimatised 
native to the brink of the grave. The Mardian territory 
was thus of no great value to the conquerors, except 
as conducting to other and healthier regions, a neces- 
sary link in the chain which was to unite East with 
West, and by means of which were to be re-knit in 
one the scattered fragments of the empire, which, 
built up originally by Cyrus, had been destroyed by 
Alexander. 

The third tract which the Parthians annexed was a 
portion of Media. A strong spur runs out from the 
Elburz mountain range, about E. long. 52° 20', which 
projects far into the desert, and forms a marked 
natural division between the regions west and east of 
it. The tract immediately to the west of the spur 
belonged to the ancient Media, and was known as 
Media Rhagiana from its capital city, Rhages, situ- 
ated in the angle between the spur and the main 
range, at no great distance from either. Parthia, soon 



10 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

after the conquest of the Mardians, invaded this 
territory, and effected a lodgment in it at a place 
called Charax, quite close to the spur, probably on 
the site now called Uevvanikif. Hence, by degrees, 
the rest of Rhagiana was overrun, and the entire tract 
passed into the possession of the Parthian s, as far 
probably as Kasvin westward, and southward as far as 
Kum. This was a district of a considerable size, a 
hundred and fifty miles long from the spur to Kasvin, 
and about eighty broad from the Elburz mountains 
to Kum. It was an elevated plain, from three thou- 
sand to four thousand feet above the sea level, having 
a climate dry and healthy, but a soil of indifferent 
quality. Portions of it belonged to the great central 
Iranian desert, and were absolutely unproductive, 
while the remainder could not boast any special fer- 
tility. It possessed, however, salt in abundance, was 
tolerably well watered, and could produce cereals and 
green crops in sufficient quantity to sustain a numerous 
population. 

The next aggressive movement of .the Parthians 
was in the opposite direction — towards the east. Here 
Parthia adjoined on the considerable state of Bactria, 
which had grown up simultaneously with herself, and 
had absorbed several extensive countries. Parthia's 
first aggression was on a small scale, and its result 
was merely the detachment from the Bactrian 
dominion of two inconsiderable provinces, known 
respectively as Turina and Aspionus. The exact 
position of these tracts is unknown to us, but they 
must certainly be placed in the western portion of 
the Bactrian territory, and probably were districts 



PART OF BACTRIA — MEDIA MAGNA. II 

north of the Paropamisus, either upon the Murghab, 
or upon the Ab-i-Kaisar river. The accession of 
territory gained by this conquest was insignificant. 

But some extensive and most valuable conquests 
soon followed. Turning her attention once more 
towards the west, Parthia made war upon Media, the 
great country which had for a time held the first place 
in Western Asia, and exercised a dominion which 
reached from the Caspian Gates to the Halys, and 
from the mouth of the Araxes to the vicinity of 
Isfahan, Subjected first by Persia, and then by 
Alexander the Great, she had sunk back within much 
narrower limits, and had at the same time become 
split up into three provinces — Media Rhagiana, Media 
Magna, and Media Atropatene. The Parthians had 
previously swallowed up, as already stated, Media 
Rhagiana : now they attacked Media Magna. This 
was an extensive tract situated between the thirty- 
second and thirty-seventh parallels, and reaching from 
the Great Salt Desert of Iran upon the east to the 
main chain of Mount Zagros upon the west. Its 
length from north to south was about five degrees, or 
nearly three hundred and fifty miles, and its width 
from west to east four degrees, or about two hundred 
and forty miles. The entire area cannot have been 
much under eighty thousand square miles, which is a 
little less than the size of Great Britain, and a little 
more than that of German Austria. The tract divides 
itself into two portions — the western and the eastern. 
The western, which is rather more than one half of 
the whole, lies within the limits of the broad mountain 
region known as Zagros, and is a country of alternate 



12 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

mountain and valley, with here and there a tolerabl> 
extensive plain, very productive, and for the most part 
picturesque and beautiful. The loftiest of the moun- 
tains are bare and rugged towards their summits, but 
the inferior ranges are thickly clothed with forests 
quite to their top, while the valleys are full of mag- 
nificent orchards and gardens. The walnut, the 
Oriental plane, the dwarf oak, the willow, and the 
poplar abound, while occasionally are to be seen the 
ash, and the terebinth, or turpentine tree. The fruit- 
trees in the orchards and gardens include, besides 
vines and mulberries, the apple, the pear, the quince, 
the plum, the almond, the nut, the chestnut, the olive, 
the peach, the nectarine, and the apricot. With this 
western region, the eastern is in strong contrast. East 
of Zagros, where the mountains sink down almost 
at once into the plain, lies a vast gravelly or sandy 
plateau, covered often with a saline efflorescence, 
called the " Kavir," and in places with a thick salt 
deposit, only scantily supplied with water from 
streams or wells which are often brackish, and crossed 
in places by bare rocky ridges, destitute of all vege- 
table mould, and incapable of nourishing even a bush 
or a tuft of grass. Still, excepting where the salt 
efflorescence prevails, even the plateau can be made 
to produce good crops, if only water be supplied in 
sufficient quantity. Hence the system of kanats, 
which is of great antiquity. Everywhere the small 
streams and rills which descend from the mountains, 
and which, if left to themselves, would be almost 
immediately absorbed by the sands of the desert, are 
led into subterranean channels, which are placed at a 



EL AM OR SUSIANA. I3 

considerable depth below the surface, and conducted 
for many miles across the plain. Openings are made 
at intervals, from which water may be drawn by 
means of a bucket for purposes of irrigation ; and in 
this way a considerable portion of the plateau is 
brought into cultivation. 

The conquest of Media Magna about doubled the 
extent of the Parthian dominions, while it also soon 
led to further acquisitions of a most important 
character. On the western flank of Media Magna lay 
the rich and valuable country, known originally as 
Elam, and later on as Kissia or Susiana. This was an 
extensive tract of very productive territory, interposed 
between the main chain of Zagros and the lower 
Tigris river, extending a distance of about five 
degrees, or three hundred and fifty miles from north- 
west to south-east, and having an average breadth of 
about a hundred and fifty, or a hundred and sixty 
miles, in the transverse direction. Like Media 
Magna, it consisted of two strongly contrasted 
regions. Towards the west was a broad tract of 
fertile alluvium, intervening between the Tigris and 
the mountains, well watered by numerous large 
streams — the Jerahi, the Karun, the Kerkhah, the 
Diala, and others — which are capable of giving an 
abundant irrigation to almost the whole of the low 
country. Above this region, towards the east and 
the north-east, was a still more pleasant district, com- 
posed of alternate mountain, valley, and upland plain, 
abounding in beautiful glens, richly wooded, and full 
of gushing brooks and clear rapid rivers. Much of 
this region is of course uncultivable mountain, range 



14 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

succeeding range in six or eight nearly parallel lines, 
as the traveller advances towards the north-east ; and 
most of the ranges exhibiting vast tracts of bare and 
often precipitous rock, in the clefts of which snow rests 
till midsummer. Still the lower flanks of the mountains 
are, in general, cultivable ; while the valleys teem with 
orchards, and the plains furnish excellent pasture. 
The region closely resembles the western portion of 
Media Magna, whereof it is a continuation. As we 
follow it, however, towards the south-east, into the 
Bakhtiyari country, where it adjoins upon the ancient 
Persia, it deteriorates in character, the mountains 
becoming barer and more arid, and the valleys 
narrower and less fertile. 

The fate of Susiana decided that of the adjoining 
countries of Babylonia and Persia, which seem to 
have submitted to Parthia without a struggle. Baby- 
lonia extended from the Persian Gulf on either side 
of the mouth of the Euphrates to the extreme 
northern limit of the alluvium, or to the vicinity of 
Hit on the Euphrates, and Samarah on the Tigris — a 
distance of about four hundred miles. The greatest 
width was about one hundred and eighty miles ; but 
the average width cannot be estimated at more than 
sixty or seventy, so that the area probably did not 
much exceed twenty-five thousand square miles. But 
the qualities of the soil were such as rendered the 
tract one of the chief granaries of the world. Accord- 
ing to Herodotus and others, wheat, barley, and 
millet, which were the grains principally grown, 
yielded ordinarily a return of two hundred, and in 
some instances of three hundred, fold. Palm groves 



BABYLONIA AND PERSIA. 15 

were numerous all along the courses of the rivers, and 
the dates which they produced were of first-rate 
quality. Under the early Achaemenian kings, when 
the food of the Court was supplied by each of the 
provinces in turn for a fixed portion of the year. 
Babylonia had the duty of furnishing the supplies 
during four months, so that it was reckoned equal, in 
respect of resources, to one-third of the empire. Irri- 
gation was so easy in Babylonia that the whole 
country was brought under cultivation, and trans- 
formed into a garden. Here Parthia inherited all the 
advantages of an ancient civilisation, and had only to 
maintain the works of earlier times — canals, sluices, 
dams, embankments — in order to obtain from a single 
province a supply of food equal to the wants of almost 
her entire population. 

Persia lay in the opposite direction from Babylonia, 
towards the east and the south-east. It stretched 
along the south-eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, 
from the inner recess of the Gulf near Mashur to Cape 
Jask, a little outside the straits of Ormuz, in E. long. 
57° 40'. Inland it reached to the neighbourhood of 
Isfahan on the west, and to the deserts of Kerman 
and Yezd eastward. In length it thus extended to 
about eight degrees of longitude, a distance of six 
hundred and twenty miles, while in width it covered 
five degrees of latitude, or nearly three hundred and 
fifty miles. The entire area cannot have fallen much 
short of one hundred and fifty thousand square miles. 
The character of the region, speaking broadly, was 
far inferior to that of either Babylonia or Susiana. 
Along the coast, in the G/iennsir, or " warm country," 



I6 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

as it is now called, was a sandy tract, often impreg- 
nated with salt, extending the whole length of the 
province, being a continuation of the flat region of 
Susiana, but falling very much short of that region 
in all the qualities which make a territory valuable. 
The soil is poor, consisting of alternate sand and clay 
— it is ill-watered, the entire tract possessing scarcely 
a single stream worthy of the name of river — and, 
lying only just outside of the northern tropic, the 
district is by its situation among the hottest in 
Western Asia. Fortunately, it was not very large in 
extent, since it reached inland a distance of only 
from ten to fifty miles, and thus did not constitute 
much more than one-eighth of the entire country. 
Of the other seven-eighths a considerable portion — 
perhaps as much as half — was very little superior, 
consisting of salt or sandy deserts, especially those of 
Kerman and Yezd, which were almost wholly unpro- 
ductive by nature, and capable of only a very scanty 
cultivation. But, between these two arid districts, 
the stretch of hilly country which separated them 
was of a superior character, consisting of mountain, 
plain, and valley curiously intermixed, and for the 
most part fairly fertile. In places it is rich, 
picturesque, and romantic, almost beyond imagina- 
tion, with lovely wooded dells, green mountain sides, 
and broad plains suited for the production of crops 
of almost any description. But, more commonly 
these features are absent, and there is a general look 
of sterility and barrenness which is unpleasant, or 
even forbidding. The supply of water is, almost 
everywhere, scanty. Scarcely any of the streams are 



ASSYRIA. 17 

strong enough to reach the sea. After short courses, 
they are either absorbed by the sand, or end in small 
salt lakes, from which the superfluous water is evapo- 
rated. Persia Proper deserves, on the whole, the 
description which its ancient inhabitants gave of 
it to Cyrus the Great — " a scant land and a rugged " — 
a land in which subsistence can only be obtained by 
strenuous and continual labour, and where the vicissi- 
tudes of climate are such as to brace and harden 
those who dwell in it. 

Another country, probably subjugated about the 
same time as Media Magna, Susiana, Babylonia, and 
Persia Proper, was Assyria. Assyria, which had 
been long previously reduced nearly within its original 
limits, was at this period a smallish country, interposed 
between Mount Zagros and the Tigris, bounded on 
the east by Media Magna, on the north by Armenia, 
on the west by Mesopotamia, and on the south by 
Susiana or Elymai's. Its greatest length was about 
three hundred and twenty miles, and its average 
width about a hundred. It would thus have had an 
area of about thirty-two thousand square miles, or 
have been equal in size to Ireland. But these narrow 
limits were amply compensated by the fertility of the 
soil. The tract between the Zagros mountains and 
the Tigris is principally an alluvium brought down by 
the rivers, which from time to time overflow their 
banks and spread themselves far and wide over the 
flat country. It produces excellent crops of Avheat, 
barley, millet, and sesame ; besides growing palms in 
places, as well as walnuts. Oriental planes, sycamores, 
and poplars. The lower ranges of hills, outposts of 



1 8 PART HI A PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

Zagros, bore olives, and in favoured situations the 
citron was largely cultivated ; while figs, vines, mul- 
berries, pomegranates, and other fruit-trees were 
common. Of minerals, Assyria produced iron, cop- 
per, lead, bitumen, naphtha, petroleum, sulphur, alum, 
and salt. 

The empire having been thus far extended towards 
the west, the time seemed to have arrived when some- 
thing like an equivalent expansion towards the east 
was desirable. Bactria had hitherto stood in the 
way of any considerable Parthian advance in this 
direction ; and though Parthia had contrived to filch 
from her two small districts, yet no real impression 
had been made upon the powerful Bactrian kingdom, 
which at this time bore rule over the entire territory 
between the Tejend and the Hydaspes. But, soon 
after the time when the great expansion of the Par- 
thian dominion towards the west was accomplished, 
Bactria began to decline in power, and may be said to 
have invited invasion. In the war which followed 
between the two countries, the success of the Par- 
thian arms was marvellous. A few years sufficed for 
the subjugation of Bactria Proper, of Margiana, Aria, 
Sarangia or Drangiana, Sacastana, Arachosia, and per- 
haps we may add Sagartia and Chorasmia. It follows 
to give a short account of each of these countries. 

Bactria Proper, the nucleus from which the Bac- 
trian Empire had proceeded, may be considered as 
equivalent to the upper valley of the Ox us, or, in 
other words, to that valley from the remotest sources 
of the river towards the east down to its entrance on 
the great Chorasmian desert, in about E. long. 



BACTRTA AND MARCjIANA. 19 

65° 30', towards the west. The valley is enclosed on 
the north by the Hazaret Sultan, and Hissar moun- 
tains, while on the south it is bounded by the Paro- 
pamisus or Hindu Kush. Eastward it reaches to the 
Pamir table-land, whence several of its head-streams 
take their origin. Its length between the Pamir and 
the desert is about three hundred and sixty miles, 
while its width between the two mountain chains 
varies from a hundred and forty to two hundred and 
fifty miles. The area is probably twice as large as 
that of Parthia Proper, and may be estimated at 
about seventy thousand square miles. Much of the 
tract, being situated at a high elevation above the 
sea-level, is cold and infertile ; but the lower portion 
of the valley, especially the country about the ancient 
capital, Bactra, now Balkh, is fairly productive; and 
the region between the Oxus and the Paropamisus — 
the southern moiety of the province, is regarded as 
among the most valuable portions of Affghanistan. 

Margiana, or the district upon the Margus river 
(Marg-ab), adjoined Bactria upon the west, and, 
though geographically reckoned as distinct, was 
probably absorbed into it at an early period. It was 
mainly a narrow tract, shut in by deserts on either 
side, extending along the course of the Margus river 
for a distance of some two hundred miles, and then 
expanding suddenly into a broad oasis of the very 
highest fertility. Known in ancient, and again in 
modern times as Merv, it is still a region of some 
importance, and has recently been annexed by Russia, 
and connected by railway with Ashkabad and 
Bokhara. 



20 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

Aria lay along the course of the River Arius, now 
the Heri-rud, which, rising on the south side of the 
Paropamisus in E. long. 67° nearly, runs westward, 
first through the mountains, and then along their 
southern flank, until, about E. long. 61° it makes a 
sweep round to the north, and finding, or forcing, a 
way through the chain, joins the Tejend at Pul-i- 
Khatun, in lat. 36° nearly. The course of the stream, 
until it makes its great bend, measures between two 
hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty 
miles ; and this may be regarded as the length of 
Aria from east to west. Its width between the Paro- 
pamisus and the tract known as Drangiana or 
Sarangia is difficult to determine, but was certainly 
not great. It may have averaged about fifty miles ; 
which would give for the entire area a size of about 
thirteen thousand square miles. The country was 
well watered, and tolerably fertile, but it was placed 
at too high an elevation to be more than moderately 
productive, Aria (or Herat), the capital, being more 
than three thousand feet above the sea-level, and the 
rest of the country being, for the most part, consider- 
ably more elevated. 

Drangiana, or Sarangia, which adjoined on Aria 
towards the south, was a region of much greater 
extent, but of less fertility. It was the country 
watered by the streams which flow into the Hamun, 
or lake of Seistan, from the north-east and the north. 
On the west it verged upon the great Iranian desert, 
and partook of its character ; on the east it extended 
to the upper sources of the Ka.sh river. It is difficult 
to determine its exact dimensions ; but it must have 



ARIA, SARANGIA, AND SACASTANA. 21 

had an extent at least double that of Aria, and the 
entire superficies may not have fallen very much short 
of thirty thousand square miles. 

Another country probably absorbed by Parthia at 
this time was Sacastana or Seistan. Sacastana was 
the country immediately south of the Hamun, or 
Great Salt Lake, in which the river Helmend ends. 
Except on the very banks of the Helmend, it was 
almost wholly unproductive, and incapable of habita- 
tion by any but a nomadic population. Portions of 
it were, however, liable to inundation, when the Hel- 
mend overflowed its banks ; and thus its general 
character was alternate reedy swamp and arid sandy 
desert. The extent was somewhat vague and indefi- 
nite, since there were no marked boundaries, unless 
the Helmend and Hamun may be reckoned such 
towards the north. Eastward it melted into Satta- 
gydia, southward into Gedrosia, and westward into 
the desert of Kerman. 

Dominion over Sarangia and Sacastana carried 
with it, almost necessarily, the sovereignty over 
Arachosia, which adjoined those countries upon the 
east. Arachosia, named from the river Arachotus 
(Argand-ab), a main tributary of the Helmend, con- 
sisted of the mountain tract about Candahar and a 
portion of the adjacent desert, now known as that of 
Registan. It was a large, but not very valuable 
country, and lay on the frontier of the Parthian 
Empire towards the south-east. 

The power which held Hyrcania, Parthia, Aria, 
and Sarangia, was always predominant also in 
Sagartia, which coincided with the eastern and 



22 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

north-eastern portions of the Iranian desert. The 
Sagartians wandered freely over the greater part of 
the central region, where they found a scanty sub- 
sistence. Their country, notwithstanding its great 
extent, was almost valueless, being incapable of 
cultivation, and producing no mineral excepting 
salt. 

An equally unproductive and undesirable territory, 
on the opposite side of the Parthian and Arian 
mountain chain, is commonly regarded as forming, 
together with Bactria, the limit of the Parthian 
dominion, east of the Caspian, towards the north. 
This is Chorasmia, or the country of the Choras- 
mians, known to moderns as the desert of Khorasan, 
which extends from the foot of the Bactrian, Par- 
thian, and Hyrcanian hills to the old course of the 
Oxus, from its entrance on the desert to its ancient 
principal mouth. Chorasmia is thus a very extensive 
country, not less than six hundred miles in length 
by three hundred in breadth ; but its value is exceed- 
ingly slight, since, except along the course of the 
Oxus, or modern Amu Daria, it does not admit of 
cultivation. 

By the absorption of these various countries and 
regions Parthia obtained her fullest extension towards 
the east and the north-east, but she was still able to 
make important additions to her dominions on the 
opposite side of her empire, especially towards the 
north-west. At a comparatively early period, certainly 
before her wars with Rome began, she made herself 
mistress of the extensive and valuable region of 
Mesopotamia Proper, which was the tract enclosed 



MESOPOTAMIA. 23 

between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, bounded 
on the north by Armenia, and on the south by the 
Babylonian alluvium. The length of this region 
from north-west to south-east was at least three 
hundred and fifty miles, while its breadth, where it 
was broadest, cannot be estimated at much under two 
hundred and sixty. But as in some places the width 
did not exceed fifty miles, the entire area, it is pro- 
bable, fell short of fifty thousand square miles. Much 
of it was very unproductive, being a treeless plain, 
the home of the wild ass, the bustard, and the gazelle; 
but towards the north there was more fertility, and 
the . Mons Masius, together with its- southern skirt, 
and the valley of the Tigris north of it, were tracts 
of some considerable value. Masius produces abun- 
dant timber, together with manna and gall-nuts ; the 
pistachio grows wild in the district between Orfah and 
Diabekr ; the Sinjar range of hills is noted for the 
cultivation of the fig ; and the whole northern region 
is favourable to the growth of fruit-trees, and produces 
walnuts, oranges, lemons, pomegranates, apricots, and 
mulberries. 

During the period of the wars with Rome the 
limits of the Parthian Empire fluctuated greatly. 
Provinces were conquered and reconquered ; large 
annexations were made and then relinquished ; whole 
countries were ceded, and, after a time, recovered. 
This is not the place for tracing out and placing on 
record all these various changes. We are concerned 
only with the question of Parthia's extremest limits 
at her most flourishing period. In order, however, to 
complete our sketch of this subject, we must bring 



24 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

under the reader's notice two more districts — Media 
Atropatene and Armenia. 

Media Atropatene, which became ultimately a 
dependency of Parthia, was the tract directly west 
of the lower Caspian Sea, extending from the River 
Araxes (Aras) towards the north to the borders of 
Media Magna and Media Rhagiana towards the 
south. Westward it bordered on Armenia, with 
which it was sometimes connected politically. Its 
southern boundary lay almost along the line of the 
thirty-sixth parallel. It was thus very nearly a 
square, extending from east to west for the space of two 
hundred and forty, and from north to south for the 
space of about two hundred and twenty miles. The 
area did not fall much short of fifty thousand square 
miles. Its chief rivers were the Aras and the Sefid- 
rud ; and it further contained within it the remark- 
able lake of Urumiah. The tract was mountainous, 
but fairly fertile, with a cold climate in the winter, 
but a delicious one during the summer months. It 
was a region of considerable value, and is still much 
prized by its possessors, the modern Persians. 

Armenia, which, to the west of the Caspian, closed 
in the Parthian territory towards the north when the 
empire had reached its acme, lay north-west and 
partly north of Atropatene. It reached from the 
Caspian at the mouth of the Aras to the elbow of 
the Euphrates, in lat. 38° 30', long. 38° 25' nearly, a 
distance of about six hundred miles, and extended 
from Iberia on the north to Mount Niphates on the 
south, a distance of rather more than two hundred 
miles. But Armenia was lozenge-shaped, narrowing 



MEDIA ATROPATENE AND ARMENIA. 25 

gradually towards both extremities ; and thus the area 
did not much exceed sixty thousand square miles. 
The character of the region closely resembled that of 
Atropatene, but was on the whole superior ; and 
Armenia is found to have been a productive terri- 
tory, which exported wine to Babylon, and traded 
in the markets of Phoenicia with horses and mules 
(Ezek. xxvii. 14). 

It would seem, then, that the Parthian Empire, 
when at the highest pitch of prosperity, extended 
fully two thousand miles from east to west between 
the Pamir upland and the Euphrates, while it had a 
general width of about five or six hundred miles 
between its northern and southern frontiers. It 
included the whole of modern Persia, the greater 
part of Affghanistan, much of Turkey in Asia, and 
some large regions which are now in the possession 
of the Russians. As Persia is said to extend over 
five hundred thousand square miles, and Affghanistan 
over two hundred thousand, while the Russian and 
Turkish provinces which were once Parthian cannot be 
estimated to contain less than one hundred thousand 
square miles, the whole territory included within 
the empire of the Parthians at its greatest extent 
can scarcely have fallen far short of eight hundred 
thousand square miles. It would thus have been 
about equal in extent to France, Germany, Austria, 
and Turkey in Europe put together. 

The boundaries of the empire were, upon the 
north, Iberia, the river Kur or Cyrus, the Caspian, 
the Oxus, and the Hazaret Sultan, and Hissar ranges ; 
on the east, the Pamir, the Bolor Chain, and the 



26 PARTHIA PROPER, AND THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

valley of the Indus ; on the south, Beluchistan and 
the Persian Gulf ; on the west, Cappadocia and the 
Euphrates. Westward of the Euphrates lay the 
territory of Rome ; northward of the Oxus were the 
wild tribes of Scythia, Alani, Massagetae, Yue-ehi, 
and others ; on the eastern frontier were the Indo- 
Scyths, a weak and divided people. Only two 
neighbours seemed to be of much account — Rome 
upon the west, and the Scythic tribes upon the 
north and north-east. With each of these enemies 
Parthia had important and dangerous wars, but her 
destruction came from neither. Revolt within her 
own borders brought the Parthian dominion to an 
end, and substituted in its place the Second Persian 
or Sassanian monarchy. 




IL 



ETHNOGRAPHICAL — TURANIAN CHARACTER OF 
THE PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 

The Parthians do not appear in history as a people 
until the time of Darius, the son of Hystaspes (B.C. 
521-515). There is no mention of them in the Old 
Testament, or in the Assyrian Inscriptions, or in 
the Zendavesta. We first find any record of their 
existence in the great Inscription of Darius, at 
Behistun. They are there called the " Parthva," or 
" Parthwa," and appear in close connection with the 
" Varkana," or people of Hyrcania. Darius regards 
them as his subjects, and speaks of their " revolting " 
against his father, Hystaspes, who seems to have been 
at the time their satrap, and fighting a battle with 
him within the limits of their own country. They 
were defeated with the loss of about ten thousand 
men in killed and prisoners ; after which they sub- 
mitted, and returned to their allegiance. 

Through the rest of the Achaemenian period (B.C. 
5i5""330 we never hear of them but as faithful 
Persian subjects. They were assigned by Darius to 
his sixteenth satrapy, and united in it with the 
Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians. They 



28 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 

took part in the expedition of his son, Xerxes, 
against Greece. They fought at Issus and at Arbela. 
We never hear of their joining in any revolt after 
their one attempt in the time of general disturbance 
at the beginning of the reign of Darius. If they did 
not offer a very strenuous resistance to Alexander, 
it was probably because the Persian Empire had 
collapsed, and the conqueror appeared to be irre- 
sistible. 

This fidelity to the Persian rule, combined with 
the fact that geographically Parthia was situated in 
the midst of a group of purely Arian tribes — the 
Hyrcanians, Chorasmians, Margians, Arians of 
Herat, Bactrians, Sagartians, and Sarangians — has 
led some writers on ethnography to maintain that 
the Parthians, like all the other people of the Iranian 
plateau, belonged to the Iranian family. They 
certainly affected, to a large extent, Persian names 
— e.£^., Mithridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, 
Rhodaspes, Chosroes, if that is a form of Cyrus 
i^Kiirush in Persian) — and some of the appellations 
peculiar to them are explainable by Arian ety- 
mologies. " Priapatius," for instance, has been in- 
geniously compared with the Zendic " Frijapaitis," 
which means, like the Greek " Philopator," " Lover 
of his father." But conjectural explanations of 
names are an exceedingly unsafe basis for ethno- 
logical speculations. And it is certain that the 
Parthian names do not, as a general rule, suggest 
the idea of derivation from Arian sources. 

If we ask what the ancient writers have left on 
record with respect to the Parthian nationality, we 



CALLED SCYTHS BY THE ANCIENT WRITERS. 29 

shall find, in the first place, a general consensus that 
they were Scyths. " The Parthian race is Scythic," 
says Arrian. " The Parthians," says Justin,, in his 
" Epitome of Trogus Pompeius," " were a race of 
Scyths, who at a remote date separated themselves 
from the rest of the nation, and occupied the 
southern portion of the Chorasmian desert, whence 
they gradually made themselves masters of the 
mountain region adjoining it." Strabo adds to this, 
that the particular Scythic tribe whereto they 
belonged was that of the Dah^e ; that their own 
proper and original name was Parni, or Aparni ; 
and that they had migrated at a remote period from 
the country to the north of the Palus Maeotis (Sea of 
Azov), where they left the great mass of their fellow- 
tribesmen. Some time after this the theory was 
started that they were Scyths whom Sesostris, on 
his return from his supposed Scythian expedition, 
brought into Asia and settled in the mountain tract 
south-east of the Caspian. We cannot put much 
faith in the details of any of these various state- 
ments, since, in the first place, they are contradictory, 
and, in the second, they are, most of them, highly 
improbable. Sesostris, for instance, if there ever 
was such a king, no more made an expedition into 
Scythia than into Lapland or Kamskatka. No 
Egyptian monarch ever penetrated further north 
than the mountain chains of Taurus and Niphates. 
Arrian's story is a mere variant of the tale told to 
Herodotus and Diodorus, and believed by them, of 
the planting of Scythian colonists in Colchis by the 
hypothetical Sesostris ; and it is even more impro- 



30 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 

bable, since it makes the returning' conqueror depart 
from his natural course, and go a thousand miles 
out of his way, to plant for no purpose a colony in 
a region which he was never likely to visit again. 
Strabo's migration tale is less incredible, since the 
tribes to the north of the Euxine and Caspian lived 
in a constant state of unrest, and migratory move- 
ments on their part, far exceeding the supposed 
Parthian movement in the distance traversed, are 
among the most certain facts of ancient history. 
But it is difficult to see what trustworthy authority 
Strabo could even suppose that he had for his 
assertions, since the migration of which he speaks 
must have taken place at least six hundred years 
before his own time, and migratory races rarely 
retain any tradition of their origin for so much as 
a century. Strabo, moreover, admits it to be doubt- 
ful whether there ever were any Dahae among the 
Scyths of the Maeotis, and thus seems to cut the 
ground from under his own feet. 

The utmost that can be safely gathered from these 
numerous and discrepant notices is the conclusion 
tliat the Parthians were felt by the Greeks and 
Romans who first came into contact with them to be 
an alien nation, intruded among the Arian races of 
these parts, having their congeners in the great steppe 
country which lay north of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, 
the Caspian, and the Oxus river. These nations 
were nomadic, uncivilised, coarse, not to any brutal, 
in their habits ; of a type very much inferior to that 
of the races which inhabited the more southern 
regions, felt by them to be barbarians, and feared as 



CHIEF SCYTHIC CHARACTERISTICS. 3 1 

a continual menace to their prosperity and civili- 
sation. There is always an underlying idea of dis- 
praise and disparagement whenever a Greek or a 
Roman calls any race, or people, or custom "Scythic" — 
the term connotes rudeness, grossness, absence of 
culture and refinement — it is not perhaps strictly 
ethnic, since it designates a life rather than a descent, 
habits rather than blood — but it points to such a life 
and such habits as have from the remotest antiquity 
prevailed, and as still prevail, in the vast plain country 
which extends from the Caucasus, the Caspian, and 
the mountain chains of the Central Asian regions to 
the shores of the great Arctic Sea. 

It is certain that the inhabitants of this tract 
have belonged, from a remote antiquity, to the ethnic 
family generally known as Turanian. In the south 
they are of the Tatar or Turkish type; in the north, 
of the Finnish, or Samoeidic. Their language is 
agglutinate, and wanting in inflections; their physique 
is weak, languid, anaemic, unmuscular ; they have 
large fleshy bodies, loose joints, soft swollen bellies, 
and scanty hair. They live chiefly on horseback or 
in waggons. Still, as enemies, they are far from 
contemptible. Admirable horsemen, often skilled 
archers, accustomed to a severe climate and to ex- 
posure in all weathers ; they have proved formidable 
foes to many warlike nations, and still give serious 
trouble to their Russian masters. 

The Scythian character of the Parthians, vouched 
for on all hands, and their derivation from Upper 
Asia, or the regions beyond the Oxus, furnish a 
strong presumption of their belonging to the Turanian 



32 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 

family of nations. This presumption is strengthened 
by the Httle that we know of their language. Their 
names, when not distinctly Persian, which they would 
often naturally be from conscious and intentional 
imitation, are decidedly non-Arian, and have certain 
Turanian characteristics. Among these may be 
mentioned, first of all, the guttural termination, found 
in Arsac-es, Sinnac-es, Parrhac-es, Vasac-es, Sana- 
troec-es, Phraatac-es, Valarsac-es, &c. — a termination 
which characterises the primitive Babylonian, the 
Basque, and most of the Turanian tongues. Beyond 
this, it would not be difficult to suggest Turanian 
etymologies for a large number of Parthian names, 
but as such suggestions could only be " guesses at 
truth," not very much weight would attach to them. 

The main argument for the Turanian character of 
the Parthian people is to be found in their physical 
and mental type, and in their manners and customs. 
Their sculptures give them the large ill-formed limbs, 
the heavy paunches, and the general flaccid appearance 
which characterise Turanian races. Their history 
shows them to have had the merits and defects of the 
Turanian type of character. They were covetous, 
grasping, ready to take the aggressive, and, on the 
whole, tolerably successful in their wars against weak 
races. But they were wanting in dash, in vigorous 
effort, and in perseverance. They were stronger in 
defence than in attack; and, as time went on, became 
more and more unenterprising and lethargic. In the 
arts they were particularly backward, devoid of taste, 
and wanting in originality. Considering the patterns 
■that they had before their eyes in the architecture 



PARTHIAN MANNERS AND CUSTOMS. 33 

and sculptures of Pasargadse, Nakhsh-i-Rustam, 
Istakr, and Persepolis, it is simply astonishing that 
they could rise no higher than the mean palace at 
Hatra, and the grotesque tablets at Behistun, Sir-pul-i- 
Zohab, and Tengh-i-Saoulek. Greek art, moreover, 
was not unknown to them ; and they imitated it upon 
their coins ; but the travesty is painful, and often 
verges on the ridiculous. In their manners and 
customs there was much that was markedly Turanian. 
Like the Turkoman and Tatar tribes generally, they 
passed almost their whole lives on horseback, con- 
versing, transacting business, buying and selling, even 
eating, while mounted on their horses. They practised 
polygamy, secluded their women from the sight of 
men, punished unfaithfulness with extreme severity, 
delighted in hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that 
which they obtained in this way, were moderate 
eaters but great drinkers, did not speak much, but yet 
were very unquiet, being constantly engaged in stirring 
up trouble either abroad or at home. A small portion 
of the nation only was free ; the remainder were the 
slaves of the privileged few. Nomadic habits con- 
tinued to prevail among a portion of those who 
•remained in their primitive seats, even in the time of 
their greatest national prosperity ; and a coarse, rude, 
semi-barbarous character attached always — even to the 
most advanced part of the nation — to the king, the 
court, and the nobles generally, a character which, 
despite a certain varnish of civilisation, was con- 
stantly showing itself in their dealings with each 
other, and with foreign nations. " The Parthian 
monarchs," as Gibbon justly observes, "like the 



34 TURANIAN CHARACTER OF PARTHIAN PEOPLE. 

Mogul sovereigns of Hindustan, delighted in the 
pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors, and the 
imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain 
of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris." 
Niebuhr seems even to doubt whether the Parthians 
dwelt in cities at all. He represents them as main- 
taining from first to last their nomadic habits, and 
regards the insurrection by which their empire was 
brought to an end as a rising of the inhabitants of 
towns — the Tadjiks of those times — against the 
Ilyats or wanderers, who had oppressed them for 
centuries. This is, no doubt, an over-statement ; but 
it has a foundation in fact, since wandering habits, 
and even tent life, were affected by the Parthians 
during the most flourishing period of their empire. 

Another respect in which the Parthians resembled 
some, at any rate, of the principal Turanian tribes was 
in their combination of the rudeness and coarseness 
already mentioned with great vigour of administration 
and government. Like the early (or Accadian) 
Babylonians, like the Mongols under Jenghis Khan 
and his successors, like the Turks of the Middle Ages, 
and to some extent even of modern times, the 
Parthians possessed, to a large amount, the governing 
or ruling faculty. They rapidly developed a great 
power ; and they held together for nearly four 
centuries a heterogeneous mass of subject nations, 
who could have had no love for their rule, yet were 
constrained by their energy and other sterling 
qualities to render them, for the most part, a cheerful 
and steady obedience. Their governmental system 
was not refined, but it was effective ; they never 



COMPARISON OF THE PARTHIANS AND TURKS. 35 

permanently lost a province ; and, at the dissolution 
of the empire, its limits were as extensive as they had 
ever been. 

On the whole, it may be said, that the Turanian 
character of the Parthian people, though not abso- 
lutely proved, appears to be in the highest degree 
probable. If we accept it, we must regard them as 
in race closely allied to the vast hordes which, from 
a remote antiquity, have roamed over the steppe 
region of Upper Asia, from time to time bursting 
upon the south, and harassing or subjugating the 
comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the warmer 
countries. We must view them as the congeners of 
the Huns, Bulgarians, Avars, Komans of the ancient 
world ; of the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Eleuts, Usbegs, 
Turkomans, &c., of the present day. Perhaps their 
nearest representatives will be, if we look to their 
primitive condition at the founding of their empire, 
the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the same 
districts ; if we regard them at the period of their 
highest prosperity, the Osmanli Turks. Like the 
Turks, they combined great military prowess and 
vigour with a capacity for organisation and govern- 
ment not very usual among Asiatics. Like them, 
they remained at heart barbarians, though they put 
on an external appearance of civilisation and refine- 
ment. Like them, they never to any extent amal- 
gamated with the subject peoples, but continued for 
centuries an exclusive dominant race, encamped in 
the countries which they had overrun, 



III. 



CONDITION OF WESTERN ASIA IN THE THIRD 
CENTURY B.C. — ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

The grand attempt of Alexander the Great to 
unite the East and West in a single universal 
monarchy, magnificent in conception, and carried out 
in act with extraordinary energy and political wisdom, 
so long as he was spared to conduct his enterprise in 
person, was frustrated, in the first place, by the 
unfortunate circumstance of his premature decease ; 
and, secondly, by the want of ability among his 
" Successors." Although among them there were 
several who possessed considerable talent, there was 
no commanding personality of force sufficient to 
dominate the others, and certainly none who inherited 
either Alexander's grandeur of conception or his powers 
of execution, or who can be imagined as, under any 
circumstances, successfully accomplishing his projects. 
The scheme, therefore, which the great Macedonian 
had conceived, unhappily collapsed, and his effort to 
unite and consolidate led only to increased division 
and disintegration. He left behind him at least 
twelve rival claimants of his power, and it was only 
by partition that the immediate breaking out of civil 

36 



DIVISION OF THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER. 37 

war among the competitors was prevented. Partition 
itself did but stave off the struggle for a few years, 
and the wars of the " Successors," which followed, 
caused further change, and tended to split the empire 
into minute fragments. After a while the various 
collisions produced something like a " survival of the 
fittest," and about the close of the fourth century, after 
the great battle of Ipsus (B.C. 301), that division of 
the Macedonian Empire was made into four principal 
parts, which thenceforward for nearly three centuries 
formed the basis of the political situation in Eastern 
Europe and Western Asia. Macedonia, Asia Minor, 
Syria, and Egypt became the great powers of the 
time, and on the fortunes of these four powers, their 
policies, and lines of action, depended the general 
course of affairs in the Oriental world for the next 
two hundred years at any rate. 

Of these four great monarchies the one with which 
the interests of Parthia were almost wholly bound up 
was the Syrian kingdom of the Seleucidae. Originally, 
Seleucus received nothing but the single satrapy of 
Babylonia. But his military genius and his popularity 
were such, that his dominion kept continually in- 
creasing until it became an empire worthy of com- 
parison with those ancient Oriental monarchies, which, 
in remoter times, had attracted, and almost monopo- 
lised, the attention of mankind. As early as B.C. 312, 
he had added to his original government of Babylonia 
the important countries of Media, Susiana, and Persia. 
After Ipsus he received, by the agreement then made 
among the " Successors," the districts of Cappadocia, 
Eastern. Phrygia, Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, and the 



38 WESTERN ASIA IN THE ^RD CENTURY B.C. 

entire valley of the Euphrates ; while, about the same 
time, or rather earlier, he, by his own unassisted 
efforts, obtained the adhesion of all the eastern 
provinces of Alexander s Empire, Armenia, Assyria, 
Sagartia, Carman ia, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sog- 
diana. Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana, Gedrosia, 
and probably part of India. The empire thus estab- 
lished extended from the Mediterranean on the west 
to the Indus valley and the Bolor mountain chain 
upon the east, while it stretched from the Caspian 
and the Jaxartes towards the north to the Persian 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean southwards. Its entire 
area could not have been much less than 1,200,000 
square miles. Of these some 300,000 or 400,000 may 
have been desert ; but the remainder was generally 
fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the 
very most productive regions in the whole world. 
The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley, the 
tract between the Southern Caspian and the moun- 
tains, the regions about Merv and Balkh, were among 
the richest in Asia, and produced grain and fruit in 
incredible abundance. The fine pastures of Media 
and Armenia furnished excellent horses. Bactria 
gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants 
in large numbers were readily procurable from India. 
Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin were furnished by 
several of the provinces, and precious stones of various 
kinds abounded. Moreover, for above ten centuries, 
the precious metals and the most valuable kinds of 
merchandise had flowed from every quarter into the 
region ; and though the Macedonians may have carried 
off, or wasted, a considerable quantity of both, yet the 



SYRIAN KINGDOM OF THE SELEUCIDM. 39 

accumulations of ages withstood the strain ; and the 
hoarded wealth, which had come down from Assyrian, 
Babylonian, and Median times, was to be found in the 
days of Seleucus chiefly within the limits of his empire. 
It might have seemed that Western Asia was about 
to enjoy under the Seleucid princes as tranquil and 
prosperous a condition as had prevailed throughout 
the region for the two centuries which had intervened 
between the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus 
(B.C. 538) and its destruction by Alexander (B.C. 323). 
But the fair prospect was soon clouded over. The 
Seleucid princes, instead of devoting themselves to 
the consolidation of their power in the vast region 
between the Euphrates and the Indus, turned all 
their attention towards the West, and frittered away 
in petty quarrels for small gains with their rivals in 
that quarter — the Ptolemies and the princes of Asia 
Minor — those energies which would have been far 
better employed in arranging and organising the 
extensive dominions whereof they were already 
masters. It was symptomatic of this leaning to the 
West, that the first Seleucus, almost as soon as he 
found himself in quiet possession of his vast empire, 
transferred the seat of government from Lower 
Mesopotamia to Upper Syria, from the banks of the 
Tigris to those of the Orontes. This movement had 
fatal consequences. Already his empire contained 
within itself an element of weakness in its over-great 
length, which cannot be estimated at less than two 
thousand miles. To counteract this disadvantage a 
fairly central position for the capital was almost a 
necessity. The empire of Seleucus might have been 



40 WESTERN ASIA IN THE ^RD CENTURY B.C. 

conveniently ruled from the old Median capital of 
Ecbatana, or the later Persian one of Susa. Even 
Babylon, or Seleucia, though further to the west, were 
not unsuitable sites ; and had Seleucus been content 
with either of these, no blame would attach to him. 
But when, to keep watch upon his rivals, he removed 
the seat of government five hundred miles further west- 
ward, and placed it almost on his extreme western 
frontier, within a few miles of the Mediterranean, he 
intensified the weakness which required to be counter- 
acted, and made the disruption of his empire within 
no great length of time certain. The change loosened 
the ties which bound the empire together, offended 
the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their monarch with- 
draw from them into a remote corner of his dominions, 
and particularly weakened the grasp of the govern- 
ment on those more eastern districts which were at 
once furthest from the new metropolis, and least 
assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the 
causes which led to the disintegration of the Seleucid 
kingdom, there is none which deserves so well to be 
considered the main cause as this. It was calculated 
at once to produce the desire to revolt, and to render 
the reduction of revolted provinces difficult, if not 
impossible. 

The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely 
postponed, if not even escaped altogether, had the 
Seleucid princes either established and maintained 
throughout their empire a vigorous and efficient ad- 
ministration, or abstained from entangling themselves 
in wars with their neighbours upon the West — the 
Ptolemies, the kings of Pergamus, and others. 



ORGANISATION OF THE SELEUCID KINGDOM. 4I 

But the organisation of the Seleucid Enipire was 
unsatisfactory. Instead of pursuing the system in- 
augurated by Alexander, and seeking to weld the 
heterogeneous elements of which his kingdom was 
composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at 
once conciliating and elevating the Asiatics by uniting 
them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by pro- 
moting intermarriage and social intercourse between 
the two classes of his subjects, educating the Asiatics 
in Greek ideas and Greek schools, opening his court 
to them, promoting them to high employments, making 
them feel that they were as much valued and as much 
cared for as the people of the conquering race, the 
first Seleucus, and after him his successors, fell back 
upon the older, simpler, and ruder system — the system 
pursued before Alexander's time by the Persians, and 
before them perhaps by the Medes — the system most 
congenial to human laziness and human pride — that 
of governing a nation of slaves by means of a clique 
of victorious aliens. Seleucus divided his empire into 
satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed the 
office of satrap on none but Macedonians and Greeks. 
The standing army, by means of which he maintained 
his authority, was indeed composed in the main of 
Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model ; but it 
was officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian 
parentage. Nothing was done to keep up the self- 
respect of the Asiatics, or to soften the unpleasant- 
ness which must always attach to being governed by 
foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satraps 
seems to have been insufficient. According to some 
writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a satrap to 



42 WESTERN ASIA IN THE ^RD CENTURY B.C. 

an Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to 
their revolt. The story may not be true ; but the 
currency given to it shows of what conduct to those 
under their rule the satraps of the Seleucidae were 
thought, by those who lived near the time, to have 
been capable. It may be said that this treatment 
was no worse than that whereto the subject races 
of Western Asia had been accustomed for many 
centuries under their Persian, Median, or Assyrian 
masters, and this statement may be quite consonant 
with truth ; but a new yoke is always more galling 
than an old one ; in addition to which we must take 
into consideration the fact, that the hopes of the 
Asiatics had been raised by the policy of assimilation 
avowed, and to some extent introduced, by Alexander; 
so that they may be excused if they felt with some 
bitterness the disappointment of their very legitimate 
expectations, when the Seleucidae revived the old 
satrapial system, unmodified, unsoftened, with all its 
many abuses as pronounced and as rampant as ever. 

An entire abstention on the part of the Seleucidae 
from quarrels with the other " Successors of Alexander," 
would perhaps scarcely have been possible. Their 
territory bordered on that of the Ptolemies and the 
kings of Pergamus, and was liable to invasion from 
either quarter. But by planting their capital on the 
Orontes they aggravated the importance of the attacks 
which they could not prevent, and became mixed up 
with Pergamenian and Egyptian, and even Macedonian, 
politics far more than was necessary. Had they but 
made Seleucia permanently their metropolis, and held 
lightly by their dominion to the west of the Euphrates, 



SYRIAN WARS OF THE PERIOD. 43 

they might certainly have avoided to a large extent 
the entanglements into which they were drawn by 
their actual policy, and have been free to give their 
main attention to the true sources of their real 
strength — the central and eastern provinces. But it 
may be doubted whether the idea of abstention ever 
presented itself to the mind of any one of the early 
Seleucid princes. It was the fond dream of each of 
them, as of the other " Successors," that possibly in 
his person might one day be re-united the whole of 
the territories which had been ruled by the Great 
Conqueror. Each Seleucid prince would have felt 
that he sacrificed his dearest and most cherished 
hopes, if he had withdrawn from the regions of the 
west, and shunning engagements and adventures 
in that quarter, had contented himself with efforts 
to consolidate a great power in the more inland 
and more thoroughly Asiatic portions of the 
empire. 

The result was that, during the first half of the 
third century (B.C. 300-250), the Seleucid princes were 
almost constantly engaged in disputes and wars in Asia 
Minor and Syria Proper, gave their personal super- 
intendence to those regions, and had neither time nor 
attention to spare for the affairs of the far East. So 
long as the satraps of these regions paid regularly 
their appointed tributes, and furnished regularly the 
required quotas of troops for service in the western 
wars, Seleucus and his successors, the first and second 
Antiochi, were content. The satraps were left to 
manage the affairs of their pi'ovinces at their own 
discretion ; and we cannot be surprised if the absence 



44 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

of a controlling hand led to various complications 
and disorders. 

As time went on these disorders would naturally 
increase, and matters might very probably have come 
to a head in a few more years through the mere 
negligence and apathy of those who had the direction 
of the state ; but a further impulse towards actual 
disintegration was given by the character of the 
second Antiochus, which was especially weak and 
contemptible. To have taken the title of " Theos " — 
never before assumed, so far as we know, by any 
monarch — was, even by itself, a sufficient indication 
of presumption and folly, and might justify us, did 
we know no more of him, in concluding that the 
calamities of his reign were the fruit of his unfitness 
to direct and rule an empire. But we have further 
abundant evidence of his incapacity. He was noted, 
even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and de- 
bauchery ; he neglected all state affairs in the pursuit 
of pleasure ; his wives and his male favourites were 
allowed to rule his kingdom at their will, and their 
most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor 
punished. The satraps, to whom the character and 
conduct of their sovereign could not but become 
known, would be partly encouraged to follow the 
bad example set them, partly provoked by it to 
shake themselves free from the rule of so hateful yet 
contemptible a master. 

It may be added, that already there had been 
examples of successful revolts on the part of satraps 
in outlying provinces, which could not but have been 
generally known, and which must have excited 



REVOLTS OF SATRAPS. 45 

ambitious longings on the part of persons similarly- 
placed, from the very beginning of the Macedonian 
period. Even at the time of Alexander's great 
conquests, a Persian satrap, Atropates, succeeded in 
converting his satrapy of Upper Media — thencefor- 
ward called Media Atropatene — into an independent 
sovereignty. Not long afterwards, Cappadocia had 
detached itself from the kingdom of Eumenes (B.C. 
326), and had established its independence under 
Ariarathes, who became the founder of a dynasty. 
Still earlier, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus, once 
Persian provinces, had revolted, and in each case the 
revolt had issued in the recovery of autonomy. Thus 
already in Western Asia, beside the Greco-Macedo- 
nian kingdoms which had been established by the 
" Successors of Alexander," there were existent some 
five or six states which had had their origin in successful 
rebellions. 

Such were the circumstances under which, in or 
about the year B.C. 256, which was the sixth year of 
Antiochus Theus, actual disturbances broke out in 
the extreme north-east of the Seleucid Empire. The 
first province to raise the standard of revolt, and pro- 
claim itself independent, was Bactria. This district 
had from a remote antiquity been one with special 
pretensions. The country was fertile, and much of 
it readily defensible ; the people were hardy and 
valiant ; they had been generally treated with 
exceptional favour by the Persian monarchs ; and 
they seem to have had traditions which assigned 
them a pre-eminence among the Arian nations at 
some indefinitely distant period. " Bactria with the 



46 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

lofty banner " is celebrated in one of the most ancient 
portions of the Zendavesta. It remained unsubdued 
until the time of Cyrus. Cyrus is said by some to 
have left it as an appanage to his second son, Bardes, 
or Tanyoxares. Under the Persians, it had for satrap 
generally, or at any rate frequently, a member of the 
royal family. Alexander had conquered it with diffi- 
culty, and only by prolonged efforts. It was therefore 
natural that disintegration should make its first 
appearance in this quarter. The Greek satrap of the 
time, Diodotus, either disgusted with the conduct of 
Antiochus Theus, or simply seeing in his weakness 
and general unpopularity an opportunity which it 
would be foolish to let slip, in or about the year 
B.C. 256, assumed the style and title of king, struck 
coins stamped with his own name, and established 
himself without any difficulty as king over the entire 
province. Theus, engaged in war with the Egyptian 
monarch, Ptolemy Philadelphus, did not even make 
an effort to put him down, and the Bactrian ruler, 
without encountering any serious opposition, passed 
into the ranks of autonomous sovereigns. 

The example of successful revolt thus set could 
not well be barren of consequences. If one Seleucid 
province might throw off the yoke of its feudal lord 
with absolute impunity, why might not others ? 
There seemed to be actually nothing to prevent them. 
Syria, so far as we can discern, allowed Bactria to 
go its way without any effort whatever either to check 
the revolt or to punish it. For eighteen years no 
Syrian force came near the country. Diodotus was 
permitted to consolidate his kingdom and rivet his 



CHARACTER OF THE PARTHIAN REVOLT. 47 

authority on his subjects, without any interference, 
and the Bactrian monarchy became thus a permanent 
factor in Asiatic poHtics for nearly two centuries. 

It was about six years after the estabhshment of 
Bactrian independence that the Parthian satrapy 
followed the pattern set it by its neighbour, and de- 
tached itself from the Seleucid Empire. The circum- 
stances, however, under which the severance took 
place were very different in the two cases. History 
by no means repeated itself. In Bactria the Greek 
satrap took the lead ; and the Bactrian kingdom was, 
at any rate at its commencement, as thoroughly 
Hellenic as that of the Seleucidae. But in Parthia 
Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The native 
Asiatics rebelled against their masters. A people of 
a rude and uncivilised type, coarse and savage, but 
brave and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished 
but comparatively effeminate Greeks, who held them 
in subjection, and claimed and succeeded in estab- 
lishing their independence. The Parthian kingdom 
was thoroughly anti- Hellenic. It appealed to patriotic 
feelings, and to the hate universally felt towards the 
stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, 
to cast out the Europeans, to recover for the native 
race the possession of its own continent. " Asia for 
for the Asiatics," was its cry. It was naturally almost 
as hostile to Bactria as to Syria, although danger 
from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to 
make a temporary alliance with the former kingdom. 
It had, no doubt, the general sympathy of the popula- 
tions in the adjacent countries, and represented to 
them the cause of freedom and autonomy. Arsaces 



48 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

effected for Parthia that which Arminius strove to 
effect for Germany, and which Tell accomplished for 
Switzerland, and Victor Emmanuel for Lombardy. 

The circumstances of the revolt of Parthia are 
variously narrated by ancient authors. According to 
a story reported by Strabo, though not accepted as true 
by him, Arsaces was a Bactrian, who did not approve 
of the proceedings of Diodotus, and, when he was 
successful, quitted the newly-founded kingdom, and 
transferred his residence to Parthia, where he stirred 
up an insurrection against the satrap, and, succeeding 
in the attempt, induced the Parthians to accept him 
as their sovereign. But it is intrinsically improbable 
that an entire foreigner would have been accepted as 
king under such circumstances, and it is fatal to the 
narrative that every other account contradicts the 
Bactrian origin of Arsaces, and makes him a Parthian, 
or next door to a Parthian. Arrian states that Arsaces 
and his brother, Tiridates, were Parthians, descen- 
dants of Phriapites, the son of Arsaces ; that they 
revolted against the satrap of Antiochus Theus, by 
name Pherecles, on account of a gross insult which 
he had offered to one of them ; and that finally, 
having murdered the satrap, they declared Parthia 
independent, and set up a government of their own. 
Strabo, while giving currency to more than one story 
on the subject, lets us see that, in his own mind, 
he accepts the following account : " Arsaces was a 
Scythian, a chief among the Parnian Dahae, who 
inhabited the valley of the Ochus (Attrek ?). Soon 
after the establishment of Bactrian independence, he 
entered Parthia at the head of a body of his country- 



CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF AUTHORS. 49 

men, and succeeded in making himself master of it." 
Finally, Justin, who no doubt, here as elsewhere, follows 
Trogus Pompeius, a writer of the Augustan age, ex- 
presses himself as follows : " Arsaces, having been 
long accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, 
attacked the Parthians with a predatory band, killed 
their satrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme 
authority." This last account seems fairly probable, 
and does not greatly differ from Arrian's. If Arsaces 
was a Dahan chief, accustomed to make forays into 
the fertile hill country of Parthia from the Choras- 
mian desert, and, in one of them, fell in with the Greek 
satrap, defeated him, and slew him, it would not be 
unlikely that the Parthians, who were of a kindred 
race, might be so delighted with his prowess as to 
invite him to place himself at their head. An op- 
pressed people gladly adopts as ruler the chieftain of 
an allied tribe, if he has shown skill and daring, and 
promises them deliverance from their oppressors. 

The date of the Parthian revolt w^as probably B.C. 
250, which was the eleventh year of Antiochus Theus. 
Antiochus was at that time engaged in a serious 
conflict with Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, 
which, however, was brought to a close in the follow- 
ing year by his marriage with Berenice, Ptolemy's 
daughter. It might have been expected that, as soon 
as his hands were free, he would have turned his 
attention towards the East, and have made an effort, 
at any rate, to regain his lost territory. But Antio- 
chus lacked either the energy or the courage to engage 
in a fresh war. He was selfish and luxurious in his 
habits, and seems to have preferred the delights of 



50 



ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 



repose amid the soft seductions of Antioch to the 
perils and hardships of a campaign in the rough 
Caspian region. At any rate, he remained quietly at 
home, while Arsaces consolidated his power, chastised 
those who for one reason or another resisted his 
authority, and settled himself firmly upon the throne. 
His capital appears to have been Hecatompylus, 
which had been built by Alexander in the valley of 
the Gurghan river. According to some late authors 
of small account, he came to a violent end, having 
been killed in battle by a spear-thrust, which pene- 
trated his side. It is certain that he had a short 




COIN OF TIRIDATES I. 



reign, since he was succeeded in B.C. 248 by his 
brother, Tiridates, the second Parthian monarch. 

Tiridates, on ascending the throne, followed a 
practice not very uncommon in the East, and adopted 
his brother's name as a " throne-name," reigning as 
Arsaces the Second. He is the first Parthian king 
of whom we possess contemporary memorials. The 
coins struck by Arsaces II. commence the Parthian 
series, and present to us a monarch of strongly- 
marked features, with a large eye, a prominent, 
slightly aquiline nose, a projecting chin, and an 
entire absence of hair. He wears upon his head a 
curious cap, or helmet, with lappets on either side 



ARSACES I. AND TIRIDATES. 5I 

that reach to the shoulders, and has around his fore- 
head and above his ears a coronal of pearls, apparently 
of a large size. On the reverse side of his coins he 
exhibits the figure of a man, seated on a sort of 
stool, and holding out in front of him a strung bow, 
with the string uppermost. This may be either a 
representation of himself in his war costume, or an 
ideal figure of a Parthian god, but is probably the 
former. Tiridates takes upon his coins the title either 
of " King," or of " Great King." The legend which 
they bear is Greek, as is that of almost all the kings 
his successors. The coins follow the Seleucid model. 
Tiridates was an able and active monarch. He 
had the good fortune to hold the throne for a period 
of above thirty years, and had thus ample space for 
the development of his talents, and for completing 
the organisation of the kingdom. Having received 
Parthia from his brother in a somewhat weak and 
unsettled condition, he left it a united and powerful 
monarchy, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in 
its defences, in alliance with its nearest and most 
formidable neighbour, and triumphant over the great 
power of Syria, which had hoped to bring it once 
more into subjection. He witnessed some extra- 
ordinary movements, and conducted affairs during 
their progress with prudence and moderation. He 
was more than once brought into imminent danger, 
but succeeded in effectually protecting himself He 
made a judicious use of the opportunities which 
the disturbed condition of Western Asia in his time 
presented to him, and might well be considered, as he 
was by many, a sort of second founder of the State. 



52 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

It was within two years of the accession of 
Tiridates to the Parthian throne that one of those 
vast, but transient, revolutions to which Asia is 
subject, but which are rare occurrences in Europe, 
swept over Western Asia. Ptolemy Euergetes, the 
son of Philadelphus, having succeeded to his father's 
kingdom in B.C. 247, made war on Syria in B.C. 245, 
to avenge the murder of his sister Berenice, to whose 
death the Syrian king, Seleucus II., had been a party. 
In the war which followed he at first carried every- 
thing before him. Having taken Antioch, he crossed 
the Euphrates, and, in the course of a couple of yeans, 
succeeded in effecting the conquest of Mesopotamia, 
Assyria, Babylonia, Susiana, Media, and Persia, while 
the smaller provinces, as far as Parthia and Bactria, 
submitted to him without resistance. He went in 
person, as he tells us, as far as Babylon, and, re- 
garding his power as established, proceeded somewhat 
hastily to gather the fruits of victory, by compelling 
the conquered countries to surrender all the most valu- 
able works of art which were to be found in them, and 
sending off the treasures to Egypt, for the adornment 
of Alexandria. He also levied heavy contributions 
on the countries which had submitted to him, and 
altogether treated them with a severity that was 
impolitic. Bactria and Parthia cannot but have felt 
considerable alarm at his victorious progress. Here 
was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, had 
marched the distance of a thousand miles from the 
banks of the Nile to those of the Lower Euphrates, 
without so much as receiving a check, and who was 
threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What 



TIRIDATES CONQUERS HYRCANIA. 53 

resistance could the little Parthian state hope to offer 
to him ? It must have rejoiced the heart of Tiridates 
to hear that, while the conqueror was reaping the 
spoils of victory in his newly-subjugated provinces, 
dangerous disturbances had broken out in his own 
land, which had forced him to withdraw his troops 
suddenly (B.C. 243), and evacuate the territory which 
he had overrun. Thus his invasion proved to be a 
raid rather than a real conquest, and, instead of 
damaging Parthia, had rather the effect of improving 
her position, and contributing to the advance of her 
power. On Ptolemy's departure, Syria recovered her 
sway over her lost provinces, and again stood forward 
as Parthia's principal enemy ; but she was less for- 
midable than she had been previously ; her hold over 
her outlying dominions was relaxed, her strength was 
crippled, her prestige lost, and her honour tarnished. 
Tiridates saw in her depression his own opportunity, 
and, suddenly invading Hyrcania, his near neighbour, 
and Syria's most distant dependency, succeeded in 
overrunning it and detaching it from the empire of 
the Seleucidae. 

The gauntlet was thus thrown down to the Syrian 
king, and a challenge given, which he was compelled 
to accept, unless he was prepared to yield unresist- 
ingly, one after another, all the fairest of his remaining 
provinces. It was not likely that he would so act. 
Seleucus II. was no coward. He had been engaged 
in wars almost continuously from his accession, and, 
though more than once defeated in battle, had never 
shown the white feather. On learning the loss of 
Hyrcania, he proceeded immediately to patch up a 



54 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

peace with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, against 
whom he was at the time contending, and having col- 
lected a large army, marched away to the East. He did 
not, however, at once invade Parthia, but, deflecting 
his course to the right, entered into negotiations with 
the revolted Bactrian king, Diodotus, and made alliance 
with him against Tiridates. It may be supposed that 
he represented Tiridates as their common foe, as much 
a danger to Bactria as to Syria, the head of a move- 
ment, which was directed against Hellenism, and 
which aimed as much at putting down Bactrian rule 
as Syrian. At any rate, he succeeded in gaining 
Diodotus to his side ; and the confederate monarchs, 
having joined their forces, proceeded to invade the 
territory of the Parthian sovereign. Tiridates did not 
await their onset. Regarding himself as overmatched, 
he quitted his country, and fled northwards into the 
region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, where he 
took refuge with a Scythic tribe, called the Aspasiaca^, 
which was powerful at this period. The Aspasiacse, 
probably lent him troops, for he did not remain long 
in retirement ; but, hearing that the first Diodotus, 
the ally of Seleucus, had died, he contrived to draw 
over his son, Diodotus II., to his alliance, and, in con- 
junction with him, gave Seleucus battle, and com- 
pletely defeated his army. Seleucus retreated hastily 
to Antioch, and resumed his struggle with his brother, 
whom he eventually overcame ; but, having learned 
wisdom by experience, he made no further attempts 
against either the Bactrian or the Parthian power. 

This victory was with reason regarded by the 
Parthians as a sort of second beginning of their 



WAR OF TIRIDATES WITH SELEUCUS II. 55 

independence. Hitherto the kingdom had existed 
precariously, and as it were by sufferance. From the 
day that the revolt took place, it was certain that, 
some time or other, Syria would reclaim, and make 
an attempt to recover, its lost territory. Until a 
battle had been fought, until the new monarchy had 
measured its strength against that of its former 
mistress, it was impossible for any one to feel secure 
that it would be able to maintain its existence. The 
victory gained by Tiridates over Seleucus Callinicus 
put an end to these doubts. It proved to the world at 
large, as well as to the Parthians themselves, that they 
had nothing to fear — that they were strong enough 
to preserve their freedom. If we consider the 
enormous disproportion between the military strength 
and resources of the narrow Parthian state and the 
vast Syrian Empire — if we remember that the one 
comprised at this time about fifty thousand, and the 
other above a million of square miles ; that the one 
had inherited the wealth of ages, while the other was 
probably as poor as any province in Asia ; that the 
one possessed the Macedonian arms, training, and 
tactics, while the other knew only the rude warfare of 
the Steppes — the result of the struggle cannot but be 
regarded as surprising. Still, it was not without pre- 
cedent ; and it has not been without repetition. It 
adds another to the many instances, where a small 
but brave people, bent on resisting foreign domina- 
tion, have, when standing on their defence in their 
own territory, proved more than a match for the 
utmost force that a foe of overwhelming strength 
could bring against them. It reminds us of Marathon, 



56 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

of Bannockburn, of Morgarten. We may not sympa- 
thise wholly with the victors, for Greek civivisation, 
even of the type introduced by Alexander into Asia, 
was ill replaced by Tatar coarseness and barbarism ; 
but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle 
of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in 
the fastnesses of their native land a host of aliens, 
and triumphing over their would-be oppressors. The 
Parthians themselves were so impressed with the im- 
portance of the conflict, that they preserved the memory 
of it by a solemn festival on the anniversary of their 
victory, which was still celebrated in the days of the 
historian Trogus Pompeius. 

It is possible that Seleucus would not have accepted 
his defeat as final, or desisted from his attempt 
to reduce Parthia to obedience, if he had felt per- 
fectly free to continue or discontinue the Parthian 
war at his pleasure. But, on his return to Antioch, 
he found much to occupy him. His brother, Antiochus 
Hierax, was still a rebel against his authority, and 
the proceedings of Attalus, King of Pergamus, were 
threatening. Seleucus was engaged in contests with 
these two enemies from the time of his return from 
Parthia (B.C. 237) almost to his death (B.C. 226). He 
was thus compelled to leave Tiridates to take his own 
course, and either occupy himself with fresh conquests, 
or devote himself to the strengthening and adorning of 
his existing kingdom, as he pleased. Tiridates chose 
the latter course; and during the remainder of his 
long reign, for the space of above twenty years, 
employed his leisure in useful labours within the 
limits of his own territories. He erected a number 



LATER YEARS OF TIRI DATES. 57 

of strong forts, or castles, in suitable positions, fortified 
the Parthian towns generally, and placed garrisons 
in them, and carefully selected a site for a new city, 
which he probably intended to make, and perhaps 
actually made, his capital. The situation chosen was 
one in the mountain range known as Zapavortenon, 
where a hill was found, surrounded on all sides by 
precipitous rocks, and placed in the middle of a plain 
of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and 
copious streams of water existed in the neighbourhood. 
The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultiva- 
tion, and the woods were so full of game as to afford 
endless amusement to hunters. The city itself was 
called Dara, which the Greeks and Romans elongated 
into Dareium. Its exact site is undiscovered ; but 
it seems to have lain towards the east, and was 
probably not very far from the now sacred city of 
Meshed. 

We may account for the desire of Tiridates to 
establish a new capital by the natural antipathy of 
the Parthians to the Greeks, and the fact that Heca- 
tompylos, which had been hitherto the seat of govern- 
ment, was a thoroughly Greek town, having been 
built by Alexander the Great, and peopled mainly by 
Grecian settlers. The Parthians disliked close con- 
tact with Hellenic manners and Hellenic ideas. Just 
as, in their most palmy days, they rejected Seleucia 
for their capital, and preferred to build the entirely 
new town of Ctesiphon in its immediate vicinity, as 
the residence of the Court and monarch, so even now, 
when their prosperity was but just budding, an 
instinctive feeling of repulsion caused them to shrink 



58 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

from sharing a locality with the Greeks, and make 
the experiment of having for their headquarters a 
city wholly their own. The experiment did not 
altogether succeed. Either Hecatompylos had natural 
advantages even greater than those of Dara, or, as the 
growth of the Parthian power was mainly towards 
the west, the eastward position of the latter was found 
inconvenient. After a short trial, the successors of 
Tiridates ceased to reside at Dara, and Hecatompylos 
became once more the Parthian capital and the seat 
of Parthian government. 

Tiridates, having done his best, according to his 




COIN OF ARTABANUS I. 



lights, for the security of Parthia from without, and 
for her prosperity within, died peaceably after a 
reign which is reckoned at thirty-four years, and 
which lasted probably from B.C. 248 to B.C. 214. He 
left his throne to a son, named Artabanus, who, like 
his father, took the " throne-name " of Arsaces, and is 
known in history as Arsaces the Third. 

Artabanus I,, if we may judge by his coins, was 
not unlike his father in appearance, having the same 
projecting and slightly aquiline nose, and the same 
large eye ; but he differed from his father in possessing 
abundance of hair, and wearing a long beard. He 
has discarded, moreover, the cap of Tiridates, and, 



REIGN OF ARTABANUS I. 59 

instead of it, wears his own hair, which he confines 
with a band (the diadem), passing from the forehead 
to the occiput, there knotted, and flowing down behind. 
He takes the later legend of his father— BASIAEflS 
MEFAAOY APSAKOr— "Arsaces, the Great King." 

It was the aim of Artabanus to pursue his father's 
aggressive policy, and further enlarge the limits of 
the kingdom. He was scarcely settled upon the 
throne, when he declared war against Antiochus the 
Great, the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, who had 
inherited the Syrian crown in B.C. 223, and was 
entangled in a contest with one of the satraps of 
Asia Minor, named Ach^us. Proceeding westward 
along the skirts of the mountains, he made his way to 
Ecbatana in Media, receiving the submission of the 
various countries as he went, and (nominally) adding 
to his dominions the entire tract between Hyrcania 
and the Zagros mountain chain. From this elevated 
position he threatened the low-lying countries of the 
Mesopotamian plain, and seemed likely, unless 
opposed, in another campaign to reach the Euphrates. 
The situation was most critical for Syria ; and 
Antiochus, recognising his peril, bent all his energies 
to meet and overcome it. Fortunately he had just 
crushed Achaeus, and was able, without greatly 
exposing himself to serious loss in the West, to 
collect and lead a vast expedition against the East. 
With an army of a hundred thousand foot and twenty 
thousand horse, he set out for Media in the spring 
of B.C. 213, recovered Ecbatana without a battle, and 
thence pressed eastward after his startled enemy, 
who retreated as he advanced. In vain Artabanus 



6o ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

attempted to hinder his progress by stopping, or 
poisoning, the wells along the route which he had 
necessarily to take ; Antiochus caught the poisoners 
at their work, and brushed them from his path. He 
then marched rapidly against Parthia, and entering 
the enemy's country, took and occupied without a 
battle the chief city, Hecatompylos. 

Artabanus, bent on avoiding an engagement, re- 
treated into Hyrcania, perhaps flattering himself that 
his adversary would not venture to follow him into 
that rugged and almost inaccessible region. If so, 
however, he soon found that he had underrated the 
perseverance and tenacity of the Syrian king. 
Antiochus, after resting his army for a brief space at 
Hecatompylos, set out in pursuit of his enemy, crossed 
by a difficult pass, chiefly along the dry channel of a 
mountain torrent, obstructed by masses of rock and 
trunks of trees, the high ridge which separated be- 
tween Parthia and Hyrcania — his advance disputed 
by the Parthians at every step — fought and won a 
battle at the top, and thence descending into the rich 
Hyrcanian valley, endeavoured to take possession of 
the entire country. But Artabanus, brought to bay 
by his foe, defended himself with extraordinary 
courage and energy. One by one the principal 
Hyrcanian towns were besieged and taken, but the 
monarch himself was unsubdued. Carrying on a 
guerilla warfare, moving from place to place, occupy- 
ing one strong position after another, he continued 
his resistance with such dogged firmness that at 
length the patience of Antiochus was worn out, and 
he came to terms with his gallant adversary, conced- 



REIGNS OF PRIAPATIUS AND PHRAATES I. 6 1 

ing to him that which was the real bone of conten- 
tion, his independence. Parthia came out of the 
struggle with the Great Antiochus unscathed : she did 
not even have to relinquish her conquered dependency 
of Hyrcania. Artabanus moreover had the honour of 
being admitted into the number of the Great King's 
allies. As for Antiochus, he turned his attention to 
the affairs of Bactria, and the remoter East, and 
having arranged them to his satisfaction, returned 
by way of Arachosia, Drangiana, and Kerman to his 
western possessions (B.C. 206). 

The retirement of Antiochus, however honourable 




to Parthia, must have left her weakened and ex- 
hausted by her vast and astonishing efforts. She 
had been taxed almost beyond her strength, and must 
have needed a breathing-space to recruit and recover 
herself Artabanus wisely remained at peace during 
the rest of his reign ; and his son and successor, Pria- 
patius, followed his example. It was not till B.C. 
181 that the fifth Arsaces, Phraates I., son of Priapa- 
tius, having mounted the throne, resumed the policy 
of aggression introduced by Tiridates, and further 
extended the dominion of Parthia in the region south 



62 ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE. 

of the Caspian. The great Antiochus was dead. His 
successor, Seleucus IV. (Philopator), was a weak and 
unenterprising prince, whom the defeat of Magnesia 
had cowed, and who regarded inaction as his only 
security. Aware probably of this condition of affairs, 
Phraates, early in his reign, invaded the country of 
the Mardi, which lay in the mountain tract south of 
the Caspian Sea, overran it, and added it to his terri- 
tories. Successful thus far, he proceeded to make 
an encroachment on Media Rhagiana, the district be- 
tween the Caspian Gates and Media Atropatene, by 
occupying the tract immediately west of the Gates, 
and building there the important city of Charax, 
which he garrisoned with Mardians. This was an 
advance of the Parthian Terminus towards the west 
by a distance of nearly two hundred miles — an 
advance, not so much important in itself as in the 
indication which it furnished, at once of Parthian 
aggressiveness and of Syrian inability to withstand 
it. The conquests of Phraates added little either 
to the military strength or to the resources of his 
kingdom, but they were prophetic of the future. 
They foreshadowed that gradual waning of the Syrian 
and advance of the Parthian state, which is the 
chief fact of West Asian history in the two centuries 
immediately preceding our era, and which was to 
make itself startlingly apparent within the next few 
years, during the reign of the sixth Arsaces. 



IV. 



FIRST PERIOD OF EXTENSIVE CONQUEST — REIGN 
OF MITHRIDATES I. 

MiTHRlDATES THE FiRST, a brother of Phraates, 
was nominated to the kingly office by his predecessor, 
who had shown his affection for him during his Hfe 
by assuming the title of " Philadelphus " upon his 
coins, and at his death passed over in his favour the 
claims of several sons. Undoubtedly, he was a born 








COIN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

*' king of men " — pointed out by nature as fitter to 
rule than any other individual among his contempo- 
raries. He had a physiognomy which was at once 
intelligent, strong, and dignified. He was ambi- 
tious, but not possessed of an ambition which was 
likely to " o'erleap itself" — strict, but not cruel — brave, 

63 



64 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

energetic, a good general, an excellent administrator, 
a firm ruler. Parthia, under his government, advanced 
" by leaps and bounds." Receiving at his accession 
a kingdom but of narrow dimensions, confined 
apparently between the city of Charax on the one 
side and the river Arius, or Heri-rud, on the other, 
he transformed it, within the space of thirty-seven 
years — which was the time that his reign lasted — into 
a great and flourishing empire. It is not too much to 
say that, but for him, Parthia might have remained to 
the end a mere petty state on the outskirts of the 
Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to 
Rome, might have sunk after a short time into insig- 
nificance and obscurity. 

To explain the circumstances under which this vast 
change — this revolution in the Asiatic balance of 
power — became possible, it is necessary that we 
should cast our eye over the general condition of 
Western Asia in the early part of the second century 
before our era, and especially consider the course of 
events in the two kingdoms between which Parthia 
intervened, the Bactrian and Syrian monarchies. 

The Bactrian kingdom, as originally established by 
Diodotus, lay wholly to the north of the Paropa- 
misus, in the long and broad valley of the Oxus, 
from its sources in the Pamir to its entrance on the 
Kharesmian Desert. The countries to the south of 
the range continued to. be Syrian dependencies, and 
were reckoned by Seleucus Nicator as included within 
the limits of his dominion. But it was not long before 
the empire of Alexander in these parts began to 
crumble and decay. Indian princes, like Sandra- 



SITUATION OF BACTRIA AT HIS ACCESSION. 65 

cottus (Chandragupta) and Sophagasenus, asserted 
their rights over the Region of the Five Rivers 
(Punjab), and even over the greater portion of 
Affghanistan. Greek dominion was swept away. 
At the time when Bactria, having had its indepen- 
dence acknowledged by Antiochus the Great, felt 
itself at liberty to embark in ambitious enterprises, 
as Parthia had done, the Greco- Macedonian sway 
over the tracts between Parthia and the Sutlej was 
either swept away altogether, or reduced to a mere 
shadow ; and Euthydemus, the third Bactrian 
monarch, was not afraid of provoking hostilities 
from Syria, when, about B.C. 205, he began his 
aggressions in this direction. Under him, and under 
his son and successor, Demetrius, in the twenty years 
between B.C. 205 and B.C. 185, Bactrian conquest was 
pushed as far as the Punjab region, Cabul and Can- 
dahar were overrun, and the southern side of the 
mountains occupied from the Heri-rud to the Indus. 
Eucratidas, who succeeded Demetrius (about B.C. 180), 
extended his sway still further into the Punjab region, 
but with unfortunate results, so far as his original 
territories were concerned. Neglected, and compara- 
tively denuded of troops, these districts began to slip 
from his grasp. The Scythian nomads of the Steppes 
saw their opportunity, and bursting into Bactria, 
harried it with fire and sword, even occupying por- 
tions, and settling themselves in the Oxus valley. 

While matters were thus progressing in the East, 
and the Bactrian princes, attempting enterprises 
beyond their strength, were exhausting rather than 
advantaging the kingdom under their sway, the 



66 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES 7. 

Seleucid monarchs in the West were also becoming 
more and more entangled in difficulties, partly of 
their own creation, partly brought about by the 
ambition of pretenders. Antiochus the Great, shortly 
after his return from the eastern provinces, became 
embroiled with the Romans (B.C. 196), who dealt his 
power a severe blow by the defeat of Magnesia (B.C. 
190), and further weakened it by the support which 
they lent to the kings of Pergamus, which was now 
the ruling state in Asia Minor. The weakness of 
Antiochus encouraged Armenia to revolt, and so lost 
Syria another province (B.C. 189). Troubles began 
to break out in Elymais, consequent upon the ex- 
actions of the Seleucidae (B.C. 187). Eleven years 
later (B.C. 176) there was a lift of the clouds, and 
Syria seemed about to recover herself through the 
courage and energy of the fourth Antiochus (Epi- 
phanes) ; but the hopes raised by his successes in 
Egypt (B.C. 171-168) and Armenia (B.C. 165) were 
destroyed by his unwise conduct towards the Jews, 
whom his persecuting policy permanently alienated, 
and erected into a hostile state upon his southern 
border (B.C. 168-160). Epiphanes having not only 
plundered and desecrated the Temple, but having set 
himself to eradicate utterly the Jewish religion, and 
completely Hellenise the people, was met with the 
most determined resistance on the part of a moiety 
of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under de- 
voted leaders, who asserted, and in the end secured, 
the independence of their country. Not alone during 
the remaining years of Epiphanes, but for half a 
century after his death, throughout seven reigns, the 



SITUATION OF SYRIA. 67 

struggle continued ; Judaea taking advantage of every 
trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach herself more 
and more completely from her oppressor, and being 
a continued thorn in her side, a constant source of 
weakness, preventing more than anything else the re- 
covery of her power. The triumph which Epiphanes 
had obtained in the distant Armenia, where he de- 
feated and captured the king, Artaxias, was a poor 
set-off against the foe which he had created for 
himself at his doors through his cruelty and intoler- 
ance. Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (B.C. 164) 
improve the condition of affairs in Syria. The throne 
fell to his son, Antiochus V. (E^upator), a boy of nine, 
according to one authority, or, according to another, 
of twelve years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised 
the chief power, and was soon engaged in a war with 
the Jews, whom the death of the oppressor had en- 
couraged to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias 
was further disputed by a certain Philip, whom 
Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor 
to the young monarch. The claim of this tutor to 
the regent's office being supported by a considerable 
portion of the army, a civil war arose between him 
and Lysias, which raged for the greater part of two 
years, terminating in the defeat and death of Philip 
(B.C. 162). But Syrian affairs did not even then settle 
down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid 
house, Demetrius by name, the son of Seleucus IV., 
and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was at 
this time detained in Rome as a hostage, having been 
sent there during his father's lifetime, as a security 
for his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason, regarded 



68 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

his claim to the Syrian throne as better than that of 
his cousin, who was the son of the younger brother ; 
and, being in the full vigour of early youth, he deter- 
mined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make 
a bold stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain 
the Senate's consent to his quitting Italy, he took his 
departure secretly, crossed the Mediterranean in a 
Carthaginian vessel, and landing in Asia, succeeded 
within a few months in establishing himself as Syrian 
monarch. 

From this review of the condition of affairs in the 
Syrian and Bactrian kingdoms during the first half 
of the second century before Christ, it is sufficiently 
apparent, that in both countries the state of things 
was favourable to any aspirations which the power 
that lay between them might entertain after dominion 
and self-aggrandisement. The kings of the two 
countries indeed, at the time of the accession of 
Mithridates to the Parthian throne (B.C. 174), were, 
both of them, energetic and able princes, but the 
Syrian monarch was involved in difficulties at home 
which required all his attention, while the Bactrian 
was engaged in enterprises abroad which equally 
engrossed and occupied him. Mithridates might 
have attacked either with a good prospect of success. 
Personally, he was at least their equal, and though 
considerably inferior in military strength and re- 
sources, he possessed the great advantage of having 
a perfectly free choice both of time and place, could 
seize the most unguarded moment, and make his 
attack in the quarter where he knew that he would 
be least expected and least likely to find his enemy 



HIS FIRST ATTACK ON BACTRIA. 69 

on the alert. Circumstances, of which we now can- 
not appreciate the force, seem to have determined 
him to direct his first attack against the territories of 
his eastern neighbour, the Bactrian king, Eucratidas. 
These, as we have seen, were left comparatively 
unguarded, while their ambitious master threw all 
his strength into his Indian wars, pressing through 
Cabul into the Punjab region, and seeking to extend 
his dominion to the Sutlej river, or even to the Ganges. 
Naturally, Mithridates was successful. Attacking the 
Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, he made 
himself master, without much difficulty, of two pro- 
vinces — those of Turiua and of Aspionus. Turiua 
recalls the great but vague name of " Turanian," 
which certainly belongs to these parts, but can 
scarcely be regarded as local. Aspionus has been 
regarded as the district of the Aspasiacse ; but the 
two words do not invite comparison. It is best to be 
content with saying that we cannot locate the districts 
conquered, but that they should be looked for in the 
district of the Tejend and Heri-rud, between the 
Paropamisus and the great city of Balkh. 

It does not appear that Eucratidas attempted any 
retaliation. Absorbed in his schemes of Indian con- 
quest, he let his home provinces go, and sought 
compensation for them only in the far East. Mean- 
time Mithridates, having been successful in his Bac- 
trian aggression, and thus whetted his appetite for 
territorial gain, determined on a more important 
expedition. After waiting for a few years, until 
Epiphanes was dead, and the Syrian throne occu- 
pied by the boy king, Eupator, while the two 



70 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were 
contending in arms for the supreme power, he 
suddenly marched with a large force towards the 
West, and fell upon the great province of Media 
Magna, which, though still nominally a Syrian 
dependency, was under the rule of a king, and prac- 
tically, if not legally, independent. Media was a 
most extensive and powerful country. Polybius calls 
it " the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia, 
whether we consider the extent of the territory, or 
the number and quality of the men, or the goodness 
of the horses produced there. For these animals," 
he says, " are found in it in such abundance, that 
almost all the rest of Asia is supplied with them from 
this province. It is here also that the Royal horses 
are always fed, on account of the excellence of the 
pasture." The capital of the province was now, as in 
the more ancient times, Ecbatana, situated on the 
declivity of Mount Orontes (Elwand), and, though 
fallen from its former grandeur, yet still a place of 
much importance, second only in all Western Asia 
to Antioch and perhaps Babylon. The invasion of 
Mithridates was stoutly resisted by the Medes, and 
several engagements took place, in which sometimes 
one and sometimes the other side had the advantage ; 
but eventually the Parthians prevailed. Mithridates 
seized and occupied Ecbatana, which was at the time 
an unwalled town, established his authority over the 
whole region, and finally placed it under the govern- 
ment of a Parthian satrap, Bacasis, while he himself 
returned home, to crush a revolt which had broken 
out. 



HIS CONQUEST OF MEDIA MAGNA. Jl 

The scene of the revolt was Hyrcania. The 
Hyrcanian people, one markedly Arian, had pro- 
bably from the time of their subjugation chafed 
under the Parthian yoke, and seeing in the absence 
of Mithridates, with almost the whole of his power, 
in Media a tempting opportunity, had resolved to 
make a bold stroke for freedom before the further 
growth of Parthia should render such an attempt 
hopeless. We are not told that they had any special 
grievances ; but they were brave and high-spirited ; 
they had enjoyed exceptional privileges under the 
Persians ; and no doubt they found the rule of a 
Turanian people galling and oppressive. They may 
well have expected to receive support and assistance 
from the other Arian nations in their neighbourhood, 
as the Mardi, the Sagartians, the Arians on the Heri- 
rud, &c., and they may have thought that Mithri- 
dates would be too fully occupied with his Median 
struggle to have leisure to direct his arms against 
them. But the event showed that they had mis- 
calculated. Media submitted to Mithridates without 
any very protracted resistance ; the Parthian monarch 
knew the value of time, and, quitting Media, marched 
upon Hyrcania without losing a moment ; the other 
Arian tribes of the vicinity were either apathetic or 
timid, and did not stir a step for their relief The 
insurrection was nipped in the bud ; Hyrcania was 
forced to submit, and became for centuries the 
obedient vassal of her powerful neighbour. 

The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians 
into contact with the important country of Susiana or 
Elymais, an ancient seat of power, and one which had 



72 REIGN OF MTTHRIDATES I. 

flourished much during the whole of the Persian 
period, having contained within it the principal 
Persian capital, Susa. This tract possessed strong 
attractions for a conqueror ; and it appears to have 
been not very long after he had succeeded in crushing 
the Hyrcanian revolt, that Mithridates once more 
turned his arms westward, and from the advantageous 
position which he held in Media, directed an attack 
upon the rich and flourishing province which lay to 
the south. It would seem that Elymais, like Media, 
though reckoned a dependency of the Seleucid Em- 
pire, had a king of its own, who was entrusted with its 
government and defence, and expected to fight his 
own battles. At any rate we do not hear of any 
aid being rendered to the Elymgeans in this war, 
or of Mithridates having any other antagonist to 
meet in the course of it, besides " the Elymaean 
king." This monarch he defeated without diffi- 
culty, and, having overrun his country, apparently 
in a single campaign, added the entire territory to his 
dominions. 

Elymai's was interposed between two regions of 
first-rate importance, Babylonia and Persia. The 
thorough mastery of any one of the three, com- 
monly carried with it in ancient times dominion 
over the other two. So far as can be gathered from 
the scanty materials which we possess for Parthian 
history at this period, the conquest of Elymais was 
followed almost immediately by the submission of 
Babylonia and Persia to the conqueror. Media and 
Elymais having been forced to submit, the great 
Mithridates was very shortly acknowledged as their 



HIS SECOND ATTACK ON BACTRIA. 73 

sovereign lord by all the countries that intervened 
between the Paropamisus and the Lower Euphrates. 

Thus gloriously successful in this quarter, Mithri- 
dates, who may fairly be considered the greatest 
monarch of his day, after devoting a few years to 
repose, judged that the time was come for once more 
embarking on a career of aggression, and seeking a 
similar extension of his dominions towards the East 
to that which he had found it so easy to effect in 
the regions of the West. The Bactrian troubles had 
increased. Eucratidas, after greatly straining the 
resources of Bactria in his Indian wars, had been 
waylaid and murdered on his return from one of 
them by his son Heliocles, who chose to declare him 
a public enemy, drove his chariot over his corpse, and 
ordered it to be left unburied. This ill beginning 
inaugurated an unfortunate reign. Attacked by 
Scythians from the north, by Indians and Sarangians 
on the east and the south-east, Heliocles had already 
more on his hands than he could conveniently manage, 
when Mithridates declared war against him, and 
marched into his country (about B.C. 150). Already 
exhausted by his other wars, Heliocles could bear up 
no longer. Mithridates rapidly overran his dominions, 
and took possession of the greater part of them. Ac- 
cording to some he did not stop here, but pressing still 
further eastward invaded India, and carried his arms 
over the Punjab to the banks of the Hydaspes. But 
this last advance, if it ever took place, was a raid 
rather than an attempt at conquest. It had no serious 
results. Indo-Bactrian kingdoms continued to exist in 
Cabul down to about B.C. 80, when Hellenism in this 



74 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES I. 

quarter was finally swept away by the Yue-chi and 
other Scythic tribes. The Parthian Empire never 
included any portion of the Indus region, its furthest 
provinces towards the east being Bactria, Aria, 
Sarangia, Arachosia, and Sacastana. 

The great increase of power which Mithridates 
had obtained by his conquests could not be a matter 
of indifference to the Syrian monarchs. But their 
domestic troubles — the contentions between Philip 
and Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, 
Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas and Demetrius II., 
Demetrius II. and Tryphon — had so engrossed them 
for twenty years (from B.C. 162 to B.C. 142), that they 
had felt it impossible, or hopeless, to attempt any 
expedition towards the East, for the protection or 
recovery of their provinces. Mithridates had been 
allowed to pursue his career of conquest unopposed, 
so far as the Syrians were concerned, and to establish 
his sway from the Hindu Kush to the Euphrates. 
A time, however, at last came when home dangers 
were less absorbing, and a prospect of engaging the 
terrible Parthians with success seemed to present 
itself The second Demetrius had not, indeed, 
altogether overcome his domestic enemy, Tryphon ; 
but he had so far brought him into difficulties as to 
believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with by 
his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains. At the same 
time, the condition of affairs in the East seemed to 
invite his interference. Mithridates ruled his new 
conquests with some strictness, probably suspecting 
their fidelity, and determined that he would not by 
any remissness allow them to escape from his grasp. 



HIS WAR WITH DEMETRIUS NICATOR. 75 

The native inhabitants could scarcely be much 
attached to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly 
not treated them with much tenderness ; but a 
possession of one hundred and ninety years' duration 
confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may 
have galled more than one to whose pressure they 
had become accustomed. Moreover, all the provinces 
which the Parthians had taken from Syria contained 
Greek towns, and their inhabitants might at all 
times be depended on to side with their countrymen 
against the Asiatics. At the present conjuncture, 
too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by 
the addition of the recently subdued Bactrians, who 
hated the Parthian yoke, and longed for an oppor- 
tunity of recovering their freedom. 

Thus, when Demetrius II., anxious to escape the 
reproach of inertness, determined to make a great ex- 
pedition upon the formidable Parthian monarch, who 
ruled over all the countries between the Paropamisus 
and the Lower Euphrates, he found himself welcomed 
as a deliverer by a considerable number of his 
enemy's subjects, whom the harshness or the novelty 
of the Parthian rule had offended. The malcontents 
joined his standard as he advanced ; and supported, 
as he thus was, by Persian, Elymsean, and Bactrian 
contingents, he engaged and defeated the Parthians 
in several battles. Mithridates at last, recognising 
his inferiority in military strength, determined to 
have recourse to stratagem, and having put Demetrius 
off his guard by proposals of peace, made a sudden 
attack upon him, completely defeated his army, and 
took him prisoner. The conquered monarch was at 



76 REIGN OF MTTHRTDATES I. 

first treated with some harshness, being conveyed 
about to the several nations which had revolted, and 
paraded before each in turn, to show them how 
foolish they had been in lending him their aid ; but 
when this purpose had been answered, Mithridates 
showed himself magnanimous, gave his royal captive 
the honours befitting his rank, assigned him a 
residence in Hyrcania, and even gave him the hand 
of his daughter, Rhodogune, in marriage. It was 
policy, however, still more than clemency, which 
dictated this conduct. Mithridates nurtured de- 
signs against the Syrian kingdom itself, and saw 
that it would be for his advantage to have a Syrian 
prince in his camp, allied to him by marriage, whom 
he could put forward as entitled to the throne, and 
whom, if his enterprise succeeded, he might leave to 
govern Syria for him, as tributary monarch. These 
far-reaching plans might perhaps have been crowned 
with success, had the head which conceived them 
been spared to watch over and direct their execution. 
But Providence decreed otherwise. Mithridates had 
reached an advanced age, and, being attacked by 
illness soon after his capture of Demetrius, found his 
strength insufficient to battle with his malady, and, 
to the great grief of his subjects, succumbed to it 
(B.C. 136), after an eventful and glorious reign of 
thirty-eight years. 



V. 



GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. — 
LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS. 

The Parthian institutions had, no doubt, their roots 
in that early condition of society among the inhabi- 
tants of the Caspian region, which belongs to the 
twilight, rather than to the dawn of history, and 
which has to be conjectured or divined rather than 
worked out from the statements of ancient writers. 
From time immemorial this region has been mainly 
occupied by nomadic tribes, for whom alone it is 
fitted, and has been divided up among a number of 
races more or less closely allied, and generally very 
similar in character. Constant wars and raids occupy 
such races. Every man has to be a warrior ; and 
their conduct in war marks out a comparatively few 
for leaders, the mass for mere soldiery. Hence, 
something like a feudal organisation naturally pre- 
vails. The leader in war is the chieftain or noble in 
peace. An aristocracy forms itself, round which the 
" villeins " or " serfs " are grouped. When, in course 
of time, some specially perilous war threatens, or 
some enterprise is taken in hand of more than usual 
magnitude and gravity, the need of a directing hand 



78 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

is felt — the confederacy of chiefs recognises the 
weakness of a confederacy — and by common consent 
a single individual is selected as King, Great Khan, 
Dictator, Governor, Commander-in-chief Thus, in 
such a state of society as has been described, 
monarchy makes its appearance. The fittest to 
command and direct is placed at the head of affairs, 
given some title or other implying authority, and 
accepted by the general body of chiefs as their 
suzerain. 

But in conceding this authority to the necessities 
of the case, the chiefs are careful to reserve to them- 
selves considerable powers, and the result is thus a 
limited monarchy. In Parthia, the king was per- 
manently advised by two councils, consisting of 
persons not of his own nomination, whom rights, 
conferred by birth or office, entitled to their high 
positions. One of these was a family conclave 
{concilmm domesticum), or assembly of full-grown 
males of the Royal House ; the other was a Senate 
comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs 
of the nation, the " Sophi," or " Wise Man," and the 
" Magi," or " Priests." Together these two bodies 
constituted the Megistanes, the " Nobles," or " Great 
Men " — the privileged class which, to a considerable 
extent, checked and controlled the monarch. The 
monarchy was elective, but only in the house of the 
Arsacidse ; and the concurrent vote of both councils 
was necessary to the election of a new king. Prac- 
tically, the ordinary law of hereditary descent appears 
to have been commonly followed, unless in the case 
where a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise 



THE KING, THE SOPHI, AND THE MAGI. 79 

the royal office. Under such circumstances, the 
Megistanes usually nominated the late king's next 
brother to succeed him, or, if he had left no brother, 
went back to an uncle. When the line of succession 
had once been changed, the right of the elder branch 
was lost, and did not revive, unless the branch 
preferred died out or possessed no member qualified 
to rule. When a king had been duly nominated by 
the two councils, the right of placing the crown 
upon his head belonged to the Surena, the " Field- 
Marshal," or " Commander-in-chief of the Parthian 
armies." The Megistanes further claimed, and some- 
times exercised, the right of deposing a monarch 
whose conduct displeased or dissatisfied them ; but 
an attempt to exercise this privilege naturally, and 
almost necessarily, led to a civil war, since no monarch 
was likely to accept his deposition without a struggle ; 
and thus it was force, and not right, which practically 
determined whether a deposed king should lose his 
crown or no. 

After a monarch had been once elected, and 
firmly fixed upon the throne, the power which he 
wielded appears to have been very nearly despotic. 
At any rate, he could put to death without a trial 
whomsoever he chose ; and adult members of the 
Royal House, who ventured to provoke the reigning 
monarch's jealousy, were constantly so treated. But 
probably it would have been more risky to arouse 
the fears of the " Sophi " or " Magi." The latter 
especially were a powerful body, consisting of an 
organised hierarchy which had come down from 
ancient times, and was feared and venerated by all 



8o GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

classes of the people. Their numbers at the close of 
the empire, counting adult males only, are reckoned 
at eighty thousand ; they possessed considerable 
tracts of fertile land, and were the sole inhabitants of 
many large towns or villages, which they were per- 
mitted to govern as seemed good to them. The 
arbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, 
have been largely checked by the privileges of this 
numerous priestly class, of which it would seem that, 
in the later times, they became jealous, thereby 
preparing the way for their own downfall. 

The dominion of the Parthians over the provinces, 
which Mithridates and earlier kings had conquered, 
was maintained by reverting to the system which had 
prevailed generally throughout the East before the 
accession of the Achaemenian Persians to power, and 
which is the simplest and rudest of all possible 
empire organisations. This was the system of 
establishing in the various countries either viceroys, ' 
holding office for life, or else dependent dynasties of 
kings. In either case, the rulers, so long as they paid 
their tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchs, and 
furnished the contingents required of them for the 
wars in which Parthia was almost always engaged, 
were allowed to govern the people under their sway 
at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher 
sense of the term, who nevertheless were vassals to 
Parthia, may be enumerated the kings of Persia, 
Elymais, Adiabene, Osrhoene, and of Armenia and 
Media Atropatene, when they formed, as they some- 
times did, portions of the Parthian Empire. The 
viceroys, who governed the other provinces, bore the 



THE VITAXM, OR VASSAL MONARCHS. 8l 

title of Vitaxse, or Bistakes, and were fourteen or 
fifteen in number. The remark has been made by 
perhaps the greatest of EngHsh historians, Gibbon, 
that the system thus estabHshed " exhibited under 
other names, a hvely image of the feudal system, 
which has since prevailed in Europe." The com- 
parison is of some value, as pointing out an analogy 
which might otherwise have been overlooked ; but, 
like most historical parallels it is inexact, the points 
of difference between the Parthian and the feudal 
systems being probably more numerous than those of 
resemblance, but the points of resemblance being very 
main points, not few in number, and striking. It was 
with special reference to the system thus established 
that the Parthian monarchs took the title of " King 
of Kings "— BASIAEYS BASIAE£2N— so frequent 
upon their coins — a title exchanged, but in one in- 
stance only, for "Satrap of Satraps" — SATPAIIHS 
TQN SATPAOQN. The title "King of Kings" 
naturally appears first on the coins of Mithridates. 
In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of 
a very curious character. The Grecian cities which 
were scattered in large numbers throughout the 
empire, foundations of Alexander or his successors, 
enjoyed a municipal government of their own, and in 
some cases were almost independent communities, 
the Parthian kings exercising over them little or no 
control. The great city of Seleucia upon the Tigris 
was the most important of these places ; its popula- 
tion was estimated in the first century after Christ at 
six hundred thousand souls ; it had strong walls, and 
was surrounded by a most fertile territory. Tacitus 



82 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

tells US that it had its own senate, or municipal 
council of three hundred members, elected by the 
inhabitants to rule over them, from among the 
wealthiest and best educated of the citizens. Under 
ordinary circumstances it enjoyed the blessing of 
complete self-government, and was entirely free from 
Parthian interference, paying no doubt its appointed 
tribute, but otherwise holding the position of a " free 
city." It was only in the case of internal dissensions 
that these advantages were lost, and the Parthian 
soldiery, invited within the walls, arranged the 
quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of the 
State at its pleasure. Privileges of a similar character, 
though probably less extensive, belonged, it would 
seem, to most of the other Greek cities, at least 
seventy in number, contained within the empire. The 
Parthian monarchs thought it politic to favour them ; 
and their practice in this respect justified the title of 
" Phil- Hellene," which they were fond of assuming 
upon their coins. On the whole, the policy may have 
been wise, but it diminished the unity of the empire, 
and there were times when serious danger arose from 
it. The Syro-Macedonian monarchs could always 
count with certainty on having powerful friends in 
Parthia, anxious to render them assistance, what- 
ever portion of it they invaded ; and even the 
Romans, though their ethnic connection with the 
cities was not so close, were sometimes indebted to 
them for aid of an important kind. 

Another anomaly of a similar character, but of less 
importance, since the number of persons which it 
affected cannot have been nearly so great, was the 



THE FREE CITIES — GREEK AND JEWISH. 83 

position occupied by the Jewish communities within 
the Parthian state. These, though far less numerous 
than the Grecian, were still not infrequent, and their 
location in some of the most considerable cities of 
the empire gave them a consequence which makes it 
necessary that they should not be overlooked. In 
Babylon, in Seleucia, in Ctesiphon, and in other 
principal towns, as Susa probably, and Rhages, there 
was so large a Jewish element in the population, that 
it had been thought best to give them municipal 
independence, the power to elect magistrates, and 
perhaps a special quarter in each town to dwell in. 
There were also a certain number of places the 
inhabitants of which were wholly Jews, and these 
enjoyed similar privileges with the " free towns " of 
the Greeks. Hence another element of weakness in 
the organisation of the empire, wherein an amalga- 
mation of races, or even a thorough consolidation 
was impossible. The worst results showed themselves 
in the towns with mixed populations, where, from time 
to time, the most fearful disturbances broke out, often 
terminating in horrible massacres. 

A Greek author of the Augustan age tells us, that 
the Great Mithridates, after effecting his conquests, 
made a collection of the best laws which he found 
to prevail among the various subject peoples, and 
imposed them on the Parthian nation. This state- 
ment is, no doubt, an exaggeration ; but we may 
attribute to Mithridates with some reason, the intro- 
duction at this time of various practices and usages, 
whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated to those 
of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became 



84 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

in the eyes of foreigners the successor and repre- 
sentative of the old Assyrian and Persian kingdoms. 
The assumption of new titles and of a new state — the 
organisation of the Court on a new plan — the bestowal 
of a new character on the subordinate officers of the 
empire, were suitable to the new phase of its life on 
which the monarchy had now entered, and may with 
the highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, 
be assigned to this period. 

It has been already noticed that Mithridates I. 
appears to have been the first Parthian sovereign 
who took the sounding title of " King of Kings." The 
title had been a favourite one with the old Assyrian 
and Persian monarchs, but was not adopted either by 
the Seleucidae or by the Greek kings of Bactria. Its 
revival implied a distinct pretension to that mastery 
of Western Asia, which had belonged of old to the 
Assyrians and Persians, and which was, in later times, 
formally claimed by Artaxerxes, the son of Babek, 
the founder of the New Persian Kingdom. Previous 
Parthian monarchs had been content to call them- 
selves " the King," or " the Great King " — Mithridates 
I, is " the King of Kings, the great and illustrious 
Arsaces " — BASIAEIIS BASIAEQN MEFAAOY 
APSAKOY Enia>ANOYS. 

At the same time Mithridates appears to have 
assumed the tiara, or tall stiff crown which, with 
certain modifications in its shape, had been the mark 
of sovereignty, both under the Assyrians and under 
the Persians. Previously the royal headdress had 
been either a mere cap of a Scythic type, pointed, but 
lower than the Scyths usually wore it, or the ordinary 



TITLES, DRESS, AND STATUS OF THE KING. 85 

diadem, which was a band encircling the head, and 
terminating in two long ribbons or ends, that hung 
down behind the head on the back. According to 
Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was double ; 
but the coins of Parthia do not exhibit this peculiarity. 
The cap of the first king is ornamented with pendant 
pearls in front ; the stiff tiara of Mithridates has three 
rows of pearls sewn on to it. 

Ammianus Marcellinus tells us that among the 
titles assumed by the Parthian monarchs was that 
of " Brother of the Sun and Moon." The Shahs of 
modern Persia still claim the epithet. It is ordinarily 
used, not so much by themselves, as by their courtiers 
and subjects, in the language of compliment, and this 
may have been to some extent the case in Parthia. 
Still, there is reason to believe that in the minds of 
men at the time, something of a divine character was 
regarded as attaching to the Arsacid race. In the 
civil contentions, which form so main a feature of the 
later history, combatants abstained from lifting their 
hands knowingly against one of the royal stock, 
since to kill or wound one was looked upon as a 
sacrilege. The actual name of ©eo?, " God," was even 
assumed as a title by at least one of the kings, and a 
favourite epithet upon the coins is OeoTrdrcop, which 
implies the divinity of the king's father. After his 
death the monarch seems generally to have been the 
object of a qualified worship ; statues were erected 
to him in the temples, where they were apparently 
associated with the images of the Sun-God and the 
Moon-God. 

No account of the Parthian Court has come down 



86 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

to US that is either complete or altogether trustworthy ; 
but some particulars may be gathered of it from the 
scattered notices of various ancient writers, on which 
we may place reliance. The best authorities are 
agreed that it was not stationary, but migrated at 
different times of the year to different cities of the 
empire, in this respect resembling the Court of the 
Achsemenians. It is not quite clear, however, which 
of the cities were thus honoured. Ctesiphon was 
undoubtedly one of them. All wjriters agree that it 
was the chief city of the empire, and the ordinary 
seat of the government. Here, according to Strabo, 
the kings passed the winter months, delighting in the 
excellence of the air. The town was situated on the 
left bank of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or 
thirteen miles below the modern Baghdad. Pliny 
says that it was built by the Parthians in order to 
reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and that when it 
failed of its purpose, they built another city, Volo- 
gesocerta, in the same neighbourhood with the same 
object ; but the account of Strabo is more probable — 
namely, that it grew up gradually out of the wish of 
the Parthian kings to spare Seleucia the unpleasant- 
ness of having the rude soldiery, which followed the 
Court from place to place, quartered upon them. The 
remainder of the year, according to the same authority, 
was spent by the Parthian monarchs either at the 
Median city of Ecbatana, which is the modern 
Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrcania. In 
Hyrcania the palace, Strabo says, was at Tape ; and 
between this place and Ecbatana he appears to have 
regarded the monarchs as spending the whole time 



SPLENDOUR OF THE COURT. 87 

which was not passed at Ctesiphon. Athenseus, how- 
ever, declares that Rhages, near the Caspian Gates, 
was the spring residence of the Parthian l<ings ; and 
it seems not unHkely that this famous city, which 
Isidore of Charax, writing in Parthian times, calls 
" the greatest in Media," was among the occasional 
residences of the Court. Parthia itself was, it would 
seem, deserted ; but still a city of that region pre- 
served in one respect a royal character, being the 
place where all the earlier monarchs were interred. 
Ultimately Arbela became the royal burying-place. 

The pomp and grandeur. of the Parthian kings are 
described only in the vaguest terms by the Greek and 
Roman writers. No author of repute, whose remains 
have come down to us, appears to have visited the 
Parthian Court. We may perhaps best obtain a true 
notion of the splendour of the sovereign from the 
accounts which have reached us of his relations and 
great officers, who can have reflected only faintly the 
magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells us that 
the general whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war 
against Crassus came into the field accompanied by 
two hundred litters wherein were contained his con- 
cubines, and by a thousand camels which carried his 
baggage. His dress was the long flowing robe of 
the ancient Medes ; he wore his hair parted down the 
middle, and had his face painted with cosmetics. A 
body of ten thousand horse, composed entirely of his 
clients and slaves, followed him in battle. We may 
conclude from this picture, and from the general 
tenor of the classical notices, that the Arsacidae 
revived and maintained very much such a Court as 



88 GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

that of the old Achsemenian princes, falling probably 
somewhat below their model in general politeness and 
refinement, but equalling it in luxury, in extravagant 
expenditure, and in display. Moreover, in one respect, 
an advance was made beyond the limits of Achae- 
menian civilisation. The theatrical representations 
introduced into Asia by the Greeks proved extra- 
ordinarily attractive to the semi-barbaric race, 
unacquainted hitherto with any such performances. 
The Greek language and literature were so far studied 
as to render the representation of Greek dramas 
intelligible to the upper classes. " An exotic litera- 
ture and a gaudy theatre flourished at Seleucia under 
the royal patronage, the ritual ceremonies of the most 
graceful of superstitions were too closely interwoven 
with the forms of the Grecian drama not to follow in 
its train. The Court of Seleucia presented a motley 
combination of the manners of different ages and 
countries, only to be paralleled, perhaps, in the semi- 
European fashions of St. Petersburg and Moscow." ^ 

But if, at their Court, the Parthian kings thus 
tolerated, or even encouraged, luxurious habits and 
enervating amusements, among the bulk of the nation, 
the very opposite characteristics prevailed. The taint 
of their Scythian origin always clung to the Parthian 
people. They had always about them, as Strabo 
notes, " much that was barbaric and Scythic." The 
organisation of their army was very rude. Each 
chieftain brought into the field, like the nobles of the 
Middle Ages, an indefinite and probably uncounted 
contingent of retainers, armed as their means allowed 

' See Merivale, "Roman Empire," vol. ii. pp. 3, 4. 



RUDE ORGANISATION OF THE ARAIY. 89 

them^— some, the richest, in coats of scale or chain 
armour, and mounted on steeds similarly protected, 
carrying, besides the universal bow and arrows, a 
long spear or pike — others lightly equipped, without 
armour, and carrying nothing but a bow and arrows, 
with a short sword or knife. Of these last, a portion 
only were mounted, while the remainder served on 
foot. When the contingents united, the troops were 
simply massed together, according to their character, 
into three bodies — the heavy cavalry, the light cavalry, 
and the foot. There were no divisions corresponding 
to the Roman legions, or our regiments ; and, ap- 
parently, no petty officers each contingent simply 
obeying its chief When he went out to battle with 
his army, the king was, of course. Commander-in- 
chief In his absence, his place was taken by a 
Surena, or field-marshal, appointed by him to the 
command. There was, however a chief Surena, whose 
ofifice was hereditary, and who, besides commanding 
in the field, was a great State official. 

Such seems to have been the general character of 
those practices and institutions which distinguished 
the Parthians from the foundation of their empire 
by Mithridates. Some of them, it is probable, he 
rather adopted than invented ; but there is no good 
reason for doubting that of many he was the 
originator. He appears to have been one of those 
rare individuals to whom it has been given to unite 
the powers and capacities which form the conqueror 
with those which constitute the successful organiser 
of a State. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt 
to seize an occasion and skilful to turn it to the best 



go GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM OF MITHRIDATES I. 

advantage, not even averse to severities when they 
seemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony 
towards those who had resisted his arms, but was 
ready to befriend them as soon as their resistance 
ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic, he conciliated 
those whom he subdued almost more easily than he 
subdued them, and by the efforts of a few years 
succeeded in welding together a dominion which 
lasted without suffering serious mutilation for nearly 
four centuries. Though not formally dignified with 
the epithet of " Great," he was beyond all question the 
greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times did 
him more justice than his contemporaries ; and, when 
the names of almost all the other kings had sunk 
into oblivion, retained his in honour, and placed it 
on a par with that of the original founder of Par- 
thian independence. " The Parthians,' says Agathias, 
" though a subject nation, and previously of very little 
reputation, put an end to the dominion of the Mace- 
donians, and subsequently became lords of the whole 
empire except Egypt, Arsaces first of all beginning 
the rebellion, and Mithridates not very long afterwards 
exalting the Parthian name to a high pitch of glory." 




VI. 



LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA — DEFEAT AND DEATH 
OF ANTIOCHUS SIDETES. 

The death of Mithridates, and the accession of a 
comparatively unenterprising successor, Phraates II., 
encouraged Syria to make one more effort to thrust 
the Parthians back into their native wilds, and to 
recover the dominion of Western Asia. So great a 
position was not a thing to be surrendered without 




COIN OF PHRAATES II. 



a final, even if it were a despairing, struggle ; and in 
the actual position of affairs it was quite open to 
question whether, on the whole, Parthia or Syria 
were the stronger. The dominion of both countries 
was comparatively recent ; neither had any firm hold 
on its outlying provinces ; neither could claim to 



92 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

have conciliated to itself the affections of the Western 
Asiatics generally, or to rest its power on any other 
basis than that of military force. And in military 
force it was uncertain which way the balance inclined. 
Both countries had a nucleus of native troops, on 
which absolute reliance might be placed, which was 
brave, faithful, stanch, and would contend to the 
death for their respective sovereigns. But, beyond 
this, both had also a fluctuating body of unwilling 
subjects or subject-allies, unworthy of implicit trust, 
and likely to gravitate to one side or the other, 
according as hope, or fancy, or the merest caprice 
might decide. The chances of victory or defeat 
turned mainly on this fluctuating body, the in- 
stability of which had been amply proved in the 
wars of the last half-century. Those wars them- 
selves, taken as a whole, had manifested no decided 
preponderance of either people over the other ; at 
one time Parthia, at another Syria, had been hard 
pressed ; and it was natural for the leaders on either 
side to believe that accidental circumstances, rather 
than any marked .superiority of one of the two 
peoples over the other, had brought about the re- 
sults that had been reached. 

In the last war that had been waged success had 
finally rested with Parthia. An entire army had been 
destroyed, and the Syrian monarch captured. Deme- 
trius " the Conqueror," as he called himself, was 
expiating in the cold and rugged region of Hyrcania, 
the rashness which had led him to deem himself a 
match for the craft and strategic skfll of Mithridates. 
But now a new and untried monarch was upon the 



RETGN OF PHRAATES IT. 93 

throne — one who was clearly without his father's 
ambition, and probably lacked his ability. Settled 
in his kingdom for the space of six years, he had 
not only attempted nothing against Syria, but had 
engaged in no military enterprise whatever. Yet the 
condition of Syria had been such as to offer the 
strongest possible temptation to a neighbour pos- 
sessed of courage and energy. Civil war had raged, 
and exhausted the resources of the country, from 
B.C. 146 to 137, after which there had been a pro- 
tracted struggle between the Syrians and the Jews 
(B.C. 137-133), in which the Syrian arms had at 
first been worsted, but had at length asserted their 
superiority. Had Phraates II., the son and suc- 
cessor of Mithridates, inherited a tenth part of his 
father's military spirit, he would have taken advan- 
tage of this troubled time to carry the war into 
Syria Proper, and might have shaken the Syrian 
throne to its base, or even wholly overturned it. In 
the person of the captured Demetrius, he possessed 
one whom he might have set up as a pretender with 
a certainty of drawing many Syrians to his side, and 
whom he might, if successful, have left to rule as 
Vitaxa, or subject king, the country of which he had 
once been actual monarch. But Phraates had no 
promptitude, no enterprise. He let all the oppor- 
tunities which offered themselves escape him, content 
to keep watch on Demetrius — when he escaped from 
confinement, to pursue and retake him — and to hold 
him in reserve as a force of which he might one day 
make use, when it seemed to him that the fitting time 
was come for it. 



94 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

The result of his long procrastination was, that the 
war, when renewed, was renewed from the othfer side. 
Antiochus Sidetes, who had succeeded to the Syrian 
throne on the captivity of his brother, Demetrius, and 
had taken to wife his brother's wife, Cleopatra, having 
crushed the pretender, Tryphon, with her assistance, 
and then with some difficulty enforced submission on 
the Jews, felt himself, in B.C. 129, at liberty to resume 
the struggle with Parthia, and, having made great 
preparations, set out for the East with the full inten- 
tion of releasing his brother, and recovering his lost 
provinces. 

It is impossible to accept without considerable 
reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the 
force which Antiochus collected. According to Justin, 
it consisted of no more than eighty thousand fighting 
men, to whom were attached the incredible number of 
three hundred thousand camp-followers, the majority 
of them consisting of cooks, bakers, and actors ! As 
in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but 
equal, or a little exceed, the number of men fit for 
actual service, this estimate, which makes them nearly 
four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit 
The late historian, Orosius, corrects the error here 
indicated ; but his account seems to err in rating the 
supernumeraries too low. According to him, the 
armed force amounted to three hundred thousand, 
while the camp-followers, including grooms, sutlers, 
courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of 
the number. From the two accounts, taken together, 
we are perhaps entitled to conclude that the entire 
host did not fall much short of four hundred thousand 



INVASION OF ANTIOCHUS SIDETES. 95 

men. This estimate receives a certain amount of 
confirmation from an independent statement made 
incidentally by Diodorus, with respect to the number 
on the Syrian side that fell in the campaign, which he 
estimates at three hundred thousand. 

The army of Phraates, according to two consentient 
accounts, numbered no more than a hundred and 
twenty thousand. An attempt which he made to 
enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries 
from the regions beyond the Oxus failed, the Scyths 
being quite willing to lend their aid, but arriving too 
late at the rendezvous to be of any use. At the same 
time a defection on the part of the subject princes 
deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which 
usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the 
support of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. 
Under these circumstances it is more surprising that 
he was able to collect a hundred and twenty thousand 
men than that he did not succeed in bringing into the 
field a larger number. 

The Syrian troops were magnificently appointed. 
The common soldiers had their military boots 
fastened with buckles or studs of gold ; and the 
culinary utensils, in which the food of the army 
was cooked, were in many instances of silver. It 
seemed as if banqueting, rather than fighting, was 
to be the order of the day. But to suppose that 
this M^as actually so would be to do the army of 
Antiochus an injustice. History, from the time of 
Sardanapalus to that of the Crimean War of 1854-6, 
abounds with instances of the somewhat strange com- 
bination of luxurious habits with valour of the highest 



96 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

kind. No charge of poltroonery can be established 
against the Syrian soldiery, who, on the contrary, 
seem to have played their part in the campaign with 
credit. They were accompanied by a body of Jews 
under John Hyrcanus, the son of Simon and grand- 
son of the first Maccabee leader, who had been forced 
to take up temporarily the position of a Syrian 
feudatory. As they advanced through the Meso- 
potamian region after crossing the Euphrates, they 
received continually fresh accessions of strength by 
the arrival of contingents from the Parthian tributary 
states, which, disgusted with Parthian arrogance and 
coarseness, or perhaps attracted by Syrian luxury 
and magnificence, embraced the cause of the invader. 
Phraates, on his part, instead of awaiting attack in 
the fastnesses of Parthia or Hyrcania, advanced to 
meet his enemy across the Assyrian and Babylonian 
plains, and, either in person or by his generals, 
engaged the Syrian monarch in three pitched battles, 
in each of which he was worsted. One of these was 
fought upon the banks of the Greater Zab or Lycus, 
in Adiabene, not far from the site of Arbela, where 
Antiochus met and defeated the Parthian general, 
Indates, and raised a trophy in honour of his victory. 
The exact scene of the other two engagements is un- 
known to us, and in no case have we any description 
of the battles, so that we have no means of judging 
whether it was by superiority of force or of strategy 
that the Syrian monarch thus far prevailed, and 
obtained almost the whole for which he was fighting. 
The entire province of Babylonia, the heart of the 
empire, where were situated the three great cities of 



EARLY SUCCESSES OF SIDETES. 97 

Babylon, Seleucia, and Ctesiphon, fell into his hands, 
and a further defection of the tributary countries from 
the Parthian cause took place, a defection so wide- 
spread, that the writer who records it says, with a 
certain amount of rhetoric, no doubt — " Phraates had 
now nothing left to him beyond the limits of the 
original Parthian territory." He maintained, however, 
a position somewhere in the Lower Babylonian plain, 
and still confronted Antiochus with an army, which, 
though beaten, was bent on resistance. 

When affairs were in this state, Phraates, recognis- 
ing the peril of his position, came to the conclusion 
that it was necessary to attempt, at any rate, a diver- 
sion. He had still what seemed to him a winning 
card in his hand, and it was time to play it. Deme- 
trius, the brother of Antiochus, and dejiLve the king of 
Syria, was still in his possession, watched and carefully 
guarded in the rough Hyrcanian home, from which he 
had twice escaped, but only to be re-captured. He 
would send Demetrius into Syria under an escort of 
Parthian troops, who should conduct him to the 
frontier and give him the opportunity of recovering 
his kingdom. It would be strange if one, entitled to 
the throne by his birth, and its actual occupant for the 
space of six years, could not rally to himself a party 
in a country always ready to welcome pretenders, and 
to accept, as valid, claims that were utterly baseless. 
Let troubles break out in his rear, let his rule over 
Syria be threatened in Syria itself, and Antiochus 
would, he thought, either hasten home, or, at the least, 
be greatly alarmed, have his attention distracted from 
his aggressive designs, and be afraid of plunging 



gS LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

deeper into Asia, lest, while grasping at the shadow of 
power, he should lose the substance. 

Demetrius and his Parthian escort set out, but the 
distance to be traversed was great, and travelling 
is slow in Asia. Moreover, the winter time was 
approaching, and each week would increase the diffi- 
culties of locomotion. The scheme of Phraates hung 
fire. No immediate effect followed from it. Antio- 
chus may not have received intelligence of the 
impending danger, or he may have thought his wife, 
Cleopatra, whom he had left at Antioch, capable of 
coping with it. In any case, it is certain that his 
movements were in no way affected by the bolt which 
Phraates had launched at him Instead of withdraw- 
ing his troops from the occupied provinces and 
marching them back into Syria, thus relinquishing all 
that he had gained by his successful campaign, he 
resolved to maintain all the conquests that he had made, 
and to keep his troops where they were, merely 
dividing them, on account of their numbers, among 
the various cities which he had taken, and making 
them go into winter quarters. His design was carried 
out ; the army was dispersed ; discipline was probably 
somewhat relaxed ; and the soldiery, having no 
military duties to perform, amused themselves, as 
foreign soldiers are apt to do, by heavy requisitions, 
and by cavalier treatment of the native inhabitants. 

Some months of the winter passed in this way. 
Gradually the discontent of the civil populations in 
the cities increased. Representations were made to 
Phraates by secret messengers, that the yoke of the 
Syrians was found to be intolerable, and that, if he 



SECRET MACHINATIONS OF PHRAATES. 99 

would give the signal, the cities were ripe for revolt. 
Much hidden negotiation must have taken place before 
a complete arrangement could have been made, or a 
fixed plan settled on. As in the " Saint Bartholomew," 
as in the " Sicilian Vespers," as in the great outbreak 
against the Roman power in Asia Minor under 
Mithridates of Pontus, the secret must have been 
communicated to hundreds, who, with a marvellous 
tenacity of purpose, kept it inviolate for weeks or 
months, so that not a whisper reached the ears of the 
victims. Sunk in a delicious dream of the most 
absolute security, careless of the feelings, and deaf to 
the grumblings of the townsmen, the Syrian soldiers 
continued to enjoy their long and pleasant holiday, 
without a suspicion of the danger that was impending. 
Meanwhile Phraates arranged all the details of his 
plan, and communicated them to his confederates. It 
was agreed that, on an appointed day, all the cities 
should break out in revolt ; the natives should take 
arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, 
and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates 
promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent the 
scattered garrisons from giving help to each other. 
It was calculated that, in this way, the invaders might 
be cut off almost to a man without the trouble of 
even fighting a battle. 

But, before he proceeded to these terrible extremi- 
ties, the Parthian prince, touched perhaps with com- 
passion, determined to give his adversary a chance 
of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely con- 
cessions. The winter was not over ; but the snow was 
beginning to melt through the increasing warmth of 



100 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

the sun's rays, and the day appointed for the general 
rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that 
no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambas- 
sadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire 
on what terms it would be granted him. The reply 
of Antiochus, according to Diodorus, was as follows : 
"If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, 
from captivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at 
the same time restoring all the provinces which had 
been taken by Parthia from Syria, and consenting to 
pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had ; 
but not otherwise." To such terms it was, of course, 
impossible that any Parthian king should listen ; and 
the ambassadors of Phraates returned, therefore, 
without further parley. 

Soon afterwards, the day appointed for the out- 
break arrived. Apparently, even yet no suspicion had 
been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere 
quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, 
when, suddenly and without any warning, they found 
themselves attacked by the natives. Taken at disad- 
vantage, it was impossible for them to make a success- 
ful resistance ; and it would seem that the great bulk 
of them were massacred in their quarters. Antiochus, 
and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far 
as we hear, escaped into the open field, and contended 
for their lives in just warfare. It had been the 
intention of the Syrian monarch, when he quitted his 
station, to hasten to the protection of the division 
quartered nearest to him ; but he had no sooner com- 
menced his march than he found himself confronted 
by Phraates, who was at the head of his main army, 



THE GREAT MASSACRE. lOI 

having, no doubt, anticipated the design of Antiochus 
and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was 
anxious to engage at once, as his force far out- 
numbered that commanded by his adversary ; but the 
latter might have declined the battle had he so willed, 
and have at any rate greatly protracted the struggle. 
He had a mountain region — Mount Zagros, probably 
— within a short distance of him, and might have 
fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at 
great disadvantage ; but he was still at an age when 
caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity 
to pass for true courage. Despite the advice of one 
of his captains, he determined to accept the battle 
which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe 
whom he had three times defeated. But the determi- 
nation of the commander was ill seconded by the 
army which he commanded. Though Antiochus 
fought strenuously, he was defeated, since his troops 
were without heart and offered but a poor resistance. 
Athenaeus, the general who had advised retreat, was 
the first to fly, and then the whole army broke up 
and dispersed itself Antiochus himself perished, 
either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His 
son, Seleucus, and a niece, a daughter of his brother, 
Demetrius, who had accompanied him in his expe- 
dition, were captured. His troops were either cut to 
pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of 
those slain in the battle, and in the general massacre, 
was reckoned at three hundred thousand. 

Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was 
the last which any Seleucid monarch conducted into 
these countries — the final attempt made by Syria to 



102 LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA. 

repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. 
Henceforth, Parthia was no further troubled by the 
power that had hitherto been her most dangerous and 
most constant enemy, but was allowed to enjoy, with- 
out molestation from Syria, the conquests which she 
had effected. Syria, in fact, had received so deep a 
wound that she had from this time a difficulty in pre- 
serving her own existence. The immediate result of 
the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the 
revolt of Judaea, which henceforth maintained its 
independence uninterruptedly to the time of the 
Romans. The dominions of the Seleucidae were 
reduced to Cilicia, and Syria Proper, or the tract west 
of the Euphrates between the chain of Am anus and 
Palestine. Internally, the Syrian state was agitated 
by constant commotions from the claims of various 
pretenders to the sovereignty ; externally, it was kept 
in continual alarm by the F^gyptians, the Romans, 
and the Armenians. During the sixty years that 
elapsed between the return of Demetrius to his king- 
dom (B.C. 128) and the conversion of Syria into a 
Roman province (B.C. 65) she ceased wholly to be 
formidable to her neighbours. Her flourishing period 
was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which 
there was no recovery. It is surprising that the 
Romans did not step in earlier, to terminate a rule 
which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome, 
however, had other work on her hands — civil troubles, 
social wars, and the struggle with Mithridates ; and 
hence the Syrian state continued to exist till the year 
B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition. 
In Parthia itself the consequences of Syria's defeat 



RESULTS — REMOTE AND IMMEDIATE. 103 

and collapse were less important than might have 
been expected. One would naturally have looked to 
see, as the immediate result, a fresh development of 
the aggressive spirit, and a burst of energy and enter- 
prise parallel to that which had carried the arms of 
Mithridates I., from his Parthian fastnesses to the 
Hydaspes on the one hand and to the Euphrates on the 
other. But no such result followed. We hear indeed 
of Phraates intending to follow up his victory over 
Antiochus by a grand attack upon Syria — an attack 
to which, if it had taken place, she must almost 
certainly have succumbed — but, in point of fact, the 
relations between the two countries continued for 
many years after the Great Massacre, peaceful, if not 
even friendly. Phraates celebrated the obsequies of 
Antiochus with the pomp and ceremony befitting a 
powerful king, and ultimately placed his remains in a 
coffin of silver, and sent them into Syria, to find their 
last resting-place in their native country. He treated 
Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, who had been made 
prisoner in the final battle, with the highest honour, 
and took to wife Antiochus's niece, who fell into his 
hands at the same time. The royal houses of the 
Seleucidae and the Arsacidas became thus doubly 
allied ; and, all grounds for further hostilities having 
been - removed, peace and amity were established 
between the former rivals. No doubt a powerful 
motive influencing Parthia in the adoption of this 
policy was that revelation of a new danger which 
will form the chief subject of the ensuing section. 



VII. 



PRESSURE OF THE NORTHERN NOMADS UPON 
PARTHIA — SCYTHIC WARS OF PHRAATES H. 
AND ARTABANUS II. 



The Turanian or Tatar races by which Central 
and Northern Asia are inhabited, have at all times 
constituted a serious danger to the inhabitants 
of the softer South. Hordes of wild barbarians 
wander over those inhospitable regions, increase, 
multiply, exert a pressure on their southern neigh- 
bours, and are felt as a perpetual menace. Every 
now and then a crisis arrives. Population has 
increased beyond the means of subsistence, or a 
novel ambition has seized a tribe or a powerful 
chief, and the barrier, which has hitherto proved a 
sufficient restraint, is forced. There issues suddenly 
out of the frozen bosom of the North a stream of 
coarse, uncouth savages— brave, hungry, countless — 
who swarm into the fairer southern regions deter- 
minedly, irresistibly ; like locusts winging their flight 
into a green land. How such multitudes come to be 
propagated in countries where life is with difficulty 
sustained, we do not know ; why the impulse 
suddenly seizes them to quit their old haunts and 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF NOMADIC INROADS. 10$ 

move steadily in a given direction, we cannot say ; 
but we see that the phenomenon is one of constant 
recurrence, and we have thus come to regard it as 
being scarcely curious or strange at all. In Asia, 
Cimmerians, Scythians, Comans, Mongols, Turks ; in 
Europe, Gauls, Goths, Huns, Avars, Vandals, Bur- 
gundians, Lombards, Bulgarians, have successively 
illustrated the law, and made us familiar with its 
operation. " Inroads of the northern barbarians " 
has become a common -place with writers of history, 
and there is scarcely any country of the South, 
whether in Asia or in Europe, that has not ex- 
perienced them. 

Such inroads are very dreadful when they take 
place. Hordes of savages, coarse and repulsive in 
their appearance, fierce in their tempers, rude in their 
habits, not perhaps individually very brave or strong, 
but powerful by their numbers, and sometimes by a 
new mode of warfare, which it is found difficult to 
meet, pour into the seats of civilisation, and spread 
havoc around. On they come (as before observed) 
like a flight of locusts, countless, irresistible — finding 
the land before them a garden, and leaving it behind 
them a howling wilderness. Neither sex nor age is 
spared. The inhabitants of the open country and of 
the villages, if they do not make their escape to high 
mountain tops or other strongholds, are ruthlessly 
massacred by the invaders, or, at best, forced to 
become their slaves. The crops are consumed, the 
flocks and herds swept off or destroyed, the villages 
and homesteads burnt, the whole country made a 
scene of desolation. Walled towns perhaps resist 



Io6 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 

them, as they have not often patience enough for 
sieges ; but sometimes, with a dogged determination, 
they sit down before the ramparts, and by a pro- 
longed blockade, starve the defenders into sub- 
mission. Then there ensues an indescribable scene 
of havoc, rapine, and bloodshed. Ancient cities, 
rich with the " accumulated stores of ages, are ran- 
sacked and perhaps burnt ; priceless works of art 
often perish ; civilisations which it has taken 
centuries to build up are trampled down. Few 
things are more terrible than the devastation and 
ruin which such an inroad has often spread over a 
fair and smiling kingdom, even when it has merely 
swept over it, like a passing storm, and has led to no 
permanent occupation. 

Against a danger of this kind the Parthian princes 
had had, almost from the first, to guard. They were 
themselves of the nomadic race — Turanians, if our 
hypothesis concerning them be sound — and had es- 
tablished their kingdom by an invasion of the type 
above described. But they had immediately become 
settlers, inhabitants of cities ; they had been softened, 
to a certain extent, civilised ; and now they looked 
on the nomadic hordes of the North with the same 
dislike and disgust with which the Persians and the 
Greco - Macedonians had formerly regarded them. 
In the Scythians of the Trans-Oxianian tract they 
saw an unceasing peril, and one, moreover, which 
was, about the time of Phraates, continually increas- 
ing and becoming more and more threatening. 

F'ully to explain the position of affairs in this 
quarter, we must ask the reader to accompany us 



THE YUE-CHI AND THE SU. 107 

into the remoter regions of inner Asia, where the 
Turanian tribes had their headquarters. There, 
about the year B.C. 200, a Turanian people called 
the Yue-chi were expelled from their territory on 
the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu, whom some 
identify with the Huns. " The Yue-chi separated 
into two bands : the smaller descended southwards 
into Thibet ; the larger passed westwards, and after 
a hard struggle, dispossessed a people called ' Su,' of 
the plains west of the river of Hi. The latter ad- 
vanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes ; and the Yue- 
chi not long afterwards retreating from the U-siun, 
another nomadic race, passed the ' Su ' on the north, 
and occupied the tracts between the Oxus and the 
Caspian. The ' Su ' were thus in the vicinity of the 
Bactrian Greeks ; the Yue-chi in the neighbourhood 
of the Parthians." ^ On the particulars of this ac- 
count, which comes from the Chinese historians, we 
cannot perhaps altogether depend ; but there is no 
reason to doubt the main fact, testified by an eye- 
witness, that the Yue-chi, having migrated about the 
period mentioned from the interior of Asia, .had 
established themselves sixty years later (B.C. 140) 
in the Caspian region. Such a movement would 
necessarily have thrown the entire previous popula- 
tion of those parts into commotion, and would 
probably have precipitated them upon their neigh- 
bours. It accounts satisfactorily for the unusual 
pressure of the northern hordes at this period on the 
Parthians, the Bactrians, and even the Indians ; and it 
completely explains the crisis of Parthian history 

' See Wilson, " Ariana Antiqua," p. 303. 



I08 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 

which we have now reached, and the necessity which 
lay upon the nation of meeting, and if possible over- 
coming, a new danger. 

In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen 
to which we have before alluded, and to which, in 
ancient times, the civilised world was always liable 
from an outburst of northern barbarism. Whether 
the peril has altogether passed away or not, we need 
not here inquire, but certainly in the old world there 
was always a chance that civilisation, art, refinement, 
luxury, might suddenly and almost without warning 
be swept away by an overwhelming influx of savagery 
from the North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when 
the evil, so far as we know, first showed itself, the 
danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing governors 
both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time 
guarded against. The expeditions of Cyrus against 
the Massagetae, of Darius Hystaspis against the 
European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getae, of 
Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed 
to check and intimidate the northern nations, to break 
their power, and diminish the likelihood of their 
taking the offensive. It was now more than four 
centuries since in this part of Asia any such effort 
had been made ; and the northern barbarians might 
naturally have ceased to fear the arms and discipline 
of the South. Moreover, the circumstances of the 
time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on con- 
tinually more and more by the newly-arrived "Su" and 
Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the Trans-Oxianian 
regions were under the necessity of seeking new 
settlements, and could only attempt to find them in 



SCYTHIC INVASION OF BACTRIA. IO9 

the quarter towards which they were driven by the 
new-comers. Strengthened probably by daring spirits 
from among their conquerors themselves, they crossed 
the rivers and the deserts by which they had been 
hitherto confined, and advancing against the Par- 
thians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all 
before them. In Bactria, soon after the establish- 
ment of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, they began to 
give trouble. Province after province was swallowed 
up by the invaders, who occupied Sogdiana, or the 
tract between the Lower Jaxartes and the Lower 
Oxus, and hence proceeded to make inroads into 
Bactria itself The rich land on the Polytimetus, or 
Ak-Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the high- 
lands between the Upper Jaxartes and Upper Oxus, 
were permanently occupied by Turanian immigrants ; 
and, if the Bactrians had not compensated them- 
selves for their losses by acquisitions of territory 
in Affghanistan and India, they would soon have had 
no kingdom left. The hordes were always increas- 
ing in strength through the influx of fresh tribes. 
Bactria was pressed to the south-eastward, and pre- 
cipitated upon its neighbours in that direction. 

Presently, in Ariana, the hordes passed the moun- 
tains, and proceeding southwards, occupied the tract 
below the great lake wherein the Helmend terminates, 
which took from them the name of Sacastana — " the 
land of the Saka or Scyths " — a name still to be 
traced in the modern Seistan. Further to the east 
they effected a lodgment in Cabul, and another in 
the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a 
time bore the name of Indo-Scythia. They even 



no THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 

crossed the Indus, and attempted to penetrate into 
the interior of Hindustan, but here they were met 
and repulsed by a native monarch, about the year 
B.C. 56. 

The people engaged in this great movement are 
called in a general way by the classical writers Sacae 
or Scythae, i.e., Scyths. They consisted of a number 
of tribes, similar for the most part in language, habits, 
and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to 
the other nomadic races of Central and Northern 
Asia. Of these tribes the principal were the 
Massagetae ("great Jits or Jats"), the former adver- 
saries of Cyrus, who occupied the country on both 
sides of the lower course of the Oxus ; the Dahae, 
who bordered the Caspian above Hyrcania, and 
extended thence to the longitude of Herat ; the 
Tochari, who settled in the mountains between the 
Upper Jaxartes and the Upper Oxus, where they gave 
name to the tract known as Tokharistan ; the Asii 
or Asians, who were closely connected with the 
Tochari ; and the Sacarauli, who are found connected 
with both the Tochari and the Asians. Some of 
these tribes contained within them further sub- 
divisions, as the Dahae, who comprised .the Parni or 
Aparni, the Pissuri, and the Xanthii ; and the Massa- 
getae, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, 
and others. 

The general character of the barbarism, in which 
these various races were involved, may be best learnt 
from the description given of one of them, with but 
few differences, by Herodotus and Strabo. According 
to these writers, the Massagetse were nomads who 



CHARACTER OF SCYTHIC BARBARISM. Ill 

moved about in waggons or carts, like the modern 
Kalmucks, accompanied by their flocks and herds, on 
whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each 
man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in 
common. They were good riders, and excellent 
archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, 
and used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, 
knives, and battle-axes. They had Ifttle or no iron, 
but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their 
other weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze 
breastplates, but otherwise the metal with which they 
adorned and protected their own persons and the 
heads of their horses, was gold. To a certain extent 
they were cannibals. It was their custom not to let 
the aged among them, die a natural death, but, when 
life seemed approaching its term, to offer them up in 
sacrifice, and then boil the flesh and feast upon it. 
This mode of ending life was regarded as the best 
and most honourable ; such as died of disease were 
not eaten, but buried, and their friends bewailed their 
misfortune. It may be added to this, that we have 
sufficient reason to believe, that the Massageta; and 
the other nomads of these parts regarded the use of 
poisoned arrows in warfare as legitimate, and employed 
the venom of serpents and the corrupted blood of 
men, to make the wounds which they inflicted more 
deadly. 

Thus, what was threatened by the existing position 
of affairs was not merely the conquest of one race by 
another cognate to it, like that of the Medes by the 
Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the oblite- 
ration of such art" civilisation, and refinement as 



112 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 

Western Asia had attained to in the course of ages 
by the successive efforts of Babylonians, Assyrians, 
Medes, Persians, and Greeks — the spread over some 
of the fairest regions of the earth of a low type of 
savagery — a type which in religion went no further 
than the worship of the Sun ; in art knew but the 
easier forms of metallurgy and the construction of 
carts ; in manners and customs, included cannibalism, 
the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between 
the sexes destructive alike of all delicacy and all 
family affection. The Parthians were, no doubt, rude 
and coarse in their character as compared with the 
Persians ; but they had been civilised to some extent 
by three centuries of subjection to the Persians and 
the Gre3ks before they rose to power ; they affected 
Persian manners ; they patronised Greek art ; they 
had a smattering of Greek literature ; they appreciated 
the advantages of having in their midst a number of 
Grecian states. Many of their kings called them- 
selves upon their coins " Phil- Hellenes," or " lovers of 
the Hellenic people." ^ Had the Massagetae and 
their kindred tribes of Sacae, Tochari, Daha;, Yue-chi, 
and Su, which now menaced the Parthian power, 
succeeded in sweeping it away, the gradual declension 
of all that is lovely or excellent in human life would 
have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread 
Western Asia. No doubt the conquerors would have 
learnt something from those whom they subjected to 
their yoke ; but it cannot be supposed that they 
would have learnt much. The change would have 
been like that which passed over the Western Roman 

^ Lindsay, " History and Coinage of the Parthians," p. 213. 



WAR OF SCYTHS WITH PHRAATES II. II3 

Empire, when Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, 
Heruli, depopulated its fairest provinces and laid its 
civilisation in the dust. The East would have been 
barbarised ; the gains of centuries would have been 
lost ; the work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and 
ther great benefactors of Asiatic humanity, would 
have been undone ; Western Asia would have sunk 
back into a condition not very much above that from 
which it had been raised two thousand years previously 
by the primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians. 

The first monarch to recognise the approach of the 
crisis and its danger was Phraates II., the son of 
Mithridates I., and the conqueror of Antiochus 
Sidetes. Not that the danger presented itself to his 
imagination in its full magnitude ; but that he first 
woke up to the perception of the real position of 
affairs in the East, and saw that, whereas Parthia's 
most formidable enemy had hitherto been Syria, and 
the Syro-Macedonian power, it had now become 
Scythia and the Sacae. No sooner did the pressure 
of the nomads begin to make itself felt on his north- 
eastern frontier, than, relinquishing all ideas of Syrian 
conquests, if he had really entertained them, he left his 
seat of empire in Babylonia to the care of a viceroy, 
Hymerus, or Evemerus, and marched in person to 
confront the new peril. The Scythians, apparently, 
had attacked Parthia Proper from their seats in the 
Oxus region. Phraates, in his haste to collect a 
sufficient force against them, enlisted in his service a 
large body of Greeks — the remnants mainly of the 
defeated army of Antiochus — and taking with him 
also a strong body of Parthian troops, marched at his 



114 ^^^ NORTHERN NOMADS. 

best speed eastward. A war followed in the mountain 
region, which must have lasted for some years, but of 
which we have only the most meagre account. At 
last there was an engagement in which the Scythians 
got the advantage, and the Parthian troops began to 
waver and threaten to break, when the Greeks, who 
had been from the first disaffected, and had only 
waited for an occasion to mutiny, went over in a 
body to the enemy, and so decided the battle. 
Deserted by their allies, the Parthian soldiery were 
cut to pieces, and Phraates himself was among the 
slain. The event proved that he had acted rashly 
in taking the Greeks with him, but he can scarcely 
be said to have deserved much blame. It would have 
been surprising if he had anticipated so strange a 
thing as the fraternisation of a body of luxurious 
and over-civilised Greeks with the utter barbarians 
against whom he was contending, or had imagined 
that in so remote a region, cut off from the rest of 
their countrymen, they would have ventured to take 
a step which must have thrown them entirely on 
their own resources. 

We have no information with regard to the ultimate 
fate of the Greek mutineers. As for the Scythians, 
with that want of energy and of a settled purpose 
which characterised them, they proceeded to plunder 
and ravage the portion of the Parthian territory 
which lay open to them, and, when they had thus 
wasted their strength, returned quietly to their homes. 

The Parthian nobles appointed as monarch, in 
place of the late king, an uncle of his, named Arta- 
banus, who is known in history as " Artabanus the 



WAR CONTINUED WITH ARTABANUS II. II5 

Second." He was probably advanced in years, and 
might perhaps have been excused, had he folded his 
arms, awaited the attack of his foes, and stood wholly 
on the defensive. But he was brave and energetic ; 
and, what was still more important, he appears to 
have appreciated the perils of the position. He was 
not content, when the particular body of barbarians, 
which had defeated and slain his predecessor, having 
ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to sit still 
and wait till he was attacked in his turn. According 
to the brief but emphatic words of Justin, he 
assumed the aggressive, and invaded the country of 




COIN OF ARTABANUS II. 

the Tochari, one of the most powerful of the Scythian 
tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the 
region that had, till lately, belonged to the Bactrian 
kingdom. Artabanus evidently felt that what was 
needed was, not simply to withstand, but to roll 
back the flood of invasion, which had advanced so 
near to the sacred home of his nation ; that the 
barbarians required to be taught a lesson ; that they 
must at least be made to understand that Parthia was 
to be respected ; if this could not be done, then the 
fate of the empire was sealed. He therefore, with a 
gallantry and boldness that we cannot sufficiently 
admire — a boldness that seemed like rashness, but 



Il6 THE NORTHERN NOMADS. 

was in reality prudence — without calculating too 
closely the immediate chances of battle, led his troops 
against one of the most forward of the advancing 
tribes. But fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How 
the battle was progressing we are not told ; but it 
appears that, in the thick of an engagement, Arta- 
banus, who was leading his men, received a wound in 
the fore-arm, from the effect of which he died almost 
immediately. The death of the leader on either side 
decides in the East, almost to a certainty, the issue of a 
conflict. We cannot doubt that the Parthians, having 
lost their monarch, were repulsed ; that the expedition 
failed ; and that the situation of affairs became once 
more at least as threatening as it had been before 
Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian mon- 
archs had now fallen, within the space of a few years, 
in combat with the aggressive Scyths — two Parthian 
armies had suffered defeat. Was this to be always so ? 
If it was, then Parthia had only to make up her mind 
to fall, and, like the great Roman, to let it be her care 
that she should fall grandly and with dignity. 




VIII. 

MITHRIDATES II. AND THE NOMADS — WAR WITH 
ARMENIA — FIRST CONTACT WITH ROME. 



Artabanus II. was succeeded on the throne by 
his son, Mithridates II., about the year B.C. 124. His 
military achievements were considerable, and pro- 
cured him the epithet of " the Great," though that 
title was perhaps better deserved by Mithridates the 
First, his uncle. However, the reign of the second 
Mithridates was undoubtedly a distinguished one, and 
it is most unfortunate that the accounts of it, which 
have come down to us, are so meagre and unsatis- 
factory. We can but trace the history of Parthia 
during his time in its general outline, with very scanty 
details, and those not always altogether trustworthy. 

There seems, however, to be no doubt, that his 
earliest efforts after mounting the throne were directed 
to the quarter where the great danger pressed — the 
danger which had proved fatal to his two immediate 
predecessors, his cousin and his uncle. Probably, in 
thus determining, he scarcely exercised any choice. 
The Scyths, after their double victory, would naturally 
take an attitude so menacing that unless immediately 
met and checked, all hope would have had to be 



Il8 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES IT. 

given up — absolute ruin would have had to be met 
and faced — Parthia would have been overrun, and the 
empire established by the first Mithridates would 
have been extinguished, within twenty or thirty years 
of its first appearance, under the second. The young 
king, perceiving his peril, bent every effort to meet 
and repel it. He employed the whole force of the 
State upon his north-eastern frontier, and, in a series 
of engagements, so effectually checked the advance 
of the Scyths, that from his time the danger which 
had been impending wholly passed away. The 
nomads gave up the hope of making any serious 
impression on the Arsacid kingdom, and, turning 
their restless energies in another direction, found a 
vent for their superabundant population in the far 
East, in Affghanistan and India, where they settled 
themselves, and set up permanent governments. 
Parthia was so completely relieved from their attacks, 
that she was able once more to take the aggressive in 
this region, and to extend her sway at the expense of 
the nation before which she had so lately trembled. 
The acquisition of parts of Bactria from the Scyths, 
which is attested by Strabo, belongs, in all probability, 
to this reign ; and it is even possible that the exten- 
sion of Parthian dominion over Sacastane, or Seistan, 
dates from the same period. We are assured that 
the second Mithridates " added many nations to the 
Parthian Empire." As these were decidedly not on 
the western side of the empire, where Mithridates 
did not even succeed in conquering Armenia, it would 
seem that they must have lain towards the East, in 
which case it would be almost certain that they must 



REBELLION OF EUEMERUS. 1 19 

have been outlying tribes of the recent Scythic 
immigration. 

The successes of Mithridates in this quarter left 
him at liberty, after a time, to turn his attention 
towards the west, where, though Syria was no longer 
formidable, troubles of various kinds had broken out, 
which could no longer be safely neglected. Hymerus, 
or Euemerus, the viceroy appointed to direct the 
affairs of the west from Babylon by Phraates II. when 
he marched eastward against the Scyths, had greatly 
misconducted himself- in his government, and almost 
shaken himself free from the Parthian yoke. He had 
treated the inhabitants of Babylon with extreme 
cruelty, condemning many of them to slavery, and 
sending them into Media, besides burning the market- 
place, several temples, and other buildings of that 
great city. He had greatly encouraged luxury and 
extravagance, had offended many by his exactions, 
and affected the state, if he did not actually claim 
the title, of an independent monarch. Mithridates, 
on reaching the West, crushed the nascent rebellion 
of Hymerus, and having thus recovered dominion 
over those regions, proceeded to engage in war with 
a new enemy. 

Armenia, the new enemy, was a territory of very 
considerable importance, and was henceforth so 
mixed up with Parthia in her various wars and 
negotiations, that some account of the country, and 
people, and of the previous history of the people 
seems to be necessary. 

According to Justin, Armenia was a tract eleven 
hundred miles long by seven hundred broad ; but 



120 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES 11. 

this is an extravagant estimate. If we extend 
Armenia from the Caspian to the range of Taurus, 
we cannot make its length much more than seven 
hundred miles ; and if we even allow it to have reached 
from the Caucasus to Mount Masius and the lake of 
Urumiyeh, we cannot make its width more than four 
hundred miles. But, practically, its limits were almost 
always much narrower. Iberia and Albania were 
ordinarily independent countries, occupying the 
modern Georgia, and intervening between Armenia 
and the Caucasus ; the Euphrates was the natural 
boundary of Armenia on the west ; and Niphates, 
rather than Mons. Masius, shut it in upon the south. 
Its normal dimensions have been already estimated 
in this volume at six hundred miles in length by a 
little more than two hundred in breadth, and its area 
at about sixty or seventy thousand square miles. 
There is no reason to believe that, during the Parthian 
period, it ever much exceeded these dimensions, except 
it were during the fourteen years (B.C. 83 to 69) when, 
under Tigranes I., it held possession of the dwindled 
kingdom of the Seleucidae. 

Armenia was a country of lofty ridges, deep and 
narrow valleys, numerous and copious streams, and 
occasional broad plains — a country of rich pasture 
grounds, productive orchards, and abundant harvests. 
It occupied the loftiest position in Western Asia, and 
contained the sources of all the great rivers of these 
parts — the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Halys, the 
Araxes, and the Cyrus — which, rising within a space of 
two hundred and fifty miles long by a hundred wide, 
flow down in four directions to three different seas. 



WAR WITH ARMENIA. 121 

It was thus to this part of Asia what Switzerland is to 
Western Europe, an elevated fastness region contain- 
ing within it the highest mountains, and yielding the 
waters which fertilise the subjacent regions. It con- 
tained also two large lakes, each occupying its own 
basin, and having no connection with any sea — those 
of Van and Urumiyeh — salt lakes of a very peculiar 
character. The mountain tracts yielded supplies of 
gold, silver, copper, lead, and other metals, beside 
emery and antimony. The soil in the valleys was 
fertile and bore several kinds of grain ; the flanks of 
the hills grew vines ; and the pastures produced horses 
and mules of good quality. 

The Armenians of Parthian times were probably 
identical with the race, which, still under the same 
name, occupies the greater portion of the old country, 
and holds an important position among the inhabi- 
tants of Western Asia. They are a pale race, with a 
somewhat sallow complexion, marked features, and 
dark eyebrows and hair. By their language, which 
can be traced back to the fourth century of our era, it 
appears that they are an Arian people, but with a 
certain amount of Turanian admixture. Their rela- 
tions are closer with the Persians than probably with 
any other race, but still they possess many notable 
points of difference. They are of a weaker physique 
than the Persians, slighter in their frames, less muscular 
and robust. They are subtle, wily, with a great talent 
for commerce, but wanting in strength, stamina, and 
endurance. In the earlier times they were strongly 
attached to their own independence, and, though 
seldom able to maintain it for long, were continually 



122 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

reasserting it whenever an opportunity seemed to 
offer. But they have now for many centuries been 
absolutely quiescent, and are patient under the harsh 
rule of the three races which hold them in subjection 
— the Russians, the Persians, and the Turks. 

Historically, the Armenians of to-day cannot be 
traced further back than about the sixth century B.C., 
when they appear to have immigrated into the terri- 
tory that they have from that time occupied. Pre- 
viously their land was possessed by three powerful and 
warlike races, who are thought to have been Turanians, 
and who from the tenth to the seventh century B.C. were 
continually at war with the great Assyrian Empire. 
These were the Nairi, the Urarda, and the Mannai, or 
Minni — names which constantly recur in the cuneiform 
inscriptions. The Nairi were spread from the mountains 
west of lake Van, along both sides of the Tigris, to Bir on 
the Euphrates, and even further ; the Urarda, or people 
of Ararat, probably the Alarodii of Herodotus, dwelt 
north and east of the Nai'ri, on the Upper Euphrates, 
about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes ; 
while the Minni, or Mannai, whose country lay south- 
east of the Urarda, held the Urumiyeh basin, and the 
adjoining parts of Zagros. Of these three races, the 
Urarda were the most powerful, and it was with them 
that the Assyrians waged their most bloody wars. 
The capital city of the Urarda was Van, on the eastern 
shores of the lake, and here it was that the kings set 
up the most remarkable of their inscriptions. The 
language of these inscriptions is of a Turanian type, 
and, though it may have furnished the non-Arian 
element in the modern Armenian, cannot have been 



PREVIOUS HISTORY OF ARMENIA. I23 

its real main progenitor. An immigration must have 
occurred between the end of the Assyrian and the 
early part of the Persian period, which changed the 
population of the mountain region, submerging the 
original occupants in a far larger number of Arian 
in-comers. 

The first distinct knowledge that we obtain of this 
new people is from the inscriptions of Darius Hys- 
taspis. Darius, after mentioning Armenia (Armina) 
among the twenty-three provinces into which his 
empire was divided, informs us that, in the second 
year of his reign (B.C. 520), while he was at Babylon, 
a great revolt broke out, in which Armenia participated, 
together with eight other districts. It was not till his 
third year that the revolt was put down, the Arme- 
nians, as well as the other confederates, making a most 
vigorous resistance. The names of the persons and 
of the places mentioned in this campaign seem to be 
Arian, as are the other Armenian names generally. 
On the suppression of the revolt, and the full establish- 
ment of the power of Darius, Armenia, together with 
some adjacent regions, became a satrapy of the Persian 
Empire — the thirteenth, according to Herodotus — and 
was rated in the Royal Books as bound to furnish a 
revenue of four hundred talents — about ^^^96,000 — 
annually. From this time its fidelity to the Persian 
monarchs was remarkable. Not only was the money 
tribute paid regularly, but a contribution of twenty 
thousand young colts was made each year to the Royal 
Stud, so far as appears, without any murmuring. Con- 
tingents of troops were also readily furnished whenever 
required by the Great Monarch ; and, through the whole 



124 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

Achaemenian period, after the reign of Darius, Armenia 
remained perfectly tranquil, and never caused the 
Persians the slightest alarm or anxiety. 

After Arbela (B.C. 331) the Armenians submitted 
to Alexander without a struggle, or an attempt at 
regaining independence, and, when in the division of 
his dominions which followed upon the battle of Ipsus 
(B.C. 301), they were assigned to Seleucus, they 
acquiesced in the arrangement. It was not until 
Antiochus the Great suffered his great defeat at the 
hands of the Romans (B.C. 190), and all Western Asia 
was thrown into a ferment, that the Arian Armenians, 
after, at least, four centuries of subjection, raised their 
thoughts to independence, and succeeded in establish- 
ing an autonom'ous monarchy. Even then the move- 
ment seems to have originated rather in the ambition 
of a chief than in any ardent desire for liberty upon 
the part of the people. Artaxias had been governor 
of the Greater Armenia in the earlier portion of the 
reign of Antiochus, and seized the opportunity afforded 
b}^ the defeat of Magnesia to change his title of satrap 
into that of sovereign. Antiochus was too much 
occupied at home to resist him ; and he was allowed 
at his leisure to establish his power, to build a new 
capital at Artaxata near the Araxes, and to reign in 
peace for a space of about twenty-five years. Then, 
however, he was attacked by Antiochus Epiphanes. 
This prince (about B.C. 165) resolved on an attempt at 
re-establishing the power of Syria over Armenia, and 
invading the country with a large army, forced 
Artaxias to an engagement, in which he defeated him 
and took him prisoner. Armenia, for the time, sub- 



PREVIOUS HISTORY OF ARMENIA. 125 

mitted ; but it was not long before fresh troubles broke 
out. When Mithridates I. overran the eastern pro- 
vinces of Syria (about B.C. 150), and made himself 
master in succession of Media, Babylonia, and Elymais, 
Armenia was once more thrown into a state of excite- 
ment, and, partly by her own efforts, partly, it would 
seem, by Parthian assistance, threw off for a second 
time the Syrian yoke, and became again independent, 
this time under an Arsacid prince, named Wagharshag 
or Val-arsaces, a member of the Parthian royal family. 
A reign of twenty-two years is assigned to this monarch, 
whose kingdom is declared to have extended from the 
Caucasus to Nisibis, and from the Caspian to the 
Mediterranean. He was succeeded by a son named 
Arshag or Arsaces, who carried on wars with the 
neighbouring state of Pontus, and had a reign of 
thirteen years, probably from about B.C. 128 to B.C. 115. 
Ardashes — the Ortoadistus of Justin — then became 
king, and was firmly seated on the Armenian throne, 
when Mithridates II., nephew of Mithridates I., having 
brought the Scythic war to a successful termination, 
determined (about B.C. lOo) to make an attempt to add 
Armenia to his dominions. 

No account has come down to us of the war between 
Ortoadistus and the invaders. The relative power of 
the two states was, however, such as to make it almost 
certain that in a collision between the two Parthia 
would have the advantage ; and a casual allusion in 
Strabo appears to indicate pretty clearly, that in point 
of fact, the advantage gained was not inconsiderable. 
Strabo says that Tigranes, the eldest son of Ortoadistus, 
was a hostage in the hands of the Parthians for some 



136 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

time before his accession to the throne — a statement 
from which it may be confidently inferred, that 
Ortoadistus, having been worsted in battle by Mithri- 
dates, concluded with him an ignominious peace, and as 
security for the performance of its terms gave hostages 
to the Parthian monarch, his own son being among the 
number. Still, it is also clear, from the fact recorded, 
that Armenia, if worsted, was far from being subju- 
gated — she ended the war by a treaty of peace — she 
maintained her own monarch upon the throne — she 
was not even seriously reduced in strength, since 
within the space of the next twenty years she attained 
to the height of her power, absorbing the Syrian state, 
and really ruling for a time from the Gulf of Issus to 
the shores of the Caspian. 

It cannot have been more than a few years after the 
termination of the Armenian war, which must have 
fallen about the close of the second, or the beginning 
of the first century before our era, that the Parthian 
state, while still under the rule of Mithridates II., was 
for the first time brought into contact with Rome. 

Rome appears as a permanent factor in the politics 
of the East somewhat later than might have been 
expected. When, towards the close of the second 
century B.C., the ambition of the Great Antiochus 
dragged her unwillingly into Asiatic quarrels, she 
disembarrassed herself, as speedily as she could, of all 
ties binding her to Asia, and made what was almost 
a formal retreat to her own continent, and renuncia- 
tion of the heritage of another, which fortune pressed 
upon her. For more than half a century the policy 
of abstention was pursued. The various states of 



FIRST CONTACT OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 127 

Western Asia were left to follow their own schemes 
of self-aggrandisement, and fight out their own quarrels 
without Roman interference. But, in course of time, 
the reasons for the policy of abstention disappeared. 
Macedonia and Greece having been conquered and 
absorbed, and Carthage destroyed (B.C. 148-146), the 
conditions of the political problem seemed to be so far 
changed as to render a further advance towards the 
East a safe measure ; and accordingly, when it was 
perceived that the line of the kings of Pergamus was 
coming to an end, the Senate set on foot intrigues 
which had for their object the devolution upon Rome 
of the sovereignty belonging to those monarchs. By 
dexterous management the third Attalus was induced, 
in repayment of his father's obligations to the Romans, 
to take the extraordinary and wholly unprecedented 
step of bequeathing by will his entire dominions as a 
legacy to the Republic. In vain did his illegitimate 
half-brother, Aristonicus, dispute the va.lidity of so 
strange a testament ; the Romans, aided by Mithri- 
dates IV., then monarch of Pontus, easily triumphed 
over such resistance as this unfortunate prince could 
offer, and, having ceded to their ally the portion of 
Phrygia which had belonged to the Pergamene king- 
dom, entered on the possession of the remainder. 
Having thus become an Asiatic power, the Great 
Republic was of necessity mixed up henceforth with 
the various movements and struggles which agitated 
Western Asia, and was naturally led to strengthen its 
position among the Asiatic kingdoms by such alliances 
as seemed at each conjuncture to be best suited to its 
interests. 



128 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct 
deahngs between Rome and Parthia. Their respec- 
tive territories were still separated by considerable 
tracts, which were in the occupation of the Syrians, 
the Cappadocians, and the Armenians. Their interests 
had neither clashed, nor as yet sufficiently united 
them to give rise to any diplomatic intercourse. But 
the progress of the two empires in opposite directions 
was, slowly but surely, bringing them nearer to each 
other ; and events had now reached a point at which 
the empires began to have — or to seem to have — such 
a community of interests as led naturally to an ex- 
change of communications. A new power had been 
recently developed in these parts. In the rapid way 
so common in the East, Mithridates V. of Pontus, the 
son and successor of Rome's ally, had, between B.C. 
112 and B.C. 93, built up an empire of vast extent, 
large population, and almost inexhaustible resources. 
He had established his authority over Armenia Minor, 
Colchis, the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, the 
Chersonesus Taurica, or kingdom of the Bosporus, 
and even over the whole tract lying west of the Cher- 
sonese as far as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniestr. 
Nor had these gains contented him. He had obtained 
half of Paphlagonia by an iniquitous compact with 
Nicomedes, King of Bithynia ; he had occupied 
Galatia ; and he was engaged in attempts to bring 
Cappadocia under his influence. In this last- 
mentioned pro'ect he was assisted by the Armenians, 
with whose king, Tigranes, the son of Ortoadistus, 
he had (about B.C. 96) formed a close alliance, at the 
same time giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in 



HIS EMBASSY TO SULLA. I2g 

marriage. Rome, though she had not yet determined 
on war with Mithridates, was bent on thwarting his 
Cappadocian projects, and in B.C. 92 sent Sulla into 
Asia, with orders to put down the puppet king whom 
Mithridates V. and Tigranes were establishing, and 
to replace upon the Cappadocian throne a certain 
Ariobarzanes, whom they had driven from his king- 
dom. In the execution of this commission, Sulla was 
brought into hostile collision with the Armenians, 
whom he defeated with great slaughter, and drove 
from Cappadocia, together with their puppet king. 
Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridates 
of Pontus, by inspiring Rome and Parthia with a 
common fear, tend to draw them together, but the 
course of events had actually given them a common 
enemy in Tigranes of Armenia, who was equally 
obnoxious to both of them. 

For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a 
hostage in Parthia, had contracted engagements 
towards the Parthian monarch, which involved a ces- 
sion of territory, and who, on the faith of his pledges, 
had been aided by the Parthians in seating himself on 
his father's throne, though he made the cession 
required of him in the first instance, had soon after- 
wards repented of his honesty, had gone to war with 
his benefactors, recovered the ceded territory, and laid 
waste a considerable tract of country lying within the 
admitted limits of the Parthian kingdom. These pro- 
ceedings had, of course, alienated Mithridates II. ; and 
we may with much probability ascribe to them the 
step, which he now took, of sending an ambassador to 
Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged 



130 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES II. 

with the duty of proposing an alHance offensive and 
defensive between the two countries. The Roman 
general received the overture favourably, but pro- 
bably considered that it transcended his powers to 
conclude a treaty ; and thus no further result was 
secured by the embassy than the establishment, at 
their first contact, of a friendly understanding between 
the two states. 

Soon after this, Tigranes appears to have renewed 
his attacks upon Parthia, which in the interval 
between B.C. 92 and B.C. 83 he greatly humbled, 
depriving it of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, at 




COIN OF MITHRIDATES II. 



this time called Gordyene, or the country of the 
Kurds, and under the rule of one of the Parthian 
tributary kings. Rome was too deeply engaged in the 
first Mithridatic war to lend Parthia any aid, even if 
she had been so disposed, and Parthia herself seems 
to have been suffering from domestic troubles, a time 
of confusion and disturbance having followed on the 
death of Mithridates II. about B.C. 89. 

Mithridates the Second is commonly regarded as 
the most distinguished of all the Parthian monarchs 
after his uncle, Mithridates the First. He has a fine 
head upon his coins, with a large eye, and a pro- 



HIS COINS AND TITLES. I3I 

minent Roman nose. He takes the epithets of 
" Theopator " and " Nicator." The obverse of his 
coins is commonly adorned with the sitting Parthian 
figure with an outstretched bow ; but sometimes ex- 
hibits, instead of this, a Pegasus or winged horse. The 
mihtary exploits of the prince were undoubtedly re- 
markable, and it is unfortunate for him that the 
record of them is so scanty. It is certain that he 
made a deep impression upon the Scythian hordes, 
and thus averted from his country a great danger. It 
is probable that he considerably enlarged the limits of 
his empire on the side of Bactria and India. But, on 
the whole, perhaps his permanent fame will rest 
mainly upon the two facts, that he was the first to 
initiate those Armenian wars which occupied so large 
a portion of the later Parthian history, and that he 
was also the first to bring Parthia into contact with 
the most formidable of all her external enemies, Rome, 
and thus — though with far different intent — to pave 
the way for those many bloody struggles with the 
Great Imperial Power, which for nearly three centuries 
— from the time of Crassus to that of Caracallus — 
riveted the attention of mankind upon the East. 



IX. 



DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY — ACCESSION 
OF SANATRCECES— PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 

The death of Mithridates II. introduced into 
Parthian* history, as has been already observed, a 
period of confusion and disturbance. Civil wars, ac- 
cording to one authority, raged during this period ; 
according to another, there was a rapid succession of 
monarchs. It would seem that the ancient race of the 
Arsacidae had pretty nearly died out ; and, as the 
superstition still prevailed, that fatal consequences 
would follow, if any one in whose veins the old blood 
did not run were allowed to ascend the throne, very 
aged scions of the royal house had to be sought out, 
and the royal authority committed to hands that were 
quite unfitted for it. One king who has been thought 
to belong to the period is said to have died at the age 
of ninety-six ^ ; another was eighty at his accession. 
Under these circumstances it may well have been that 
younger rivals sprang up, whether of the royal, or of 
some fresher and lustier stocks, who disputed the crown 
with the decrepit monarchs preferred to the position 
by the Megistanes, and threw the whole country into 
confusion. These quarrels fell out at an unfortunate 

' See Appendix. 
133 



DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 133 

conjuncture. Rome had at last been forced into a 
contest with Mithridates of Pontus, and this pre-occu- 
pation of the two great powers had for the moment 
given Armenia a free hand. Armenia, under Tigranes, 
one of the most ambitious princes that ever Hved, took 
immediate advantage of the occasion, and, while the 
Mithridatic war was impending, and also during the 
eleven years that it lasted (B.C. 85-74), employed herself 
in building up a powerful and extensive empire. Not 
content with recovering from Parthia the portion of 
territory which he had begun by ceding to her, 
Tigranes had, quite early in his reign, carried his 
aggressions much further, had made himself master of 
two most important Parthian provinces, Gordyene or 
Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabene or the tract 
about the Zab rivers, including Assyria Proper and 
Arbelitis, had conquered Sophene, or the lesser 
Armenia, which was independent under a king named 
Artanes, and had also brought under subjection the 
extensive and valuable country of Media Atropatene, 
which had maintained its independence since the time 
of Alexander. Nor had these successes contented 
him. Invited into Syria, about B.C. 8^, by the wretched 
inhabitants, who were driven to desperation by the 
never-ceasing civil wars between rival princes of the 
house of the Seleucidae, he had found no difficulty in 
absorbing the last remnant of the Syro-Macedonian 
Empire, and establishing himself as king over Cilicia, 
Syria, and most of Phoenicia. About B.C. 80 he had 
determined on building himself a new capital in the 
recently-acquired province of Gordyene — a capital of 
a vast size, provided with all the luxuries required by 



134 DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 

an Oriental Court, and fortified with walls such as 
should recall the glories of the ancient cities of the 
Assyrians. Twelve Greek cities were depopulated to 
furnish Tigrano-certa — so the new capital was called 
— with a sufficiency of Hellenic inhabitants ; three 
hundred thousand Cappadocians were at the same 
time transported thither ; and the population was 
further swelled by contingents from Cilicia, Gordyene, 
Adiabene, and Assyria Proper. A royal palace on a 
large scale was constructed in the immediate vicinity, 
together with extensive parks or " paradises," marshes 
well stocked with wild-fowl, and well-appointed hunt- 
ing establishments. The walls of the city are declared 
to have been seventy-five feet in height ; and the 
intention evidently was to constitute it a standing 
menace to Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Babylon, or whatever 
might be made the Parthian western capital. The 
supersession of Parthia by Armenia was clearly aimed 
at ; and it was only a slight step in advance when 
finally Tigranes placed upon his coins the ancient title 
of the Great Sovereigns of Asia — recently claimed 
only by the Arsacid monarchs — the title of ^aai\tv<; 
^acnXicov. 

The emergence of Armenia into the position of a 
Great Power would, under any circumstances, have 
tended to throw Parthia into the shade ; and now, 
occurring as it did when she was already under a 
cloud, rent with civil dissensions, and guided by the 
uncertain hands of aged and feeble monarchs, it pro- 
duced her almost entire disappearance. For twenty 
years — from B.C. 89 to B.C. 69 — amid the rapid 
movements that occupy the field of Oriental history, 



ACCESSION OF SANATRCECES. 135 

we scarcely obtain a glimpse of Parthia, which is 
jostled out of sight by the stronger and burlier forms 
that fill the space, and force themselves on our 
attention. 

It is with difficulty that, by dint of careful search, 
we at length discover, or fancy we discover, among 
the fierce struggles of the times two shadowy forms 
of Parthian kings to place in this interval as links 
connecting the earlier with the later history. The 
first of these is a certain Mnasciras, of whom Lucian 
appears to speak, as a Parthian prince who reached 




COIN OF SANATRCECES. 



the great age of ninety-six years, and whom it is 
impossible to insert at any other point.^ The other 
is a somewhat better defined personage — a certain 
Sanatroeces, called also Sinatroces and Sintricus — 
who has left his name upon some of his coins, and 
is mentioned by several authors. This last-named 
monarch appears to have reigned from B.C. y6 
to B.C. 69, and thus to have been contemporary 

• Professor Gardner argues that the supposed Mnasciras is in reaHty 
a certain Kamnasciras, otherwise known to us, who was not a Parthian 
king at all, and did not belong to this period {" Coinage of Parthia," 
p. 8). His arguments must be allowed to have great force. 



136 REIGN OF SANATRCECES. 

with Tigranes of Armenia, Mithridates of Pontus, and 
the Roman general, Lucullus. He was seventy-nine 
years old at his accession, and is said to have been 
indebted for his crown to aid lent him in the civil 
struggles, wherein he was engaged with rivals, by the 
Scythic tribe of the Sacauracje. During his short 
reign it was his special endeavour to hold himself 
aloof from the quarrels of his neighbours, and thus 
escape the fate of the earthen pot when brought into 
collision with iron ones. He entirely declined the 
overtures of Mithridates for an alliance, which were 
made to him in B.C. 72 ; and when, in B.C. 69, the 
war had approached his own frontier, and, the most 
earnest appeals for assistance reaching him from both 
parties, he found it impossible to maintain the line of 
pure abstention, he had recourse to the expedient of 
amusing both sides with promises, while he lent no 
real aid to either. Plutarch tells us that this course 
of action so offended and enraged Lucullus, that at 
one time it almost induced him to defer to a more 
convenient season his quarrel with Mithridates and 
his ally, Tigranes, and direct the whole force at his 
command against Parthia. But the prolonged re- 
sistance of Nisibis, and the success of Mithridates in 
Pontus (B.C. 6y) averted the danger, and, the war 
rolling northwards, Parthia was not yet driven to 
take a side, but found herself able to maintain her 
neutral position for a few years longer. 

The turning point of the Mithridatic War was the 
recall of Lucullus (B.C. 66), and his replacement by one 
of the greatest Roman generals of the time, Cneius 
Pompeius, Pompey's generalship showed him at 



ACCESSION OF PHRAATES III. I37 

once that, so long as Rome was obliged to contend 
single-handed with two such powerful enemies as 
Mithridates and Tigranes, success could not be 
reasonably expected. The Pontine and Armenian 
kings played into each other's hands, and between 
them possessed such advantages in local position, in 
men, and in resources, that the war might go on 
indefinitely without any clear and decisive issue, 
unless its conditions could be changed. He looked 
about therefore to see whether a new factor could not 
be called in, and a change in the balance of force be 
thereby brought about. Might not Parthia, which 
had rejected the cheap blandishments of Lucullus 
and despised his coarse threats, be won over by some- 
what more dexterous management, and more refined 
diplomacy ? A Parthian monarch was now seated 
upon the throne who was untried, to whom overtures 
had not yet been made, who at any rate had not 
committed himself to the policy of abstention. Might 
he not be prevailed upon? Might not Phraates the 
Third, the son of Sanatroeces, who had just succeeded 
his father upon the Parthian throne, be induced by 
a sufficiently tempting promise, to join his forces with 
those of Rome in the war, and so place the pre- 
ponderance of military strength on the Roman side ? 
The main question was, what would be a sufficiently 
tempting offer ? Pompey thought it enough to 
pledge himself, that, if Parthia embraced his cause 
and gave him the assistance which he required, 
Armenia should at the end of the war be compelled 
to make restitution to her of her lost provinces — she 
should be once more put in possession of Gordyene, 



138 PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 

and Adiabene. The bait took — Phraates came into 
the terms proposed — and Parthia for the first and last 
time became a Roman ally. 

The general terms of the agreement made between 
the high contracting parties seem to have been, that, 
while Rome pressed the war against the Pontine 
monarch incessantly and without relaxing in her efforts, 
Phraates should enter Armenia, and find occupation for 
Tigranes in his own country. As Parthia and Armenia 
were conterminous along an extended line of frontier, 
Phraates could make his assault where he pleased, 
and how he pleased. It happened that he had at his 
Court an Armenian refugee of the highest consequence 
— no less a person than the Crown Prince of Armenia, 
or eldest living son of Tigranes, who, having quarrelled 
with his father, had raised a rebellion, and being 
defeated had been forced to fly, and seek a refuge in 
Parthia. Phraates determined to take advantage of 
this circumstance. Having completed his arrange- 
ments with Pompey, he, in the year B.C. 65, placed 
himself at the head of his troops, and, in conjunction 
with the Armenian prince, invaded the territory of 
Tigranes. The prince had a party in the country 
which desired to see a youthful monarch upon the 
throne, and was soon joined by a considerable body 
of supporters. The invading army penetrated deep 
into Armenia, advancing upon the capital, Artaxata, 
whither Tigranes had retreated. The Armenian 
monarch made, however, no stand, even at his 
metropolis ; but, when his foes still pressed forward, 
quitted the city, and fled to the neighbouring 
mountains. Artaxata was invested ; but, as the 



PHRAATES ITT. ATTACKS TIGRANES. 139 

siege promised to be long, Phraates became tired of 
sitting before the place, and persuaded himself that 
he had done enough to satisfy Pompey, and might 
safely leave the young prince, with a contingent of 
Parthian troops and his own adherents, to carry on 
the war against his father. Accordingly, he retired, 
and the young prince remained in sole command. 
The result followed which might have been antici- 
pated. Scarcely was Phraates withdrawn, when the 
old king, descending suddenly from his fastnesses, 
fell upon his son's army at unawares, defeated it, 
and drove it out of the country. He thus recovered 
full possession of Armenia, and was once more 
in a position to render help to Mithridates against 
Pompey ; but the time for giving effectual help was 
gone by. Pompey had made such good use of the 
interval during which the hands of Tigranes were 
fully employed, that in a single campaign he had 
broken the power of Mithridates, driven him in head- 
long flight from place to place, and finally forced him 
to seek a refuge beyond the Phasis, at Dioscurias, in 
the modern Mingrelia. Deprived of his ally, Tigranes 
was too weak to make further head against Rome, 
and his complete submission, in the autumn of B.C. 66, 
left Pompey at liberty to settle the affairs of the East 
at his pleasure. 

The settlement made was not very greatly to the 
liking of the Parthian king. His old adversary, the 
elder Tigranes, who had propitiated Pompey by the 
gift of six thousand silver talents — nearly a million 
and a half of our money — though deprived of Syria, 
which was made into an actual Roman province, was 



140 PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 

left in full possession of his ancestral kingdom of 
Armenia, and not even mulcted of the valuable 
province of Gordyene, which he had seized in the 
time of the acute Parthian distress. His friend and 
protege, the younger Tigranes, was first offered the 
petty principality of Sophene, and when he refused it 
and remonstrated, was arrested, put in confinement, 
and reserved by Pompey for his triumph. He himself 
gained nothing by the Roman alliance but the 
recovery of Adiabene, of which he no doubt took 
possession before invading Armenia in B.C. 66. 
When he attemped, without Pompey 's permission, to 
repeat in Gordyene the process which had proved 
successful on the other side of the Tigris, Pompey did 
not scruple to resist him in open warfare — and this 
notwithstanding that the province had been actually 
promised to him as the price of his alliance. Phraates 
learnt what Roman promises were worth, when, on 
seeking to repossess himself of Gordyene, he was 
met by Pompey's legate, Afranius, who, at the head 
of an armed force, drove his troops from the country, 
and proceeded to deliver it into the hands of the 
A.rmenians. Policy might, conceivably, have been 
pleaded for this measure, which would tend to weaken 
Parthia, Rome's most formidable rival in the East, 
and strengthen Armenia, Rome's most convenient 
ally, against her ; but no plea of policy could excuse 
the useless insult offered to the Parthian monarch, 
when Pompey in his written communications refused 
him his generally recognised title of " King of 
Kings." 

There can be little doubt, but that, at this time, 



HESITATION OF POMPEY. I4I 

Pompey was balancing in his mind, with an inclina- 
tion to the affirmative side, the question whether he 
should, or should not, declare the Parthian prince, a 
Roman enemy, and direct the full force of the 
Republic against him. There was much to attract 
him to the formation of such a decision. His military 
career had been hitherto without a reverse. He had 
great confidence in his good fortune. If not as 
ambitious as his rival, Julius, he was at any rate 
thoroughly desirous of posing in the eyes of his 
countrymen as unmistakably the foremost man of 
his day. To engage a new enemy, and that enemy 
the recognised successor of Assyria and Persia in the 
inheritance of the Asian continent, to tread in the 
steps of Alexander, and carry the arms of the West 
to the shores of the ocean which shut in the world 
upon the East, would give him a prestige which 
would elevate him far above all rivals, and satisfy all 
the dreams that he had ever entertained of distinc- 
tion and glory. But, on the other hand, prudence 
counselled abstention from a risky enterprise. As 
the war had not been formally committed to him, his 
enemies at Rome would make his having entered 
upon it a ground of accusation. He had seen, more- 
over, with his own eyes, that the Parthians were an 
enemy far from despicable, and his knowledge of 
campaigning told him that success against them was 
by no means certain. He feared to risk the loss of 
all the glory which he had hitherto gained by grasp- 
ing greedily at more, and deemed it wiser to enjoy 
the fruits of the good luck which had hitherto 
attended him than to tempt fortune on a new field. 



142 PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY. 

He therefore, after hesitating for a while, determined 
finally on a pacific course. He would not allow him- 
self to be provoked into hostilities by the reproaches, 
the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts of the 
Parthian king. When Phraates demanded his lost 
provinces, he replied, that the question of borders was 
one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome, but 
between Parthia and Armenia. When he laid it 
down that the Euphrates properly and of right 
bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey 
not to cross it, the latter said he would keep to the 
just bounds, whatever they were. When Tigranes 
on his part complained, that, after having been 
received into the Roman alliance, he was still 
attacked by the Parthian armies, the reply of Pompey 
was, that he was quite willing to appoint arbitrators 
who should decide all the disputes between the two 
nations. The moderation and caution of these answers 
proved contagious. On hearing them, the monarchs 
addressed resolved to compose their differences, or at 
any rate to defer the settlement of them to a more 
convenient time, when Rome should have withdrawn 
from the neighbourhood. They accepted Pompey's 
proposal of an arbitration ; and in a short time an 
arrangement was effected by which relations of amity 
were re-established between the two countries. 

With the retirement of Pompey from Asia in the 
year B.C. 62, the East settled down into a state of 
comparative tranquillity. There was a general feel- 
ing that time was necessary to recruit the strength 
exhausted in the fierce and sanguinary wars of the 
last thirty years, and a general impression that 



MURDER OF PHRAATES BY HIS SONS. I43 

further contention would only advantage the common 
enemy — Rome. Rome had now to be looked upon 
as a permanent neighbour, securely lodged in Cilicia, 
Syria, and Cappadocia, biding her time, and at any 
moment ready to take advantage of any false step 
which might be made by any of the Asiatic king- 
doms. Parthia, as having the most to lose, had the 
most to fear ; but Armenia was still more exposed to 
attack, and might expect to be assailed first. The 
other minor powers could only hope to escape de- 
struction by remaining quiet, and offering no provo- 
cation to the stronger states in their vicinity. 

But external tranquillity in Parthia was only too 
apt to be the precursor of domestic disturbance. 
Within two years of Pompey's departure from Asia, 
a conspiracy was formed against the life of Phraates, 
which resulted in his assassination. His two sons, 
Mithridates and Orodes, plotted and effected his 
destruction, for what reason, or on what pretext, we 
know not. Phraates had held the throne during a 
time of difficulty, and had ruled, if not with signal 
success, yet on the whole with prudence and vigour. 
He had shown himself an active commander, a fair 
strategist, a successful negotiator. He was apparently 
in the full possession of all his powers and faculties 
when he was struck down. It seems as if the motive 
of the parricide must have been mere personal ambi- 
tion, that unnatural longing to thrust a parent from 
his rightful place which has too often produced such 
tragedies, more especially in the East. 

Mithridates, the elder son, obtained the throne, but 
scarcely succeeded in establishing himself firmly upon 



144 REIGN OF MITHRIDATES III. 

it Very early in his reign he became jealous of his 
brother and fellow-conspirator, Orodes, and drove 
him into banishment ; while at the same time he 
treated a large number of the Parthian nobles with 
cruelty. The Megistanes consequently deposed him, 
and the hereditary commander-in-chief brought back 
Orodes from exile, and set him up as king in his 
brother's room. As some compensation for the loss 
of his independent sovereignty, Mithridates was given 
the government of the important province of Media 
Magna ; and, had he been content to remain in this 
subordinate position he might probably have lived 




COIN OF MITHRIDATES III. 



out the full term of his natural life in peace and quiet- 
ness. But there are temperaments which nothing but 
actual kingship will content, after they have once had 
a taste of it, and the temperament of Mithridates 
would appear to have been of this order. He was 
raising an army with a view to the recovery of his 
lost throne, when Orodes, having become aware of 
his intention, marched against him, and crushed his 
nascent rebellion. Mithridates had to cross the 
frontier, and place himself under the protection of 
the nearest Roman proconsul, who happened to be 
Gabinius, governor of Syria, who had obtained his 
post through the influence of Pompey. Gabinius, 



MITHRIDATES III. AND ORODES. I45 

a man of moderate abilities, but of vast ambition, 
readily received the fugitive, and for a time contem- 
plated an immediate invasion of the Parthian territory, 
and an attempt to force back Mithridates upon his 
unwilling subjects. The expedition would probably 
have taken place, had it not happened that, just at 
the time, the Syrian proconsul received another invi- 
tation from another quarter, which, on the whole, was 
more tempting. Ptolemy Auletes (" the Fluter "), 
expelled from Egypt by his exasperated subjects, 
having obtained the countenance and patronage of 
Pompey, presented himself before Gabinius in the 
spring of B.C. 55> ^i^d besought his powerful assistance 
in recovering his lost kingdom. The price which 
he was ready to pay for the boon named was a sum 
nearly equal to two and a half millions of our money 
(twelve and a half millions of dollars). This offer 
dazzled Gabinius, and almost persuaded him ; but 
the opposition made by his officers was such as might 
perhaps have induced him to decline it, had not the 
influence of the young Mark Antony, who was in his 
camp, been exerted in favour of Auletes, and his 
representations turned the scale in favour of the 
Egyptian venture. Mithridates, whose hopes had 
been raised to the highest pitch, was thus left to bear 
as he might his cruel disappointment. It is surprising 
that he did not altogether succumb. But it would 
seem that he still fancied he saw a possible chance of 
success. The wild Arab tribes recently settled by 
Tigranes in Mesopotamia were willing to espouse his 
cause, and the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon 
appear to have also declared in his favour. Under 



146 DEATH OF MITHRIDATES III. 

these circumstances he threw himself into Babylon, 
and there endured a long siege at the hands of his 
brother. It was not until food failed the garrison 
that a surrender was determined on. Then at last 
Mithridates, trusting that the ties of blood would be 
taken into consideration by his adversary, and would 
cause him to be spared the usual penalty of rebellion, 
allowed himself to fall alive into Orodes' hands. But 
fraternal affection was not strongly developed among 
the Parthians. Orodes, having declared that he 
placed the claims of country above those of kindred, 
caused the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to 
be instantly executed in his presence. Such was the 
end of the third Mithridates, a weak and selfish 
prince, with whom it is impossible to feel any sym- 
pathy. 



X. 



GREAT EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST PARTMIA, 
AND ITS FAILURE — RETALIATORY RAID OF 
PACORUS, 

Crassus — or, to give him his full name, Marcus 
Licinius Crassus — though one of the foremost Romans 
of his day, was neither a great man, nor a great com- 
mander. Sprung from a noble stock, and the son of 
a respectable father, he first became noted for his 
skill and success in money-getting, an employment 
to which for many years he devoted all his energies, 
and which he pursued with an ardour and persever- 
ance that made success certain. The times were 
favourable for the quick accumulation of a fortune 
by commercial methods. The civil struggles, through 
which Rome was passing, were accompanied by a 
continual succession of forfeitures, confiscations, and 
forced sales, which gave an opportunity, even for 
moderate capitalists, within a comparatively short 
space, by judicious investments, to become men of 
large wealth. Crassus allowed no considerations of 
compassion, or friendship, or delicacy to hamper him 
in his bargains ; and the result was that in course of 
time he came to be the legal owner of the greater 

147 



148 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

portion of the soil on which Rome was built. His 
other possessions were in proportion. He had mines 
which were rich and productive, fertile and well-culti- 
vated estates, and, above all, an enormous number of 
valuable slaves. His own estimate of the worth of 
his property, shortly before he started on his expedi- 
tion, rated it at above seven thousand talents, or more 
than a million and seven hundred thousand English 
pounds. 

In Rome — or at any rate in the Rome of this time 
— wealth led, almost of necessity, to political distinc- 
tion. An enormous expenditure was needed in order 
to obtain the highest offices of the state, and these 
offices became naturally the objects of contention 
among the most opulent men. The wealth of Crassus 
thrust him into a prominent position, and the position 
gradually awoke in him those ambitious longings 
which do not seem to have troubled him during his 
youth. After a time he began to court popularity, 
and to endeavour to outshine the other political 
favourites of the hour. He came forward as a pleader 
in the courts, undertook causes which others declined, 
and showed himself especially zealous and pains- 
taking. He threw his house open to all, lent money 
freely to his friends without requiring interest, and 
exercised a wide, if not a lavish, hospitality. In this 
way he crept on into office, and by degrees worked 
his way up to the highest grades. There, the talents 
that he displayed, without being brilliant, were re- 
spectable. He came to be reckoned shrewd and safe. 
At last, he was put on a par with the highest candi- 
dates for political power, and, though really quite 



CAREER AND CHARACTER OF CRASSUS. I49 

undeserving of the position, was " bracketed " with 
Caesar and Pompey in the so-called " First Trium- 
virate." The consulship followed (B.C. 55) as a matter 
of course, and when, on the lots being cast, Syria 
came out as his "province," Crassus found himself 
exalted to what was, practically, the first position in 
the state. 

There is reason to believe that, for many long 
years, the ambition of Crassus, and his jealousy of 
the other chief political leaders, especially of Pompey 
and Csesar, had been growing and expanding. It 
was particularly in military renown that their repu- 
tation excelled his ; and it was consequently in this 
respect that he was most anxious to place himself on 
their level, if not even, as he hoped, to excel and out- 
do them. In the position now assigned him he 
thought he saw his opportunity. The project of 
Gabinius had got wind, and it had flashed upon the 
imagination of Crassus how grand a thing it would 
be to reduce under the dominion of Rome a wholly 
new country, and that country the seat of ancient 
empires, and the scene of the highest triumphs of 
Alexander. Like many another man of dull and 
plodding temper, Crassus no sooner allowed the desire 
of glory to get a hold on him, than his unstable mind 
was carried all lengths, and indulged in flights of the 
most wild and irrational character. Instead of wait- 
ing till he had reached his province, and examined 
into the position of affairs, before deciding how he 
would act, or what enterprise he would undertake, 
Crassus immediately began to boast among his friends 
of his designs and intentions. He spoke of the wars 



150 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

which Lucullus had waged against Tigranes and 
Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child's 
play, and declared that he was not going to con- 
tent himself with such paltry conquests as had satis- 
fied them ; Syria did not bound his horizon, no, nor 
Parthia either ; it was his intention to carry the Roman 
arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern Ocean. The 
more prudent among the statesmen of the Republic 
remonstrated, but in vain. His friends and flatterers 
applauded and encouraged him. Even Caesar, nothing 
loth to help towards the downfall of a reputation, 
wrote to him from Gaul to fan the flame of his 
ambition and stimulate his hopes. Crassus hurried 
on his preparations, and, though the tribune Ateius 
endeavoured to deter him by a solemn curse, and 
even, had the other tribunes permitted, would have 
arrested his steps at the city gates, left Rome some 
weeks before his consulship had expired, and, despis- 
ing alike warnings and omens, set sail with a large 
fleet from Brundusium. 

The journey of Crassus from Brundusium to the 
Euphrates was prosperous on the whole and unevent- 
ful. "He lost a certain number of his transports in 
crossing the Adriatic, which, as it was already mid- 
November, was not surprising. Landing at Dyrrha- 
chium, he passed through Macedonia and Thrace to 
the Hellespont, and thence through Asia Minor into 
Syria where he established himself at Antioch. On 
his way he fell in with an old Roman ally, Deiotarus, 
King of Galatia, who happened to be building a new 
city on his line of route. As Deiotarus was far 
advanced in years, Crassus, forgetting his own age. 



PREPARATIONS OF ORODES. 151 

indulged in a joke at his expense : " You begin to 
build, Prince," he said, " rather late in the day " ; — 
whereto the other replied with the retort : " And you, 
too, Commander, are not beginning very early in the 
morning to attack the Parthians." 

During the time that Crassus was making his 
preparations at Rome, and the further time that he 
spent upon his march, Orodes, the Parthian monarch, 
had an ample space for forming his general plan of 
campaign at his leisure, and making ready to receive 




COIN OF ORODES I. 



his enemy. Not only was he able to collect his native 
troops from all parts of the empire, and to arm, train, 
and exercise them, but he had an opportunity of gain- 
ing over certain chiefs upon his borders, who had 
hitherto held a semi-independent position, and might 
have been expected to welcome the Romans. The 
most important of these was Abgarus, prince of 
Osrhoene, or the tract lying east of the Euphrates 
about the city of Edessa, who had been received into 
the Roman alliance by Pompey, and was thought by 
the Romans generally to be well disposed to their 
cause. Orodes, however, persuaded him, while still 



152 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

remaining professedly a Roman ally, to give in secret 
his best services to the Parthian side. Another chief, 
^^chandonius, an Arab sheikh of these parts, who had 
' :; his submission to Rome even earlier, becoming 
. .iv'inced that Parthia was the stronger power of 
che two, was at the same time gained over. Orodes 
held himself on the defensive, covering the important 
cities of Seleucia and Babylon with his troops, and 
waiting to see in what way Crassus would develop 
his attack, and by what route he would advance into 
the interior 

The proconsul was at first in no hurry. His old lust of 
gain came upon him, and after contenting himself with 
a mere reconnaissance in Mesopotamia, where he 
defeated a Parthian satrap at Ichnse on the Belik, and 
received the voluntary submission of a number of 
small Greek towns, which he garrisoned, he retraced 
his steps ere the year was half out, and gave himself 
up to a series of discreditable but "very lucrative" 
transactions. At Hierapolis, or Bambyce, where was 
a famous temple of the Syrian goddess, Atergatis 
or Derketo, he entered the shrine, carefully weighed 
all the offerings in the precious metals, and then 
ruthlessly carried them off. Having tidings of the 
treasures still remaining in the Sanctuary of Jehovah 
at Jerusalem, notwithstanding Pompey's sacrilege, he 
paid the city a visit for the mere purpose of plunder, 
rifled the sacred treasury, carried off the golden orna- 
ments, and possessed himself by a perjury of a beam 
of solid gold of 750 pounds weight. In the other 
cities and states he professed to make requisitions of 
men and supplies, but let it be understood that in all 



PROPOSAL MADE BY ARTAVASDES. 153 

cases he was willing to accept, instead, a composition in 
money. One Greek town in Mesopotamia, which re- 
sisted his arms, he took by storm and sacked, after- 
wards selling all the inhabitants, who survived the 
sack, as slaves. 

Thus passed the autumn and winter of B.C. 54. 
The spring of B.C. 53 arrived, and the avaricious pro- 
consul began to see that he must absolutely do some- 
thing to justify his high boasts. Caesar had sent him 
from Gaul his eldest son, a gallant youth and good 
officer, who was burning to distinguish himself ; and 
his quaestor, C. Cassius Longinus, was also a captain 
of repute, who would have been ashamed to return to 
Rome without having fleshed his sword upon some 
worthier enemy than a handful of miserable Greek 
colonists. Artavasdes too, the Armenian king, the son 
of the younger Tigranes, was anxious that so large a 
Roman army as had been collected, should not quit the 
neighbourhood without striking Parthia a blow that 
might seriously weaken, if not even permanently 
cripple her. With the first appearance of spring he 
came into the camp of Crassus, and made him the 
offer of all the resources of his country. He promised 
the assistance of sixteen thousand cavalry, of whom 
ten thousand should be equipped in complete armour, 
and of thirty thousand infantry, at the same time 
strongly urging Crassus to direct his march through 
his own friendly territories, well supplied with water 
and provisions, and abounding with hills and streams, 
suited to baffle the manoeuvres of the terrible Parthian 
horsemen. A march through Southern Armenia would 
conduct to the head streams of the Tigris, whence 



154 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

there was an easy route through a fertile and practi- 
cable country down the course of the river to Seleucia- 
Ctesiphon, the double Parthian capital. Seleucia 
might be expected to welcome the Romans as libera- 
tors ; and there were other Grecian cities upon the 
route that might lend important aid. The Armenian 
proposals had much that was tempting about them, 
and there were not wanting some, among the more 
sober of the proconsul's advisers, to recommend their 
acceptance ; but he himself felt hampered by the 
situation into which he had brought himself by his 
movements of the preceding year, which had led to 
his placing garrisons in the various cities of Osrhoene, 
whom he could not now leave to the tender mercies of 
the enemy. He therefore felt compelled to decline the 
offers of Artavasdes ; and it was probably with some 
feeling of offence that that prince quitted his camp 
and returned hastily to his own country. 

On the part of Orodes no important movement was 
made during the winter season except his despatch of 
an embassy to the procc3nsul, which seems to have 
been intended rather to exasperate him than to 
induce him to forego his attack. The Parthian 
monarch, it may be suspected, had begun to despise 
his enemy. He would naturally compare him with 
Lucullus and Pompey, and when the whole of the 
first year passed by without anything more important 
being undertaken then a raid into an outlying province 
and the occupation of few insignificant and disaffected 
towns, he would begin to understand that a Roman 
army, like any other, was formidable or the reverse, 
according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He 



ORODES TAUNTS HIS ADVERSARY. 155 

would know that Crassus was a sexagenarian, and may 
have heard that he had never yet shown himself a 
captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted 
whether the proconsul had any real intention of pres- 
sing the contest to a decision, and might not rather be 
expected, when he had enriched himself and his troops 
with Mesopotamian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons 
across the Euphrates. Under these circumstances, 
Orodes, in the early spring, sent an embassy to the 
Roman camp, with a message which was well calcu- 
lated to stir to action the most sluggish and poor- 
spirited of commanders. " If the war," said his 
envoys, " was really waged by Rome, it must be fought 
out to the bitter end. But if, as they had good reason 
to believe, Crassus, against the wish of his country, had 
attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own 
private gain, Arsaces would be moderate. He would 
have pity on the advanced years of the proconsul, 
and would give the Romans back those men of theirs, 
who were not so much keeping watch in Mesopotamia 
as having watch kept on them." Crassus, stung with 
the taunt, made the answer so significant of the pride 
that goes before a fall — " He would give the ambassa- 
dors his response in their capital." Wagises, the chief 
envoy, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, 
and glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the 
palm of one hand with the fingers of the other : 
" Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you see 
Seleucia." 

Soon after this, before the winter could well be said 
to be over, the offensive was taken against the Roman 
garrisons and adherents in Mesopotamia. The towns 



156 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

occupied were attacked by the Parthians in force, 
and though it does not seem that any of them were 
recovered, yet all of them were menaced, and all 
suffered considerably. The more timid of the de- 
fenders made their escape from some of them and 
brought to the Roman camp an exaggerated account 
of the difficulties of Parthian warfare. " The enemy," 
they said, " were so rapid in their movements that it 
was impossible either to overtake them when they fled 
or to escape them when they pursued ; their arrows 
sped faster than sight could follow, and penetrated 
every kind of defence, while their mail-clad horsemen 
had weapons that would pierce through any armour, 
and armour that defied the thrust of every weapon." 
Considerable alarm was excited by these rumours, an 
alarm which was reflected in the reports of unfavour- 
able omens issuing from the augural staff; but the 
proconsul had by this time made up his mind that 
something must be risked, and that he could not face 
the storm of ridicule that would meet him at Rome, 
if he did not fight at least one great battle. 

A second campaign was therefore resolved upon ; 
but it still remained to determine the line of march. 
Armenia had been already rejected, partly as too cir- 
cuitous and involving an unnecessary waste of time, 
but mainly as implying the desertion, and so the sacri- 
fice, of the troops which to the number of eight thou- 
sand had been left in Mesopotamia the year before. 
Crassus felt bound to support his garrisons, and so to 
make Mesopotamia, and not Armenia, the basis of his 
operations. But there were several lines of route 
through Mesopotamia. In the first place, there was the 



HIS ADVANCE THROUGH MESOPOTAMIA. 157 

line best known to the Greeks, and through them 
best known to the Romans — that of the Euphrates — 
which had been pursued by Cyrus the Younger in the 
expedition against his brother, whereon he had been 
accompanied by the Ten Thousand. Along this line 
water would be plentiful ; forage and other supplies 
might be counted on to a certain extent ; and the ad- 
vancing army, resting its right upon the river, could 
not be surrounded. Another was that which Alexan- 
der had taken against Darius Codomannus — the line 
along the foot of the Mons. Masius (Karajah Dagh), 
by Edessa and Nisibis to Nineveh. Here, too, water 
and supplies would have been readily procurable, and 
by clinging to the skirts of the hills the Roman 
infantry would have been able to set the Parthian 
cavalry at defiance. Between these two extreme 
courses to the right and to the left, were numerous 
slightly divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, 
all of them shorter than either of the two above- 
mentioned routes, and none offering any great advan- 
tage over the remainder. 

The original inclination of Crassus seems to have 
been to follow in the track of the Ten Thousand. He 
crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma (Bir or Birehjik), in 
about latitude 37°, at the head of seven legions, four 
thousand cavalry, and an equal number of slingers 
and archers, and at first began his march along the 
river bank. No enemy appeared in sight ; and his 
scouts brought him word that there was none to be 
seen for a long distance in front ; the only traces that 
appeared were numerous tracks of horses in rapid 
retreat before his advancing squadrons. The news 



158 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

was considered to be good, and the soldiers marched 
forward cheerfully. The same direction was main- 
tained ; but presently, Abgarus, the Osrhoenian sheikh, 
made his appearance, and had a conference with the 
proconsul, wherein he professed the most friendly feel- 
ings, and strongly recommended an entire change of 
tactics. " The Parthians," he said, " did not intend to 
make a stand ; they might do so later, when the king 
had collected all his forces ; but at present they were 
demoralised, and were thinking only of quitting Meso- 
potamia, and flying with their treasures to the remote 
regions of Hyrcania and Scythia. The king was 
already far away ; the main host was in full retreat ; 
only a rearguard under a couple of generals, Surenas 
and Sillaces, still lingered in Mesopotamia, and might 
be within striking distance. Crassus should give up his 
cautious proceedings, and hurry on at his best speed ; 
he would then probably succeed in overtaking and 
cutting to pieces the rearguard of the great army, 
a flying multitude encumbered with baggage, which 
would furnish a rich spoil to the victors." The crafty 
Osrhoenian was believed ; and, though Cassius with 
some other officers is said to have still counselled 
a more cautious advance, the proconsul resolved on 
giving himself up to the guidance of " the Bedouin," 
and altering the direction of the march in accordance 
with his recommendations. Accordingly, he turned 
off from the Euphrates, and proceeded eastward over 
the swelling hills and dry gravelly plains of Upper 
Mesopotamia. 

Here we shall leave him for the present, while we 
consider the real disposition of his forces which the 



ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY ORODES. 159 

Parthian monarch had made to meet the impending 
attack. He had, as already stated, come to terms 
with his outlying vassals, the prince of Osrhoene and 
the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged 
especially the services of the former against his as- 
sailant. He had further, on considering the various 
possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion 
that it would be best to divide his forces, and while 
himself attacking Artavasdes in the mountain fast- 
nesses of his own country, to commit the task of 
meeting and coping with the Romans to a general of 
approved talents. It was of the greatest possible 
importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a 
junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in 
that arm in which they were especially deficient, the 
cavalry. Probably nothing short of an invasion of his 
kingdom by the Parthian monarch in person would 
have prevented Artavasdes from detaching a portion 
of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no doubt 
it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his 
general, whom he may even have felt to be a better 
commander than himself Surenas, as we must call 
him, since his personal appellation has not come down 
to us, was in all respects a person of the highest con- 
sideration. He was the second man in the kingdom 
for birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage and 
ability he excelled all his countrymen ; and he had 
the physical advantages of commanding height, and 
great personal beauty. When he went to battle, he 
was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels, 
which carried his baggage ; and the concubines in 
attendance on him required for their conveyance as 



l6o EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

many as two hundred chariots. A thousand mail- 
clad horsemen, and a still larger number of light- 
armed, formed his body-guard. At the coronation of 
a Parthian monarch, it was his hereditary right to 
place the diadem on the brow of the new sovereign. 
When Orodes was driven into banishment, it was he 
who had brought him back to Parthia in triumph. 
When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault 
had first mounted the breach, and striking terror into 
the defenders, had taken the city. Though less than 
thirty years of age when he was appointed com- 
mander, he was believed to possess, besides these 
various qualifications, consummate prudence and 
sagacity. 

The force which Orodes committed to his brave and 
skilful lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This 
was not the ordinary character of a Parthian army, 
which often comprised four or five times as many 
cavalry as infantry. Whether it was to any extent 
the result of his own selection and military insight, is 
uncertain. Perhaps fortunate accident rather than 
profound calculation brought about the sole employ- 
ment against the Romans of the cavalry arm. Horse 
would be wholly useless in the rugged and mountainous 
Armenia, while they would act with effect in the com- 
paratively open and level Mesopotamian region. Foot- 
men,on the other hand, were essential for the Armenian 
war, and perhaps the king thought that he needed 
as many as he could collect. In this case he would 
naturally take with him the whole of the infantry, and 
leave his general the troops which were not required 
for his own operations. It certainly does not appear, 
that Surenas was allowed any choice in the matter. 



PARTHIAN FORCE OPPOSED TO HIM. l6l 

The Parthian horse, Hke the Persian, was of two 
kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the 
other. The bulk of their cavalry was of the lightest 
and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, 
with scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a 
single rein, \vere mounted by riders clad only in a 
tunic and trousers, and armed with nothing but a 
strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training 
begun in early boyhood and continued through youth 
made the rider almost one with his steed ; and he 
could use his weapons with equal ease and effect 
whether his horse was stationary or at full gallop, or 
whether he was advancing towards or hurriedly re- 
treating from his enemy. His supply of missiles was 
practically inexhaustible, since when he found his 
quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance 
and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the 
backs of camels, in the rear. It was his ordinary plan 
to keep constantly in motion when in the presence of 
an enemy, to gallop backwards and forwards, or 
round and round his square or column, never charging 
it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen 
and barbed shafts ; which were driven by a practised 
hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this 
light cavalry enveloped the advancing or retreating 
foe, and inflicted grievous damage, without, for the 
most part, suffering anything in return. 

But this was not the whole, nor the worst. In ad- 
dition to these light troops, a Parthian army contained 
always a body of heavy cavalry, armed on an entirely 
different system. The strong chargers selected for this 
service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, 



l62 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

neck, chest, even their sides and flanks, were protected 
by scale- armour of bronze or iron, sewn probably upon 
leather. Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the 
same materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For 
an offensive weapon they carried a long and strong 
spear or pike. They formed a serried line in battle, 
bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom 
they attacked, and standing firm as an iron wall 
against the charges that were made upon them. A 
cavalry, answering to this in some respects, had been 
employed by the later Persian monarchs, and was in 
use also among the Armenians at this period ; but 
the Parthian pike appears to have been considerably 
more formidable than the corresponding weapon borne 
by either of these nations. 

As compared with these troops, the Romans, as 
Mommsen observes, were thoroughly inferior both in 
respect of number and of excellence. Their infantry 
of the line, excellent as they were in close combat, 
whether at a short distance with the heavy javelin, or 
in hand-to-hand combat with the sword, could not 
compel an army consisting wholly of cavalry to come to 
an engagement with them ; and they found, even when 
they did come to a hand-to-hand conflict, an equal 
or superior adversary in the iron-clad hosts of lancers. 
As compared with a force like that of Surenas, the 
Roman army was at a disadvantage strategically, be- 
cause the cavalry commanded the communications ; 
and at a disadvantage tactically, because every weapon 
of close combat must succumb to that which is wielded 
from a distance, unless the struggle becomes an in- 
dividual one man against man. The concentrated 



HTS ARMY AT A DISADVANTAGE. 163 

position, on which the whole Roman method of war 
was based, increased the danger in the presence of 
such an attack, since the closer the ranks of the 
Roman column, the less could the missiles fail to hit 
their mark. Under ordinary circumstances, where 
towns have to be defended, and difficulties of the 
ground have to be considered, such a system of opera- 
ting with mere cavalry against infantry could never 
be completely carried out ; but in the Mesopotamian 
plain region, where an army was almost like a ship on 
the high seas, neither encountering an obstacle, nor 
meeting with a basis for strategic dispositions during 
many days' rnarch, this mode of warfare was irresistible 
for the very reason that circumstances allowed it to be 
developed there in all its purity and therefore in all its 
power. TJiere everything combined to put the foreign 
infantry at a disadvantage against the native cavalry. 
Where the heavily-laden Roman foot soldier dragged 
himself toilsomely over the steppe, and perished from 
hunger, or still more from thirst, on a route marked 
only by water-springs that were far apart and difficult 
to find, the Parthian horseman, accustomed from child- 
hood to sit on his fleet steed or camel, nay, almost to 
spend his life in the saddle, easily traversed the desert, 
whose hardships he had long learned how to lighten, 
and in case of need to bear. There no rain fell to 
mitigate the intolerable heat, and to slacken the bow- 
strings and leathern thongs of the enemy's archers and 
sHngers ; tJiere in the light soil of some places ordinary 
ditches and ramparts could hardly be formed for the 
camp. Imagination can hardly conceive a situation in 
which all the military advantages were more on the 



164 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

one side, and all the disadvantages more thoroughly on 
the other. 

The force entrusted by Orodes to Surenas com- 
prised cavalry of both the kinds above described. No 
estimate is given us of their number ; but, as they are 
called " a vast multitude," and " an immense body," 
we may assume that it was considerable. At any rate 
it was sufficient to induce him to make a movement 
in advance — to cross the Sinjar range and the river 
Khabour, and take up his position in the country be- 
tween that stream and the Belik — instead of merely 
seeking to cover the capital. The presence of the 
traitor, Abgarus, in the camp of Crassus, became now 
of the utmost importance to the Parthian commander. 
Abgarus, fully trusted by the Romans, and at the head 
of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for out- 
post service, was allowed, upon his own request, to 
scour the country in front of the advancing legions, 
and had thus the means of communicating freely with 
the Parthian chief He kept Surenas informed of all the 
movements and intentions of Crassus, while at the 
same time he suggested to Crassus such a line of route 
as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our 
chief authority for the details of the expedition, Plu- 
tarch, tells us, that he led the Roman troops through 
an arid and trackless desert, across plains without tree, 
or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed 
of a light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a 
succession of hillocks that resembled the waves of an 
interminable sea. The soldiers, he says, fainted with 
the heat and with the drought, while the audacious 
Osrhoenian scoffed at their complaints and reproaches, 



THE DISADVANTAGE EXAGGERATED. 165 

asking them whether they expected to find the border- 
tract between Arabia and Assyria a country of cool 
streams and shady groves, of baths and hostelries, Hke 
their own dehcious Campania. But our knowledge of 
the real geographical character of the region through 
which the rnarch lay makes it impossible for us to 
accept this account as true. The country between the 
Euphrates and the Belik is one of alternate hill and 
plain, neither destitute of trees, nor very ill-provided 
with water. The march through it can have presented 
no very great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do to 
serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus 
to trust himself to the open country instead of cling- 
ing either to a river or to the mountains ; and, secondly, 
to bring him, after a hasty march, and in the full heat 
of the day, into the presence of the enemy. Both 
these things he contrived to effect ; and Surenas was, 
no doubt, so far beholden to him. But the notion 
that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless 
desert, and gave it over, when it was perishing with 
weariness, hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its 
enraged enemy, being in contradiction with the topo- 
graphical facts, must be regarded as a fiction of Roman 
apologists, and is one not even consistently maintained 
by all the classical writers. 

It was probably on the third or fourth day after he 
had quitted the Euphrates that Crassus found him- 
self approaching his enemy. After a hasty and hot 
march he had approached the banks of the Belik, 
when his scouts brought him w^ord that they had 
fallen in with the Parthian army, which was advancing 
in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus 



l66 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS;. 

had recently quitted him on the pretence of doing 
him some undefined service, but in reality to range 
himself on the side of his true friends, the Parthians. 
His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the 
river, and defer an engagement till the morrow, but 
he had no fears ; his son, Publius, a gallant officer 
formed in the school of Julius Caesar, was anxious for 
the fray ; and accordingly the Roman commander 
gave the order to his troops to take some refreshment 
as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly. 
Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on 
wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his num- 
bers, and had even, we are told, made his troops 
cover their arms with cloths and skins, that the glitter 
might not betray them. But, as the Romans drew 
near, all concealment was cast aside ; the signal for 
battle was given ; the clang of the kettledrums 
sounded on every side ; the squadrons came forward 
in their brilliant array ; and it seemed at first as if the 
heavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host, 
which was formed in a hollow square, with the light- 
armed in the middle, and with supports of horse along 
the whole line, as well as upon the flanks. But, if 
this intention was ever entertained, it was altered 
almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was 
adopted of halting at a convenient distance, and 
assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of 
arrows, delivered without pause, and with extraordi- 
nary force. The Roman endeavoured to meet this 
attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers, but 
they were quite unable to cope with the numbers and 
superior weapons of the enemy, who forced them 



BATTLE OF THE BELIK. 167 

almost immediately to retreat, and take shelter 
behind the line of the legionaries. These were once 
more exposed to the deadly missiles, which pierced 
alike through shield and breastplate and greaves, and 
inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once 
the legionaries dashed forward and sought to close 
with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian 
squadrons retired as the Roman infantry advanced, 
maintaining the distance which they thought best 
between themselves and their foe, whom they plied 
with their shafts as incessantly while they fell back as 
when they rode forward. For a while the Romans 
maintained the hope that the missiles would at last be 
all spent, but when they found that each archer con- 
stantly obtained a fresh supply of arrows from the 
rear, this expectation deserted them. It became 
evident to Crassus under these circumstances that 
some new movement must be attempted, and, as a 
last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom 
the Parthians were threatening to outflank, to take 
such troops as he thought proper and charge. The 
brave youth was only too glad to receive the order. 
Selecting the Celtic cavalry which Caesar had sent 
with him from Gaul, who numbered a thousand, and 
adding to them three hundred other horsemen, five 
hundred archers, and about four thousand legionaries, 
he advanced at speed against the nearest squadrons 
of the enemy. The Parthians pretended to be afraid, 
and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followed with all 
the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of sight 
of his friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he 
believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had 



l68 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a 
stand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, 
and completely enveloped him and his detachment 
with their light-armed. Publius made a desperate 
resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with 
their hands, and dragged the encumbered horsemen 
to the ground ; or, dismounting, slipped beneath the 
horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in the 
belly brought steed and rider down upon themselves. 
His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endea- 
voured to make a wall of their shields, but the Par- 
thian archers closed around them, and slew them 
almost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly 
six thousand strong, no more than five hundred were 
taken prisoners, and scarcely a man escaped. The 
young Crassus might possibly, had he chosen to make 
the attempt, have forced his way through the enemy 
to Ichnae, a Greek town not far distant, but he pre- 
ferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than fall 
alive into the hands of the enemy, he caused his 
shield-bearer to despatch him ; and his example was 
followed by his principal officers. The victors struck 
off" his head, and, elevating it on a pike, returned to 
resume their attack on the main body of the Roman 
army. 

The main army, much relieved by the diminution 
of the pressure upon them, had waited patiently for 
Publius to return in triumph, regarding the battle as 
well-nigh over, and success as certain. After a time 
the prolonged absence of the young captain aroused 
suspicions, which grew into alarm when messengers 
arrived telling of his extreme danger. Crassus, 



RETREAT OF THE ROMANS. 169 

almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the 
word to advance, and the army had moved forward a 
short distance when the shouts of the returning enemy 
were heard, and the head of the unfortunate Publius 
was seen displayed aloft, while the Parthian squad- 
rons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on 
their remaining foes with increased vigour. The 
mailed horsemen approached close to the legionaries 
and thrust at them with their long pikes, which 
sometimes transfixed two men at once ; while the 
light-armed, galloping across the Roman front, dis- 
charged their unerring arrows over the heads of their 
own men. The Romans could neither successfully 
defend themselves nor effectively retaliate ; they 
could neither break the ranks of the lancers, nor 
reach the archers. Still time brought some relief. 
Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted or splintered, 
arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax ; and 
when night closed in both parties were almost equally 
glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness ren- 
dered compulsory. 

It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Per- 
sians, to bivouac at a considerable distance from an 
enemy for fear of a night surprise. Accordingly, as 
evening closed in, they drew off, having first shouted 
jeeringly to the Romans that they would grant the 
general one night in which to bewail his son ; on the 
morrow they would return and take him prisoner, 
unless he should prefer the better course of surrender- 
ing himself to the mercy of Arsaces. A short 
breathing-space was thus allowed the Romans, who 
took advantage of it to retire towards Carrhae, leaving 



170 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

behind them the greater part of their wounded, to 
the number of four thousand. A small body of horse 
under the command of Egnatius reached Carrhae 
about midnight, and gave the ■ commandant such 
information as led him to put his men under arms 
and issue forth to the succour of the proconsul. The 
Parthians, though the cries of the forsaken wounded 
made them well aware of the Roman retreat, adhered 
to their system of avoiding night combats, and 
attempted no pursuit till daybreak. Even then they 
allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively 
trivial matters — the capture of the Roman camp, the 
massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the 
numerous stragglers scattered along the line of march 
— and made no haste to overtake the retreating arm}^ 
The bulk of the troops were thus enabled to effect 
their retreat in safety to Carrhae, where, having the 
protection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time, 
secure. 

It might have been expected that the Romans 
would here have made a stand. The siege of a 
fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if we under- 
stand by siege anything more than a very incomplete 
blockade. And the Parthians were notoriously 
inefficient against walls. There was a chance, more- 
over, that Artavasdes might have been more success- 
ful than his ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian 
monarch, might be on his way to bring relief to the 
Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly dispirited, 
and would not listen to these suggestions. Pro- 
visions, no doubt, ran short, since, as there had been 
no expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been 



BATTLE OF SINN AC A. 171 

made for standing a siege. The Greek inhabitants of 
the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a 
falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near, and the 
Parthian system of abstaining from action during the 
night seemed to render escape tolerably easy. It was 
resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the protec- 
tion of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to 
endeavour by a rapid night march to reach the 
Armenian hills. The various officers seem to have 
been allowed to arrange matters each for himself 
Cassius took his way towards the Euphrates, and 
succeeded in escaping with five hundred horse. 
Octavius, with a division which is estimated at five 
thousand men, reached the outskirts of the hills at a 
place called Sinnaca, and found himself in compara- 
tive security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made 
but poor progress during the night ; he had, however, 
arrived within little more than a mile of Octavius 
before the enemy, who would not stir till daybreak, 
overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing 
squadrons, he, with his small band of two thousand 
legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a low 
hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with 
the position of Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host 
beset him, and he would infallibly have been slain or 
captured at once had not Octavius, deserting his 
place of safety, descended to the aid of his com- 
mander. The united seven thousand held their own 
against the enemy, having the advantage of the 
ground, and having, perhaps, by the experience of 
some days, learnt the weak points of Parthian war- 
fare. 



172 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure 
the person of the Roman commander. In the East 
an excessive importance is attached to this proof of 
success ; and there were reasons which made Crassus 
particularly obnoxious to his antagonists. He was 
believed to have originated, and not merely con- 
ducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of 
gold. He had refused with the utmost haughtiness 
all discussion of terms, and had insulted the majesty 
of the Parthians by the declaration that he would 
treat with them nowhere but at their capital. If he 
escaped, he would be bound at some future time to 
repeat his attempt ; if he were made a prisoner his 
fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, 
as evening approached, it seemed to the Parthian 
that the prize which he so much desired was about to 
elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would 
be gained by the fugitives during the night, and 
further pursuit of them would be futile. It remained 
that he should effect by craft what he could no longer 
hope to obtain by the employment of force ; and to 
this point all his efforts were henceforth directed. 
He drew off his troops and left the Romans without 
further molestation. He allowed some of his 
prisoners to escape and rejoin their friends, having 
first contrived that they should overhear a conversa- 
tion among his men, of which the theme was the 
Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come 
to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed 
time for the report of his pacific intentions to spread, 
rode with a few chiefs towards the Roman camp, 
carrying his bow unstrung, and his right hand 



DEATH OF CRASSUS. I73 

stretched out, in token of amity. " Let the Roman 
general," he said, " come forward with an equal num- 
ber of attendants, and confer with me in the open 
space between the armies on terms of peace." The 
aged proconsul was disinclined to trust these over- 
tures, but the Roman soldiery, demoralised as it was, 
clamoured and threatened ; upon which Crassus 
yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied 
by Octavius and a few others. Surenas received the 
proconsul and his staff with apparent honour, and 
terms were arranged ; only, with just bitterness, the 
Parthian chief required that they should be at once 
reduced to writing, " since," he said, with pointed 
allusion to the bad faith of Pompey, " you Romans 
are not very apt to remember your engagements." A 
movement being requisite for the purpose of drawing 
up the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers 
were induced to mount upon horses furnished by 
the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the pro- 
consul on his steed than they proceeded to hurry him 
forward, with the evident intention of carrying him 
off to their camp. The Roman officers took the alarm 
and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a 
Parthian, and killed one of the grooms who were 
hurrying Crassus away. A blow from behind 
stretched him on the ground lifeless. A general 
me/ee followed, and in the confusion Crassus was 
killed, whether by one of his own side and with his 
own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian, is uncer- 
tain. The army, learning the fate of their com- 
mander, with but few exceptions, surrendered. Such 
as sought to escape under cover of the approaching 



174 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

night were hunted down by the Bedouins, who served 
under the Parthian standard, and killed almost to a 
man. Of the entire force which had crossed the 
Euphrates, consisting of above forty thousand men, 
not more than a fourth returned. One half of the 
whole number perished. Nearly ten thousand 
prisoners were settled by the victors near the extreme 
east of their empire in the fertile oasis of Margiana 
(Merv) as bondsmen, compelled after the Parthian 
fashion to render military service. Here they inter- 
married with native wives, and became submissive 
Parthian subjects. 

Such was the result of this great expedition, the 
first attempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, 
not so much to conquer Parthia, as to strike terror 
into the heart of her people, and to degrade them to 
the condition of obsequious dependants on the will 
and pleasure of the " world's lords." The expedition 
■failed so utterly, not from any want of bravery on 
the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any 
absolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman 
tactics, but partly from the incompetence of the 
commander, partly from the inexperience of the 
Romans up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian 
warfare, and from their consequent ignorance of the 
best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose 
main arm is the cavalry with a body of foot soldiers, 
supported by an insignificant number of horse, must 
be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct such 
an attack on the more open part of the country, 
where cavalry could operate freely, was wantonly to 
aggravate the peril. After the first disaster, to quit 



RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 175 

the protection , of walls, when it had once been 
obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus 
taken care to get the support of some of the desert 
tribes, if Armenia could not or would not help him, 
and had he then advanced, either by the way of the 
Mons. Masius and the Tigris, or along the line of 
the Euphrates, the issue of his attack might have been 
different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia 
and Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and 
Septimius Severus, and might have taken and 
plundered those cities. He would, no doubt, have 
experienced difficulties in his retreat ; but he might 
have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Parthian 
expedition has been generally regarded as rather a 
feather in his cap, and as augmenting rather than 
detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant and 
inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of 
arms with an enemy of whom he knew little or 
nothing, in their own country, without supports or 
allies, and then neglecting every precaution suggested 
by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by a 
pretended friend, and marching straight into a net 
prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat The 
credit of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer by 
the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly 
enhanced. The latter showed, as they had shown in 
their wars against the Syro-Macedonians, that their 
somewhat loose and irregular army was capable of 
acting with effect against the solid masses and well- 
ordered movements of the best disciplined troops. 
They acquired by their use of the bow a fame like 
that which the English bowmen obtained at Crecy 



176 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans to 
respect them, and to allow that there was at least one 
nation in the world which could meet them on equal 
terms and not be worsted in the encounter. They 
henceforth obtained recognition from the Greco- 
Roman writers — albeit a grudging and covert recogni- 
tion — as the Second Power in the world, the admitted 
rival of Rome, the only real counterpoise upon the 
earth to the mighty empire which ruled from the 
banks of the Euphrates to the shores of the Atlantic 
Ocean. 

While the general of King Qrodes was thus com- 
pletely successful against the Romans in Mesopotamia, 
the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages 
of almost equal importance, though of a different kind. 
Instead of waging an internecine war with Artavasdes, 
he had come to terms with him, and, having con- 
cluded a close alliance, had set himself to confirm and 
cement it by uniting his son, Pacorus, in marriage 
with the sister of the royal Armenian. A series of 
festivities was in course of being held, to celebrate 
the auspicious event, when news arrived of the triumph 
of Surenas and the fate of Crassus. According to the 
barbarous customs at all times prevalent in the East, 
the head and hand of the slain proconsul accompanied 
the intelligence. We are told that, at the moment of 
the messengers' arrival the two sovereigns, with their 
attendants, were being amused by a dramatic enter- 
tainment. Strolling companies of Greek players were 
at this time frequent in the East, where they were sure 
of patronage in the many Greek cities, and might 
sometimes find an appreciative audience among the 



TREATMENT OF THE BODY OF CRASSUS. lyy 

natives. Artavasdes, as the master of the revels, had 
engaged such a company, since both he and Orodes 
had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and 
language, in which he had himself composed both 
historical works and tragedies. The performance had 
begun, and it happened, that, when the messengers 
arrived, the actors were engaged in the representation 
of the famous scene in the " Bacchae " of Euripides, 
where Agave and the Bacchanals come upon the 
stage with the mutilated remains of the murdered 
Pentheus. The head of Crassus was thrown to them ; 
and instantly the player who personated Agave seized 
the bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus in 
lieu of the one that he was carrying, paraded it before 
the delighted spectators, while he chanted the well- 
known lines — 

" From the mountain to the hall 
New-cut tendril, see, we bring — 
Blessed prey ! " 

The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please 
an Eastern audience ; loud and prolonged plaudits, 
we may be sure, rang out ; and the entire assemblage 
felt a keen satisfaction in the performance. It was 
followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity, and still 
more thoroughly Oriental. The Parthians, in derision 
of the motive which was supposed to have led Crassus 
to make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and 
poured it into his mouth. 

Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious 
troops, and seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleu- 
cians by the exhibition of a farcical ceremony. Hq 



178 EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

spread the report that Crassus was not killed but 
captured ; and selecting from among the prisoners 
the Roman most like him in appearance, he dressed 
the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upon a 
horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of 
"Crassus" and "Imperator," conducted him in triumph 
to the Grecian city. Before him went, mounted on 
camels, a band arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, 
the lictors' rods having purses suspended to them, and 
the axes in their midst being crowned with the bleed- 
ing heads of Romans. In the rear followed a train of 
Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the 
effeminacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After 
this pretended parade of his prisoner through the 
streets of the town, Surenas called a meeting of the 
Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them 
the indecency of the literature which he had found in 
the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true ; 
but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the 
moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the 
train of concubines that had accompanied Surenas 
himself to the field, and thought further of the loose 
crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that was 
commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army. 

It might have been expected that the terrible 
disaster which had befallen the Roman arms, and the 
vast triumph which the Parthians had achieved for 
themselves, would have had extraordinary and far- 
reaching consequences. No one could have been 
surprised if the result had been to shake the very 
foundations of the Roman power in the East, or even 
to restore to Asia that aggressive attitude towards the 



TEMPORARY INACTION OF THE PARTHIANS. 179 

rest of the world, which she had held four hundred 
and fifty years earlier. But the commotion and 
change produced was far less than might have been 
anticipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered 
by the Parthians to itsextremest limit, the Euphrates ; 
and Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and 
thrown for the time into complete dependence upon 
Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited ; 
and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and 
recently aggrieved by the unprovoked spoliation of 
their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms. But no 
general movement of the Oriental races took place. 
It might have been supposed that the Syrians, Phoe- 
nicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians, and other 
Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether 
Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising 
against their Western lords and driving the Romans 
back upon Europe. It might have been thought that 
Parthia at least would have immediately assumed the 
offensive in force, and have made a determined effort 
to rid herself of neighbours who had proved so 
troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circum- 
stances was most favourable — though not only was 
Rome paralysed in the East, but was also on the 
point of civil war in the West — yet the man was 
wanting. Had Mithridates of Pontus or Tigranes of 
Armenia been living, or had Surenas been king of 
Parthia instead of a mere general, advantage would 
probably have been taken of the occasion, and Rome 
might have suffered seriousl}-. But Orodes seems to 
have been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful 
as a commander ; he lacked at any rate the keen and 



l8o EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. 

all-embracing glance which could sweep the political 
horizon, and, comprehending the exact character of the 
situation, see at the same time how to make the most 
of it. He allowed the opportunity to slip by without 
hastening to put forth his full strength, or indeed 
making any considerable effort ; and the occasion 
once lost was sure never to return. 

If there was a man living at the time who might 
possibly have taken full advantage of the situation, 
and forced Rome to pay the deserved penalty of her 
rashness and aggressiveness, it was Surenas. But 
that chief had lost the favour of his sovereign. 
There are services which, in the East, it is not safe 
for a subject to render to the head of the state, and 
Surenas had exceeded the proper measure. The 
jealousy of Orodes was aroused by the success and 
reputation of his general ; and it was not long before 
he found an excuse for handing him over to the 
executioner. Parthia was thus left without any com- 
mander of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second 
in command during the war with Crassus, had in no 
way distinguished himself in the course of it. This 
condition of things may account for the feebleness of 
the efforts made, in the years B.C. 53 and 52, to 
retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their 
invasion. A few weak flying bands only crossed the 
Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and 
ravage, in which they were speedily disturbed by 
Cassius, who easily drove them back across the river. 
Rome should have taken advantage of the interval 
to strengthen her forces in these parts, and secure the 
inviolability of her frontier ; but those who were at 



RETALIATORY RAID OF PACORUS. l8l 

the head of the Roman State, knowing civil war to 
be imminent, dechned to detach troops from their 
own party standards for the advantage of the 
national cause. 

Hence, when, in B.C. 51, Orodes had made up his 
mind to attempt a blow, and a great Parthian army 
under the young prince, Pacorus, and an officer of 
ripe age and experience, by name Osaces, appeared 
on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, there were no 
means of resisting them. Cassius had done his best 
to unite and re- organise the broken remnants of the 
army of Crassus, which he had formed into two weak 




COIN OF PACORUS I. 

legions ; but no reinforcements had reached him, and 
he did not feel justified in taking the open field with 
his small force, much less in giving battle to the 
enemy. The Parthians therefore crossed the Euphrates 
unopposed, and swarmed into the rich Syrian territory. 
The walled towns shut their gates, and maintained 
themselves ; but the open country was everywhere 
overrun : and a thrill of mingled alarm and excite- 
ment passed through all the Roman provinces in 
Asia. These provinces were at the time most 
inadequately supplied with Roman troops, owing to 
the impending civil war in Italy. The natives were 
for the most part disaffected, and inclined to hail the 



l82 RETALIATORY RAID OF PACORUS. 

Parthians as brethren and deliverers. Excepting 
Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappa- 
docia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) 
plaintively declared, not a friend on the Asiatic con- 
tinent. And Cappadocia was miserably weak, and 
open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodes 
and Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the latter, 
while Orodes sent his armies into Syria, poured the 
Armenian forces into Cappadocia and then into 
Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do), there 
would have been the greatest danger to the Roman 
possessions. As it was, the excitement in Asia 
Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappa- 
docia with the bulk of his Roman troops, and 
summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his Galatians, 
at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to 
implore reinforcements. Cassius shut himself up in 
Antioch, and allowed the Parthian cavalry to pass 
him by, and even to proceed beyond the bounds of 
Syria into Cilicia. But the Parthians seem scarcely 
to have understood the straits of their adversaries or 
to have been aware of their own advantages. Pro- 
bably . their " information department " was ill 
organised. Instead of spreading themselves wide, 
raising the natives, and leaving them to blockade the 
towns, while with their as yet unconquered squadrons 
they defied the enemy in the open country, we find 
them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for 
which they were totally unfit, and confining them- 
selves almost entirely to the narrow valley of the 
Orontes. Under these circumstances we are not 
surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beaten 



PLOT TO MAKE PACORUS KING. 183 

them back from Antioch, contrived to lead them into 
an ambush on the banks of the river, and severely 
handled their troops, even killing the general, Osaces. 
The Parthians withdrew from the neighbourhood 
of the Syrian capital after this defeat, which must 
have taken place about the end of September, and 
soon after went into winter quarters in Cyrrhestica, or 
the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. 
Here they remained quietly during the winter months 
under Prince Pacorus, and it was expected that the 
war would break out again with fresh fury in the 
spring ; but Bibulus, the new proconsul of Syria — 
" as wretched a general as he was an incapable 
statesman " — conscious of his military deficiencies, 
contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians 
themselves and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in 
another direction. He suggested to Ornodapantes, 
a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to 
open a correspondence, that Pacorus would be a more 
worthy occupant of the throne of the Arsacidae than 
his father, and that he would consult well for his own 
interests, if he were to proclaim the young prince as 
king, and lead the army of Syria against Orodes. 
Pacorus had already been associated in the govern- 
ment by his father, and his name appears on some of 
his father's later coins ; but this, while stimulating, 
did not satisfy his ambition. He appears to have 
lent a ready ear to the whispers of Ornodapantes, and 
to have been on the verge, if he did not even over- 
step the verge, of rebellion. There are Parthian 
coins bearing the head of a beardless youth, and 
the exact set of titles that had become fashionable 



184 END OF THE FIRST ROMAN WAR. 

under Orodes, which are with ample reason assigned 
to this prince, and which must have been struck to be 
put in circulation when his revolt was declared. But 
the plot was nipped in the bud. Orodes, learning the 
designs cherished by Pacorus, summoned him to his 
Court ; and, the plans laid down not being yet ripe 
for execution, he felt that there was no other course 
open to him but to obey. The Parthian squadrons 
seem to have recrossed the Euphrates in July, 
B.C. 50. The danger to Rome was past ; but the 
stain was not wiped out from the shield of Roman 
honour, nor was the reputation of Rome restored in 
the East. The " First Roman War " ended, after a 
period of a little more than four years, with the 
advantage wholly on the side of Parthia, both in 
respect of glory and of material gain. The laurels 
lost by Rome at Carrhae had never been recovered, 
and the acquisition of Armenia by Parthia was a 
substantial increase of strength. 




XI. 



SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME — PARTHIAN 
INVASION OF SYRIA, PvVLESTINE, AND ASIA 
MINOR. 

The end of the first war of Parthia with Rome 
synchronised nearly with the breaking out of the 
civil contest between Caesar and Pompey. In this 
struggle the sympathies of Parthia were on the 
Pompeian side. Though Pompey had certainly not 
given the Parthians much reason for regarding him 
with favour, since he had openly and flagrantly 
broken the terms of his treaty of alliance with them, 
yet on the whole they seem certainly to have pre- 
ferred his cause to that of his great adversary. 
Perhaps they viewed Csesar as more bound in 
honour than Pompey to seek revenge for the death 
of Crassus, since he had sent a favourite officer, with 
a contingent of troops, to his aid, or possibly they 
may simply have felt more fear of his military 
capacity. Communications certainly took place be- 
tween Orodes and Pompey in the course of the year 
B.C. 49 or 48, and the terms of an alliance were dis- 
cussed between them. Pompey, who was not very 
scrupulous, or really patriotic, made the overtures, 
and desired to know on what terms the Parthian 



l86 SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 

monarch would lend him effective aid in the war 
which was on the point of breaking out. The reply 
of Orodes was to the following effect : "If the 
Roman leader would deliver into his hands the 
province of Syria, and make it wholly over to the 
Parthians, Orodes was willing to conclude an alliance 
with him and send him help ; but not otherwise." 
It is to the credit of Pompey that he rejected these 
terms, and, while not above contemplating a foreign 
alliance against a domestic foe, was unwilling to 
purchase the assistance to himself at -a cost that 
would have inflicted a serious injury on his country. 
The rupture of the negotiations produced an estrange- 
ment between the negotiators, and Orodes went so 
far as to throw Hirrus, the envoy of Pompey, into 
prison, as a means of giving vent to his disappoint- 
ment. Still, however, Pompey looked upon Orodes 
as a friend ; and when, a few months later, he had 
fought his great fight, and suffered his great defeat, 
at Pharsalus (August 9, B.C. 48), his thoughts reverted 
to the powerful Parthian king, and he entertained for 
some time the idea of taking refuge at the Court of 
Ctesiphon. It is even said that he only relinquished 
the design, and made his disastrous choice of Egypt 
as a refuge, when, on the receipt of intelligence that 
Antioch had declared for his rival, he understood that 
the route to the Parthian capital was no longer open 
to him. Otherwise, notwithstanding the persuasions 
of his friends, who thought the risk too great, both 
for himself and his wife, Cornelia, to be run with 
prudence, the world might have have seen the spec- 
tacle of a second Coriolanus, tliundering at the gates 



CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO IT. 187 

of Rome and demanding recall and reinstatement, at 
the head of legions recruited in a foreign land and 
furnished by a foreign enemy. As it was, Roman 
history was spared this scandal ; and at the same 
time Orodes was spared the awkwardness and 
difficulty of having to elect between repulsing a 
suppliant, and provoking the hostility of the most 
powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the 
age. 

The year B.C. 47 saw Caesar in Syria and Asia 
Minor, whither he was drawn by the necessity of 
crushing the mad schemes of Pharnaces, son of 
Mithridates of Pontus, who thought he saw in the 
internal quarrels of the Romans an opportunity of 
re-establishing his father's empire. After the facile 
victory of Zela, the Great Roman can scarcely have 
avoided debating with himself the question, whether 
he should at once turn his arms against his only 
other Asiatic enemy, and by a movement as rapid as 
that which had crushed Pharnaces, strike a blow 
against Orodes, and so avenge the defeat of Carrhae. 
But, if the idea crossed his mind, he dismissed it. 
The time was not suitable. Too much remained to 
be done in Africa, in Spain, and at home, for so large 
a matter as a Parthian War to be, for the moment, 
taken in hand. Caesar resolutely averted his gaze 
from the far East, and deferring the " revenge " to a 
comparatively remote date, kept whatever projects he 
may have entertained on the subject to himself, and 
was careful, while he remained in Asia, to avoid 
provoking or exasperating by threats or hostile 
movements, the Power on which the peace of the 



l88 SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 

East principally depended. It was not until he had 
brought the African and Spanish wars to an end that 
he allowed his intention of leading an expedition 
against Parthia to be openly talked about. In B.C. 44, 
four years after Pharsalus, having put down all his 
domestic enemies, and arranged matters, as he 
thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he let a decree be 
passed, formally assigning to him the Parthian War, 
and sent the legions across the Adriatic on their way 
to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have con- 
templated is uncertain. One writer represents him 
as intending to enter Parthia by way of the Lesser 
Armenia, and to proceed cautiously to try the 
strength of the Parthians before engaging them in a 
battle. Another credits him with a plan for rapidly 
overrunning Parthia, and then proceeding by the 
way of the Caspian into Scythia, from Scythia 
invading Germany, and after conquering Germany 
returning into Italy by the way of Gaul ! But neither 
author is likely to have had any trustworthy authority 
for his statement. The Great Dictator would not be 
likely to have formed any definite scheme ; he would 
have felt the need of being guided by circumstances. 
Still, there can be no doubt that an expedition under 
his auspices would have constituted a most serious 
danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her 
subjection to Rome. The military talents of Julius 
were of the most splendid description ; his powers of 
organisation and consolidation enormous ; his pru- 
dence and caution equal to his ambition and courage. 
Once launched on a career of conquest in the East, 
it is impossible to say whither he might not have 



CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO IT. 189 

carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he might 
not have added to the empire. But Parthia was saved 
from the imminent peril without any effort of her 
own. The daggers of the " Liberators " struck down 
on the 15th of March, B.C. 44, the only man whom 
she had seriously to fear ; and with the removal of 
Julius passed away even from Roman thought for 
many a year the design which he had entertained, 
and which he alone could have accomplished. 

In the civil war which followed on the murder of 
Julius, the Parthians appear to have actually taken 
a part. The East fell into confusion on the with- 
drawal of Julius after Zela, and in the course of the 
troubles a Parthian contingent was sent to the aid of 
a certain Ca^cilius Bassus, a Pompeian adherent, who 
was seeking to obtain for himself something like an 
independent principality in Syria. The soldiers of 
Bassus, after a while (B.C. 43), went over in a body to 
Cassius, who was in the East collecting troops for his 
great struggle with Antony and Octavian ; and thus 
a handful of Parthians came into the power of the 
second among the " Liberators." Of this accidental 
circumstance he determined to take advantage, in 
order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body of 
troops from Orodes. He therefore presented each of 
the Parthian soldiers with a sum of money for their 
immediate wants, and dismissed them graciously to 
their homes, at the same time seizing the opportunity 
to send some of his own officers as ambassadors to 
Orodes, with a request for substantial aid. On re- 
ceiving this application, the Parthian monarch seems 
to have come to the conclusion that it would be a 



3 go SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME. 

wise policy to comply with it. It was for the interest 
of Parthia that the Roman arms, instead of being 
directed to Asiatic conquests, should be engaged for 
as long a time as possible in intestine strife ; and 
Orodes might well conceive that he was promoting 
his own advantage by fomenting and encouraging 
the quarrels which, at any rate for the time, secured 
his own empire from attack. He may have hoped 
also to obtain some equivalent in territory from the 
gratitude of Cassius at some future period, since 
Cassius was at the time Proconsul of Syria, and, if 
successful against Octavian and Antony, might be 
expected to choose the East for his province and to 
make a fresh arrangement of it. At any rate, he 
complied with Cassius's request, and sent him a body 
of Parthian horse, which were among the troops 
engaged at Philippi. 

The crushing defeat suffered by the " Liberators " 
(November, B.C. 42) was an immediate disappointment 
to Orodes, but, as instead of producing a pacification 
of the Roman world, it only intensified the strife and 
general confusion, it cannot be said to have worked 
disadvantageously for his interests. He himself, at 
any rate, judged otherwise. The Roman world 
seemed to him more divided against itself than ever ; 
and the " self- wrought ruin," which Horace prophesied, 
seemed absolutely impending. Three rivals held 
divided sway in the corrupted State, each of them 
jealous of the other two, and anxious for his own 
aggrandisement. The two chief pretenders to the 
first place were bitterly hostile ; and while the one 
was detained in Italy by insurrection against his 



ATTACK MADE BY ORODES. 19I 

authority, the other was plunged in luxury and dis- 
sipation, enjoying the first transports of a lawless 
passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the 
East were, moreover, alienated by the exactions of 
the profligate Triumvir, who, to reward his parasites 
and favourites, had laid upon them a burden that it 
was scarcely possible for them to bear. The condi- 
tion of things generally seemed to invite a foreign 
power to step in, and, taking the opportunity offered 
by Rome's weakness, seriously to cripple her power. 

Parthia enjoyed also at the time the rare good 
fortune of having at her disposal the services of a 
Roman general. Quintus Labienus, the son of Titus, 
Caesar's legate in Gaul, who had gone over to the 
Pompeians, having been sent as envoy to Orodes by 
Brutus and Cassius a little before Philippi, had, on 
learning the severities of the Triumvirs, elected to 
make Parthia his home, and had taken service under 
the Parthian banner. Though not an officer of much 
distinction among his countrymen, he had the advan- 
tage of knowing the weak points of their military 
system ; and it might well seem to Orodes, that the 
occasion which thus offered itself ought to be utilised. 

Under these circumstances, the Parthian monarch, 
who had never accepted the failure of Pacorus in B.C. 
52-50 as final, made preparations during the winter 
of B.C. 41-40, for a fresh attack upon the Roman 
territory. Having collected an imposing force from 
all parts of his dominions, he placed it under the joint 
command of his son, Pacorus, and the Roman refugee, 
O. Labienus, and sent it across the Euphrates with the 
first blush of spring, while Antony was still occupied 



192 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA. 

with his Egyptian dalliance, and Octavius, having at 
last captured Perusia, was applying himself to the 
pacification of Italy. Antony might perhaps have 
exchanged the soft delights of Cleopatra's Court 
for the perils of a Parthian campaign, since when 
roused to action by what seemed to him a sufficient 
motive, he had all the instincts of a soldier ; but it 
happened that, just at the time, messengers reached 
him from his brother Lucius, imploring him to hasten 
to the West, and arrest before it was too late the 
victorious progress of Octavius. With one regretful 
glance in the direction of Syria, the self-seeking 
Triumvir sailed away from Alexandria to Italy, 
leaving the care of Roman interests in the East to the 
incompetent hands of his lieutenant, Decidius Saxa, 
who had already alienated the affections of the 
provincials by his exactions, and was about to lose 
their respect by his incapacity. The Parthian hordes, 
thus weakly opposed, burst into Syria with irresistible 
force, rapidly overran the open country between the 
Euphrates and Antioch, and entering the rich valley 
of the Orontes, threatened the great seats of Hellenic 
civilisation in these parts, Antioch, Apameia, and 
Epiphaneia. From Apameia, situated (like Durham) 
on a rocky peninsula almost surrounded by the river, 
they were at first repulsed ; but, having shortly 
afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa and his legions 
in the open fields, they received the submission of 
Apameia and Antioch, which latter city Saxa 
abandoned at their approach, flying precipitately 
into Cilicia. 

Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and 



SUCCESSES OF LABIENUS AND PACORUS. 193 

Pacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage 
simultaneously in two great expeditions. Pacorus 
undertook to carry the Parthian standard throughout 
the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, 
while Labienus took upon himself to invade Asia 
Minor, and see if he could not wrest some of its more 
fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions 
were crowned with extraordinary success. Pacorus 
reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the single 
city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want 
of a naval force. He then advanced into Palestine, 
which he found in its normal condition of intestine 
commotion. Hyrcanus and Antigonus, two princes 
of the Asmonaean house, uncle and nephew, were 
rivals for the Jewish crown ; and the latter, whom 
Hyrcanus had driven into exile, was content to make 
common cause wnth the invader, and to be indebted 
to a rude foreigner for the possession of the kingdom 
whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a thousand 
talents— nearly a quarter of a million of our money — 
and five hundred Jewish women, if he would espouse 
his cause, and seat him upon his uncle's throne. The 
offer was readily embraced, and by the irresistible 
help of the Parthians a revolution was effected at 
Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. 
A new priest-king was set up in the person of 
Antigonus, the last Asmonsean prince, who reigned 
at Jerusalem for three years — B.C. 40-37 — as a 
Parthian satrap or vitaxa, the creature and dependant 
of the great monarchy on the further side of the 
Euphrates. 

Meanwhile, in Asia Minor, Labienus carried all 



194 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA. 

before him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in 
Cicilia) ventured upon a battle, was not only defeated, 
but slain. Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria — the whole 
south coast — were overrun. Stratonicea was be- 
sieged ; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken. According 
to some writers, the Parthians even pillaged Lydia 
and Ionia, and were in possession of Asia Minor to 
the shores of the Hellespont. It may be said that 
for a full year Western Asia changed masters:- the 
rule and authority of Rome disappeared ; and the 
Parthians were recognised as the dominant power. 
Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not sur- 
prising that Labienus lost his head ; that he affected 
the style and title of " Imperator; " struck coins, and 
placed his own head and name on them, and even 
added the ridiculous title " Parthicus," which to a 
Roman ear meant " Conqueror of the Parthians " — 
a title of honour whereto he had no possible claim. 

But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the 
autumn of B.C. 39, Antony, having patched up his 
quarrel with Octavius and set out from Italy to 
resume his command in the East, sent his Heu- 
tenant,! Publius Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to 
act against Labienus, and the triumphant Parthians. 
Ventidius landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia 
Minor, and so alarmed Labienus, who happened to 
have no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell 
back hurriedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the 
more western provinces, and at the same time send- 
ing urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succour. 
Pacorus despatched a strong body of cavalry to his 
aid ; but these troops, instead of putting themselves 



PARTHIAN REVERSES. I95 

under his command, had the folly to act indepen- 
dently, and the result was, that, in a rash attempt to 
surprise the Roman camp, they were defeated by 
Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, 
leaving Labienus to his fate. The self-styled " Im- 
perator," upon this, deserted his men and sought 
safety in flight ; but his retreat was soon discovered ; 
and he w^as pursued, captured, and put to death. 

Meanwhile, the Parthians under Pacorus, alarmed 
at the turn which affairs had taken in Asia Minor, left 
Antigonus, the Asmonaean prince, to manage their 
interests in Palestine, and concentrated themselves in 
Northern Syria and Commagene, where they awaited 
the approach of the Romans. A strong detachment, 
under a general named Pharnapates, was appointed 
to guard the " Syrian Gates," a narrow pass over 
Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. 
Here Ventidius gained another victory. He had 
sent forward an officer called Pompsedius Silo with 
some cavalry to endeavour to seize this post, and 
Pompaedius had found himself compelled to an en- 
gagement with Pharnapates, in which he was on the 
point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, 
who had probably feared for his subordinate's safety, 
appeared on the scene, and turned the scale in favour 
of the Romans. The detachment under Pharnapates 
was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was 
among the slain. When news of this defeat reached 
Pacorus, he thought it prudent to retreat, and ac- 
cordingly withdrew his troops across the Euphrates, 
This movement he appears to have executed without 
being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered 



196 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 

Syria to the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or 
early in B.C. 38. 

But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish 
the contest. He had made himself popular among 
the Syrians by his mild and just administration, and 
knew that they preferred his government to that of 
the Romans. He had many allies among the petty 
princes and dynasts, who occupied a semi-indepen- 
dent position on the borders of the Parthian and 
Roman empires, as, for example, Antiochus, King of 
Commagene ; Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituraea ; Malchus, 
sheikh of the Nabataean Arabs, and others. More- 
over, Antigonus, whom he had established as king of 
the Jews, still maintained himself in Judsea against 
the efforts of Herod, to whom Octavius and 
Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore 
arranged during the remainder of the winter for a 
fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the 
field earlier than his adversary expected, made ready 
to recross the Euphrates. We are told that, if he had 
crossed at the usual point, he would have come upon 
the Romans quite unprepared, the legions being still 
in their winter quarters, some of them north and some 
south of the great mountain range of Taurus. Ven- 
tidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to induce 
him to effect his passage at a different point, consider- 
ably lower down the stream, and in this way to waste 
some valuable time, which he himself employed in 
collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the Par- 
thians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, 
the Roman general was prepared to engage them, 
and was not even loth to decide the fate of the war 



DEATH OF PACORUS. igy 

by a single battle. He had taken care to provide 
himself with a strong force of slingers, and had en- 
trenched himself in a position on high ground at 
some distance from the river. The Parthians, finding 
their passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when 
they fell in with the enemy, seeing him entrenched, 
as though resolved to act only on the defensive, 
became over bold ; they thought the force opposed to 
them must distrust its own strength, or its own fighting 
capacity, and would be likely to yield its position 
without a blow, if suddenly and vigorously attacked. 
Accordingly, as on a former occasion, they charged 
up the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, 
hoping, like the Boers at Majuba, to take it by mere 
audacity. But the troops in the camp were held 
ready, and at the proper moment issued forth ; the 
assailants found themselves in their turn assailed, and, 
fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon 
driven down the declivity. The battle was continued 
in the plain below, where the mail-clad horse of the 
Asiatics made a brave and prolonged resistance ; but 
the slingers galled them severely, and in the midst of 
the struggle it happened by ill fortune that Pacorus was 
slain. The result followed which is almost invariable 
in the case of an Oriental army : having lost their 
leader, the soldiers almost everywhere gave way ; 
flight became universal, and the Romans gained a 
complete victory. The Parthian army fled in two 
directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by 
which it had crossed the Euphrates, but was inter- 
cepted by the enemy and destroyed. Part turned 
northwards into Commagene, and there took refuge 



198 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 

with the king, Antiochus, who refused to surrender 
them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt 
allowed them to return to their own country. It 
was said that this final encounter took place on the 
anniversary of the great disaster of Carrhae, and 
Rome flattered herself that she had at last retrieved 
that disgrace, having compensated for the loss of her 
own legions by the destruction of a Royal Parthian 
army, and having by the death of the associated 
monarch, Pacorus, more than avenged the slaughter 
of Crassus. 

Thus terminated the great Parthian invasion of 
Syria under Labienus and Pacorus ; and with it 
terminated the prospect of any further spread of the 
Arsacid dominion towards the West. When the two 
great world-powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into 
collision, when the hard blow struck by the latter in 
the annihilation of the army of Crassus was followed 
up by the advance of their clouds of horse into Syria, 
Palestine, and Asia Minor — when Apameia, Antioch, 
and Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius 
Saxa was defeated and slain — Cilicia, Pamphylia, 
Lycia, and Caria occupied, Lydia and Ionia ravaged 
— it seemed as if Rome had met, not so much an 
equal, as a superior ; it looked as if the power hitherto 
predominant would be compelled to draw back and 
retreat, while the new power, Parthia, would make a 
long step in advance, and push her frontier to the 
^gean and the Mediterranean. The history of the 
contest between the East and West, between Asia 
and Europe, is a history of re-actions. At one time 
one of the two continents, at another time the other, 



FINAL FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION. 199 

is in the ascendant. The time appeared to have come 
when the Asiatics were once more to recover their 
own, and to beat back the European aggressor to his 
proper shores and islands. The triumphs achieved 
by the Seljukian Turks between the eleventh and 
the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been 
anticipated by above a thousand years through the 
efforts of a kindred and not dissimilar people. But 
it turned out that the effort now made was premature. 
While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted 
for the national defence on the broad plains of inner 
Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and, comparatively 
speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difficult 
regions. The Parthian military system had not the 
elasticity of the Roman — it did not in the same way 
adapt itself to circumstances, or admit of the addition 
of new arms, or the indefinite expansion of an old 
one. However loose and seemingly flexible, it was 
rigid in its uniformity ; it never altered ; it remained 
under the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under 
the first, improved in details perhaps, but essentially 
the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were 
always modifying and improving their system, always 
learning new combinations, or new manoeuvres, or 
new modes of warfare, from their enemies. They 
met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous 
distant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of 
cavalry, with an increase in the number of their own 
horse, a larger employment of auxiliary irregulars, 
and a greater use of the sling. At the same time 
they learnt to take full advantage of the Parthian 
inefficiency against walls, and to practise against 



200 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 

them the arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The 
result was that Pafthia found she could make no 
serious impression upon the dominions of Rome, and 
having become persuaded of this by the experience 
.of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever 
the dream of Western conquest. She took up, in 
fact, from this time a new attitude. Hitherto she had 
been consistently aggressive. She had laboured con- 
stantly to extend herself at the expense of the 
Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro-Macedonians, and 
the Armenians. She had proceeded, like Rome, from 
one aggression to another, leaving only short intervals 
between her wars, and had always been looking out 
for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, 
comparatively speaking, pacific. She was content, 
for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought 
no new foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated, in 
the main, into a struggle for influence over the border 
kingdom of Armenia ; and her hopes were limited to 
the reduction of that kingdom to a subject position. 

The grief of Orodes at the death of Pacorus 
was something extreme and abnormal, even in the 
emotional East. For many days he would neither 
eat, nor speak, nor sleep ; then his sorrow took 
another turn. He imagined that his son had re- 
turned ; he thought continually that he heard or saw 
him ; he could do nothing but repeat his name. 
Every now and then, however, he awoke to a sense of 
the actual fact, and mourned the death of his favourite 
with tears. After a while this excessive grief wore 
itself out; and the aged king began to direct his atten- 
tion once more to public affairs, and to concern him- 



EXTREME GRIEF OF ORODES — HIS DEATH. 201 

self about the succession. Of the thirty sons who 
still remained to him there was not one who had 
made himself a name, or was in any way distinguished 
above the remainder. In the absence, therefore, of 
any personal ground of preference, Orodes — who 
seems to have regarded himself as possessing a right 
to nominate the son who should succeed him — thought 
that the claims of primogeniture were entitled to be 
considered, and selected as his successor, Phraates, the 
eldest of the thirty. Not content, however, with 
nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the 
nomination would be accepted by the Megistanes, he 
proceeded further to abdicate in his favour, whereupon 
Phraates became actual king. The transaction proved 
a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of 
his brothers, who were the sons of a princess married 
to Orodes, whereas his own mother was only a concu- 
bine, removed them by assassination, and when the 
ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the 
act, added the crime of parricide to that of fratricide 
by putting to death his aged father. Thus perished 
Orodes, son of Phraates, the thirteenth Arsacid, after 
a reign of eighteen or twenty years — the most 
memorable in the Parthian annals. Though scarcely 
a great king, he carried Parthia to the highest pitch 
of her glory, less however by his own personal merits, 
than by his judicious selection of able officers for the 
command of his armies. Exceedingly ambitious, he 
allowed no scruples to interfere with his personal 
aggrandisement, but, having waded to power through 
the blood of a father and a brother, maintained him- 
self in power by the sacrifice of his foremost subject. 



202 PARTHIAN INVASION OF SYRIA, ETC. 

His affection for his son Pacorus is the most amiable 
trait in his character, and redeems it from the charge, 
to which it would otherwise be liable, of a complete 
defect of humanity. Even here, however, he showed a 
want of balance and moderation ; and, by allowing 
his mind to become unhinged, brought disaster on 
himself, and on those dearest to him. It may have 
been a just Nemesis, that he should die at the hands 
of one of his sons, but it seems hard that affection 
for one son should have put him altogether in the 
power of another. 




XII. 

EXPEDITION OF MARK ANTONY AGAINST PARTHTA 
— ITS FAILURE — WAR BETWEEN PARTHIA AND 
MEDIA. 

Phraates, the son of Orodes, who is generally 
known as Phraates the Fourth, ascended the Parthian 
throne in the year B.C. -^J. The Roman world was 
still in the throes of revolution. A mock peace had 
indeed been patched up between the irreconcilable 
rivals, Octavian and Antony, in the year B.C. 40, by 
the sacrifice of " the fair, the modest, and the discreet 
Octavia " — " that marvel of a woman," as Plutarch 
calls her — to the short-lived passion of the coarse 
Triumvir ; but dissension had quickly broken out — 
the bride and bridegroom had quarrelled — and, before 
the year B.C. 37 was over, had parted, never to come 
together again. Antony and Octavian were once 
more acknowledged enemies, and felt it necessary to 
place half the world between them in order that they 
might not at once come to blows. Antony betook 
himself to the eastern portion of the Roman Empire, 
and renewed his dalliance with his Egyptian mistress. 
Octavian remained in Italy, launching recriminations 
against his rival, and preparing for the deadly struggle 
which, he well knew, impended. Phraates probably 



204 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

thoug"ht himself safe from attack under the circum- 
stances, and felt himself free to indulge his natural 
temperament, which was cruel, jealous, and blood- 
thirsty. Not content with having brushed from his 
path the brothers whose title to the throne was 
better than his,i he proceeded to make a clean sweep, 
and killed the remainder of the thirty. Nor was 
this all. From the massacre of his own relations, he 
passed to executions of Parthian nobles who had 
provoked his jealousy, and at last created such a 
panic among them, that numbers of them fled the 




COIN OF PHRAATES IV. 



country, and taking refuge in the territory west of 
the Euphrates, filled the camps and cities of the 
Roman provinces. Among these fugitives was a 
certain Monaeses, a nobleman of high distinction, who 
appears to have gained more than one military success 
in the Syrian war of Pacorus.^ This officer repre- 
sented to Antony that Phraates had by his tyranni- 
cal and sanguinary conduct made himself detested by 
his subjects, and that a revolt on the part of large 
numbers could easily be effected. " If the Romans 
would support him," he said, " he was quite willing to 
^ See above, p. 20i. ' Hor. " Od.," iii. 6 ; 1. lo. 



ATTEMPT OF MONMSES. 205 

invade Parthia, and he made no doubt of wresting 
the greater portion of it from the hands of the tyrant, 
and of being himself accepted as king. In that case, he 
would consent to hold his crown of the Romans, as their 
dependant and feudatory ; and they might count on 
his fidelity and gratitude." Antony received Monaeses 
with ostentatious generosity, and, affecting the munifi- 
ence of an Artaxerxes towards a Themistocles, made 
him a present of three cities of Asia, Larissa, Arethusa, 
and Bambyce, or Hierapolis. The Parthian monarch, 
alarmed at the prospect, sought to withdraw his 
traitorous subject from the enemy's blandishments 
by the offer of pardon and renewed favour ; and 
Monsses, after duly balancing the proposals made to 
him one against the other, came to the conclusion 
that his home prospects were the more promising. 
He therefore represented to Antony that he might 
probably do him better service as a friend at the 
Court of Phraates than as a pretender to his crown, 
and asked permission to accept the overtures which 
he had received, and to return to his native country. 
It is probable that the Triumvir was clever enough to 
see through his motives, and to understand that no 
dependence was to be placed on his protestations ; 
but it fitted in with his own interests to amuse 
Phraates for a short time longer with pacific pro- 
fessions, and he saw in the request of Monaeses an 
opportunity for throwing dust in the eyes of a not very 
keen-sighted barbarian. Monaeses thus obtained per- 
mission to rejoin his sovereign, and was instructed to 
assure him that the Roman commander desired 
nothing so much as peace, and asked only that the 



206 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

standards captured by the Parthians in the war with 
Crassus and Ventidius, and such of the prisoners 
taken as still survived, should be handed over to the 
Romans. 

But while thus playing with his adversary, and de- 
luding him with fond expectations, the Triumvir had 
fully made up his own mind to plunge into war, and 
was leaving no stone unturned to perfect his prepara- 
tions. It is very unlikely that it had required the 
overtures of a Monseses to put a Parthian expedition 
into his thoughts. The successes of his own lieutenants 
must have been stimulants of far greater efficacy. C. 
Sosius, as governor of Syria, had performed several 
martial exploits on the frontiers of that province. 
Canidius Crassus had defeated the Armenians, with 
their Albanian and Iberian allies, and had once more 
planted the Roman standar.ds at the foot of the 
Caucasus. Above all, the great glory of Ventidius, 
who had been allowed the much- coveted honour of a 
" triumph " at Rome on account of his defeats of the 
Parthians in Cilicia and Syria, must have rankled in 
his mind, and have moved him to emulation, and caused 
him to cast about for some means of outshining his 
lieutenants and exalting his own military reputation 
above that of his subordinates. Nothing, he well 
knew, could be so effectual for this purpose as a 
successful Parthian . expedition — the infliction upon 
this hated foe of an unmistakable humiliation, and 
the dictating to them of terms of peace on their own 
soil after some great and decisive victory. Nor did 
this now appear so very difficult. After the successes 
of Ventidius and Canidius Crassus the prestige of the 



NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF HIS ARMY. 207 

Parthian name was gone. The legionaries could be 
trusted to meet them without any undue alarm, and 
to contend with them in the usual Roman fashion, 
without excitement or flurry. Time had shown the 
weakness, as well as the strength, of the Parthian 
military system, and the Roman tacticians had suc- 
ceeded in devising expedients by which its strong points 
might be met and triumphed over. With the forces 
at his command Antony might well expect to attack 
Parthia successfully, and not merely to avoid the fate 
of Crassus, but to obtain important advantages. 

At the same time he had his eyes open to all the 
possibilities of the military situation, and was making 
his preparations with the greatest prudence and 
secrecy. He collected Roman troops from every 
available quarter, and gradually raised his legions to 
the number of sixteen, or (according to some) of 
eighteen. These he disposed in the different cities of 
Asia, and did not begin to mass them until he had no 
further need for concealment. He had brought with 
him from Europe Gallic and Iberian horse to the 
number of ten thousand ; his Roman infantry is 
reckoned at sixty thousand ; and the cavalry and 
infantry of the Asiatic allies amounted to thirty thou- 
sand. The Armenian monarch, Artavasdes, was 
secretly won over in the course of the winter, and 
promised a contingent of seven thousand foot and 
six thousand horse. Thus the entire number of all 
arms on which he could count to begin the campaign 
was 113,000. 

Antony was in no hurry to begin. More lover 
than soldier, he was glad to defer the hour for parting 



208 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

with the siren by whose charms he was fascinated, 
and exchanging the dehghts of voluptuous dalliance 
for the hardships of life in the field. Thus it was not 
until the midsummer of B.C. ^6 had arrived that he 
could bring himself to dismiss his mistress to her 
Egyptian home, and place himself at the head of his 
legions. It was his original intention to cross the 
Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and to advance against 
Parthia by the direct route, as Crassus had done ; but, 
on reaching the banks of the Euphrates, possibly 
at Zeugma, he found the attitude of defence assumed 
by the enemy on his own frontier so imposing, that 
he abandoned his first design, and, turning north- 
wards, entered Armenia, resolved to attack Parthia, 
in conjunction with his Armenian ally, from that 
quarter. Artavasdes gladly welcomed him, and 
recommended that he should begin the war, not by 
invading Parthia itself but by an attack on the 
dominions of a Parthian feudatory, the King of 
Media Atropatene, whose territories adjoined Ar- 
menia on the south-east. The king, he said, was 
absent, having been summoned to join his suzerain 
on the banks of the Euphrates, and having marched 
away with his best troops to the rendezvous. His 
territory, therefore, would be ill-defended, and open to 
ravage ; it was even possible that Praaspa, his capital, 
might be an easy prey. The prospect excited Antony, 
and he put himself at the disposition of Artavasdes. 
Dividing his army into two portions, and ordering 
Oppius Statianus, one of his best officers, to follow 
him leisurely with the more unwieldly portion of the 
troops, the siege-batteries, and the baggage-train, he 



HIS INVASION OF NORTHERN MEDIA. 20g 

himself proceeded by forced marches to Praaspa, 
under the guidance of Artavasdes, accompanied by- 
all the cavalry and infantry of the better sort. This 
town was situated at the distance of nearly three 
hundred miles from the Armenian frontier ; but the 
way to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where 
food and water were abundant. Antony accomplished 
the march without any difficulty, and sat himself 
down before the place. But the want of his siege- 
engines and battering-train caused him to make little 
impression ; and he was compelled to have recourse 
to the long and tedious process of raising up a mound 
against the walls. For some time he cherished the 
hope that Statianus would arrive to his relief ; but 
this illusion was ere long dispelled. News arrived 
that the Parthian monarch, having been made ac- 
quainted with his plans and proceedings, had followed 
on the footsteps of his army, had come up with Sta- 
tianus, and made a successful onslaught on his detach- 
ment. Ten thousand Romans were killed in the 
engagement ; many prisoners were taken ; all the 
baggage- waggons and engines of war fell into the 
enemy's hands ; and Statianus himself was among 
the slain. A further and still worse result followed. 
The Armenian monarch was so disheartened by the 
defeat, that, regarding the Roman cause as desperate, 
he retired from the contest, drew off his troops, and 
left Antony to his own resources. 

The situation became now one of great difficulty. 
Autumn was approaching ; supplies were falling 
short ; the siege works which Antony had attempted 
made no progress ; and it was impossible to construct 



210 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

a fresh battering-train to replace that which had been 
taken. If Antony could only capture the town 
before the winter set in, he would feel himself in 
safety, and, having a breathing-space during which 
he might repair his losses, would be able to re- 
cruit himself for another campaign. He therefore 
made desperate efforts to overcome the resistance 
offered by the besieged, and to obtain possession of 
the city. But all was in vain. The walls were too 
strong and too high. His mound was never brought 
to a level with their summit. From time to time the 
defenders made sallies, drove off his workmen, and 
inflicted serious damage on his construction. The 
Parthian monarch, hovering about in the neighbour- 
hood, looked with scorn on his unavailing endeavours, 
and contented himself with hindering his supplies 
and interfering with his foraging parties. Efforts 
made by Antony to bring on a general engagement 
by means of a foraging expedition on a large scale 
failed, the Parthians retreating as soon as attacked, 
and exhibiting their marvellous power of getting out 
of an enemy's reach almost without suffering any 
losses. The* Roman commander, as the equinox 
drew near, came to the conclusion that he must with- 
draw from the siege and retire into Armenia, but 
before making this confession of failure, as a last 
resource, he sought to persuade his adversary to 
terms of accommodation. He would at once relin- 
quish the siege, and recross the frontier, he said, if 
Phraates would only yield up to him the Crassian 
captives and standards. The demand was prepos- 
terous, and the Parthians simply laughed at it, feeling 



HIS FAILURE TO TAKE PRAASPA. 211 

that it was for Antony rather to purchase an un- 
molested retreat, than for themselves to pay him for 
retiring. Each day that he hngered placed him in 
a worse position, and made it more certain that he 
could not escape serious disaster. 

At last the equinox arrived, and retreat became 
imperative. There were two roads by which it would 
be possible to reach the Araxes at the usual point oi 
passage. One lay to the left, through a plain and 
open country, probably along the course of the Jag- 
hetu and the eastern shores of Lake Urumiyeh, which 
is the route that an army would ordinarily take ; the 
other, which was shorter but more difficult, lay to the 
right, leading across a mountain tract, but one fairly 
supplied with water, and in which there were a number 
of inhabited villages. The Triumvir was informed by 
his scouts that the Parthians had occupied the easier 
route in the expectation that he would select it, and 
were hopeful of overwhelming his entire force with 
their cavalry in the plains. He therefore took the 
road to the right, through a rugged and inclement 
country — probably that between Takht-i-Suleiman 
and Tabriz — and, guided by a Mardian who was well 
acquainted with the district, set out to make his way 
back to the Araxes. His decision took the Parthians 
by surprise, and for two whole days he was unmo- 
lested. By the third day, however, they had thrown 
themselves across his path. Antony, expecting no 
interference, was pursuing his march in a somewhat 
disorderly manner, when the Mardian guide, perceiv- 
ing signs of recent injury to the route, gave him warn- 
ing that the enemy could not be far off, and the 



212 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

Roman general had just time to make his troops 
form in battle array, and bring his light armed and 
slingers to the front, when the Parthian horsemen 
made their appearance on all sides, and began a fierce 
assault But the Roman light troops, especially those 
armed with slings and darts, made a vigorous resist- 
ance, the leaden missiles of the slingers being found 
particularly effective ; and, after a short combat, the 
Parthians, following their usual tactics, drew off, only, 
however, to return again and again, until at last 
Antony's Gallic cavalry found an opportunity of 
charging them, when they broke and fled hastily, 
having received a serious check, from which they did 
not recover during the remainder of the day. 

However, on the day following, they reappeared ; 
and thenceforth for nineteen consecutive days they 
disputed with Antony every inch of his road, and 
inflicted on him the most grievous losses. " The 
sufferings of the Roman army during this time," says 
a modern historian of Rome, "were unparalleled in 
their military annals. The intense cold, the blinding 
snow and driving sleet, the want sometimes of pro- 
visions, sometimes of water, the use of poisonous 
herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy's 
cavalry and bowmen, which could only be repelled 
by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or the 
tortoise, reduced the retreating army by one-third of 
its numbers." Much gallantry was shown, especially 
by some of the officers, as Flavins Gallus; and Antony 
himself displayed all the finest qualities of a com- 
mander, except judgment ; but every effort was in 
vain : as the Roman army dwindled in numbers, that 



HIS RETREAT AND LOSSES. 213 

of the Parthians increased ; as the strength of the 
individual soldiers failed through scantiness or un- 
wholesomeness of food, the courage and audacity of 
their adversaries were augmented ; the Roman losses 
grew greater from day to day, and at last culminated 
in one occasion of extreme disaster, when eight thou- 
sand men were placed /wrs de combat, three thousand 
of them, including Gallus, being slain. At length, 
after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, 
the survivors reached the river Araxes, probably at 
the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it, found themselves in 
Armenia. But the calamities of the return were not 
yet ended. Although it had been arranged with 
Artavasdes that the bulk of the Roman army should 
winter in Armenia, yet, before the various detach- 
ments could reach the quarters assigned them in 
different parts of the country, eight thousand more 
had perished, through the effect of past privations or 
the severity of the Armenian winter. Altogether, 
out of the hundred thousand men whom Antony had 
taken with him into Media Atropatene in the mid- 
summer of B.C. 36, less than seventy thousand re- 
mained to commence the campaign of the ensuing 
year. Well may the unfortunate commander have 
exclaimed during the later portion of his march, as 
he compared his own heavy losses with the light ones 
suffered by Xenophon and his Greeks in these same 
regions : " Oh, those Ten Thousand ! those Ten Thou- 
sand ! " . 

On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia, a 
quarrel broke out between Phraates and his Median 
vassal. The latter complained that he was wronged 



214 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

in the division made of the Roman spoils, and ex- 
pressed himself with so much freedom as seriously to 
offend his suzerain. Perceiving this, he became 
alarmed lest Phraates should punish his boldness 
by deposing him from his office and setting up 
another vitaxa in his place. He thought it necessary 
therefore to look out for some powerful support, and 
on carefully considering the political situation, came 
to the conclusion that his best hope lay in making a 
friend of his late foe Antony, and placing himself 
under Roman protection. Antony was known to 
have been deeply offended by the conduct of his 
Armenian ally in the late campaign, and to be 
desirous of taking vengeance on him. He had 
already made an attempt to get possession of his 
person, which had failed through the suspiciousness 
and caution of the wily Oriental. Hostilities between 
Armenia and Rome were evidently impending, and 
might break out at any moment. It would be clearly 
for Antony's interest, when war broke out, to have a 
friend on the Armenian frontier, and especially one 
who was strong in cavalry and bowmen. The Median 
monarch therefore sent an ambassador of rank to 
Alexandria, where Antony was passing the winter, 
and boldly proposed an alliance. Antony readily 
accepted the offer. He was intensely angered by the 
conduct of his late confederate, and resolved on 
punishing his disaffection and desertion ; he viewed 
the Median alliance as of the utmost importance; not 
only as against Armenia, but still more in connection 
with the design, which he still entertained, of invading 
Parthia itself; and he saw in the Atropatenian ruler 



RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 215 

a prince whom it would be well worth his while to 
bind to his cause indissolubly. He therefore embraced 
the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded 
the messenger who had brought them with a princi- 
pality. After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into 
his power, which occupied him during the greater 
part of B.C. 35, but which were unsuccessful, in the 
spring of B.C. 34 he suddenly made his appearance in 
Armenia. His army, which had remained there from 
the previous campaign, held all the most important 
positions, and, as he professed the most friendly feel- 
ings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance 
between their families, that prince, after some hesita- 
tion, at length ventured into his presence. He was 
immediately seized and put in chains. Armenia was 
rapidly overrun. Artaxias, the eldest son of Arta- 
vasdes, whom the Armenians made king in the room 
of his father, was defeated, and forced to take refuge 
with the Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage 
between a daughter of the Median monarch and his 
own son by Cleopatra, Alexander ; and leaving garri- 
sons in Armenia to hold it as a conquered province, 
carried off Artavasdes, together with a rich booty, 
into Egypt, 

Phraates, during these transactions, had remained 
wholly upon the defensive. He was not a man of 
much enterprise, and probably thought that a waiting 
policy was, under the circumstances, the best one. 
It cannot have been displeasing to him to see Arta- 
vasdes punished ; and doubtless he must have been 
gratified to observe how Antony was injuring his own 
cause by exasperating the Armenians, and teaching 



2l6 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

them to detest Rome even more than they detested 
Parthia. But while the Roman troops held possession 
both of Syria and of Armenia, and the alliance be- 
tween Rome and Media Atropatene continued, he 
could not venture to take any aggressive step, or think 
of doing more than protecting his own frontier. 
Almost any other Roman commander than Antony 
would, after crushing Armenia, have at once carried 
the war, in conjunction with his Median ally, into 
Parthia, and have endeavoured to strike a blow that 
might avenge the defeat of Carrhae. Phraates natu- 
rally expected an invasion of his territories both in 
B.C. 34, after Antony's occupation of Armenia, and in 
the following year, when he again appeared in these 
parts, and advanced to the Araxes. But Antony's 
attention was so much engrossed by the proceedings 
of his rival, Octavian, in the West, and it was so clear 
to him that the great contest for the mastership of 
the Roman world could not be delayed much longer, 
that Eastern affairs had almost ceased to interest him, 
and his chief desire was to be quit of them. The 
object of his advance to the Araxes in B.C. ^t, was to 
place things in such a position that his presence might 
be no longer necessary. It seemed to him that the 
interests of Rome would be sufficiently safeguarded, 
if the Median alliance were assured, and he therefore 
sought an interview with the Atropatenian king, and 
concluded a treaty with him. The terms were very 
favourable to the Median. He received a body of 
Roman heavy infantry in exchange for a detachment 
of his own light horsemen ; his dominions were con- 
siderably enlarged on the side of Armenia ; and the 



RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION. 217 

marriage previously arranged between his daughter, 
Jotapa, and Antony's son, Alexander, was accom- 
plished. Antony then marched away to meet his 
Roman rival, flattering himself that he had secured, 
at any rate for some years, the tranquillity of the 
Asiatic continent. 

But Phraates now saw his opportunity. In con- 
junction with Artaxias, he attacked the Median king, 
and, though at first repulsed by the valour of the 
Roman troops in the Median service, succeeded, after 
Antony had required them to rejoin his standard, in 
inflicting on him a severe defeat, and even making 
him a prisoner. This success led to another. Artaxias, 
having now only the Roman garrisons to contend 
with, re-entered and recovered Armenia. The Roman 
garrisons were put to the sword. Armenia became 
once more wholly independent of Rome ; and it is 
probable that Media Atropatene returned to the 
Parthian allegiance. 

The result of the expedition of Antony was thus 
rather to elevate Parthia than to depress her. An- 
tony, notwithstanding his undoubted courage, let it be 
clearly seen that he shrank from a direct encounter 
with the full force of the Parthian kingdom. Hence his 
avoidance of any invasion of actual Parthian territory, 
and the limitation of his efforts to the injuring of his 
enemy by striking at her through her dependencies, 
Media and Armenia. Nor was the timidity thus ex- 
hibited compensated for by success in the compara- 
tively small enterprises to which he confined himself. 
The expedition against Media Atropatene was a com- 
plete failure, and resulted in the loss of thirty thousand 



2l8 PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 

men. The Armenian campaign succeeded at the time, 
but it aUenated a nation which it was of the utmost 
importance to conciliate, and it was followed almost 
immediately by a revolt in which Rome suffered fresh 
disasters, and which drew Armenia closer to Parthia 
than she had ever been drawn previously. On the 
retirement of Antony from the East, Parthia occupied 
as grand a position as had ever before been hers, 
excepting during the brief space of her successes under 
Pacorus and Labienus. 




XIII. 

INTERNAL TROUBLES IN PARTHIA — HER RELATIONS 
WITH ROME UNDER AUGUSTUS AND TIBERIUS. 



Phraates, justly proud of his successes against 
Antony, and of the re-estabhshment of his authority 
over Media Atropatene, regarding, moreover, his posi- 
tion in Parthia as thereby absolutely secured, pro- 
ceeded to indulge the natural cruelty of his disposi- 
tion, and resumed the harsh and tyrannical treatment 
of his subjects, by which he had made himself odious 
in the early years of his reign. '^ So far did he push 
his oppression, that ere long the patience of the people 
gave way, and an insurrection broke out against his 
authority, which compelled him to fly the country (B.C. 
33). The revolt was headed by a certain Tiridates, a 
Parthian noble, who, upon its success, was made king 
by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and 
appealed to the nomads to embrace his cause. Ever 
ready for war and plunder, the hordes were nothing 
loth ; and, crossing the frontier in force, they suc- 
ceeded without much difficulty in restoring the exiled 
monarch to the throne from which his subjects had 
deposed him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, 

' See above, p. 204. 
219 



220 INTERNAL TROUBLES IN PARTHIA. 

having contrived to carry off in his flight the youngest 
son of Phraates, presented himself before Octavian, 
who was in Syria at the time (B.C. 30) on his return 
from Egypt, surrendered the young prince into his 
hands, and requested his aid against the tyrant. 
Octavian accepted the vahiable hostage, but, with his 
usual caution, declined to pledge himself to furnish 
any help to the pretender ; he might remain, he said, 
in Syria, if he so wished, and while he continued 
under Roman protection a suitable provision should 
be made for his support, but he must not expect to be 




COIN OF TIRIDATES II. 



replaced upon the Parthian throne by the Roman 
arms. Some years later (B.C. 2;^), Phraates in his turn 
made application to the Imperator for the surrender 
of the person of Tiridates and the restoration of his 
kidnapped son ; but the application was only partially 
successful. Octavian said he willingly restored to him 
his son, and would not even ask a ransom ; but the 
surrender of a fugitive was a different matter, and one 
that he could not possibly consent to. Where would 
be the honour of Rome, if such a thing were done ? 
Phraates would, no doubt, feel that some return was 
due on account of his son. An acceptable return 



PHRAATES IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 221 

would be the delivery to the Romans of the standards 
and captives taken from Crassus and Antony. The 
Parthian monarch made no direct reply to this sug- 
gestion. He gladly received his son, but ignored the 
rest of the message. It was not until three years 
later, when Octavian (now become Augustus) visited 
the East, and war seemed the probable alternative if he 
continued obdurate, that the Parthian monarch brought 
himself to relinquish the trophies, which were as much 
prized by the victors as by the vanquished. The act 
was one so unpatriotic as to be scarcely pardonable ; 
but we must remember that Phraates held his crown 
by a very insecure tenure — -he was extremely un- 
popular with his subjects, and Augustus had it in his 
power at any moment to produce a pretender, who 
had once occupied, and with Roman help might easily 
have ascended for a second time, the throne of the 
Arsacids. 

The remaining years of Phraates — and he reigned 
for nearly twenty years after restoring the standards 
— were almost unbroken by any event of importance. 
The result of the twenty years' struggle between 
Rome and Parthia had been to impress either nation 
with a wholesome fear of the other. Both had 
triumphed on their own ground ; both had failed 
when they ventured on sending expeditions into their 
enemy's territory. Each now stood on its guard, 
watching the movements of its adversary across the 
Euphrates. Both had become pacific. It is a well- 
known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of 
policy to his successors that the Roman territory had 
reached its proper limits, and could not with any ad- 



222 PARTHIA'S relations WITH ROME. 

vantage be extended further. This principle, followed 
with the utmost strictness by Tiberius, was accepted 
as a rule by all the earlier Caesars, and only regarded 
by them as admitting of rare and slight exceptions. 
Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years 
after the accession of Augustus, made light of it, and 
set it at defiance. With him re-awoke the spirit of 
conquest, the aspiration after universal dominion. 
But in the meantime there was peace — peace not 
indeed absolutely unbroken, for border wars occurred, 
and Rome was sometimes tempted to interfere by 
arms in the internal quarrels of her neighbour ; but a 
general state of peace and amity prevailed ; neither 
state made any grand attack on the other's dominions ; 
no change occurred in the frontier ; no great battle 
tested the relative strength of the tv/o peoples. Such 
rivalry as still continued was exhibited less in arms 
than in diplomacy, and showed itself mainly in en- 
deavours on either side to obtain a predominant in- 
fluence in Armenia. There alone during the century 
and a half that intervened between Antony and Trajan 
did the interests of Rom.e and Parthia come into col- 
lision, and in connection with this kingdom alone was 
there during these years any struggle between the two 
empires. 

After Phraates had yielded to Augustus in the im- 
portant matter of the standards and the prisoners, he 
appears for many years to have studiously cultivated 
his good graces. In the interval between B.C. 1 1 and 
B.C. 7, having reason to distrust the intentions of his 
subjects towards him, and to suspect that they might 
not improbably depose him and place one of his sons 



PHRAATES IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 223 

upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these 
possible rivals out of the country ; and on this occa- 
sion he paid Augustus the compliment of selecting 
Rome for his children's residence. The youths were 
four in number — -Vonones, who was the eldest, Seras- 
padanes, Rhodaspes, and Phraates ; two of them 
were married and had children. They resided at 
Rome during the remainder of their father's lifetime, 
and were treated as became their rank, being sup- 
ported at the public charge, and in a magnificent 
manner. The Roman writers speak of them as 
" hostages " given by Phraates to the Roman Em- 
peror ; I but this was certainly not the intention of 
the Parthian monarch, and it was scarcely possible 
that the idea could be entertained by the Romans 
at the time of their residence. 

The friendly relations thus established between 
Phraates and Augustus would probably have con- 
tinued undisturbed until the death of the one or the 
other had not a revolution broken out in Armenia, 
which tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers 
of resistance. On the death of Artaxias, in the year 
B.C. 20, Augustus, who was then in the East, had sent 
Tiberius into Armenia, to arrange the affairs of the 
nation ; and Tiberius had thought it best to place 
upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes. 
Parthia had made no objection to this arrangement, 
but had tacitly admitted the Roman suzerainty over 
the Armenian nation. Fourteen years afterwards, in 
B.C. 6, Tigranes died ; and the Armenians, without 

' Veil. Paterculus, Suetonius, Tacitus, Justin, Eutropius, Orosius, 
&c. 



224 PARTHIA'S relations with ROME. 

waiting to know the pleasure of the Roman Emperor, 
conferred the sovereignty on his three sons, whom 
their father had previously designated for the royal 
office by associating them with him in the govern- 
ment. But this was a liberty which Augustus could 
not possibly allow. He therefore, in B.C. 5, sent an 
expedition into Armenia, deposed the three sons of 
Tigranes, and established in the kingdom a certain 
Artavasdes, whose birth, rank, and claims to the royal 
position are unknown. But the Armenians were dis- 
satisfied and recalcitrant. After enduring the rule of 
Rome's nominee for the. short space of three years, 
they rose in revolt against him, defeated the Romans 
who endeavoured to support his authority, and drove 
him out of the kingdom. Another Tigranes was 
placed upon the throne ; and, at the same time, Parthia 
was called in to give the Armenians their protection, 
in case Rome should again interfere with the choice 
of the nation. Phraates could not bring himself to 
reject the Armenian overtures. Ever since the time 
of the second Mithridates, it had been a settled prin- 
ciple of Parthia's policy that Armenia should be de- 
pendent on herself; and, even at the cost of a rupture 
with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he must re- 
spond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might 
not come. Augustus was now advanced in years, and 
might submit to the indignity offered him without 
resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his 
best general — his stepson, Tiberius — who, in conse- 
quence of the slights put upon him, had gone into 
retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could 
entrust with an army but his grandsons, youths who 



PHRAATES IV. AND AUGUSTUS. 225 

had not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates 
probably hoped that, under such circumstances, 
Augustus would draw back before the terrors of a 
Parthian war, and would allow without remonstrance 
— or, at any rate, without resistance — the passing of 
Armenia into the position of a Parthian subject-ally. 

But, if such were his expectations, he had greatly 
miscalculated. Augustus had as keen a sense of 
what the honour of Rome required now that he was 
an old man of sixty as when he was a youth of 
twenty. From the time that he first heard of the 
Armenian outbreak, and of the support lent it by 
Parthia, he appears never to have wavered in his 
determination to re-assert the Roman claim to a pre- 
ponderating influence over Armenia, but only to have 
hesitated for a time as to the individual whose services 
it would be best to employ in the business. Tiberius 
naturally presented himself to his mind as by far the 
fittest person for such a work — a work in which diplo- 
matic and military ability might be, both of them, 
almost equally required ; but Tiberius had recently 
taken offence at certain slights which he supposed 
himself to have received, and had withdrawn from the 
public service and from official life altogether. In 
default of his brave and astute stepson, Augustus. 
could only fall back upon his grandsons ; but the 
eldest of these, Caius, was now, in the year B.C. 2, no 
more than eighteen years of age, and the policy of 
employing so young a man in so difficult and impor- 
tant a business could not but appear to him extremely 
questionable. Augustus therefore hesitated, and it 
was not until late in the year B.C. i that he despatched 



226 PARTHIA'S relations WITH ROME. 

Caius to the East, with authority to settle the Parthian 
and Armenian troubles as it should seem best to him. 

Meanwhile, however, a change had occurred in 
Parthia. Phraates, when somewhat advanced in life, 
had married an Italian slave-girl, called Musa, who 
had been sent to him as a present by Augustus, and 
had had a son born to him from this marriage, who, 
as he grew up, came to hold an important position 
in the Parthian state. It was perhaps through the 
influence of this youth's mother, Musa, that Phraates 
was induced to send his four elder boys to Rome, there 
to receive their education. At any rate, their absence 
left an opening for her son, Phraataces, of which she 
took care that he should have the full advantage ; and 
the youth, becoming his father's sole support in his 
declining years, came to look upon himself, and to 
be looked upon by others, as his natural successor. 
Conscious, however, of the weakness of his claim to 
the throne, and doubtful of his father's intentions with 
regard to him, if he allowed events to take their 
natural course, the ambitious youth resolved to become 
the shaper of his own future, and, in conjunction with 
his mother, administered poison to the aged monarch, 
from the effects of which he died, Phraataces then 
seized the throne, and reigned as joint sovereign with 
his mother, to whom he allowed the titles of " Queen " 
and " Goddess," and whose image he placed upon the 
reverse of most of his coins. 

Among the first acts of Phraataces as king was the 
sending of an embassy to Augustus, whom he pro- 
fessed to regard as still friendly to Parthia, though he 
must have known that the Parthian attitude towards 



PHRAATACES AND AUGUSTUS. 227 

Armenia had alienated him. He informed Augustus 
of his accession to the throne of the Arsacidae, apolo- 
gised for the circumstances under which it had taken 
place, and proposed a renewal of the treaty of peace 
which had subsisted between Augustus and his father, 
adding a request that the Roman Emperor would, in 
consideration of the peace, kindly surrender to him 
his four brothers, whose proper place of residence was 
not Rome, but Parthia. With respect to Armenia he 
observed a discreet silence, leaving it to Augustus to 
initiate negotiations on the subject or to accept the 
status quo. Augustus replied to this message in terms 
of extreme severity. Addressing Phraataces by his 




COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MUSA. 



bare name, without adding the title of king, he re- 
quired him to lay aside the royal appellation, which 
he had so arrogantly and unwarrantably assumed, and 
at the same time to evacuate all the portions of 
Armenia which his troops wrongfully occupied. With 
respect to the surrender of the Parthian princes, the 
brothers of Phraataces, and their families, he said 
nothing. Nor did he respond to the appeal concern- 
ing the formal renewal of a treaty of peace. He left 
Phraataces to infer that his brothers would be retained 
at Rome, as pretenders to the throne of Parthia, whom 
it might be convenient at some future time to bring 



228 PARTHIA'S relations with ROME. 

forward ; and he not obscurely intimated that no treaty 
of peace would be concluded until the Parthian 
troops were withdrawn across the Armenian frontier. 
Phraataces, however, was not to be cowed by mere 
words. He repaid Augustus in his own coin, sending 
him a contemptuous message, in which, while assum- 
ing to himself the high-sounding Oriental designation 
of " King of Kings," he curtly addressed the Roman 
Emperor as " Caesar." 

It is probable that this attitude of defiance would 
have been maintained, and that the Parthian troops 
would have continued to garrison Armenia, had 
Augustus refrained from active measures, and been 
content with menaces. But when, in B.C. i, the 
Emperor proceeded from words to acts, and des- 
patched his grandson, Caius, to the East at the head 
of a large force, with orders to re-establish the Roman 
influence in Armenia, even at the cost of a Parthian 
war, and when Caius showed himself in Syria with all 
the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, 
Phraataces became alarmed. It was arranged during 
the winter that an interview should be held between 
the two princes in the spring of A.D. i, on an island 
in the Euphrates, where the terms of an arrangement 
between the two empires should be discussed and 
settled. For the first and almost the last time a 
Parthian monarch and a scion of the Roman Imperial 
House met amicably for the purpose of negotiation, 
and discussed the terms on which the two empires 
could be friends. On either bank of the " great river " 
were drawn up the mighty hosts, which, within a few 
days, if no agreement were come to, would be loosed at 



PHRAATACES AND CAIUS. 229 

each other's throats. The two chiefs, accompanied by 
an equal number of attendants, passed from their 
respective banks to the island, and there, in the full 
sight of both armies, proceeded to hold the conference. 
An arrangement satisfactory to both sides was made, 
the chief proviso of which was the evacuation of 
Armenia by the Parthians. Feasting and banqueting 
followed. The Parthian king was first entertained by 
Caius on the Roman side of the river, after which Caius 
was in his turn feasted by the Parthian on the opposite 
bank. Cordial relations were established. For once 
in the course of the long struggle with Rome, Parthia 
seems to have actually made up her mind to relinquish 
Armenia to her adversary. She gave up her claims, 
withdrew her troops, and, during the serious troubles 
which followed — troubles wherein Caius lost his life — 
honourably abstained from all interference, either by 
intrigue or arms, in Armenian affairs, and allowed 
Rome to settle them at her pleasure. 

The willingness of Phraataces thus to efface himself, 
and concede to Rome the foremost position in Asia, 
arose probably from the unsettled state of the king- 
dom, and the internal difficulties which threatened him. 
To be a parricide was not in Parthia an absolute bar 
to popularity and a quiet reign, as had been proved 
by the prosperous reign of Phraates IV., but there were 
circumstances connected with the recent palace revo- 
lution, which threw special discredit upon the prin- 
cipal agent in it, and grievously offended the pride of 
the Parthian nobles. Private and selfish motives had 
alone actuated the young prince, who could not even 
pretend any public ground for the extreme step that 



230 PARTHIA'S relations with ROME. 

he had taken. His subjection to female influence, 
especially when the female was a foreign slave-girl, 
enraged the nobles and drew down their contempt. 
The exalted honours which he heaped on her 
offended their pride. Rumours, which may have had 
no foundation in fact, increased his unpopularityj and 
covered his companion on the throne with even a 
deeper shade of disgrace. The Megistanes consulted 
together, and within a few years of his establishment 
as king raised a revolt against his authority, which 
terminated in his deposition or death. An Arsacid, 




COIN OF ORODES II. 



named Orodes, was chosen in his place ; but he too, 
in a short time, displeased his subjects, and was mur- 
dered by them, either at a banquet or during a hunt- 
ing expedition. It then occurred to the Megistanes 
to fall back on the legitimate heir to the throne, who 
was still at Rome, whither he had been sent by his 
father some fifteen years previously. Accordingly, 
they despatched an embassy to Augustus (A.D. 5), and 
asked to have Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates 
IV., sent back to Parthia, that he might receive his 
father's kingdom. Augustus readily complied, since 
he regarded it as for the honour of Rome to give a 



ACCESSION OF VONONES I. 231 

king to Parthia, and Vonones was sent out to Asia 
with much pomp and many presents, to occupy a 
position which was the second highest that the world 
had to offer. 

It is said that princes are always popular on their 
coronation day; and certainly Vonones was no ex- 
ception to the general rule. His subjects received 
him with every demonstration of joy, pleased like 
children with a new plaything. But this state of 
feeling did not continue very long. The foreign train- 
ing of the young monarch soon showed itself Bred 
up at Rome, amid the luxuries and refinements of 
Western civilisation, the rough sports and coarse 
manners of his countrymen displeased and disgusted 
him. He took no pleasure in horses, seldom ap- 
peared in the hunting-field, absented himself from the 
rude feastings which formed a marked feature of the 
national manners, and, when he showed himself in 
public, was usually seen reclining in a litter. He had 
brought with him, moreover, from the place of his 
exile, a number of Greek companions, whom the 
Parthians despised and ridiculed. The favour which 
he showed these interlopers excited their jealousy and 
rage. It was to no purpose that he sought to con- 
ciliate his angry subjects by the openness and 
affability of his demeanour, or by the readiness with 
which he allowed access to his person. Virtues and 
graces, unknown to the nation hitherto, were, in the 
eyes of the cOurtiers, not merits but defects. Dislike 
of the monarch led them to look back with dissatis- 
faction on the part which they had taken in placing 
him upon the throne. " Parthia had indeed degene- 



232 



PART HI A' S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 



rated," they said, " in asking for a king who belonged 
to another world, and into whom there had been 
engrained a foreign and hostile civilisation. All the 
glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing 
Antony was utterly lost and gone, if the country was 
to be ruled by Caesar's bond-slave, and the throne of 
the Arsacidse to be treated as if it were a Roman 
province. It would have been bad enough to have 
had a prince imposed upon them by the will of a 
superior, if they had been conquered ; it was worse, 
in all respects worse, to suffer such an insult, when 
they had not even had war made upon them." Under 




COIN OF VONONES I. 



the influence of these feelings, the Parthians, after 
they had tolerated Vonones for a few years, rose in 
revolt against him (about A.D. lo), and summoned 
Artabanus, an Arsacid, who had grown to manhood 
among the Dahae of the Caspian region, but was at 
this time subject-king of Media Atropatene, to rule 
over them. 

A crown, when it is offered, is not often declined, 
though a few crowns may have gone begging in the 
modern world, now that kingship has lost its glamour ; 
and Artabanus, on receiving the overture from the 
Parthian nobles, at once expressed his willingness to 



WAR OF VONONES AND ARTABANUS. 233 

accept the proffered dignity. He invaded Parthia at 
the head of an army consisting of his own subjects, 
and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difficulties 
the bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. This 
engagement resulted in the defeat of the Median 
monarch ; and Vonones was so proud of his victory 
that he immediately had a coin struck to commemo- 
rate it, bearing on the obverse his own head, with the 
legend of, BASIAEYS ONQNHS, and on the reverse a 
Victory with the legend— BASIAEYS ONQNHS NEI- 
KHSAS APTABANON— "King Onones on his defeat 




COIN OF ARTABANUS III; 



of Artabanus." But the self-gratulation was prema- 
ture. Artabanus had made good his retreat into his 
own country, and, having there collected a larger army 
than before, returned to the attack. This time he 
was successful. The forces of Vonones were defeated, 
and he himself, escaping from the battle with a few 
followers, fled on horseback to Seleucia, while his 
vanquished army, following more slowly in his track, 
was pressed upon by the victorious Mede, and suffered 
great losses. Artabanus, entering Ctesiphon in 
triumph, was immediately acclaimed king. Vonones 
took refuge in Armenia, and, the throne happening to 



234 PARTHIA S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 

be vacant, was not only given an asylum, but ap- 
pointed to the kingly office. Artabanus naturally 
remonstrated, and threatened war unless Vonones 
were surrendered to him. Armenia was alarmed, and 
began to waver ; whereupon Vonones withdrew him- 
self from the country, and sought the protection of 
Creticus Silanus, the Roman governor of Syria, who 
received him with favour, gave him a guard, and 
allowed him the state and title of king, but at the 
same time kept him in a sort of honourable captivity. 
It was under these circumstances that the Roman 
Emperor, Tiberius, who had recently succeeded 
Augustus, determined to entrust the administration 
and pacification of the East to a personage of impor- 
tance — one who should combine the highest rank with 
considerable experience, and should striTce the imagi- 
nation of the Orientals, and command their attention, 
at once by the dignity of his office, and by the pomp 
and splendour of his surroundings. It may be that, 
in his selection of the individual, he was actuated by 
motives of jealous}^, and by the wish to separate one, 
whom he could not but regard as a rival, from an army 
which had grown too much attached to him. But it 
seems scarcely fair to attribute these motives to him 
upon mere suspicion, and it is difficult to see what 
better choice than the one he made was open to him 
under the circumstances of the period. Germanicus 
was, at the time, the second man in the State. He 
had knowledge of affairs ; he was a good soldier 
and general ; his manners were courteous and agree- 
able ; and he was popular with all classes. At 
once the nephew and the adopted son of the sove- 



ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 235 

reign, he would scarcely seem to the Orientals to 
shine with a reflected radiance ; they would see 
in him the alter e^o of the great Western autocrat, 
and would be awed by the grandeur of his posi- 
tion, while fascinated by the charm of his person- 
ality. The more to affect their minds, Tiberius 
conferred on his representative none of the ordinary 
and well-worn titles of Roman administrative em- 
ployment, but coined for him a phrase unknown 
in official language previously, investing him with 
an extraordinary command over all the Roman 
dominions east of the Hellespont. Full powers were 
granted him for making peace or war, for levying 
troops, annexing provinces, appointing subject kings, 
concluding treaties, and performing other sovereign 
acts without referring back to Rome for instructions. 
A train of unusual magnificence accompanied him to 
his charge, calculated to impress the Orientals with 
the conviction that this was no common negotiator. 
Germanicus arrived in Asia in the spring of A.D. 18, 
and within the space of a single year completed the 
task, which he had undertaken, satisfactorily. Having 
visited Artaxata in person, and ascertained the feel- 
ings and disposition of the Armenians, he made up 
his mind not to demand the re-instatement of Vonones, 
which would have been throwing down the gauntlet 
to Parthia, nor yet to allow the establishment of an 
Arsacid on the Armenian throne, which would have 
been exalting Parthia to the shame and dishonour of 
Rome, but to pursue a middle course, at which neither 
the Armenians nor the Parthians could take offence, 
while Roman dignity would be upheld, Roman tradi- 



236 PARTHIA'S relations with ROME. 

tions maintained, and something done to soothe the 
feehngs and gratify the wishes of both the irritated 
Asiatic nations. There was in Armenia, where he had 
grown up, a foreign prince, named Zeno, the son of 
Polemo, once king of the curtailed Pontus, and after- 
wards of the Lesser Armenia, who was in very good 
odour among the Armenians, since he had, during a 
long residence, conformed himself in all respects to 
their habits and usages. Finding that it would please 
the Armenians, Germanicus determined on giving 
them this man for ruler, and at the seat of govern- 
ment, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude 
of the people, and with the consent and approval of 
the principal nobles, he placed with his own hand 
the diadem on the brow of the favoured prince, and 
saluted him as king under the Armenian name, which 
he had never hitherto borne, of " Artaxias." For the 
satisfaction of the Parthian monarch, who required 
that Vonones should either be delivered into his hands 
or removed to a greater distance from the Parthian 
frontier, he " interned " the unhappy prince in the 
Cilician city of Pompeiopolis — a change of residence 
so much disliked by the prince himself that the next 
year he endeavoured to escape from it, but, his 
attempt being discovered, he was pursued, overtaken, 
and slain in a skirmish on the banks of the river 
Pyramus. The pacification of the East was thus, 
with some difficulty, effected ; and Germanicus, quit- 
ting Asia, indulged himself in the luxury of a pleasure 
trip to Egypt. 

The dispositions which Germanicus had made 
sufficed to preserve the tranquillity of the East for the 



ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 237 

space of fifteen years. Artabanus, at peace with 
Rome and with Armenia, employed the time in the 
chastisement of border-tribes, and in petty wars, 
which however increased his reputation. Success 
followed on success ; and by degrees his opinion of 
his own military capacity was so much raised that he 
began to look upon a rupture with Rome as rather to 
be desired than dreaded. He knew that Germanicus 
was dead ; that Tiberius was advanced in years, and 
not likely to engage in a distant military expedition ; 
and that the East was under the rule of an official 
who had never yet distinguished himself as a com- 
mander When, therefore, in A.D. 34, the Armenian 
throne was made vacant by the death of Artaxias 
III., the nominee of Germanicus, he boldly occupied 
the country, and claiming the disposal of the vacant 
dignity, bestowed it upon his own eldest son, a prince 
who bore the name of Arsaces. Nor did he rest 
content with this. Insult must be added to injury. 
Ambassadors were despatched to Rome with a 
demand for the restoration of the treasure which 
Vonones had carried off from Parthia and taken with 
him into Roman territory ; and a threat was held 
out that Artabanus was about to reoccupy all the 
territory which, having been once Macedonian or 
Persian, was now properly his, since he was the 
natural successor and representative of Cyrus and 
Alexander. According to one writer,'^ the Parthian 
monarch actually commenced military operations 
against Rome by the invasion of Cappadocia, which 
had been for some time a Roman province. 
^ Dio Cassius. 



238 PARTHIA's relations with ROME. 

It is uncertain what response Tiberius would have 
made to these demands and proceedings had the 
internal condition of Parthia been sound and satisfac- 
tory. He was certainly averse to war at this period 
of his life, and had actually sent instructions to 
Vitellius, the governor of Syria, after the seizure of 
Armenia, by Artabanus^ that he was to cultivate 
friendly relations with Parthia. But the Parthian 
kingdom was internally in a state of extreme disquiet ; 
insurrection was threatened ; and the nobles were in 
active correspondence with the Imperial court on the 
subject of bringing forward a pretender. "Arta- 
banus," they said, " had, among his other cruelties, 
put to death all the adult members of the royal family 
who were in his power, and there was not an Arsacid 
in Asia of age to reign ; but for a successful revolt an 
Arsacid leader was absolutely necessary : would not 
Rome supply the defect ? Would she not send them 
one of the surviving sons of Phraates IV., to head the 
intended insurrection, which would then be sure to 
succeed ? One son, named Phraates, like his father, 
was still living, and was, they understood, at Rome ; if 
Tiberius would only send him, and he were once seen 
on the banks of the Euphrates, they guaranteed a 
successful outbreak — Artabanus would be driven from 
his throne without difficulty. Tiberius was prevailed 
upon to do as they desired. He furnished Phraates 
with all things necessary for his journey, and sent 
him into Asia, to lay claim to his father's kingdom. 

Phraates, however, was unequal to the task 
assigned him. The sudden change in his life and 
habits, which his new position necessitated, broke 



ARTABANUS TIT. AND TIBERIUS. 239 

down his health, and he was but just arrived in Syria 
when he sickened and died. Tiberius replaced him 
by a nephew, named Tiridates, probably a son either 
of Rhodaspes or of Seraspadanes, and proceeded to 
devote to the affairs of the East all the energies of a 
mind eminently sagacious and fertile in resources. 
At his instigation, Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a 
portion of the modern Georgia, was induced to take 
the field, and invade Armenia ; where, after removing 
the reigning Parthian prince, Arsaces, by poison, he 
occupied the capital, and established his own brother, 
Mithridates, as king. Artabanus met this movement 
by giving the direction of affairs in Armenia to 
another son, Orodes, and sending him with all speed 
to maintain the Parthian cause in the disputed 
province ; but Orodes proved no match for his adver- 
sary, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of 
his troops, and in familiarity with the localities. 
Pharasmanes had obtained the assistance of his 
neighbours, the Albanians, and opening the passes of 
the Caucasus, had admitted through them a number 
of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes, who were 
always ready, when their services were well paid, to 
take a part in the quarrels of the south. Orodes 
failed to secure either mercenaries or allies, and had 
to contend unassisted against the three enemies who 
had joined their forces to oppose him. For some time 
he prudently declined an engagement ; but it was 
impossible to restrain the ardour of his troops, whom 
the enemy exasperated by their reproaches. After a 
while he was compelled to accept the battle which 
Pharasmanes incessantly offered. The troops at his 



240 PARTHIA'S relations with ROME. 

disposal consisted entirely of cavalry, while Pharas- 
manes had, besides his horse, a powerful body of 
infantry. The conflict was nevertheless long and 
furious ; the Parthians and Sarmatians were very 
equally matched ; and the victory might have been 
doubtful, if it had not happened that in a hand-to- 
hand combat between the two commanders, Orodes 
was struck to the ground by his antagonist, and 
thought by most of his own side to be killed. As 
usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout fol- 
lowed. If we are to believe Josephus, " many tens 
of thousands " were slain. Armenia was wholly lost 
to Parthia ; and Artabanus found himself left with 
diminished resources and tarnished reputation to 
meet the intrigues of his domestic foes. 

Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In 
the spring of A.D. 36, having levied the whole force of 
the empire, he took the field in person, and marched 
northwards, with the intention of avenging himself 
on the Iberians and recovering his lost province. But 
his first efforts were unsuccessful ; and before he 
could renew them the Roman general, Vitellius, put 
himself at the head of his legions, and, moving 
towards the Euphrates, threatened Mesopotamia with 
invasion. Placed thus between two dangers, the 
Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to 
abandon Armenia and return to the defence of his 
own proper territories, which in his absence must 
have lain temptingly open to an invader. His return 
caused Vitellius to change his tactics. Instead of 
challenging Artabanus to an engagement, and letting 
the quarrel be decided by a trial of strength in the 



ARTABANUS hi. and TIBERIUS. 241 

open field, he fell back on the weapon of intrigue so 
dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish ex- 
penditure of money to excite disaffection once more 
among the Parthian grandees. This time the con- 
spiracy was successful. The military disasters of the 
last two years had alienated from Artabanus the 
affections of those whom his previous cruelties had 
failed to disgust or alarm ; and he found himself 
without any armed force whereon he could rely, 
beyond a small number of the foreign guards whom 
he maintained about his person. It seemed to him 
that his only safety was in flight ; and accordingly 
he quitted his capital, and removed himself hastily to 
Hyrcania, in the immediate vicinity of the Scythian 
Dahse, among whom he had been brought up. Here 
the population was friendly to him, and he lived a 
retired life, waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, 
who could judge an absent prince with fairness, 
although they could not long continue faithful to a 
present one, should repent of their behaviour to him. 

When the flight of Artabanus became known to 
the Romans, Vitellius immediately advanced to the 
banks of the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates 
into his kingdom. Fortunate omens were said to 
have accompanied the passage of the river, and these 
were followed by adhesions, the importance of which 
was undoubted. Ornospades, satrap of Mesopotamia, 
and a former comrade of Tiberius in the Dalmatic 
war, was the first to join the standard of the pretender 
with a large body of horse. Next came Sinnaces, 
who had long been in correspondence with the 
Romans, with a contingent ; then his father, Abda- 



242 PARTHIA'S RELATIONS WITH ROME. 

geses — " the pillar of the party," as Tacitus calls 
him — and the keeper of the royal treasures, together 
with other persons of high position. Vitellius, on 
seeing the pretender thus warmly welcomed by his 
countrymen, regarded his mission as accomplished, 
and returned with his troops into Syria. Tiridates 
proceeded through Mesopotamia and Assyria, re- 
ceiving on his way the submission of many Greek 
and some Parthian cities, as Halus and Artemita. 
The Greeks saw in his Roman breeding a guarantee 
of the politeness and refinement which had been 
wholly wanting in Artabanus, brought up among the 
uncivilised Scyths. In the great city of Seleucia he 
was received with an obsequiousness that bordered on 
adulation. Besides paying him all the customary 
royal honours, both old and new, they flatteringly 
compared him with his predecessor, who, they said, 
had been no true Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to 
reward these unseemly compliments by a modification 
of the Seleucian constitution in a democratic sense. 
From Seleucia he crossed the Tigris to Ctesiphon, 
where, after a short delay, caused by the absence oi 
some important governors of provinces, he was 
crowned King of Parthia according to the established 
forms by the Surena, or Commander-in-chief of the 
period. 

Tiridates thought that now all was secure. Arta- 
banus was in hiding in Hyrcania, leading a miserable 
existence. The whole of the western provinces had 
declared for him, and no signs of hostility appeared 
in the East. He deemed his rule acquiesced in 
generally, and there is reason to suppose that his 



ARTABANUS III. AND TIBERIUS. 243 

anticipations would have proved correct, had not 
discontent shown itself at the Court and among the 
higher officials. There had been many who had hoped 
for the office of Grand Vizier, and in nominating one 
to it Tiridates had displeased all the rest. There 
were also many, who through accident or hesitation 
in making up their minds had been absent from the 
coronation ceremonial, and who believed themselves 
to be on that account suspected of disaffection, or 
at any rate of lukewarmness. It is also more than 
probable that the " Roman breeding " of the new 
monarch, which delighted his Grecian, offended his 
Parthian subjects. At any rate, however we may 
account for it, disaffection certainly broke out. 
Emissaries from the nobles sought the dethroned 
monarch in his obscure retirement, and placed 
before him the prospect of a restoration, which they 
declared themselves anxious to bring about. Dis- 
trustful at first of what seemed to him mere levity 
and fickleness, Artabanus was ultimately persuaded 
that the overtures made to him were sincere, and that 
if he himself were not the object of any very devoted 
affection on the part of the malcontents, Tiridates 
at any rate was the object of a very real and pro- 
nounced hostility. He therefore placed himself in 
the hands of the conspirators, and, having first 
secured the services of a body of Dahae and other 
Scyths, marched westward with all speed, anxious at 
once to cut short the preparations which were being 
made to resist him by his enemies, and to forestall 
the desertions, which he could not but anticipate, on 
the part of his friends. The good policy of this rapid 



244 PARTHIA\s relations with ROME. 

movement is unquestionable. It startled and greatly- 
discomposed Tiridates and his counsellors. Of these, 
some recommended an immediate attack on the 
troops of Artabanus before they were recovered from 
the fatigues of their long march ; while others, and 
among them Abdageses, the chief vizier, advised a 
retreat into Mesopotamia, and a junction with the 
Armenian levies, and with the Roman troops, which 
Vitellius, on the first news of the insurrection, had 
thrown across the Euphrates. The more timid 
counsel prevailed, and a retreat was determined 
on. But reader pour mieux saiiter is a maxim only 
suited to the West. In the East the first step in 
retreat is the first step towards ruin. No sooner was 
the Tigris crossed and the march through Mesopo- 
tamia begun than the host of Tiridates melted away 
like an iceberg in the Gulf Stream. The Arabs of 
the Mesopotamian desert were the first to break up 
and disband themselves, the nearness of their homes 
offering an irresistible attraction ; but their example 
was soon followed by the rest of the army, which had 
no such excuse. Some directed their steps home- 
wards ; others joined the enemy ; Tiridates was at 
last left with a mere handful of adherents, and, 
hastening into Syria, put himself once more under 
Roman protection. 

The attempt to establish the influence of Rome 
over the Parthian kingdom, by fixing a Roman puppet 
on the throne of the Arsacidse, thus proved altogether 
a failure. But the general effect of the struggle was 
advantageous to Rome, and reflects credit on the 
prince who, at the age of seventy-seven, at once vin- 



CONCESSIONS MADE BY ARTABANUS. 245 

dicated the Roman honour and baffled the schemes 
of one of the ablest of the Parthian monarchs. 
Artabanus, when after his various vicissitudes he 
recovered his throne, had no longer any stomach for 
great enterprises. He took no further steps to disturb 
Mithridates in his possession of Armenia, and he 
left Vitellius unmolested on the Euphrates. When, 
towards the close of A.D. 36, or very early in A.D. 37, 
he had an interview with the Roman proconsul half- 
way between the two banks of the river, he distinctly 
renounced all claims to the Armenian kingdom ; at 
the same time agreeing to send one of his sons, 
Darius, to Rome in a position which Rome regarded 
as that of a hostage, and further consenting to offer 
incense to the emblems of Roman sovereignty — an 
act, as the Romans understood it, of submission and 
homage. Artabanus, by these concessions, the 
meaning of which he did not perhaps fully under- 
stand, decidedly lowered the prestige of his nation, 
and yielded to Rome a pre-eminence which was 
scarcely admitted by any other monarch, or at any 
other period. We cannot be surprised that the 
credit of concluding such a peace, though belonging 
really to Tiberius, was falsely claimed by his flatterers 
for Caligula, the new emperor, soon after whose 
accession in March, A.D. 37, the news of the success- 
ful negotiations reached Rome. 




XIV. 

ASINAI AND ANILAI — AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN 
HISTORY. 

It was during the troubled reign of Artabanus the 
Third, when the state was distracted between foreign 
war and domestic feud, that disturbances broke out 
in Mesopotamia, which have been graphically de- 
scribed by the Jewish writer Josephus, and which 
serve to throw considerable light on the internal 
condition of the Parthian Empire at this period. 
There was a large Jewish element in the population 
of the more western provinces of the empire, an 
element which dated from a time anterior to the rise, 
not only of the Parthian, but even of the Persian 
monarchy. That system of " transplantation of 
nations," which was pursued on so large a scale by 
the Assyrian and Babylonian sovereigns of the 
eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries before Christ, 
had introduced into the heart of Asia a number of 
strange nationalities, and among these there was 
none more remarkable than that of the Hebrews. 
Whatever had become of the descendants of the Ten 
Tribes — whether in any places they still constituted 
distinct communities, or had long ere this been 



THE yEWS IN PARTHIA. 247 

absorbed into the general population of the country 
— at any rate, colonies of Jews, dating from the time 
of Nebuchadnezzar's Captivity, maintained them- 
selves, often in a flourishing condition, in various 
parts of Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Mesopotamia, 
Susiana, and probably in other Parthian provinces. 
These colonies exhibited very generally the curious 
but well-known tendency of the Jewish race to a rate 
of increase quite disproportionate to that of the 
population among which they are settled. The 
Hebrew element became continually larger and 
more important in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and the 
the adjacent countries, notwithstanding the large 
draughts which from time to time were made upon 
it by Seleucus Nicator, and others of the Syrian 
princes. And this alien element in the population, 
for the most part prospered. The Jewish settlers 
seem to have enjoyed under the Parthians the same 
sort of toleration, and the same permission to 
exercise a species of self-government, which both 
Jews and Christians enjoy now in several parts of 
Turkey. In many cities they formed a recognised 
community under their own magistrates ; some 
towns they had wholly to themselves ; those who 
dwelt in Mesopotamia possessed a common treasury ; 
and it was customary for them to send up to 
Jerusalem from time to time the offerings of the 
faithful, escorted by a convoy of thirty thousand or 
forty thousand armed men. The Parthian kings 
treated them well, and probably regarded them as a 
valuable counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and 
Syrians of this part of the empire. They laboured 



248 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 

under no disabilities ; suffered no oppression- ; had 
no grievances of which to complain ; and it would 
have seemed beforehand very improbable that they 
would ever become the cause of trouble or dis- 
turbance to the state ; but circumstances seemingly 
irivial threw the whole community into commotion, 
and led on to disasters of an unusual and lamentable 
character. 

There were two young Jews, named respectively 
Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of Nearda, the 
city in which the general treasury of the community 
was established, who, on suffering some ill-usage at 
the hands of the manufacturer in whose service they 
were, threw up their employment, and, retiring to a 
marshy district enclosed between two arms of the 
Euphrates, made up their minds to exchange the dull 
career of honest labour for the more exciting one of 
robbery. The vagabonds of the neighbourhood, by 
the attraction which draws like to like, soon gathered 
about them, and a band was formed which in a little 
time became the terror of the entire vicinity. They 
exacted a black mail from the peaceable population 
of shepherds and others who lived near them, occa- 
sionally made plundering raids to a distance, and 
required a contribution from all travellers and mer- 
chants who passed through their district. Their 
proceedings having become notorious and intolerable, 
the satrap of Babylonia thought it his duty to put 
them down, and marched against them with the 
troops at his disposal, intending to take them by 
surprise on the Sabbath day, when it was supposed 
that their religious scruples would prevent them from 



ARTABANUS III. AND ASINAT. 249 

making any resistance. But his intentions got wind, 
and the robber band, having agreed annong themselves 
to disregard the obHgation of the Sabbatical rest, 
turned the tables upon their assailant, and, instead of 
allowing themselves to be surprised, surprised him, 
and inflicted on him a severe defeat. Tidings of the 
affair having reached Artabanus, who had his hands 
already sufficiently occupied, he thought it best to 
make pacific overtures to the victors, and having 
induced them to pay him a visit at his Court, instead 
of inflicting any punishment, assigned to Asinai, the 
elder of the two brothers, the entire government of 
the Babylonian satrapy. At first the experiment 
appeared to be a success. Raised from the condition 
of an outlaw to that of a vitaxa., or Persian provincial 
governor, Asinai was perfectly content, and adminis- 
tered his province with zeal, diligence, and ability. For 
the space of fifteen years all things went smoothly in 
Babylonia, and no complaint was raised against the 
administration. At the end of that time, however, 
the lawless temper which from the first had charac- 
terised the two brothers, reasserted itself, not, how- 
ever, in Asinai, but in Anilai. Having fallen in love 
with the wife of a Parthian nobleman, who seems to 
have been the commander of the Parthian troops 
stationed in Babylonia, and not knowing how other- 
wise to accomplish his purpose, he made an open 
attack upon the chieftain and killed him. Having 
thus removed the obstacle to a marriage, he, within a 
short space, made the object of his affections his wife, 
and having established her as the mistress of his 
house, allowed her to introduce into it the heathen 



250 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 

rites whereto she had always been accustomed. But 
this gave great offence to the entire Jewish com- 
munity, who were shocked that idolatrous practices 
should be permitted in a Hebrew household, and laid 
their complaint before Asinai, calling upon him to 
interfere in the matter, and compel Anilai to divorce 
his Parthian wife. Asinai came into their views, and 
would probably have enforced them upon his brother, 
had not the lady, alarmed at her impending disgrace, 
and, it may be, sincerely attached to her Jewish 
husband, anticipated the accomplishment of the 
project by secretly poisoning her brother-in-law. 
On the death of Asinai the authority which he had 
wielded with so much satisfaction to all concerned, 
passed, apparently without any fresh appointment by 
the crown, into Anilai's hands, who thus became 
satrap of the extensive province of Babylonia, at 
this time the most important in the empire. 

Anilai, however, possessed unfortunately none of 
his brother's capacity for administration and govern- 
ment. His instincts were those of a mere ordinary 
freebooter, and he was no sooner settled in his pro- 
vince than he proceeded to give them free vent by 
invading, without so much as a pretext, the territory 
of a neighbouring satrap, named Mithridates, who 
was not only a Parthian noble of the highest 
rank, but was connected with the Royal house, being 
married to a daughter of Artabanus. Mithridates 
flew to arms in defence of his province, but Anilai, 
who had military if he had no other talent, fell 
suddenly upon his encampment in the night, com- 
pletely routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself 



ASINAI' SUCCEEDED BY ANILAI. 25I 

prisoner. The unhappy captive was subjected to ex- 
treme indignity ; by the orders of Anilai, he was 
stripped naked, set upon an ass, and in this guise con- 
ducted from the battlefield to the camp of the victors, 
where he was paraded before the eyes of the soldiery. 
Not daring, however, to put to death a connection of 
the Great King, of whose vengeance he had a whole- 
some dread, Anilai felt compelled after a time to release 
his captive and allow him to return to his satrapy. 
There the account which he gave of his sufferings so 
exasperated his wife, that she set herself to make 
his life a burden to him, and never rested until he 
consented to collect a second army and continue 
the war. His forces advanced against Anilai's 
stronghold, but the Jewish captain was too proud 
to remain within it. Quitting the marshes, he led his 
troops a distance of ten miles through a hot and 
arid plain to meet the enemy, thus foolishly and 
quite unnecessarily exhausting them, and exposing 
them to the attack of the enemy under circumstances 
of the greatest disadvantage. The natural conse- 
quence followed. Anilai was defeated with great 
loss, but he himself escaped, and having enrolled 
fresh troops of a worthless character, proceeded to 
revenge himself by carrying fire and sword over the 
lands of his own Babylonian subjects, whom he must 
have looked upon as on the point of escaping from 
his jurisdiction. The unfortunate natives sent to 
Nearda and required that Anilai should be given up 
to them ; but the Jews of Nearda, even supposing 
them to have had the will, had not the power to com- 
ply. Negotiations were then tried, but with no better 



253 AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 

result, except that, in the course of them, the Baby- 
lonians contrived to obtain an exact knowledge of 
the position which Anilai and his troops occupied, 
together with a general notion of their habits. 
Taking advantage of the knowledge thus acquired, 
they one night fell suddenly upon them, when they 
were all either drunk or asleep, and at one stroke 
exterminated the whole band. Such was the end of 
Anilai. 

Up to this point, though the occurrences had been 
strange and abnormal, indicative of extreme dis- 
organisation and weakness on the part of the Par- 
thian government, yet no very great harm had been 
done. Two Jewish bandits had been elevated into 
the position of Parthian satraps, and had borne 
rule over an important province, with the result, in 
the first place, of fifteen years of peace and prosperity, 
and subsequently of a short civil war, terminating in 
the destruction of the surviving robber chief and the 
annihilation of the entire band of marauders. But 
worse consequences were to follow. The bonds of 
civil order cannot be relaxed or disturbed without 
extreme danger to the whole social edifice. There 
had long been a smouldering feud between the native 
Babylonian population and the Jewish colonists in 
Babylon, which from time to time had broken out 
into actual riot and commotion. Diverse in race, in 
manners, and in religion, the two nationalities were 
always ready to fly at each other's throats when a 
fitting occasion offered. The present seemed an occa- 
sion not to be missed ; authority was relaxed ; the 
Jewish element in the population of Mesopotamia 



ANTI-SEMITIC DISTURBANCES. 253 

was at once disgraced and weakened. It had made 
itself obnoxious to the dominant power in the state, 
and was not hkely to receive government support or 
protection. Moved by these considerations, the 
native Babylonian population, very shortly after the 
destruction of Anilai, rose up against the Hebrews 
settled in their midst and threatened them with 
extermination. Finding themselves unable to make 
an effectual resistance, and receiving no assistance 
from the government, the Hebrews came to a de- 
termination to withdraw from the conflict by retiring 
altogether from a city where they provoked such 
hostility and were subjected to such ill-usage. Not- 
withstanding the enormous pecuniary loss which such 
a migration necessarily entails, and the vast difficulty 
of finding new homes for a population of many scores 
of thousands, they quitted Babylon in a body and 
transferred themselves to Seleucia. Seleucia, origi- 
nally a Hellenic city, had at this time a tripartite 
population, consisting of Greeks, Syrians, and Jews. 
The Greeks and Syrians were opposed to each other, 
but hitherto the Hebrew element had managed to live 
on tolerably friendly terms with both the other na- 
tionalities. Now, however, the new-comers felt them- 
selves drawn to the Syrians, who were a kindred race, 
and, uniting with them against the Greeks, forced 
these last to succumb, and to accept a subordinate 
position. But such a condition of things could not 
last ; the Greeks found it insupportable ; and before 
many months were past they succeeded in gaining 
over the Syrians to their side, and persuading them 
to join in an organised attack upon the Hebrews. 



254 ^^ EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 

Too weak to make head against so powerful a combi- 
nation, the Hebrews were utterly overpowered, and 
in the massacre that ensued they lost, it is said, 
above fifty thousand men. Those who escaped 
crossed the Tigris, and transferred their abode to 
Ctesiphon, but the malice of their enemies was still 
unsatisfied. The persecution continued, and did not 
come to an end until the entire Jewish population, de- 
serting the metropolitan cities, withdrew to the smaller 
provincial towns, which had no other inhabitants. 

The series of events here related derives its in- 
terest, partly from its connection with the Jewish 
people, whose history will always, more or less, 
command our sympathies, but partly also, and indeed 
mainly, from the light which it throws on the cha- 
racter of the Parthian rule, and the condition of the 
countries under Parthian government. Once more 
the resemblance between the Parthian and the Tur- 
kish systems is brought vividly to our notice, and the 
scenes enacted in Syria and the Lebanon before our 
own eyes — the mutual animosities of Christian and 
Druse and Maronite, the terrible conflicts, and the 
bloody massacres that have been an indelible dis- 
grace to Turkish administration, present themselves 
to our thoughts and memories. The picture has the 
same features of antipathies of race, unsoftened by 
time and contact, of perpetual feud bursting out into 
occasional conflict, of undying religious hatreds, of 
strange combinations, of massacres, of fearful out- 
rages, and of a government looking tamely on, and 
allowing things for the most part to take their course. 
It is clear that the Parthian system failed utterly to 



PARTHIAN AND TURKISH GOVERNMENT. 255 

blend together or amalgamate the conquered races ; 
and not only so, but that it rubbed off none of their 
angles, rendered them after the lapse of centuries not 
one whit more friendly, or better disposed one to- 
wards another than they had been at the first, did 
absolutely nothing towards producing the " unity, 
peace, and concord," which ought to knit togethef 
the subjects of a single government, the constituent 
elements of a single kingdom. Moreover, the Par- 
thian system, as set before us in the events which we 
are considering, was impotent even to effect the first 
object of civil government, the securing of quiet and 
tranquillity within its borders. If we were bound to 
regard the events of the Asinai and Anilai episode as 
representing to us truthfully the 7wrmal condition of 
the peoples and countries with which it is concerned, 
and to take the picture as a fair sample of the general 
condition of the empire, we should be forced to 
conclude that Parthian government was merely a 
euphemistic name for anarchy, and that it was a rare 
good fortune which prevented the State from falling 
to pieces at this early period, within three centuries 
of its establishment. But, on the whole, there is 
reason to believe that the reign of Artabanus III. 
puts before us, not the normal, but an exceptional 
state of things — a state of things which could only 
arise in Parthia when the machinery of government was 
deranged in consequence of rebellion and civil war. 
We have to bear in mind that Artabanus III. was 
actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that 
during the greater part of his reign he lived in 
perpetual fear of revolt and insurrection. It is not 



256 



AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY. 



at all improbable that the culminating atrocities of 
the struggle which we have described, synchronised 
with the second expulsion of the Parthian monarch, 
and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary 
weakness of the Parthian rule, as an indication of 
the terrible strength of the forces which that rule for 
the most part restrained and held under control. 




XV. 



END OF THE REIGN OF ARTABANUS III.— GOTARZES 

AND HIS RIVALS. 



Artabanus did not continue on the throne very- 
long after his undignified submission to Vitellius.^ 
His proceedings probably disgusted his subjects, who 
vented their indignation in murmurs and threats of 
revolt. These threats coming to the knowledge of 
the king, provoked him to adopt severe measures 
against the malcontents ; who thereupon banded 
themselves together, and from malcontents became 
open conspirators. Artabanus felt himself unequal 
to the task of coping with the movement, and, 
quitting his capital, fled to the Court of Izates, tribu- 
tary king of Adiabene, who received him hospitably, 
and undertook to replace him upon the throne from 
which he had been driven. It Jends an interest to 
this portion of Parthian history to learn from 
Josephus, who relates it, that Izates, and his mother, 
Helena, were converts to Judaism, and entertained so 
much affection for the Jewish people as to send 
supplies of corn to Jerusalem, when (about A.D. 44) 
that city was threatened with famine.^ Meanwhile, 

' See abo\e, p. 245. - Compare Acts xi. 28-30. 

257 



258 END OF THE REIGN OF ARTABANUS III. 

however, the Parthian Megistanes had deposed 
Artabanus, and elected in his place a certain 
Kinnamus, or Cinnamus, a distant relation of the 
cashiered monarch, brought up by him in his house. 
War would probably have broken out had not 
Cinnamus, who was of a gentle disposition, waived his 
claim in favour of his benefactor, and written to him, 
inviting him to return. Artabanus upon this remounted 
his throne, while Cinnamus carried his magnanimity 
so far as to take the diadem from his own head, and, 
replacing it on that of the old monarch, to salute 
him as king. It was a condition of the restoration, 
guaranteed both by Artabanus and Izates, that the 
transaction should be accompanied by a complete 
amnesty for all political offences. Such mildness, 
very unusual among the Parthians, may perhaps be 
ascribed to the gentle councils of the Judsean Izates. 

It seems that Artabanus died very shortly after his 
restoration to the throne. His last days were 
clouded by the calamity of the revolt of Seleucia, 
far the most important of the Hellenic cities of the 
empire. We may assume that the disturbed condi- 
tion of the Parthian kingdom, the frequent revolts, 
the occasional civil wars, the manifest tendency to 
disruption which the empire about this time showed, 
had raised among the Hellenic subjects of the 
Parthian crown, always disaffected, a belief, or at 
any rate a hope, that they might succeed in shaking 
off the yoke of their barbaric lords. Seleucia, natu- 
rally, took the lead. Had she succeeded in estab- 
lishing her independence, other lesser towns, as 
Apollonia, Nicephorium, Edessa, Carrhae, might 



VARDANES AND GOTARZES. 259 

have followed her example. Rome might have been 
called in as a protector, and might perhaps have 
undertaken the charge. An impermni m imperio 
might conceivably have been established. But, as 
the event proved, the attempt now made was ill- 
judged. Though Artabanus himself failed to recover 
the revolted city, which maintained a precarious 
independence for the space of over six years (A.D. 
40-46), yet there was at no time any reasonable 
prospect of a prosperous issue. Rome held aloof. 
The unhappy Greeks were overmatched. Though 
Parthia was thought to have incurred some dis- 
grace I by her inability to reduce a single rebel city 
to subjection for the space of nearly seven years, 
yet ultimately she prevailed. Seleucia succumbed to 
a son of Artabanus in A.D. 46, and resumed a subject 
position under her old masters. 

On the death of Artabanus, the succession was 
disputed between two of his sons, Vardanes and 
Gotarzes. According to Josephus, the crown was 
left by his father to the former, who was probably 
the elder of the two ; but, as he happened to be at a 
distance, while Gotarzes was present in the capital, 
or close at hand, the last named had the opportunity 
of occupying the throne, and, being an ambitious 
prince, availed himself of it. He reigned, however, 
at this time only for a few weeks. Having put to 
death a brother, named Artabanus, together with his 
wife and son, and otherwise shown a tyrannical 
disposition, he so alarmed his subjects, that they sent 
hurriedly for Vardanes, and offered him the post of 

' Tacit. " Ann.," xi. 9 : " Non sine dedecore Parthorum.' 



26o REIGN OF VARDANES I. 

king. Vardanes, a man of prompt action, instantly 
complied, and, having accomplished a journey of 350 
miles in two days, drove Gotarzes from the kingdom ; 
after which he received the submission of the pro- 
vinces and cities generally, the only exception being 
Seleucia, which maintained its revolt, and resisted all 
his efforts to reduce it. Meantime Gotarzes had fled 
to the Dahae of the Caspian region, and thrown him- 
self upon their support and protection. The Dahse, 
who were not Parthian subjects, willingly gave him 
an asylum ; and from this secure retreat he proceeded 
to seduce the neighbouring Hyrcanians from their 




COIN OF VARDANES I. 



allegiance to his brother, and drew together so large 
a power, that Vardanes felt himself under the neces- 
sity of raising the siege of Seleucia, and marching in 
person to the distant East. The two armies con- 
fronted each other in the plain country of Bactria, but 
before they came to an engagement, the commanders 
on either side thought it expedient to hold a con- 
ference, and arrange, if possible, terms of peace. It 
had come to the knowledge of Gotarzes, that there 
was a design afloat among the chief nobles in either 
army to get rid of both the brothers, and elect to the 



HIS DESIGNS ON ARMENIA. 26 1 

throne a wholly new king. Having informed his 
brother of this alarming discovery, he succeeded in 
arranging a secret meeting with him, where pledges 
were interchanged, and an understanding come to 
with respect to the future. Gotarzes agreed to relin- 
quish his claims to the Parthian crown, and was 
assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was probably 
made over to his government. Vardanes returned to 
the West, and resuming his siege operations, finally 
compelled Seleucia to a surrender in the year A.D. 46, 
the seventh year of the insurrection. 

Regarding himself now as firmly settled in his 
kingdom, and as having nothing more to fear from his 
brother, Vardanes thought that the time was come for 
taking in hand a new and important enterprise. This 
was no less than the recovery of Armenia from the 
Roman influence. That country, relinquished to 
Tiberius by Artabanus III. in A.D. ^y, and placed 
by Rome under the governm.ent of Mithridates, an 
Iberian, had suffered various vicissitudes, and was now 
(A.D. 46) extremely discontented with its ruler, as well 
as with his Roman patrons and upholders. Var- 
danes thought that there would be no great difficulty 
in driving out Mithridates from the kingdom upon 
which he had so weak a hold, and replacing Armenia 
within the sphere of the Parthian rule and influence. 
But for success in such an enterprise he required the 
hearty concurrence and support of his principal 
feudatories, and especially of the great Izates, whose 
services to Artabanus had been rewarded by an 
important enlargement of his dominions, and who 
was now king both of Adiabene and of Gordyene or 



262 ACCESSION OF GOTARZBS. 

Upper Mesopotamia. Accordingly, he took this 
prince into his councils, and requested his opinion as 
to the prudence of the course which he was contem- 
plating. Izates gave the project his most strenuous 
opposition. He was profoundly convinced of the 
military strength and greatness of Rome, and on that 
account wholly disinclined to quarrel with her, while 
further he had a private and personal motive for 
desiring to maintain amicable relations with the 
great Western power from the fact that five of his 
sons were residing in Rome, whither he had sent 
them in order that they might receive a polite educa- 
tion. He refused, therefore, to abet Vardanes in his 
design, and the latter, indignant at a refusal, which 
he regarded as an act of rebellion, proceeded to 
engage in hostilities against his feudatory. 

It was probably this condition of things which 
induced Gotarzes suddenly to come forth from his 
retirement, and again assert his claim to the Parthian 
throne — a claim which he had only withdrawn under 
the pressure of necessity. The quarrel of Vardanes 
with Izates had weakened his power, and inclined 
even the nobles who had hitherto supported his 
cause to desert him, and go over to his adversary. 
Many of them invited Gotarzes to resume the 
struggle ; and Vardanes found himself compelled 
for the second time to march eastward. Several 
battles were fought between the two pretenders to 
the throne in the country between the Caspian and 
Herat, in which the advantage mostly rested with 
Vardanes ; but his successes in the field failed to 
overcome the aversion in which he was held by his 



DISCONTENT OF HIS SUByECTS. 263 

subjects ; and on his return from the war a number 
of them, in spite of the glory which he had acquired, 
conspired against him, and treacherously slew him in 
the hunting field. 

Gotarzes was then unanimously accepted as king, 
and reigned for some years in peace. But he had 
the common Parthian defect of a cruel and suspicious 
temper, while he added to this defect the compara- 
tively unusual faults of indolence and addiction to 
luxury. In a short time he alienated the affections 
of his subjects from him, partly by his severities. 




COIN OB- GOTARZES. 



partly by his luxurious living, and to some extent by 
his ill-success in some small military expeditions. 
In the year A.D. 49, steps were taken by those especi- 
ally opposed to him, for relieving their country from 
the incubus of a thoroughly bad king. Claudius, the 
Roman Emperor, was approached, and entreated to 
come to the aid of his Parthian " friends and allies." 
" The rule of Gotarzes," they said, " had become in- 
tolerable, alike to the nobility and the common 
people. He had murdered all his male relations, or 
at least all those who were within his reach — first his 



264 REIGN OF GOTARZES. 

brothers, then his near kinsmen, finally even those 
whose relationship was more remote ; nor had he 
stopped there ; he had proceeded to put to death 
their young children and their pregnant wives. He 
was sluggish in his habits, unfortunate in his wars, 
and had betaken himself to cruelty, that men might 
not utterly despise him for his want of manliness. 
They knew that Rome and Parthia were bound 
together by the terms of a treaty, and they wanted 
no infringement of it. Let Rome send them an 
Arsacid worthy of reigning in the place of the un- 
worthy scion of the house under whose tyranny they 
groaned. They asked for Meherdates, the son of 
Vonones, and grandson of Phraates IV., who was 
resident at Rome, and, having been so long accus- 
tomed to Roman manners, might be expected to 
rule justly and moderately." This speech was de- 
livered in the Roman Senate, Claudius being present, 
and also Meherdates, the candidate for the Parthian 
throne. The Emperor made a favourable response — 
" He would follow the example of the Divine 
Augustus, and allow the Parthians to receive from 
Rome the monarch whom they requested. That 
prince, bred up in the City, had always been remark- 
able for his moderation. He would (it was to be 
hoped) regard himself in his new position, not as a 
master of slaves, but as a ruler of citizens. He 
would find that clemency and justice were the more 
appreciated by a barbarous people, the less they had 
experience of them. Meherdates might accompany 
the Parthian envoys ; and a Roman of rank, Caius 
Cassius, the prefect of Syria, should be instructed to 



WAR OF GOTARZES WITH MEHERDATES. 265 

receive them on their arrival in Asia, and to see them 
safely across the Euphrates." 

Meherdates thus set out for his proposed kingdom 
under the fairest auspices. He had a large party- 
devoted to his cause in Parthia itself ; he was backed 
by the great name of Rome ; and he had the active 
support of a Roman of distinction, well acquainted 
with the East, and of good antecedents. Moreover, 
when he arrived at Zeugma on the Euphrates, he 
found himself welcomed, not only by a number of 
the Parthian nobles, but by a personage of great 
importance in those parts, no other than Abgarus, 
the Osrhoenian king, who commanded the passages 
of the Euphrates, and held the country to the east 
of the river, probably as far as the Khabour, or at 
any rate of the Ras-el-Ain, its western tributary. 
The parting advice of Cassiiis to his young Jrrote^e 
was, that he should lose no time in pressing forward 
against his rival, Gotarzes, since the barbarians were 
always impetuous at the commencement, but lost 
their energy, or even grew perfidious, if there was 
delay. Meherdates, however, fell entirely under the 
influence of the Osrhoenian monarch, who seems to 
have been a traitor, like his predecessor in the time 
of Crassus,! and to have determined from the first 
to lure the young prince to his destruction. By the 
persuasions of Abgarus, Meherdates was induced, 
first of all, to waste precious time while he indulged 
in a series of feasts and banquets at Edessa, the 
Osrhoenian capital, and then to proceed against his 
antagonist by the difficult and circuitous Armenian 

' See p. 164. 



266 REIGN OF GOTARZES. 

route, which followed the course of the Tigris by 
Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, instead of striking directly 
across Mesopotamia to Ctesiphon. The rough moun- 
tain passes and the snow-drifts of Armenia harassed 
his troops and seriously delayed his progress, ample 
time being thus given to Gotarzes for collecting a 
strong force and disposing it in the most convenient 
situations. Fortune, however, still continued to smile 
on the pretender. When he reached Adiabene, 
Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, openly 
embraced his cause, and brought a body of troops to 
his assistance. Pressing forward towards Ctesiphon, 
Meherdates possessed himself of the fort which 
occupied the ancient site of Nineveh, as well as of 
the strong post of Arbela, and there found himself 
in the near vicinity of his adversary. But Gotarzes 
was unwilling to risk all on the fate of a battle. He 
stood on the defensive, with the river Corma in his 
front, and would not suffer himself to be provoked, 
or tempted, to an engagement. Reinforcements were 
still reaching him, and he had a good hope of drawing 
to his own side, or at any rate persuading to neutrality, 
a portion of his adversary's adherents, if he could 
set his emissaries at work among them. These tactics 
were crowned with success. After a brief hesitation, 
Izates, the Adiabenian, and Abgarus, the Osrhoenian 
monarch, proved faithless to the cause which they 
had professedly espoused, and drew off their troops. 
Meherdates feared that other desertions might follow, 
and resolved, before losing more of his army, to pre- 
cipitate a fight. Gotarzes being also willing to engage, 
since he was no longer outnumbered, the battle took 



ROCK TABLET OF GOTARZES. 267 

place. It was stoutly contested. For a long time 
neither side could boast any decided advantage ; 
but at last Carrhenes, the chief general on the side of 
Meherdates, having repulsed the troops opposed to 
him, was tempted to pursue them too far, and being 
intercepted by the enemy on his return was either 
killed or made prisoner. His misfortune decided the 
engagement. The loss of their principal commander 
caused a general panic among the soldiers of Meher- 
dates, who dispersed in all directions. The pretender 
might perhaps have escaped ; but having entrusted 
his person to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his 
father's, who promised to conduct him to a place of 
safety, he was seized, bound, and delivered up to 
Gotarzes. Gotarzes seems to have been touched with 
compassion by his rival's youth and helplessness. 
Instead of awarding him the usual punishment of 
rebels and pretenders who fall into their enemies' 
hands, he contented himself with inflicting on him 
a slight mutilation, sufficient, according to Oriental 
ideas, to incapacitate him from ever exercising 
sovereignty. 

This victory which brought the troubles of Gotarzes 
with his rivals to an end, was regarded by him as 
worthy of commemoration in an unusual way. The 
Parthians had but little taste for mimetic art, and 
seldom indulged in artistic representations of any of 
the events of their history. But Gotarzes on this 
occasion took the exceptional course of commemo- 
rating his achievement by a rock tablet. On the 
great and sacred mountain of Behistun (originally, 
Baghistan, " The Place of the Gods "), which was 



268 DEATH OF GOTARZES. 

already adorned by a sculptured tablet representing 
the Achaemenian monarch, Darius, the son of 
Hystaspes, with two attendants, receiving a number 
of conquered rebels, he caused to be engraved a 
second, though much smaller tablet, representative 
of his own exploit. In this he appeared seated on 
horseback, with a heavy spear in his right hand, while 
a Victory flying in the air crowned him with a wreath 
or diadem, and behind him his army galloped over 
the plain in pursuit of the fixing foe. Some of the 
figures formed, apparently, a walking procession ; 
while an inscription in the Greek character and 
language explained the intention of the monument. 
This inscription is now almost illegible, but, when 
first found, contained in two places the name 
" Gotarzes," and in one the name " Mithrates," an 
undoubted equivalent of " Meherdates." 

It appears that the successful monarch did not 
long survive his victory. His death, which is assigned 
by the best authorities to the year A D. 50, is variously 
related by the historians. According to Tacitus, it 
was natural, the result of disease ; but according to 
Josephus it was violent, and effected by a conspiracy. 
There would be nothing surprising in this, since 
through his whole reign he was unpopular, and must 
have had many bitter enemies. But Tacitus is an 
authority who cannot be lightly set aside ; and his 
emphatic words — " morbo obiit " — have generally 
been accepted as closing controversy on the subject. 
The reign of Gotarzes must be considered to have 
helped forward in no small degree the disorganisation 
of the Parthian state. It showed Rome how easy it 



ILL EFFECTS OF HIS REIGN. 269 

was to interfere in the internal affairs of her eastern 
neighbour, and to paralyse her action beyond her 
frontier, by raising troubles within it. It accustomed 
the Parthians themselves to intrigue, civil war, and con- 
fusion. It must have tended, moreover, to exhaust the 
resources of the empire. At any rate the downward 
course of the state from this time, though not rapid, 
is marked and continuous ; and, though the tenacity 
of the race enables it to prolong its independent 
existence for nearly two centuries longer, yet the 
student of the history clearly sees that a decline 
has set in from which any real recovery is impossible. 




XVI. 

PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO — VOLOGASES I. 
AND CORBULO. 

GOTARZES was succeeded by a distant relative, an 
Arsacid called Vonones, and known in Parthian 
history as " Vonones the Second." This prince did 
not occupy the throne more than about two months, 
and is chiefly remarkable as the father of three kings 
much more celebrated than himself — Vologases I., 
King of Parthia, Tiridates, King of Armenia, and 
Pacorus, dependent King of Media. Tiridates appears 
to have been the eldest, Pacorus the second, and 
Vologases the third son ; but, on the death of their 
father, the two elder princes agreed to cede the 
Parthian throne to their younger brother. This 
was the more remarkable as Vologases was the son 
of Vonones by a Greek concubine, whereas his two 
brothers were legitimate. Probably he had given 
indications of an ability, which they did not recognise 
in themselves, and for which he may have been in- 
debted to the foreign blood that flowed in his veins. 
At any rate he found himself, in A.D. 50 or 51, 
established upon the throne, and able to reward 

Pacorus for his complaisance by bestowing on him 

270 



ACCESSION OF VOLOGASES I. 27 1 

the quasi-royal government of Media. For Tiridates 
something more was needed, and Vologases may be 
presumed to have been anxiously on the watch, 
during the earlier portion of his reign, for an oppor- 
tunity of conferring on his other brother a dignity 
worthy of his acceptance. The opportunity came 
in A.D. 51, through circumstances which had lighted 
up the flames of war in the neighbouring territory of 
Armenia. 

The origin of the strife was the following. Rhada- 
mistus, the eldest son of Pharasmanes, King of 




COIN OF VOLOGASES I. 



Iberia, was a youth of such recklessness, and 
possessed with such a lust for power, that, for the 
security of his own crown, his father thought it 
necessary to divert his son's thoughts to the acquisi- 
tion of another. He therefore pointed out to him 
that his uncle, Mithridates, King of Armenia under 
the Romans, was a most unpopular ruler, and that 
it might not be difficult to supplant him, if he took 
up his residence at his court and gave his mind to 
ingratiating himself with the Armenian people. The 
ambitious youth followed the advice offered him, and 



272 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

ere long succeeded in making himself a general 
favourite, after which, having contrived to get 
Mithridates into his power, he ruthlessly put him to 
death, together with his wife and children. This was 
a challenge to the Romans, who had established 
Mithridates in his kingdom ; but the Roman officer, 
Ummidius Ouadratus, president of Syria, whose 
business it was to take up the challenge, neglected 
to do so, and another official, Julius Pelignus, pro- 
curator of Cappadocia, even went further, and 
authorised Rhadamistus to assume the title and 
insignia of king. A large party in Armenia was, 
however, adverse to the new rule, distrusted Rhada- 
mistus, and condemned the course which he had 
pursued. The country was accordingly thrown into 
a ferment ; and Vologases, having recently ascended 
the Parthian throne, and needing a principality for 
his brother Tiridates, thought he saw in the situation 
of Armenia an excellent opportunity of at once 
gratifying his brother and advancing his own repu- 
tation. To detach Armenia once more from the 
dominion of Rome and re-attach it to Parthia would 
be a happy inauguration of his reign, and one that 
would draw down upon him the open applause and 
secret envy of his neighbours. 

Accordingly, Vologases, in A.D. 51, the year of his 
accession, having collected a large force, led an 
expedition into Armenia. At first it seemed as if 
he would effect an easy conquest. The Iberian 
garrison, on whose support Rhadamistus principally 
relied, quitted the field without risking a battle ; his' 
Armenian troops made but a poor resistance ; 



VOLOGASES I. INVADES ARMENIA. 273 

Artaxata and Tigrano-certa, his two principal cities, 
opened their gates to the foe ; Vologases took 
possession of Armenia, and established Tiridates at 
Artaxata, the capital. But this fair beginning was soon 
clouded over. A severe winter, and some defect in the 
commissariat arrangements, caused the outburst of a 
pestilence, which so thinned the Parthian garrisons 
that Vologases was compelled to withdraw them. 
Rhadamistus returned, and, though ill-received by 
his subjects, and occasionally in danger of losing his 
life, on the whole contrived to maintain himself 
during the three years extending from A.D. 51 to 54, 
and was still in possession when Vologases, in the 
last-named year, having brought some other wars to 
an end, found himself in a position to resume his 
designs upon Armenia. 

The delay in grappling with the Armenian difficulty 
had had a double origin. In A.D. 52 a dispute had 
arisen between Vologases and one of his principal 
feudatories, Izates, vitaxa of Adiabene, whose preten- 
sions to exclusive privileges appeared to his feudal 
lord excessive and even dangerous. After fruitless 
negotiations, Izates appealed to arms, and took up a 
position on the Lower Zab, which was the southern 
limit of his territory. Vologases had advanced to the 
opposite bank of the river, and was on the point of 
crossing, and attacking his adversary when tidings 
reached him of the invasion of his own dominions 
by a foreign enemy. The Dahae, and the Scythians 
in their neighbourhood, had passed into Parthia 
Proper from the Caspian region, and were threatening 
to carry fire and sword through the entire province. 



274 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

Domestic revolt could be chastised at any time, but 
a foreign foe must be met as soon as he showed 
himself. Vologases, accordingly, marched away from 
Adiabene to the Parthian and Hyrcanian frontier, 
east of the Caspian sea, where he met and repulsed 
the band of marauders, who had probably only ven- 
tured to invade his territory because they knew him 
to be engaged in a serious quarrel at a considerable 
distance, and imagined that they would therefore be 
unresisted. Successful in this quarter, he was about 
to resume his operations in Adiabene, when infor- 
mation reached him of the death of Izates, which 
brought his domestic difficulties to an end. The 
pretensions of the deceased monarch had been 
personal, being grounded upon special privileges 
granted him by Artabanus III., which would not 
pass to a successor, and Vologases had consequently 
no quarrel with Monobazus, Izates' brother, who had 
inherited his throne. He thus found himself, at the 
close of A.D. 53, wholly his own master, and free to 
engage in whatever enterprise might seem to him 
most promising. 

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that, in A.D. 54, he turned his attention once more 
to Armenian affairs, and resumed his project of 
establishing his brother, Tiridates, upon the throne 
of that ancient, and still semi-independent, kingdom. 
Rhadamistus, though he continued in possession of 
the nominal sovereignty, had failed to establish his 
power, or to obtain any firm hold on the affections of 
his subjects, and might be attacked with a good 
prospect of success, unless he received external 



TIRIDATES ESTABLISHED IN ARMENIA. 275 

assistance. The real question was, would Rome 
interfere ? Would she come to the aid of a monarch, 
who had not received his throne from herself, but had 
obtained it by supplanting, and finally murdering, her 
protege} Vologases was probably aware that a new 
sovereign had recently ascended the Imperial throne, 
a youth not yet eighteen years of age, one wholly 
destitute of military tastes or training, devoted to 
music and the arts, who could not be credited with 
very keen patriotic feelings, or with a very full 
comprehension of the niceties of the political situa- 
tion. Would this raw youth grasp the meaning of 
a diminution of Roman influence in the far East, 
or rush to arms because a border kingdom — not 
a Roman province — wavered in its allegiance ? 
Vologases, it would seem, answered three questions 
in the negative : or perhaps, while recognising the 
risk, he may have thought the immediate advantage 
so great as to make it worth his while to encounter 
the hazard. At any rate, early in A.D. 54, he made 
his invasion, drove Rhadamistus out of Armenia, 
reduced the whole country to subjection, and 
established his brother, Tiridates, as king in the 
capital city of Artaxata. 

The boldness of this stroke took the Romans by 
surprise, and produced something like a panic in the 
Imperial city. But the traditions of Imperial policy 
were too firmly fixed in the minds of the official 
class for any doubt to be entertained as to the 
necessity of meeting and resisting the aggression. 
Orders went forth at once for recruiting the Oriental 
legions up to their full strength, and for moving them 



276 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

nearer to the Armenian frontier ; preparations were 
made for bridging the Euphrates ; Agrippa II., 
King of Chalcis, and Antiochus, King of Commagene, 
were ordered to raise troops and make ready for an 
invasion of Parthia ; new governors were appointed 
over Sophene and the Lesser Armenia ; above and 
beyond all, the brave and experienced Corbulo, 
universally allowed to be the best general of the 
time, was summoned from his command in Germany, 
and given the general superintendence of the war in 
Armenia, with Cappadocia and Galatia as his pro- 
vinces. Ummidius Quadratus was maintained in 
the proconsulship of Syria, but required to co-operate 
with Corbulo, and made practically his second in 
command. Four legions, together with numerous 
auxiliaries were concentrated on the Armenian 
frontier ; and it seemed as if the next year would 
see the contest between Rome and Parthia renewed 
on a scale which would recall the times of Antony 
and Phraates IV. 

But to ardent spirits the new year brought nothing 
but disappointment. Instead of rushing to arms, 
and pouring their combined legions into Armenia or 
Parthia, the two Roman commanders suddenly 
showed a disposition for peace. Emissaries from 
both sought the Court of Vologases with offers of 
peace — offers which implied an acceptance of the 
status quo, provided that the Parthian monarch would 
take no further steps in opposition to Rome, and 
would place some Parthians of importance in the 
hands of the Romans as hostages. This he was 
quite willing to do, as he knew many of the nobles 



REVOLT OF VARDANES. 277 

to be disaffected, and their absence from his Court 
would relieve him of the necessity of watching them. 
Internal troubles, probably fomented by Rome 
had commenced by the open revolt of his son, 
Vardanes, whose defection from his father Tacitus 
places in A.D. 54,^ and whose coins show that he had 
assumed the royal title, and set himself up as a rival 
to Vologases, certainly before the end of the next 
year. A truce with Rome was, consequently, what 
the Parthian monarch must earnestly have desired ; 
and we can only feel surprised that the Roman 




COIN OF VARDANES II. 

commanders should have consented to play into his 
hands, and have left him wholly unmolested in the 
time of his greatest difficulties. Probably they were 
already jealous of each other, and disinclined to press 
forward a war in which each felt that mere accident 
might give the chief laurels to the other. 

Vologases was thus able to give his whole attention, 
during the three years from A.D. 55 to A.D. 58, to the 
contest with his son. Its details have not come down 
to us ; but it appears to be certain that by the spring 
of A.D. 58 he had succeeded in crushing the revolt, 

' Tacit., "Ann.," xiii. 7, ad Jin. 



278 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

and re-establishing his authority over the whole 
kingdom. As Vardanes is no more heard of, we may- 
presume that he either perished in battle, or was 
executed. His coins, which are numerous, belong to 
the years A.D. 55-58, and show a strong, masculine, 
type of face, with an expression that is fierce and 
determined. 

The Great King> being now at liberty to resume 
the projects and plans, which his son's rebellion 
had compelled him to drop, took up once more the 
Armenian question, which was still unsettled between 
his own Court and that of Rome, and by his envoys 
pressed for a final arrangement. He claimed that of 
right, and by ancient possession, Armenia was a 
Parthian province, or at least a Parthian dependency, 
and required that not only should Tiridates be left in 
undisturbed possession of it, but that there should be 
a distinct understanding that he held it, not as a 
Roman, but as a Parthian, feudatory. To this the 
Romans, and especially Corbulo, demurred. Armenia, 
they said, had been added to the Roman Empire by 
Lucullus, or at any rate by Pompey, and it was not 
consistent with the greatness of Rome to surrender 
territory which she had once acquired. Let Tiridates 
remain quiet, and the matter be settled by negotia- 
tion ; otherwise Rome would be compelled to use 
force. Corbulo had utilised the three years of waiting 
by recruiting his legions from Cappadocia and Galatia, 
by tightening their discipline, and by accustoming 
them to the hardships of winter marches and move- 
ments ; he had also obtained an additional legion 
from Germany ; and he now felt read}^ for a campaign. 



^ VOLOGASES I, AND CORBULO. 279 

Tiridates soon gave him the opportunity which he 
seems to have desired. Having received a contingent 
of troops from Vologases, he commenced proceedings 
against the Roman partisans in Armenia, harrying 
them with fire and sword ; whereupon Corbulo crossed 
the frontier to their rehef A number of partial engage- 
ments were fought in which Rome had the advantage, 
and at last, after three years' fighting, Tiridates, 
having lost his capital city, Artaxata, in A.D. 58, 
and Tigrano-certa, the second city of his kingdom, 
in A.D. 60, withdrew from the contest, and yielded the 
entire possession of Armenia to the Romans. By the 
favour of Nero, Tigranes, grandson of Archelaus, a 
former monarch of Cappadocia, was made king ; but, 
as his ability to administer so large a territory 
was doubted, portions of it were detached from his 
rule, and made over to the neighbouring princes. 
Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristo- 
bulus of the Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of 
Commagene, profited by the new arrangement, 
which could not, however, but be distasteful to the 
Armenians, who saw the country of which they were 
so proud, not merely conquered, but broken into 
fragments. 

Corbulo's success must be attributed in a great 
measure to the absence of Vologases from the scene 
of contest. The Armenian monarch had been called 
away in A.D. 58 to his north-eastern frontier by a 
revolt, perhaps fomented by Rome,i of the distant 
province of Hyrcania, and had found full occupation 
there for his utmost energies, so that he was wholly 

' So Dean Merivale, "Roman Empire," vol. vii. p. 23. 



28o PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

unable to lend effectual aid to his brother. But 
about the year A.D. 62, the Hyrcanian troubles came 
to an end, and, the hands of Vologases being once 
more free, he had to consider and determine whether 
he should accept the state of things established in 
Armenia by Corbulo, or interfere by force of arms to 
modify it. To what conclusion he would have come, 
had his own dominions been left unmolested, it is im- 
possible to say : as it was, the intolerable aggressions 
of Tigranes upon his rich province of Adiabene, and 
the bitter complaints of his subjects, who threatened 
to transfer their allegiance to Rome, left him no choice. 
His own interests and the honour of his country 
alike required him to assert his cause in arms ; and 
Vologases, having made up his mind to declare war, 
announced his intention to a council of his nobles in 
a speech which is reported as follows : " Parthians, 
when I obtained the sovereignty of Parthia by the 
cession of my brothers' claims, my intention was to 
substitute for the old system of fraternal hatred and 
strife, a new one of domestic affection and agreement ; 
my brother Pacorus, accordingly, received Media 
from my hands at once ; and Tiridates, whom you 
see now present before you, I shortly afterwards 
inducted into the royal appanage of Armenia, a 
dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian kingdom. 
Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and 
satisfactory footing. But these arrangements are 
now disturbed by the Romans, who have never 
hitherto gained anything by breaking faith with us, 
and will scarcely do so on the present occasion. I 
shall not deny that up to this time 1 have proposed 



VOLOGASES I. AND CORBULO. 281 

to maintain my right to the dominions left me by my 
ancestors by fair dealing rather than by shedding of 
blood, by negotiation rather than by arms ; if how- 
ever I have erred in this, and have been weak to 
delay so long, I will now amend my fault by showing 
the more vigour. You at any rate have lost nothing 
by my holding back ; your strength is intact, your 
glory undiminished. Nay, you have added to your 
other well-known merits, the credit of moderation — a 
virtue which not even the highest among men can 
afford to despise, and which the gods view with special 
favour ? " His speech ended, Vologases placed a 
diadem on the brow of Tiridates, in token of his 
determination to restore him to the Armenian throne, 
at the same time commanding Moneses, a Parthian 
noble, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian king, to take 
the field and invade Armenia, while he himself 
collected the whole strength of the empire, and 
marched to attack the Roman legions on the 
Euphrates. 

The campaign which followed was of less impor- 
tance than might have been anticipated from these 
preparations for it. Vologases, instead of invading 
Syria, marched no further than Nisibis, which was 
well within the limits of his own dominions. Moneses 
and Monobazus, on the other hand, carried out the 
concerted programme, and having invaded Armenia, 
and advanced to Tigrano-certa, which had now become 
the capital of the kingdom, besieged Tigranes in that 
city (a.D. 62). But the Parthian attack on walled 
places was always ineffective, and Tigrano-certa hap- 
pened to be exceptionally strong. The walls are said 



282 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

to have been seventy-five feet in height, the river 
Nicephorius, a broad stream, washed a portion of 
them ; a huge moat protected the remainder ; the 
town was strongly garrisoned ; and the besieging 
force, though not wanting in gallantry, proved unable 
to make any serious impression upon the place. 
Vologases, as time went on, began to despair of 
effecting very much under existing circumstances by 
force of arms, and leant towards negotiation, which 
Corbulo invited. His army, which consisted almost 
entirely of cavalry, was reduced to inaction by want 
of forage, Mesopotamia having recently suffered from 
a plague of locusts. Hence he consented to con- 
clude a truce with his antagonist, and to send a fresh 
embassy to Rome for the purpose of making a satis- 
factory arrangement. The truce was to last until the 
ambassadors returned ; and, meanwhile, Armenia was 
to be evacuated by both parties, and care was to be 
taken that no collision should occur between the 
soldiers of the two nations. 

But this well-meant effort at pacification was 
entirely without result. Nero gave the envoys no 
answer ; and, indeed, he had made arrangements be- 
fore their arrival, from which he anticipated a trium- 
phant issue to the contest instead of a mere patched-up 
and unstable convention. At the request of Corbulo, 
who was anxious not to arouse his jealousy, he had 
sent out a second commander to the East, a special 
favourite of his own, and from the conduct of the war 
by this new leader he looked for immediate results of 
the most important character. L. Csesennius Paetus 
was a man of energy and boldness, confident in him- 



CAMPAIGN OF C^SENNIUS PMTUS. 283 

self, and contemptuous of the prudence and caution 
of his colleague. He held a separate command, with 
forces equal to those led by Corbulo, and soon let it 
be known that he was about to carry on the war in a 
new fashion. " Corbulo," he said, " had shown no 
dash or vigour ; he had neither plundered nor massa- 
cred ; if he had besieged cities, it had been in name 
rather than in reality. His own method would be 
different. Instead of setting up shadowy kings he 
would bring Armenia under Roman law, and reduce 
it to the condition of a province." These brave words 
were followed up by a show of brave deeds. Cross- 
ing the Euphrates, Paetus invaded Armenia with two 
legions, and spreading his troops over a wide extent 
of country, burnt the strongholds, ravaged the terri- 
tory, and carried off a considerable booty. But he 
neither fought a single battle, nor ventured to besiege 
a single town. As winter approached, he withdrew 
his troops into Cappadocia, but, intent on pleasing his 
Imperial master, he gave in his despatches an exag- 
gerated account of what he had achieved in his short 
campaign, and spoke as if the war was well-nigh over. 
Corbulo, on his part, maintained the prudent atti- 
tude habitual to him. He bridged the Euphrates in 
the face of a large opposing force by anchoring vessels 
laden with military engines in mid-stream. He then 
passed his troops across, and occupied a strong posi- 
tion in the hills at a little distance from the river, 
where he caused his legions to construct an entrenched 
camp, and remained on the defensive. He greatly 
distrusted Paetus, and would not allow himself to be 
so entangled in military operations as not to be able 



284 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

at any moment to march to his colleague's assistance 
if he should hear that he was in any danger. 

The prudence of this course soon became evident. 
Paetus, regarding the season for war as over, sent one 
of his legions to winter in Pontus, while he himself 
with the other two took up his quarters in the country 
between the Taurus and the Euphrates, and allowed 
free furloughs to all the soldiers who applied for them. 
While his legions were in this way much weakened, 
he suddenly heard that Vologases, braving the in- 
clemency of the season, was advancing against him 
at the head of a strong force. The crisis revealed his 
incapacity. He was uncertain whether to await the 
enemy in quarters or to take the field against him, 
whether to concentrate his troops or to disperse 
them. Now he adopted one course, now another. 
The only consistency that he showed was in imploring 
aid from Corbulo, to whom he sent messenger after 
messenger. That general, however, was in no hurry 
to render help, since he did not wish to appear upon 
the scene as deliverer until it was clear that the danger 
threatening Partus was imminent. Vologases, mean- 
while, steadily pursued his way. Without attempting 
any rapid movements, he closed in upon Paetus, his 
adversary, swept away the small force that Paetus had 
detached to guard the passes of Taurus, and blocked up 
the remainder of his army in a position from which 
extrication, unless his colleague came to his aid, was 
almost impossible. Corbulo was now on his march, and 
pressing forward with all speed, but a panic had seized 
on Paetus and his soldiers. Though he had abundant 
provisions, and might have prolonged the defence 



CORBULO ONCE MORE IN COMMAND. 285 

for weeks, or even for months, yet in his cowardly 
alarm he preferred to precipitate matters, and having 
entered into negotiations with Vologases, he practically 
capitulated to him. The terms granted were, that the 
blockaded army should be allowed to quit its entrench- 
ments, and be free to march away, but that it must 
at once quit Armenia ; its stores and its fortified posts 
must be surrendered ; no further hostilities must be 
engaged in ; and Paetus should obtain from Nero the 
exact conditions on which he would now be willing to 
make peace. These terms were carried out, not how- 
ever without the addition of some further insults and 
indignities. The Parthians entered the Roman en- 
trenchments before the legionaries had quitted them, 
claiming and seizing whatever they professed to 
recognise as Armenian spoil ; they even took posses- 
sion of the soldiers' arms and clothes, which were 
tamely relinquished to them with the object of avoid- 
ing a conflict. Armenia was then quitted hastily, and 
not without disorder, Paetus setting the example of 
unseemly hurry. Corbulo was reached after a three 
days' march, and received the fugitives without re- 
proaches, and with every demonstration of sympathy. 
Vologases followed up his success against Paetus by 
at once re-establishing his brother, Tiridates, in the 
Armenian kingdom. At the same time he devised a 
plan whereby, he thought, the interminable quarrel 
between the two empires of Rome and Parthia might 
be made up, and a modus vivendi arrived at. Rome, 
under Nero at any rate, was not really bent upon fur- 
ther conquests. It was rather her honour for which she 
was jealous than her power which she desired to see 



286 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OE NERO. 

augmented. Vologases therefore sent an embassy to 
the Court of Nero, and explained that, so long as his 
brother was accepted and acknowledged by Rome as 
Armenian king, he would offer no objection to his 
going in person to Rome and receiving investiture 
from the Imperial hands. Nero and his counsellors 
in reality approved this compromise, but they felt that 
it would be too palpable a surrender of former claims, 
and too manifestly a concession extorted by recent dis- 
aster, if they closed with the suggestion of the Parthian 
monarch at once. No ; Rome must not make an open 
confession of defeat ; her recession from a claim must 
be glossed over, cloaked. Dust must be thrown in 
the eyes of the nations, and they must be induced to 
think that, whatever change Rome made in her politi- 
cal arrangements was made of her own free will, and 
because she regarded it as for her advantage. Accord- 
ingly, the envoys of Vologases were dismissed with 
an ambiguous answer. Paetus was recalled from the 
East, and Corbulo reinstated in sole command, and 
invested with a new and almost unlimited authority. 
The number of his troops was augmented, and their 
quality improved by draughts from Egypt and Illyri- 
cum. He was bidden once more to take the offensive, 
and, in the spring of A.D. 6^, he crossed the frontier, 
and penetrated to the heart of Armenia by the road 
formerly opened by Lucullus. Tiridates met him, not 
however in arms, but for negotiation. On the site of 
the camp of Partus, an interview was held between the 
Roman general and the Armenian monarch, where 
the terms suggested by the envoys of Vologases at 
Rome were accepted. It was agreed that Rome 



COMPROMISE SUGGESTED BY VOLOGASES. 287 

should withdraw her support from Tigranes, and ac- 
knowledge Tiridates as rightful monarch, while Tiri- 
dates should perform an act of homage to Rome for 
his kingdom, and be nominally Rome's feudatory. 
To indicate his acceptance of these terms, Tiridates, 
in the presence of Corbulo and his suite, divested him- 
self of the regal ensigns, and placed them at the foot 
of the statue of Nero, undertaking not to resume 
them except at Nero's hands. For actual investiture 
he undertook to journey to Rome as soon as circum- 
stances permitted, and meanwhile he placed in the 
hands of Corbulo one of his daughters as a hostage. 
Corbulo, on his part, undertook that Tiridates should 
be treated with the utmost honour and respect, both 
during his stay at Rome and on his journey to and 
from Italy, should be entitled to wear his sword, and 
have free access to all the provincial authorities upon 
the route. Peace was made upon these terms to the 
satisfaction of both parties, and it only remained that 
the terms should be faithfully executed. 

The execution was delayed for the space of above 
two years ; but in the spring of A.D. 66, Tiridates, 
having set the affairs of Armenia in order, started 
upon his promised journey, accompanied by his wife, 
by a number of the Parthian princes and nobles, 
including sons of Vologases, Pacorus, and Mono- 
bazus, and by an escort of three thousand Parthian 
cavalry in all the glittering array of their gold 
ornaments and bright-gleaming panoplies. The long 
cavalcade passed, like a magnificent triumphal pro- 
cession, through two-thirds of the Roman Empire, 
and was everywhere received with warmth, and 



288 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

entertained with profuse hospitality. The provincial 
cities which lay upon the line of route selected were 
gaily decorated to receive their unwonted visitors, 
and the loud acclamations of the assembled multi- 
tudes showed that they fully appreciated the novel 
spectacle. The whole journey, except the passage of the 
Hellespont, was made by land, the cavalcade proceed- 
ing through Thrace and Illyricum to the head of the 
Adriatic Gulf, and then descending the peninsula. 
The Roman Treasury defrayed the entire expenses of 
the travellers, which are said to have amounted to 
an average daily cost of 800,000 sesterces, or about 
£62^0 of English money. As this outlay was 
continued for nine months, the entire sum expended 
by the Treasury must have exceeded a million and 
a half pounds sterling. Audience was given to the 
Parthian prince at Naples, where Nero happened to 
be residing, and passed off without serious difficulty. 
At first, indeed, an obstacle presented itself ; it was 
the etiquette of the Roman Court that those intro- 
duced to the Ernperor were to be unarmed, and 
consequently the usher, when Tiridates approached 
the Hall of Audience, requested him to lay aside his 
sword. This he refused to do, since he was entitled 
to wear it by the terms of his agreement with 
Corbulo. The affair might have ended in a dead- 
lock, had not it been ingeniously suggested, that the 
Emperor's safety might be assured and the Parthian 
prince's honour saved, by the simple expedient of 
fastening the obnoxious weapon to its scabbard with 
half a dozen nails. This done, Tiridates was intro- 
duced into the Imperial presence, where he made 



NERO's INVESTITURE OF TIRI DATES. 289 

obeisance, bending one knee to the ground, interlacing 
his hands, and at the same time saluting the Emperor 
as his " lord." 

The investiture was reserved for a subsequent 
occasion, and was made a spectacle to the Roman 
populace. On the night preceding, all the streets of 
the city were illuminated and decorated with garlands ; 
as morning approached, " the Tribes," clothed in long 
white robes and bearing branches of laurels in their 
hands, entered the Forum and filled all the middle 
space, arranged as was customary ; next came the 
Praetorians, in their splendid arms and with their 
glittering standards, stationing themselves in two 
lines which reached from the further extremity of 
the Forum to the Rostra, to maintain the avenue of 
approach clear ; all the roofs of the houses which 
gave upon the Forum were hidden beneath the masses 
of spectators ; at break of day Nero himself entered, 
accompanied by the Senate and by his own body- 
guard, wearing the garb appropriated to Triumphs, 
and, passing down between the two lines of Prae- 
torians, ascended a raised platform near the Rostra, 
and took his seat in an archaic curule chair. Tiridates 
was then introduced ; silence was proclaimed ; and 
in a short speech of a sufficiently abject character, 
the Parthian prince placed himself at the Roman 
Emperor's disposal. Nero responded haughtily, but 
executed the covenanted investiture. Saluting Tiri- 
dates as king of Armenia, he handed him to a seat 
prepared for the purpose at his own feet, gave him 
the kiss which sovereigns only gave to sovereigns, 
and with his own hand placed upon his brow the 



290 PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO. 

coveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty. 
Magnificent entertainments followed, with shows and 
games of various kinds, in which the emperor himself 
took part ; but this condescension astonished, more 
than it pleased, the Asiatic. However, he doubtless 
appreciated better the closing act of the entire drama, 
which was a parting gift from his nominal suzerain of 
not much less than a million sterling ! 

Tiridates returned to Asia across the Adriatic, and 
by the ordinary route through Greece, no doubt well 
pleased with his visit. At the cost of a formal sub- 
mission, and a certain amount of personal humiliation, 
he had obtained a sum which not even a king could 
despise, and an assured title to the throne of a con- 
siderable kingdom. Vologases, who must be regarded 
as the moving spirit throughout the whole transaction, 
may also well have been satisfied. He had firmly 
established his brother upon the Armenian throne, 
and if he had conceded to Roman vanity the honour 
and glory of the arrangement, yet he had secured for 
himself the substantial advantage. As Dean Merivale 
well observes, " While Tiridates did homage for his 
kingdom to Nero, he was allowed to place himself 
really under the protection of Vologases." ^ 

^ " Roman Empire," vol. vii. p. 26. 



XVII. 

VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN — PACORUS II. AND 
DECEBALUS OF DACIA. 

The establishment of peace between Rome and 
Parthia, while no doubt a fortunate circumstance for 
the subjects of the two empires, is one vexatious to 
the modern historian of the Parthians, since it places 
him at a considerable disadvantage. Until the con- 
clusion of the peace, he is able to obtain tolerably 
ample materials for his narrative from the Greek and 
Roman writers who describe the condition of affairs 
in the East under the early Roman Emperors, and 
who have to trace the causes and course of the 
hostilities in which the two countries were engaged 
almost continuously. From the date of the paci- 
fication he wholly loses the benefit of this consecutive 
history, and has nothing to rely upon except a few 
scattered and isolated notices, not always very in- 
telligible, occurring here and there in the pages of the 
classical authors, together with the series, which now 
becomes very confused and confusing, of the Parthian 
coins. The view obtainable of Parthian history is 
thus, for the space of above half a century, most im- 
perfect and disjointed. Even the succession of the 



292 VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 

kings is uncertain ; and the attribution of the coins to 
this or that monarcli, rests frequently on conjecture. 

The latest authorities seem to be of opinion that 
Vologases I. — the monarch who ascended the Parthian 
throne in A.D. 50 or 51 — continued to reign until 
about A.D. '/"/. If so, he must have been contemporary 
with six Roman Emperors — Claudius, Nero, Galba, 
Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian — reigning contempo- 
raneously with the last named of these for about 
eight years. The relations between the two rulers 
were, for the most part, friendly. When Vespasian first 
came forward as a candidate for empire (A.D. 70), Volo- 
gases went so far as to offer him the services of forty 
thousand horse-archers to assist in his establishment 
upon the throne ; but the successes of his generals in 
Italy enabled the Emperor to decline this magnificent 
proposal, and so to escape the odium of employing 
foreign troops — "barbarians," the Romans would have 
said — against his own countrymen. In the same spirit, 
when, a year later, Titus paid a visit to the Roman 
station of Zeugma on the Euphrates, the Parthian 
monarch sent to congratulate him on his successful 
conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged him to 
accept at his hands a crown of gold. Titus, with his 
usual amiability, consented ; and, to show his appre- 
ciation of the compliment paid him, invited the envoys 
of Vologases to a banquet and sumptuously enter- 
tained them. 

Shortly after this, however, by the machinations of 
Caesennius Paetus, the unsuccessful general in the last 
Armenian campaign, who had been recently pro- 
moted to the office of Syrian proconsul, these pleasing 



MACHINATIONS OF CZESENNIUS PMTUS. 293 

prospects were overclouded, and a rupture in the 
amicable relations that had hitherto subsisted be- 
tween the two monarchs, appeared to be imminent. 
Csesennius Paetus — on what grounds it is impossible to 
say, perhaps on no reasonable grounds at all — sent 
a report to Vespasian, in A.D. 72, of a most important 
and alarming character. He had discovered a plot, he 
said, for the transfer of the Roman dependency of 
Commagene, a portion of Upper Syria, from the 
Roman to the Parthian allegiance — a plot concerted, 
he declared, between Vologases and the Commagenian 
king, Antiochus, and about to be almost immediately 
put into execution. Samosata, the capital of Comma- 
gene, which commanded the passage of the Euphrates, 
was to be put into the hands of the Parthian monarch 
by the Commagenians, and a ready access thereby 
given him to the Roman provinces of Cappadocia, 
Cilicia, and Syria itself, which could all be easily 
invaded from the important site. Unless he were 
authorised at once to take steps to prevent the 
transfer, it would within a very short space be ac- 
complished, and the East once more thrown into 
confusion. Vespasian, who had no reason to doubt 
the correctness of the proconsul's information, replied 
to him without delay, and gave him full liberty of 
acting as he thought best. Hereupon, Paetus, who 
had made every preparation in anticipation of such 
a response, immediately marched a strong force into 
Commagene, and meeting with no resistance, pro- 
ceeded against Samosata, which he carried by a 
couJ> de main. It cannot but be suspected that the 
whole story told to Vespasian was the invention of 



294 VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 

Psetus, who desired war as a field for his energies. 
His sudden invasion only failed to produce the crisis 
that he sought to bring about, owing to the moderation 
and prudence of the two sovereigns against whom his 
charges had been made. Antiochus, the Comma- 
genian monarch, refused altogether to assume the 
part of rebel which had been assigned him, and, 
though his sons took arms against Psetus, himself 
withdrew from the country, and passing into the 
Roman province of Cilicia, took up his abode at 
Tarsus. Vologases declined to give the action taken 
by the sons of Antiochus any support. He folded 
his arms, and simply looked on while they contended 
with Paetus ; when, on their father's withdrawal into 
Cilicia, their troops abandoned them, and they were 
forced to take to flight, he contented himself with 
allowing them a temporary refuge in Parthia, and 
writing a letter to Vespasian on their behalf It was 
probably this letter which induced Vespasian so far 
to pardon the young princes as to allow them to 
reside in Rome with their father, while at the same 
time he made the family an ample allowance from his 
privy purse. 

It was not long after he had escaped the danger 
of a Roman war that Vologases was attacked by a 
savage enemy from another quarter. The Alani, a 
Scythic, or more probably a Finnish tribe from the 
regions east of the Caspian, having made alliance 
with the important nation of the Hyrcanians, which 
in later Parthian history gave many signs of being 
disaffected, burst through the Caspian Gates suddenly 
in the year A.D. 75, and, pouring into Media, drove 



PARTHIA IMPLORES ROMAN AID. 295 

King Pacorus, the brother of Vologases, to take refuge 
in the fastnesses of the mountains, while they carried 
fire and sword over the open country. From Media 
tliey passed on into Armenia, which was still held by 
Tiridates, defeated him in a pitched battle, and very 
nearly succeeded in making him prisoner by means 
of a lasso. Vologases, in great alarm, sent an embassy 
to Vespasian, and relying on his own offer, a few years 
previously, to lend the Roman Emperor, if he required 
it, a body of forty thousand horse archers, asked 
that an efficient contingent of Roman troops might 
now be placed at his disposal. He further requested 
that their commander might be either Titus or Do- 
mitian. The latter prince, jealous of his brother's 
military fame, was most anxious to be selected, and 
to be placed at the head of a powerful army, so that 
he might have an opportunity of rivalling the great 
achievements of Titus. But Vespasian, with the 
caution of old age, felt averse from embarking the 
State in fresh adventures, and bluntly declared that 
he saw no reason for making himself a busybody in 
affairs that no way concerned him. Had he accepted 
the proffered support of Vologases in years previously, 
the case would have been different, but, as he had 
declined it, his hands were unshackled, and he was 
free either to consent or to refuse as he chose. The 
best interests of the State seemed to him to require 
abstention, and he therefore sent a negative reply to 
Vologases. The Parthian prince was not only dis- 
appointed, but angered, and vented his spleen by 
withholding from the Emperor, in subsequent diplo- 
matic correspondence, his rightful titles, Vespasian, 



296 VOLOGASES I. AND VESPASIAN. 

with a sense of humour rare in persons so highly 
placed, made no remonstrance beyond the ironic one 
of adopting in his reply the humble style assigned 
him by his correspondent. To the salutation— 
" Arsaces, King of Kings, to Flavius Vespasianus 
sends greeting," he answered, " Flavius Vespasianus, 
to Arsaces, King of Kings, sends greeting." 

A coolness in the relations between the two powers 
now set in. Parthia, thrown on her own resources, 
was forced to submit to considerable loss in the way 
of booty at the hands of the Alani and their allies, 
and was unable to take any revenge upon them for 
their unprovoked attack ; but she succeeded in main- 
taining her western territories intact, and in recover- 
ing both Media and Armenia. Hyrcania, it may be 
suspected, was from this time detached from her rule, 
and the cause of continual trouble and disturbance, 
falling under the dominion of pretenders who claimed 
Arsacid descent, and even took the full titles of Par- 
thian sovereignty. 

Vologases died about A.D. 78, and was succeeded 
by a certain Pacorus, not his brother, but probably 
his son, who appears by his coins to have been, at 
his accession, a very young man, and seems to have 
reigned for thirty years, from A.D. 78 to A.D. 108. 
This prince was thus contemporary with iive Roman 
Emperors — Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Nerva, and 
Trajan — but with none of these does he seem to have 
held any communications. The " coolness " which 
had set in under his father gradually deepened into 
hostility ; and, when the warlike Trajan came to the 
throne, it was soon apparent that an open quarrel 



ACCESSION OF PACORUS II. 297 

could not be long avoided. Rome's pretensions to a 
predominating influence in Armenia were revived, and 
Parthia, not knowing how soon she might be attacked, 
began to look out for allies among the avowed 
enemies of the Roman Empire. Relations were 
established between Pacorus and Decebalus,i the 
Dacian monarch, who had been at war with Rome in 
the reign of Domitian (A.D. 8i-go), and was now (a.d. 
loi) again threatened by Trajan. Pacorus, however, 
had not the courage to lend his ally any active 
assistance, either by sending troops to his aid in the 




COIN OF PACORUS II. 



struggle that went on upon the Danube, or by effect- 
ing a diversion in his favour upon the Euphrates. 
When Decebalus fell, in A.D. 104, and Dacia became 
a Roman province, Pacorus must have felt that he 
stood alone, and that, having provoked the hostility 
of Rome by his relations with her enemy, he -might 
expect at any moment an attack. Trajan, however, 
was too wise and too cautious to precipitate matters ; 
an invasion of the East needed careful preparation ; 
and the invasion which he contemplated was one of 

' Plin., "Epist.," X. 16; Merivale, " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 
154- 



298 PACORUS AND ARTABANUS IV. 

unusual importance and magnitude : he therefore 
abstained for the present from all offensive measures, 
and contented himself with paving the way for his 
intended expedition by intrigues in Armenia and 
elsewhere, by accumulating warlike stores, and 
increasing the strictness of military discipline. 
Pacorus was thus left in peace to the termination of 
his long reign (A.D. 108), and the storm which had so 
long threatened did not burst until the time of his 
successor. A pretender, however, Artabanus IV., 
who has left coins, falls into this reign. 




COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. 



XVIII. 

CHOSROES AND TRAJAN — TRAJAN'S ASIATIC CON- 
QUESTS— RELINQUISHMENT OF THESE CON- 
QUESTS BY HADRIAN. 

Pacorus THE Second was succeeded upon the 
throne by Chosroes, his brother, whom the Parthian 
Megistanes preferred over the heads of Exedares and 
Parthamasiris, Pacorus's two sons, as more fit to rule 
under the difficult circumstances of the period. It 




COIN OF CHOSROES. 

was known, or at any rate suspected, that the warlike 

and experienced Trajan designed an expedition 

against the East, and it therefore seemed necessary 

to entrust the government of the Parthian state to a 

man of mature age and sound judgment. The sons of 

Pacorus were young and rash, certainly incompetent 

to cope with so dangerous an antagonist as Trajan. 

299 



300 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

Chosroes was of ripe age, at any rate, and, though 
untried, was beheved to possess abiHty, a behef which 
after events, on the whole, justified. 

The ostensible cause of quarrel between Rome and 
Parthia was, as so frequently before, Armenia. On 
the death of Tiridates, in or about the year A.D. lOO, 
Pacorus appears, without any consultation with Rome, 
to have placed his own son, Exedares, upon the 
Armenian throne. This was certainly throwing out 
a challenge to Trajan, and was a high-handed pro- 
ceeding, not justified by the previous relations of the 
countries. On the last occasion of the throne being 
vacant, though Parthia had nominated the prince, 
Rome's right to give investiture had been admitted, 
and Tiridates had, in fact, received his diadem from 
the hands of Nero. But Pacorus probably knew that 
Trajan had his hands fully occupied with the Dacian 
troubles, and was therefore not likely to engage in 
another war, while he may perhaps have thought 
that the right of investiture was too shadowy a 
matter for Rome greatly to value it. Events so far 
justified his expectations that Trajan made neither 
remonstrance nor threat at the time, but seemingly 
acquiesced in the new departure. When, however, 
the Dacian War was over, and the country reduced 
into the form of a Roman province (about A.D. 114), 
the Emperor, whose appetite for conquest was 
whetted rather than satisfied by his Danubian suc- 
cesses, considered that the time was come for taking 
the affairs of the East into his serious consideration, 
and for placing them on a footing which should give 
Rome security against the troubles that had now, for 



TRAJAN ON THE EASTERN QUESTION. 30I 

about a century and a half, threatened her from this 
quarter. 

Two views might be taken of the Oriental ques- 
tion. It might be regarded in the light in which the 
greatest of the Roman Emperors — Augustus, Tiberius, 
Vespasian — had hitherto regarded it, as chronic — a 
fatal necessity involving continuous trouble, con- 
tinuous effort, and at the best of times only admitting 
of a sort of patched-up arrangement. Or it might be 
viewed in a more heroic light, as Alexander the 
Great had viewed it in his day, as an evil to be con- 
quered, a difficulty to be overcome, an intolerable 
state of things, which might be brought to an end, 
and ought to be brought to an end as soon as 
possible. Ordinary minds would naturally see it in 
the former light. There had always been an East, 
there would necessarily always be an East, set in 
antagonism to the West, with a perpetual quarrel 
going on between them. The case would then only 
admit of palliatives, partial remedies, modi vivejidi, 
such expedients as a wise diplomacy might suggest, 
and carry out, for avoiding collisions or minimising 
them, and carrying on such intercourse as was neces- 
sary with as little friction as possible. The other 
view opened a wider range both of thought and 
action. Might it be practicable to crush the East, to 
get rid of the constant antagonism ; and if so, by 
what means, and at what cost ? 

That this latter alternative was not an altogether 
hopeless one had been shown by Alexander himself. 
Alexander had conquered the East, and for a cen- 
tury and a half there had been no great barbaric 



302 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

Oriental monarchy standing over against the West, 
thwarting it and threatening it. The ambition of 
Trajan seems to have been fired by the thought of 
what Alexander had achieved, and an idea of rivalry 
seems to have taken possession of him. Without 
divulging his intentions even to his intimates, much 
less, like Crassus,i making an open boast of them, he 
determined on an attempt to bring the Eastern ques- 
tion to an end by the subjugation of Parthia. At 
first, however, he veiled his designs under a cloak of 
pretended moderation. He professed that his sole 
object was the vindication of the Roman honour in 
respect of Armenia. Both Pacorus and Chosroes, he 
said, had insulted Rome by dealing with Armenia as 
if its government were altogether a Parthian, and not 
a Roman, affair. He maintained, on the contrary, 
that the authority of Rome was paramount. It was 
in vain that Chosroes offered to fall back upon the 
modus Vivendi which had been accepted by Nero, and 
to allow Trajan to invest his nephew, Parthamasiris, 
a son of Pacorus, and younger brother of Exedares, 
with the diadem, Trajan replied ambiguously that 
he would see what was fittest to be done when he 
arrived in Syria, and proceeded to hasten his march, 
to augment the number of his troops, and to make 
preparations of an unusual character. The autumn 
of A.D. 1 14 saw him at Antioch, and in the spring of 
the ensuing year, undaunted by the terrible earth- 
quake which had almost destroyed the Syrian capital 
in the winter of A.D. 1 14-5, he set out upon his march 
from Antioch to the Armenian frontier. The satraps 
^ See above, pp. 149, 150. 



SEIZURE OF PARTHAMASIRIS. 303 

and petty princes of the region made submission as 
he advanced, and sought his favour with gifts of 
various kinds, which he was pleased to receive 
graciously, while he made his way from Zeugma, the 
Roman outpost, to the passages of the Euphrates at 
Samosata and Elegia. Here, on the frontier of the 
Greater Armenia, he awaited the arrival of Partha- 
masiris, who, after attempting to negotiate with him 
as an equal, and being treated with disdain, had been 
encouraged to present himself as a suppliant in the 
Roman camp, and to ask his crown of Trajan. There 
can be no doubt that the Armenian prince understood 
that the scene was to be a repetition of that enacted 
at Rome in A.D. 66, when Tiridates received the 
diadem from Nero. But Trajan was otherwise 
minded. When the young prince, having ridden 
into the camp at the head of a small retinue, stript 
the diadem from his own brows and laid it at the feet of 
the Roman Emperor, then stood in dignified silence, 
expecting that his mute submission would be 
graciously accepted, and that the emblem of sove- 
reignty would be returned to him, Trajan made no 
movement. The army, which stood around, pre- 
pared, no doubt, for the occasion, shouted with all 
their might, and, saluting Trajan anew as Imperator, 
congratulated him on his " bloodless victory." Par- 
thamasiris saw that he had fallen into a trap, and 
would fain have fled ; but the troops had closed in 
upon him on all sides, and he found his retreat inter- 
cepted. Hereupon he once more confronted the 
Emperor, and demanded a private audience, which 
was granted him. A short conference was held be- 



304 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

tween the two in the Emperor's tent, but the pro- 
posals of Parthamasiris were rejected. He was given 
to understand that he must submit to the forfeiture 
of his crown, and summoned a second time before the 
Imperial tribunal, to show cause, if he desired to do 
so, against the proposed forfeiture, and to hear the 
Emperor's decision. Parthamasiris, justly indignant, 
spoke at some length, and with much boldness. 
" He had neither been defeated," he said, " nor made 
prisoner by the Romans, but had come of his own 
free will to hold a conference with the chief of the 
Roman State, in full assurance that he would suffer no 
wrong at his hands, but would be invested by him with 
the Armenian sovereignty, just as Tiridates had been 
invested by Nero. He demanded to be set at liberty, 
together with his retinue." Trajan answered curtly 
that he did not intend to give the sovereignty of 
Armenia to any one. The country belonged to Rome, 
and should have a Roman governor. Parthamasiris 
might go where he pleased with his Parthians ; but 
any Armenians that he had brought with him must 
remain — they were Roman subjects. Parthamasiris, 
upon this, rode off; but Trajan had no intention of 
allowing him to escape, and become the leader in an 
Armenian war. He ordered some of his troops to 
follow and arrest him, and, if he resisted, to put him 
to death. These instructions were carried out, and 
Parthamasiris was killed, as a recent historian says, 
" brutally." 

Cruel and brutal acts are frequently successful — at 
any rate, for a time. Trajan's " sharp and sudden 
blow " was effective, and produced the prompt and 



ARMENIA MADE A ROMAN PROVINCE. 305 

complete submission of Armenia. No resistance was 
made. It did not, perhaps, much matter to the bulk 
of the inhabitants whether a Parthian vitaxa or a 
Roman proconsul governed them. Trajan found no 
difficulty in carrying out his intention of absorbing 
Armenia into the empire. The two Armenias — 
the Greater and the Less — were united together, 
placed under a Roman governor, and reduced into 
the form of a province. 

Attention was then turned to the neighbouring 
countries. Friendly relations were established with 
Anchialus, king of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and 
gifts were sent him in return for those which his 
envoys had brought to Trajan. A new king was 
given to the Albanians. Alliances were concluded 
with the Iberi, Sauromatae, Colchi, and even with the 
distant tribes settled on the Cimmerian Bosphorus. 
These names recalled to the Romans the glorious 
times of the great Pompey, and made it evident to 
them that Roman influence was now paramount in 
the entire region between the Caucasus, the Caspian, 
and the Araxes. 

Still, the Emperor viewed what he had achieved 
as a mere prelude to what he was bent on achieving. 
It was Parthia, not Armenia, against which his ex- 
pedition had been really aimed. Accordingly, having 
arranged matters in the north-east, and left garrisons 
in the principal Armenian strongholds, he made a 
counter-movement towards the south-west, on which 
side Parthia seemed to him most assailable. Station- 
ing himself at Edessa, the capital of the province of 
Osrhoene, which was still administered by a Parthian 



306 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

vassal, bearing the usual name of Abgarus, he partly 
terrified, partly coaxed, that shifty prince into sub- 
mission, after which he entered into negotiations with 
Sporaces, phylarch of Anthemusia, Mannus, an 
Arabian chieftain, and Manisares, a Parthian satrap, 
who had a quarrel of his own with Chosroes. Having 
drawn these chiefs to his side, he commenced his 
attack on the great Parthian kingdom by a double 
movement. Part of his troops marched southward, 
by the route which Crassus had followed, and made 
themselves masters of the tract known as Anthemusia, 
or that between the Euphrates and the Khabour ; part 
proceeded eastward against Batnae, Nisibis, and 
Gordyene, or the country of the Kurds. No serious 
resistance was offered to the invaders on either route. 
Chosroes had withdrawn his forces to the further side 
of the Tigris, and left the defence of the provinces to 
his vassals, who were for the most part too weak to 
venture on opposing the march of a well-appointed 
Roman army. By the end of the year the whole tract 
between the Euphrates and the Tigris, as far south as 
the town of Singara and the modern range of Sinjar, 
had been overrun, and occupied ; Upper Mesopotamia, 
in the broadest sense of the term, had become 
Roman ; and the conqueror, pursuing the system 
which he had resolved on adopting from the first, 
absorbed the newly won territory into the empire 
and made Mesopotamia a Roman province. At 
Rome these successes were greeted with enthusiasm : 
medals were struck, on which the subjected countries 
were represented as prostrate under the foot of their 
conqueror, and the Senate conferred on him the titles. 



TRAyAN INVADES PARTHIA. 307 

which now appear upon his coins, of " Armeniacus " 
and " Parthicus." 

As winter approached, the Emperor quitted his 
army, and retired to Edessa or Antioch, leaving his 
generals to maintain possession of the conquered 
regions, and giving them very special instructions 
with respect to the preparations that they were to 
make for the campaign of the ensuing year. As 
Trajan had resolved not to attempt the passage 
through the desert which intervenes between the 
Sinjar range and Babylonia, the crossing of the 
Tigris would be the first important operation to be 
accomplished. But the banks of the Tigris were, as 
Trajan knew, very deficient in wood, or at any rate 
in wood suitable for the construction of such boats 
as were required for the building of a bridge 
across the river. He therefore gave orders that, 
during the winter, a large fleet should be prepared at 
Nisibis, the headquarters of the army, where timber 
was excellent and abundant, so constructed that the 
vessels could be readily taken to pieces and put 
together again. These, when the spring came, were 
conveyed in waggons to the western bank of the 
Tigris, probably at the point where it debouches from 
the mountains upon the low country, a little above 
Jezireh. Trajan and his army accompanied them, 
meeting with no resistance until they reached the 
river and began their preparations for passing it. 
Then, however, the inhabitants of the opposite bank 
— not disciplined soldiers, but brave mountaineers 
— gathered together in force, to dispute the passage. 
It was only by launching a number of his boats at 



308 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

different points, laden with companies of heavy-armed 
and archers, which advanced into mid-stream and 
engaged the enemy, while at the same time they 
threatened to land at many different points, that 
Trajan was able, slowly and with difficulty, to com- 
plete his construction, and finally bridge the river. 
His troops then effected their passage, the enemy 
dispersing ; and the Emperor rapidly overran the 
whole of the rich country of Adiabene, between the 
river and the hills, occupying in succession Nineveh, 
Arbela, and Gaugamela, and nowhere meeting with 
any resistance. Chosroes remained aloof, waiting till 
he had drawn his enemy further away from his base 
of operations, and nursing his own resources. Mebar- 
sapes, the vitaxa or subject-king of Adiabene, who 
had hoped to be able to defend the line of the Tigris, 
finding that forced, appears to have despaired, and 
withdrew from the struggle. One after another the 
forts and strongholds of the district were taken and 
occupied. Adenystrse, a place of great strength, was 
captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners, who, 
when they found their friends near, rose upon the 
garrison, killed the commandant, and opened the 
gates to their countrymen. In a few weeks all 
Adiabene, the heart of the ancient Assyria, was 
conquered ; and a third province was added to the 
empire. 

It might now have been expected that the Roman 
army would advance directly upon Ctesiphon. The 
way was open ; and Trajan might well have antici- 
pated, as Napoleon did in 1812, that the capture of 
the enemy's main capital would conclude the war. 



THE ROMANS OCCUPY CTESIPHON. 3O9 

But for reasons that are not made clear to us, the 
Emperor determined otherwise. Having repassed the 
Tigris into Mesopotamia, he took Hatra, one of the 
most considerable towns of the Middle Mesopotamian 
region, and, crossing to the Euphrates, visited the 
bitumen pits at Hit, so famous in the world's history, 
whence the march was easy to Babylon. As still no 
enemy showed himself, Babylon was approached, in- 
vested, and taken — so far as appears — without a blow 
being struck. Seleucia soon afterwards submitted ; 
and it only remained to attack and reduce the capital 
in order to have complete possession of the entire 
region watered by the two rivers. Here a fleet was 
again needful ; and Trajan, accordingly, transported 
the flotilla, which he had taken care to have in readi- 
ness on the Euphrates, across the narrow tract be- 
tween the streams in N. lat. 33° on rollers, and 
launched it upon the Tigris. He was prepared for a 
vigorous resistance, but once more found himself 
unopposed. Ctesiphon opened its gates to him. 
Chosroes had some time previously evacuated it, with 
his family and his chief treasures, withdrawing further 
into the interior of his vast empire, and seeking to 
weary out his assailant by means of distance, natural 
obstacles, and guerilla warfare. The tactics pursued 
resemble those which have not uncommonly been 
adopted by a comparatively weak enemy when 
attacked by superior force, and remind us of the 
method by which Idanthyrsus successfully defended 
Scythia against Darius Hystaspis in the sixth century 
B.C., and by which the Russian Alexander baffled the 
Great Napoleon in the days of our own fathers or grand- 



310 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

fathers. But Trajan may be excused if he took his 
enemy's retreat for entire withdrawal from the contest, 
and the apathy of the Western provinces for the 
complete submission of the empire. Ctesiphon was 
his ; Babylon was his ; Susa, the old capital of the 
Achaemenidae, was his ; the war might be regarded 
as over ; and so, not troubling himself to pursue his 
flying foe into the remote and barbarous regions of 
the far East, he proceeded to enjoy his triumph, 
embarked on a pleasure voyage down the Tigris, and 
even launched his bark upon the waters of the 
Persian Gulf The career of Alexander the Great 
presented itself vividly to his imagination ; and he 
sighed to think that, at his age, he could not hope 
to reach the limits which had been attained by the 
Macedonian. He instituted inquiries, however, with 
respect to India, and may have contemplated sending 
an expedition there, when he had had time to settle 
and arrange his Parthian conquests, and to place 
Mesopotamian affairs on a satisfactory footing. No 
suspicion seems to have crossed his mind that the 
conquests which he had so rapidly effected were 
insecure — no prevision of coming trouble appears 
to have disturbed his self-complacency. In a fool's 
paradise he dreamed away the closing weeks of the 
summer of A.D. ii6, and was still lazily floating on 
the waters of the Southern Sea, when intelligence of 
a startling character was suddenly brought to him. 

Revolt had broken out in his rear. At Seleucia, at 
Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa, the natives had flown to 
arms, had ejected the Roman garrisons from their cities, 
or in some instances massacred them. His whole line 



REVOLTS IN THE EMPEROR's REAR. 3 II 

of retreat was beset by foes, and he ran a great risk 
of having his return cut off, and of perishing in the 
distant region which he had invaded. The occasion 
called for the most active exertions and for the 
greatest energy ; fortunately for the Romans, Trajan 
was equal to it. Personally, he hastened northwards, 
while he issued peremptory orders to his generals that 
they should everywhere take the most active measures 
against the rebels, and do their utmost to check the 
spread of insurrection. The chastisement of Seleucia 
was intrusted to Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander, 
who stormed the city, and ruthlessly delivered it to 
the flames. Lucius Quietus succeeded in recovering 
Nisibis, and punished its rebellion in the same way. 
He also plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus, 
however, one of Trajan's most trusted officers, on 
coming to an engagement with the enemy, was de- 
feated and slain. A Roman army with its legate was 
cut to pieces. Trajan himself, having returned to 
Ctesiphon, and made himself acquainted with the 
whole condition of affairs, woke up from his dream of 
an easy conquest, and saw that a complete change of 
policy was necessary. Parthia must not be treated 
like Armenia and Mesopotamia — its people must be 
humoured and conciliated. A native king and a 
show of independence must be allowed them. Ac- 
cordingly, he selected a certain Parthamaspates, a 
man of Arsacid descent, who had embraced the 
side of Rome in the recent struggle, and summoning 
the Parthians of the capital and its neighbourhood to 
a great meeting in a plain near Ctesiphon, he pro- 
duced before them the individual whom he favoured, 



312 CHOSROES AND TRAJAN. 

commended him to their loyal affection in a speech of 
considerable length, and, after magnifying somewhat 
injudiciously the splendour of his own achievements, 
placed the diadem with his own hand upon his brow. 
He then commenced his retreat Taking the direct 
line through Mesopotamia, he marched, in the first 
instance, upon Hatra, one of the towns which had re- 
volted from him, and had not yet been reduced. The 
place was small, but strongly fortified. It lay in the 
desert between the Tigris and Euphrates, nearer to 
the former, and was protected, by the scantiness of its 
water, and the unproductiveness of the region around, 
from attack except by a small force. Trajan battered 
down a portion of the wall, and attempted to enter by 
the breach ; but his troops met with a decided repulse, 
and he himself, having rashly approached too near 
the walls, was in the greatest danger of being wounded. 
The horseman nearest to him was actually struck by 
an arrow and slain. After this the siege did not last 
long. As autumn approached the weather broke up, 
and thunderstorms prevailed, with rain and violent 
hail. It was believed that whenever the Romans 
proceeded to the assault, the fury of the elemental 
war increased in severity. Moreover, a plague of 
insects set in. Gnats and flies disputed with the 
soldiers every morsel of their food and every drop of 
their drink. Under these circumstances the Emperor 
felt compelled to relinquish the siege and beat a re- 
treat. He retired through Mesopotamia upon Syria, 
and took up his quarters at Antioch, having suffered, 
it would seem,^ considerable loss upon the way. At 
' So Fronto, " Princip. Hist." p. n^. 



RETREAT AND DEATH OF TRAJAN. 313 

Antioch the effects of his heavy toils and exertions 
began to show themselves. He fell sick, and quitting 
his army, made an attempt to reach Rome, but suc- 
cumbed to his malady before he had proceeded very 
far, and died at Selinus, in Cilicia, August, A.D. 117. 

On the retirement of Trajan, the Parthian monarch, 
quitting Media, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled 
Parthamaspates without difficulty, and re-established 
his own rule over the regions which Trajan had over- 
run, but had not reduced into the form of provinces. 
Armenia, however. Upper Mesopotamia, and Assyria, 
or Adiabene, were still held in force by the Romans, 
and might probably have been maintained against 
any attack that Parthia could have made, had the 
new Emperor, Hadrian, who had succeeded Trajan, 
regarded their retention as desirable. But Hadrian, 
who, as prefect of Syria, had been a near witness of 
Trajan's campaigns, and possessed an intimate ac- 
quaintance with the general condition of the East, 
was deeply convinced that the attempt of Trajan had 
been a mistake, and that the true policy for Rome 
was that laid down in principle by Augustus — that 
the possessions of the empire should not be extended 
beyond their natural and traditional limits. He re- 
solved, therefore, to withdraw the Roman legions once 
more within the Euphrates, and to relinquish the 
newly-conquered provinces, of which so great a boast 
had been made — Armenia, Mesopotamia, Adiabene. 
It is generally allowed by modern historians, that the 
resolution was a wise one. " There was no soil be- 
yond the Euphrates," says Dean Merivale with excel- 
lent judgment, "in which Roman institutions could 



314 TRAJAN'S CONQUESTS RELINQUISHED. 

take root, while the expense of maintaining them 
would have been utterly exhausting." ^ As far as 
the Euphrates Greek colonisation had so leavened 
the original Asiatic mass as to render it semi-Euro- 
pean, and so to prepare it to a large extent for the 
reception of Roman ideas and Roman principles of 
government : beyond, the Greek infusion had been 
too weak to produce much effect — Orientalism pure 
prevailed — and Western institutions, if introduced, 
would have found themselves in an alien soil, where 
they could only have withered and died. Even apart 
from this, the Roman Empire was already so large as 
to be unwieldy, and to endanger its continued cohesion. 
The chiefs of provinces east of the Euphrates would 
have been so far removed from the seat of government 
as to be practically exempt from effectual control and 
supervision. They would have had enormous forces 
in men and money at their command, and have been 
under a perpetual temptation to revolt and endeavour 
to secure for themselves an independent position. The 
garrisoning, moreover, of such extensive countries 
would have been a severe drain upon the military 
resources of the empire, and would have exercised a 
demoralising influence upon the soldiery, such as was 
already felt to some extent with regard to the legions 
quartered in Syria. Altogether, it is clear that the 
course pursued by Hadrian in contracting once more 
the eastern limits of the empire was a prudent one, 
and entitles the prince who adopted it, not only to the 
praise of " moderation," but to that of political insight 
and sagacity. 

^ " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 192. 



CHOSROES AND HADRIAN. 3I5 

The evacuation of the conquered countries brought 
about a return to the condition of things in the East 
which had prevailed ever since the time of Augustus. 
Rome and Parthia resumed their ancient boundaries. 
Armenia reverted to its old condition of a kingdom 
nominally independent, but too weak to stand alone, 
and necessarily leaning on external support, at one 
time practically dependent on Rome, at another on 
Parthia. Its first ruler, after it ceased to be a Roman 
province, was Parthamaspates, to whom Hadrian 
seems to have handed it over, and in whose appoint- 
ment Chosroes must have acquiesced. Chosroes could 
not but be well disposed towards the ruler who, with- 
out being compelled to do so by a defeat, had restored 
to Parthia the two most important and valuable of her 
provinces ; and the consolidation of his power in them 
probably gave him ample occupation, and made him 
satisfied to have a time of repose from external 
troubles. He seems to have continued on friendly 
terms with Hadrian during the remainder of his life. 
Once only, in A.D. 122, was the good understanding 
threatened. The exact causes of complaint have not 
come down to us ; but it appears that in that year 
rumours of an intended Parthian invasion reached the 
Emperor, and induced him to make a journey to the 
far East, in order, by his personal influence and as- 
surances, to avert the danger. An interview was held 
between the two monarchs upon the frontier, and ex- 
planations were given and received, which both parties 
regarded as satisfactory The Parthian prince gave up 
his intention of troubling the peace of Rome, and the 
two empires continued, not only during the rest of the 



3i6 



LATER YEARS OF CHOSROES. 



reign of Chosroes, but till some time after the death 
of Hadrian, on terms of friendship and amity. Hadrian 
went so far as to restore to Chosroes (about A.D. 1 30) a 
daughter who had been taken prisoner at Susa by the 
generals of Trajan fourteen years before, and had re- 
mained at Rome in captivity ; and he is even said to 
have promised the restoration of the golden throne 





COINS OF VOLOGASES II. 





COIN OF MITHRIDATES IV. COIN OF ARTABANUS IV. 



captured at the same time, on which the Parthians set 
a special value. 

Chosroes, during his later years, had to contend 
with a pretender to his throne, who bore the name, so 
common at this time, of Vologases. The Parthian 
empire showed, more and more as time went on, a 
tendency to disintegration ; and there is reason to 
believe that, during the space commonly assigned to 
Chosroes (A.D. 108-130), different monarchs reigned, 



TROUBLES CAUSED BY PRETENDERS. 317 

not infrequently, in different parts of Parthia at the 
same time. The coins of Vologases 11. run parallel 
for many years with those of Chosroes. A coin of a 
Mithridates, and another of an Artabanus, fall into 
the same interval. The classical writers make no 
mention of these rival kings ; and the native remains 
are so scanty that it is impossible to draw any con- 
tinuous narrative from them. We can only say, 
generally, that Parthia has entered the period of her 
decadence, and that, even apart from foreign attack, 
she would, if left to herself, have probably expired 
within little more than a century. 




XIX. 

VOLOGASES 11. AND ANTONINUS PIUS — VOLOGASES 
III. AND VERUS. 

The Vologases who had for so many years dis- 
puted the crown with Chosroes, appears, on the 
decease of the latter, to have been generally ac- 
knowledged as king. He was an aged prince, in- 
disposed to any unnecessary exertion, and quite 
content to continue on the friendly terms with Rome 
which had been established under his predecessor. 
He had not, however, been settled more than three 
years upon the throne, when hostilities came upon 
him from an unexpected quarter. Pharasmanes, who 
enjoyed the sovereignty of Iberia under Roman pro- 
tection, but chafed at his dependent position, and had 
private grounds of quarrel with Hadrian, in the year 
A.D. 133, suddenly threw the whole of the East into 
a blaze. Inviting into Asia a great horde of the 
northern barbarians from the tracts beyond the Cau- 
casus, he induced them to precipitate themselves upon 
Armenia, Cappadocia, and Media Atropatene, which 
was once more a dependency of Parthia, and to carry 
fire and sword into the midst of those fertile regions. 
Vologases at once complained to Rome of the injury 



REIGN OF VOLOGASES II. 319 

done him by her feudatory, and requested assistance ; 
but Hadrian regarded troubles in so distant a region as 
unimportant, and, satisfied that Cappadocia would be 
sufficiently protected by its governor, who was Arrian, 
the historian of Alexander, he left Vologases to 
struggle with his difficulties as he best might. The 
aged monarch, under these circumstances, had recourse 
to an expedient at once impolitic and disgraceful — 
he bribed the horde of Alans, which had invaded his 
province, to quit the country, and turn their arms in 
another direction. Such a policy, though occasionally 
adopted by the Romans themselves, can never be 
other than mistaken and ruinous. Once entered 
upon, it is almost certain to be continued, and to bring 
about at once the exhaustion and the degradation of 
the people that condescends to it. 

It is not perhaps surprising that Hadrian, always 
studious of peace, abstained from taking any active 
part in the Alanic war ; but it certainly seems strange 
that, instead of inflicting any punishment on Pharas- 
manes for his reckless action in introducing the bar- 
barians into Asia, and actually letting them loose 
upon the empire, he should have shortly afterwards 
loaded him with honours and benefits. He summoned 
him indeed to Rome, to answer for his conduct, but, 
having done this, accepted his explanations, condoned 
his crimes, and not only so, but rewarded him by an 
enlargement of his dominion, and by various other 
marks of favour. He permitted him to sacrifice in 
the Capitol, placed his equestrian statue in the temple 
of Bellona, and was present at a sham fight in which 
the Iberian monarch, his son, and his chief nobles 



320 VOLOGASES II. AND ANTONINUS PIUS. 

exhibited their skill and prowess. It is not likely 
that Vologases can have been much pleased at these 
results of his complaints ; but he seems to have sub- 
mitted to them without a murmur ; and, when Hadrian 
died (in A.D. 138), and was succeeded by his adopted 
son, Titus Aurelius, better known as Antoninus Pius, 
he sent to Rome an embassy of congratulation, and 
presented his Roman brother with a crown of gold. 
The medal, which records this event, was struck in 
the first year of Antoninus, and exhibits on the 
reverse a female figure holding a bow and quiver in 
the left hand, and with the right presenting a crown, 
while underneath is the inscription, PARTHIA. 

Having thus, as he thought, secured the good-will 
of the new monarch by a well-timed compliment, 
Vologases ventured on intruding upon him with an 
unpleasant demand. Hadrian, in a moment of weak- 
ness, had promised that the golden throne, captured 
by Trajan in his great expedition, should be given 
back to its proper owners ; but, finding that the act 
would be unpalatable to his subjects, had delayed the 
performance of his promise, and finally died without 
giving effect to it. Vologases hoped that his successor 
might be more accommodating, and instructed his 
envoys to bring the matter before Antoninus, to 
remind him of Hadrian's pledged word, and make a 
formal request for the delivery to them of the much- 
prized relic. But Antonine was as much averse to 
relinquishing the trophy as his predecessor had been, 
and positively refused to grant the request made of 
him. The envoys had to return re infecta, and to 
report to their master that, for the present at any 



ACCESSION OF VOLOGASES III. 321 

rate, all hope must be laid aside of recovering the 
emblem of Arsacid sovereignty. 

The remainder of the reign of Vologases II. was 
tranquil and unmarked by any striking incident. No 
pretensions were put forward by the Parthians with 
respect to Armenia, to which, probably on the death 
Parthamaspates, Rome was suffered, without protest, 
to appoint a new monarch. No further attempt was 
made to obtain the surrender of the " golden throne." 
The coolness between the two states, which had 
followed on Antonine's rejection of the demand pre- 
ferred by Vologases, merely tended to keep the rival 
powers apart, and to prevent occasions of collision, 
while Antonine's truly peaceful policy preserved 
Parthia even from internal disturbance, and allowed 
the successor of Chosroes to enjoy his throne, un- 
threatened by any pretender, for the comparatively 
long term of nineteen years (A.D. 130 to 149). The 
aged monarch left his crown to a successor of the 
same name as himself, who was probably his son, 
though of this there is no direct evidence. 

The third Vologases ascended the Parthian throne 
either in A.D. 148 or 149. He took the same titles as his 
predecessor, but added to them,upon his coins,a Semitic 
legend — either sd'po ''K'j'?'). " Vologases, King," or ''E»'j'?i 
ii:hl2 |'»d'?d iSJ'-ix, " Volagases, Arsaces, King of Kings." 
The dates on his coins extend from A.D. 148-9 to 
A.D. 190- 1, showing that he held the throne for the 
long space of forty-two years. During the earlier 
portion of the time (a.D. 148-161) he was contemporary 
with Antoninus Pius, and, though discontented with 
the exclusion of Parthia from all influence in Armenia, 



322 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 

and meditating a war with Rome on this account, he 
suffered himself to be persuaded, by letters from the 
pacific Emperor, to keep the peace as long as /le 
occupied the Imperial throne, and to defer his con- 
templated outbreak until the reign of his successor. 
On the death of Antoninus, however, he was not 
further to be restrained, but at once took the field, and 
marching an army suddenly into Armenia, carried 
all before him, expelled Soaemus, Rome's vassal and 
creature, from the kingdom, and placed upon the 
throne a protege of his own, a certain Tigranes, a scion 




COIN OF VOLOGASES III. 



of the old royal stock, whose name recalled to the 
Armenians the period of their greatest glory. The 
Roman governors of the adjacent provinces learnt with 
surprise and alarm that Armenia was detached from 
the empire ; and Severianus, prefect of Cappadocia, 
the nearest to the scene of action, and a man of an 
impetuous disposition, being a Gaul by birth, hurried 
to the scene at the head of a single legion, partly 
moved by his own hot temper, partly yielding to the 
persuasions of a pseudo- prophet of those parts named 
Alexander, who promised him a signal victory. But 



ARMENIA SEIZED BY VOLOGASES. 323 

the result signally falsified the prophecy. Scarcely 
had Severianus crossed the Euphrates into Armenia, 
when he found himself in the presence of a superior 
force under the command of a Parthian general called 
Chosroes, and was under the necessity of throwing 
himself into the city of Elegeia, where he was immedi- 
ately besieged and blockaded. Though he offered a 
strenuous resistance, it was unavailing. His troops 
were not of good quality, and, unable to break through 
the cordon which surrounded them, they were in a 
short time shot down by the Parthian archers, and 
perished ahnost to a man. Severianus shared their 
fate ; and the Parthians obtained a success which was 
paralleled with that of Surenas against Crassus, or of 
Arminius against Varus. Their mastery over Armenia 
was confirmed, and the Roman provinces were laid 
wholly open to their attacks. Their squadrons crossed 
the Euphrates, and marched into Syria, where they 
obtained a second success. L. Attidius Cornelianus, 
the proconsul, gathered together the forces of his 
province, and gave battle to the invaders, but was 
repulsed. The situation became nearly such as had 
obtained after the defeat of Crassus, or when Pacorus 
and Labienus, in the year B.C. 40, carried ravage 
and ruin over the region between the Euphrates and 
the Orontes. The Parthians passed from Syria into 
Palestine, and the whole of the Roman East seemed 
to lie open to them. Intelligence of what had 
happened was rapidly carried to Rome, and threw 
the Senate into consternation. Aurelius felt that he 
could not be spared from Italy, but deputed Verus to 
represent him in the East, and bade him hasten to the 



324 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 

scene of action with such forces as could be gathered. 
Verus, however, was a lover of pleasure. First he 
loitered on his way in Apulia, then proceeded at a 
leisurely pace to Syria, finally settled himself in the 
luxurious Antioch, and, giving himself up to its 
pleasures and amusements, handed over the cares of 
war to his lieutenants. Fortunately for Rome, there 
were among these several generals of the antique type, 
as especially Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and 
Martius Verus. Cassius, even before the arrival of 
Verus and his army, had begun an effective resistance. 
He had, by almost incredible efforts, brought the 
Syrian legions into a state of order and discipline, had 
with them checked the advance of Vologases, and had 
finally found himself in a condition to take the 
offensive. In A.D. 163 he fought a great battle with 
the Parthians, defeated them, and drove them across 
the Euphrates. Meanwhile, Statius Priscus and 
Martius Verus had undertaken the recovery of 
Armenia. Statius had advanced without a check 
from the frontier to the capital, Artaxata, had taken 
the city, and burnt it to the ground, after which he 
built a new city, which he strongly garrisoned with 
Roman troops, and sent intelligence to Rome that 
Armenia was now ready to welcome back her expelled 
prince, Soaemus. Sojemus upon this returned, and, 
though some further disturbances were made by the 
anti-Roman party, yet these were successfully dealt 
with, chiefly by Martius Verus, and, in a short time, 
the Roman nominee was recognised as undisputed 
king, and the entire country brought into a state of 
tranquillity. 



GREAT EXPEDITION OF AVIDIUS CASSIUS. 325 

The success which had attended the first rush to 
arms of Vologases III. was thus completely neutralised. 
In the space of two years Rome had made good all 
her losses, and shown that she was fully able to main- 
tain the position in Western Asia which she had 
acquired by the victories of Trajan. But the ambi- 
tious generals, into whose hands the conduct of the 
war had fallen through the incapacity of Verus, were 
far from satisfied with the mere recovery of what had 
been lost. Personal, rather than patriotic, motives 
actuated them. In the circumstances of the time 
military distinction was more coveted than any other, 
and was looked upon as opening a path to the very 
highest honours. The successful general became, as 
a matter of course, by virtue of his position, a candi- 
date for the Imperial dignity. If, under the great 
Napoleon, every conscript felt that he carried a 
marshal's ddton in his knapsack, still more, under the 
Middle Empire, was every victorious commander per- 
suaded that each step in the path of victory brought 
him sensibly nearer to the throne. Of all the officers 
engaged in the Parthian war, nominally under Verus, 
the most capable and the most ambitious was Avidius 
Cassius. Sprung from the family of the great 
" Liberator," who had contended for the supreme 
power in the state with Augustus and Antony, he 
had a hereditary bias towards pushing himself to the 
front, and might be counted upon to let slip no occa- 
sion which fortune should put in his way. His posi- 
tion in Syria gave him a splendid opportunity. After 
his first successes against Vologases, Aurelius had 
made him a sort of generalissimo ; and, having thus 



326 VOLOGASBS III. AND VERUS. 

perfect freedom of action, he resolved to carry the war 
into the enemy's country, and see if he could not rival, 
or even outdo, the achievements of Trajan half a 
century earlier. No continuous history of his cam- 
paign has reached our time, but from the fragmentary 
notices of it which are still extant we may gather a 
good general idea of its course and character. Cross- 
ing the Euphrates into Mesopotamia at Zeugma, the 
most important of the Roman stations upon the river, 
he proceeded first to Nicephorium, near the junction 
of the Belik with the Euphrates, and thence made his 
way down the course of the stream to Sura (probably 
Sippara) and Babylon. At Sura a battle was fought, 
in which the Romans were victorious, but it was after 
this that the great successes took place which covered 
Cassius with glory. The vast city of Seleucia upon 
the Tigris, which had at the time a population of 
four hundred thousand souls, was besieged, taken, and 
burnt, to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants. 
Ctesiphon, upon the opposite bank of the river, 
the summer residence of the Parthian kings, was 
occupied, and the royal palace there situated was 
pillaged, and levelled with the ground. The vari- 
ous fanes and temples were stripped of their 
treasures ; and search was made for buried riches 
in all the places which were thought likely to have 
been utilised, the result being that an immense 
booty was carried off. The Parthians, worsted in every 
encounter, after a time, ceased to resist, and all the 
conquests made by Trajan, and relinquished by 
Hadrian, were recovered. Further, an expedition was 
made into the Zagros mountain tract, and a portion of 



RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION, 327 

it, considered to lie within the limits of Media, and 
never yet possessed by Rome, was occupied. Aurelius 
owed it to the valour and good fortune of his general 
that he was thus entitled to add to the epithets of 
" Armeniacus" and " Parthicus," which he had already 
assumed, the further and wholly novel epithet of 
" Medicus." 

The victories of Avidius Cassius, unlike those of 
Trajan, were followed by no reverses, and they had 
further the effect, denied to Trajan's, of making 
the permanent addition of a large tract to the Roman 
Empire. When Vologases, after five years of un- 
successful warfare, finally sued for peace to his too 
powerful antagonist, he was compelled to surrender, as 
the price of it, the extensive and valuable country of 
Western Mesopotamia. The entire region between 
the Euphrates and the Khabour passed under the 
dominion of Rome at this time, and though not 
formally made into a province, became wholly lost to 
Parthia. The coins of the Greek cities within the 
area bear henceforth on the obverse the head of a 
Roman Emperor, and on the reverse some local token 
or legend ; every trace of Paithian influence is removed 
from them. 

But, if Rome thus carried off all the honours of the 
war with Vologases III., still she did not escape the 
Nemesis which usually attends upon the over-fortu- 
nate. During its stay in the marshy regions of 
Lower Mesopotamia, the army of Cassius was deeply 
infected with the germs of a strange and terrible 
malady, which clung to it on its return, and was 
widely disseminated along the whole line of the 



328 VOLOGASES III. AND VERUS. 

retreat. The superstition of the soldiers assigned to 
the pestilence a supernatural origin. It had crept 
forth, they said, from a subterranean cell, or a golden 
coffer, in the temple of the Comsean Apollo at 
Seleucia, during the time that a portion of the army 
was engaged in plundering the temple treasures. 
Placed there in primeval times by the spells of the 
Chaldseans, it raged with the more virulence on 
account of its long confinement, and amply avenged 
the Parthians for the many woes inflicted on them by 
Roman hands. Every town that lay upon the route 
of the returning army was smitten by it ; and from 
these centres it diverged in every direction, east and 
west, and north and south, into the adjacent districts. 
At Rome, the number of victims amounted to tens 
of thousands, " Not the vulgar herd of the Suburra 
only, the usual victims of a pestilence, were stricken, 
but many of the highest rank also suffered." ^ 
According to Orosius,^ in Italy generally the whole 
country was so devastated, that the villas, towns, and 
fields were everywhere left without inhabitant or 
cultivation, and fell to ruin, or relapsed into wilder- 
nesses. The army suffered especially, and is said to 
have been almost annihilated. In the provinces more 
than half the population was carried off, and the 
pestilence, overleaping the Alps, spread as far as the 
Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean. 

The remainder of the reign of Vologases III. was 
uneventful. He continued to occupy the Parthian 



' Merivale, " Roman Empire," vol. viii. p. 333. 
= Paul. Oros., "Hist.," vii. 15. 



VOLOGASES III. AND COMMODUS. 329 

throne until A.D. 190 or 191, but took no further part, 
so far as we know, in any military operations. Once 
only does he seem to have been so far stirred from 
his inaction as to contemplate resuming the struggle 
against his powerful enemy. This was in A.D. 174 or 
175, when, Aurelius being detained upon the Danube, 
the inordinate ambition of Avidius Cassius drove him 
into open rebellion, and the prospect of a Roman 
civil war seemed to offer a chance of Parthia being 
able to reassert herself But the opportunity passed 
before Vologases could bring himself to make any 
serious movement. The revolt of Cassius collapsed 
almost as soon as it had broken out, and the East 
returned to its normal condition. Vologases repented 
of his warlike intention ; and when (in A.D. 176) 
Aurelius visited Syria, sent ambassadors to him 
with friendly assurances, who were received with 
favour. 

Four years later the reign of the philosophic 
Emperor came to an end ; and the Imperial power 
passed into the hands of his weak and unworthy son, 
Lucius Aurelius Commodus. A second opportunity 
for an aggressive movement offered itself ; but, again, 
Vologases resisted the temptation to rush into 
hostilities, and remained passive within the limits of 
his own dominions. The reign of Commodus (a.d. 
180-192) was, from first to last, untroubled by any 
Parthian outbreak. Vologases was probably by this 
time an old man, since he had held the Parthian 
throne for thirty-two years when Commodus suc- 
ceeded his father, and may naturally have been dis- 
inclined to further warlike exertion. Rome was 



330 



VOLOGASES III. AND COM MODUS. 



therefore still allowed to maintain her Mesopotamian 
conquests unchallenged ; and when Vologases died 
(in A.D. 190 or 191), the condition of things continued 
as established by Aurelius in A.D. 165. 




XX. 



VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

The third Vologases was succeeded by another 
prince of the same name, who is usually regarded as 
his son, though there is no distinct evidence of the 
fact. His coins, which generally present his full face 
upon their obverse, instead of the customary profile, 
have dates which run from A.D. 191 to 208. He thus 
appears to have been contemporary with the Roman 




COIN OF VOLOGASES IV. 



Emperors — Commodus, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, 
Pescennius Niger, and Septimius Severus. The great 
Parthian war of Severus fell entirely within his reign, 
and it is as the antagonist of this distinguished prince 
that he is chiefly known to history. 

It was very shortly after the accession of Vologases 
IV. that the officers of the Court of Commodus, 



332 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

unable any longer to endure his excesses and 
cruelties, conspired against the unworthy son of the 
good Aurelius and assassinated him in his bed- 
chamber. This murder was soon followed by another 
— that of the virtuous, but perhaps over-strict, 
Pertinax. The Praetorians, after this, put up the 
office of Roman Emperor to public auction, and 
knocked it down to Didius Julianus, a rich senator, 
who is said to have paid for his prize no less than 
three millions of our money. But this indignity 
exhausted the patience of the legions, and threw the 
entire empire into confusion. In three places — in 
Britain, in Pannonia, and in Syria — revolt broke out, 
and the soldiers invested their respective leaders, 
Clodius Albinus, Septimius Severus, and Pescennius 
Niger, with the purple. Niger, who, as prefect of 
Syria, held the second dignity in the empire, imagined 
that his elevation would not be disputed, and, instead 
of straining every nerve to raise forces, and strengthen 
himself by alliances, declined at first the offers of 
assistance made him by various Parthian feudatories, 
and remained inactive in the East, expecting the 
Senate's confirmation of his appointment. But the 
unpleasant intelligence soon reached him that Sep- 
timius Severus, proclaimed Emperor in Pannonia and 
acknowledged at Rome, was on his way to Syria, 
determined to dispute with him the prize, whereof he 
had somewhat rashly thought himself assured. Under 
these changed circumstances, Niger felt compelled to 
alter his own policy, and to implore the assistance 
which so shortly before he had rejected. Towards 
the close of the year A.D. 193 he despatched envoys 



PRETENSIONS OF PESCBNNIUS NIGER. 333 

to the courts of the chief princes beyond the 
Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Armenia, 
Parthia, and Hatra, entreating them to send con- 
tingents to his aid as soon as possible. The Armenian 
monarch — Vologases, the son of Sanatroeces — made 
answer that it was not his intention to ally himself 
with either side ; he should stand aloof from the 
conflict and simply defend his own kingdom if any 
attack were made upon it. The reply from the 
Parthian Vologases was more favourable. He could 
not send troops at once, he said, as his army was 
disbanded, but he would issue an order to his satraps 
for the collection of a strong force as soon as possible. 
Barsemius, king of Hatra, went further even than his 
suzerain, and actually despatched to Niger's aid a 
body of archers, which reached his camp in safety, 
and took part in the war. Vologases IV. must have 
given his sanction to this movement on the part of 
his feudatory, who could certainly not have ventured 
on such a proceeding against the will of his lord 
paramount. Still Vologases was not prepared to 
commit himself unreservedly to either side in the 
impending conflict, and refrained from taking any 
active steps in furtherance of his professed design to 
collect an army, waiting to see to which side the 
fortune of war would incline. 

The struggle between the rival Emperors was soon 
terminated. Niger passed from Asia into Europe, 
and took up a position near Byzantium, but, having 
suffered a defeat at Cyzicus, was soon forced to fall 
back upon his reserves, and, passing through Asia 
Minor, gave his adversary battle for the second time 



334 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

near Issus, where his army was completely routed, 
and he himself captured and put to death. Mean- 
while, however, the nations of the East had flown to 
arms. The newly-subjected Mesopotamians had risen 
in revolt, had massacred most of the Roman detach- 
ments stationed in their country, and had even laid 
siege to Nisibis, which was the headquarters of the 
Roman power in the district. Their kindred tribes 
from the further side of the Euphrates, particularly 
the people of Adiabene, had assisted them, and taken 
part in the attack. The first object of Severus after 
the defeat and death of Niger was to raise the siege, 
and to chastise the rebels, with their aiders and 
abettors. He marched hastily to Nisibis, defeated 
the combined Osrhoeni and Adiabeni, relieved the 
distressed garrison, and took up his own quarters in 
the place. He then proceeded to re-subject Meso- 
potamia. The inhabitants sought to disarm his 
resentment by representing that they had taken 
up arms, not against him, or against the Romans 
generally, but against Niger, his rival and foe, whom 
they had endeavoured to distress for his (Severus's) 
benefit. They professed a readiness to surrender the 
Romans whom they had taken prisoners, and such 
portion of the Roman spoil as remained still in their 
hands ; but it was observed that they said nothing about 
giving up the strongholds that they had taken, or about 
resuming the position of Roman tributaries. On the 
contrary, they put forward a demand that all the Roman 
troops still in their country should be withdrawn from 
it, and that their independence should be respected 
in the future. Severus was not prepared to accept 



FIRST EXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 335 

these terms, or to sanction the retreat of Terminus. 
His immediate adversaries — the kings of Osrhoene, 
Adiabene, and Hatra — were of small account, and he 
might expect to defeat them without difficulty. Even 
if the Parthian monarch espoused the cause of his 
feudatories, he was not indisposed to cross swords 
with him. The expeditions of Trajan and Avidius 
Cassius had done much to diminish the terror of the 
Parthian name ; and to ambitious Romans the East 
presented itself as the quarter in which, without any 
serious danger, the greatest glory was to be won. 

Accordingly, the Emperor rejected the Mesopo- 
tamian proposals, and applied himself to the task of 
reducing their country to complete subjection. From 
the central position of Nisibis, where he himself 
remained, he sent out his forces under his three best 
commanders — Laternus, Candidus, and Laetus — in 
three directions, with orders to carry fire and sword 
through the entire region, and to re-establish every- 
where the Imperial authority. His commands were 
executed. Resistance was everywhere crushed ; the 
old administration was restored ; and Nisibis, raised 
to the dignity of a Roman colony, once more became 
the metropolis of the country. Nor was Severus 
contented with the mere restoration of the Roman 
power. He caused his troops to cross the Tigris 
into Adiabene, and though the inhabitants offered a 
stout resistance, succeeded in overrunning the district 
and occupying it. Further aggressions and further 
conquests would probably have followed, but the 
attitude of Albinus in the West made it imperative 
on Severus to quit these distant lands and return to 



336 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

his capital, which was menaced on the side of Gaul 
by the commander of the Western legions. The 
Emperor left Nisibis, and returned to Rome early in 
the year A.D. 196. 

No sooner had he retired than the flames of war 
burst out more fiercely than before. Vologases, roused 
from his inaction by the threatened loss of a second 
province, poured his troops into Adiabene, drove out 
the Roman garrisons, and, crossing the Tigris into 
Mesopotamia, swept the Romans from the whole of 
the open country. Even the cities submitted them- 
selves, excepting only Nisibis, which was saved from 
capture by the courage and capacity of Lastus. Ac- 
cording to Spartianus, the victorious Parthians, not 
content with recovering Mesopotamia, even passed 
the Euphrates, and spread themselves once more over 
the fertile plains of Northern Syria, as they had done 
in the times of Pacorus and Labienus. Severus, 
engaged in his doubtful contest with Albinus on the 
western side of the empire, could do nothing to 
relieve the pressure upon the east, and the Syrian 
prefecture continued open to the Parthian raids for 
the space of nearly a full year. An enterprising 
monarch might have done much during this interval ; 
. but Vologases frittered away his opportunity, and at 
length the victory of Lyons set Severus free, and 
allowed him again to turn his attention to Oriental 
affairs. In the summer of A.D. 197 he made a second 
Eastern expedition for the purpose of recovering his 
lost laurels, and of justifying the titles, which he had 
already assumed, of "Arabicus" and "Adiabenicus." It 
is probable that in his own mind he entertained still 



SECOND EXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 337 

loftier aspirations, and, like Trajan, haa hopes of 
reducing the whole Parthian Empire under the Roman 
yoke. 

One of the most important points to be secured by 
an assailant of Parthia from the west, was the friend- 
ship, or at. any rate the neutrality, of the two kings 
of Armenia and Osrhoene. Armenia had professed 
itself neutral when the quarrel between Severus and 
Niger first broke out, but had subsequently, in some 
way or other, offended the former, and on his arrival 
in the East, was viewed as hostile to the Roman 
designs. The first intention of Severus was to fall 
with his full force on Armenia, and to endeavour to 
reduce it to subjection ; but, before the fortune of M'ar 
had been tried, the Armenian monarch, Vologases, 
son of Sanatroeces, made overtures for peace, sent 
gifts and hostages,- assumed the attitude of a suppliant, 
and so wrought upon Severus that he not merely 
consented to conclude a treaty with him, but even 
granted him a certain extension of his dominions. 
The Arab king of Osrhoene, who is called, as usual, 
Abgarus, made a more complete and unqualified sub- 
mission. He rode into the Roman camp at the head 
of a large body of archers, whose services he offered 
to the Emperor, and accompanied by a number of his 
sons, whom Severus was requested to look upon as 
hostages. All being prosperous thus far, Severus had 
only to determine by which line of route he should 
advance against the Parthian monarch, who had taken 
up his position at Ctesiphon, and to make his pre- 
parations accordingly. He fixed on the line of the 
Euphrates, but at the same time masked his intention 



338 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

by sending a strong body of troops under generals 
across the Tigris to ravage Adiabene, and create an 
impression that the main attack would come from 
that quarter. Meanwhile, following the example of 
Trajan, he was causing a fleet to be built in Upper 
Mesopotamia, where timber was plentiful, and was 
preparing to march his main army down the left 
bank of the Euphrates, while his transports, laden 
with stores, descended the stream. In this way he 
reached the neighbourhood of Seleucia and Ctesiphon 
without suffering any loss, or even incurring any 
danger, and took the Parthians by surprise, when, 
having captured the cities of Babylon and Seleucia, 
which were deserted by their defenders, he made his 
appearance before the capital. His fleet, which he 
could easily transfer from one river to the other by 
means of the great canals that traversed the alluvium, 
would give him the complete command of the Tigris, 
and enable him to attack the city on either side, or 
indeed entirely to invest it. Vologases appears to 
have fought a single battle in defence of his capital, 
but, being defeated, shut himself up within its walls. 
The defences, however, were not strong ; and, after a 
short siege, Severus took the city, by assault, without 
much difficulty, the king escaping with a few horse- 
men in the confusion of the capture. Thus the 
Parthian capital fell easily — a third time within the 
space of eighty-two years — into the hands of a 
foreign invader. On the first occasion it had opened 
its gates to the conqueror, and had experienced 
gentle treatment at the hands of a benignant emperor. 
On the second it had suffered considerably. Now it 



SACK OF CTESIPHON. 339 

was to learn what extreme severity meant at the hands 
of a monarch whose character accorded with his name. 
The captured city was given up to massacre and 
pillage. The soldiers were allov/ed to plunder both 
the public and the private buildings at their pleasure. 
The precious metals accumulated in the royal treasury 
were seized, and the rich ornaments of the royal 
palace were taken from their places and carried off. 
All the adult male population was slaughtered ; while 
the women and children, torn from their homes with- 
out compunction, were led into captivity by the 
victorious army, to the number of a hundred thousand. 
Thus far the expedition of Severus had been com- 
pletely successful. He stood where Trajan stood in 
A.D. 116, master of the whole low region between the 
Arabian desert and the Zagros mountains, lord of 
Mesopotamia, of Assyria, of Babylonia, of the entire 
tract watered by the two great rivers from the Arme- 
nian highlands to the shores of the Persian Gulf 
What use would he make of his conquests ? Would 
he, like Trajan, endeavour to retain them, or would 
he, like the wiser Hadrian, relinquish them ? He 
endeavoured to take an intermediate course. Recog- 
nising the fact, that to retain the more southern 
districts was impossible, and that the more eastern 
portions of the Parthian Empire were beyond his 
reach, he neither pursued the flying Vologases into 
the remote tracts in which he had taken refuge nor 
attempted to organise his southern conquests into 
provinces, but resolved at once to evacuate them. 
Notwithstanding the elaborate preparations which 
he had made for his invasion, and the care which he 



340 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

had taken to cany supplies with him, he found him- 
self, about the time that he captured Ctesiphon, in 
want of provisions. He had exhausted the immense 
stores of grain which Lower Mesopotamia commonly- 
furnished, or else the inhabitants ' had destroyed or 
hidden them, and his troops had, we are told, to 
subsist for some days on roots, which produced a 
dangerous dysentery. He was obliged to retreat 
before famine overtook him. Moreover, as the march 
of his army along the course of the Euphrates had 
stripped that region of its supplies of corn and fodder, 
he could not return as he had come, but was com- 
pelled to confront the perils of a new route. The line 
of the Tigris was the only route open to him, and 
along this he advanced, still supported by his fleet, 
which with some difficulty made its way against the 
current up the course of the stream. It does not 
appear that any opposition was offered to him ; but, 
after he had proceeded a moderate distance, he found 
himself in the vicinity of Hatra, the capital of a small 
state subject to Parthia, which had given him special 
offence by lending active support to the cause of his 
rival, Niger. His troops had now obtained sufficient 
supplies of food in an unexhausted country, and were 
ready for a fresh enterprise. Severus regarded his 
honour as concerned in the chastisement of a state 
which, without provocation, had declared itself his 
enemy. He may also have remembered that Trajan 
had attacked Hatra unsuccessfully, and have hoped to 
place himself above that conqueror by the capture of 
a town which had defied the utmost efforts of his 
predecessor. At any rate, whatever his motives, it 



SEVERUS BESIEGES HATRA. 341 

seems certain that, when in the latitude of Hatra, he 
diverged from his previous hne of march, and, pro- 
ceeding westward, encamped under the walls of the 
city which had given him such dire offence, and 
engaged in its siege. He had brought with him a 
number of military engines — probably those employed 
with complete success at Ctesiphon, and, putting them 
in position, made a fierce attack upon the place. But 
the inhabitants were not daunted ; the walls of the 
town were strong, its defenders brave and full of 
enterprise. They contrived to set on fire and destroy 
the siege machines brought against them, and repulsed 
with heavy loss the attacking soldiers. The army, 
upon this, grew discontented, and threatened mutiny ; 
Severus was obliged to punish with death some of his 
leading officers, among them his best general, Lsetus. 
This, however, only increased the exasperation ; and, 
to smooth matters over, he had to pretend that the 
execution of this officer had taken place without his 
knowledge. Even so the soldiers' minds were not 
calmed down, and at last, in order to bring about a 
better state of feeling, he had to discontinue the siege 
and remove his camp to a distance. 

He had not, however, abandoned his enterprise. 
Reader pour mieiix sauter was among the principles 
that guided his actions, and it was in the hope of 
returning and renewing the attack ere many weeks 
were past, that he had drawn off his army. In the 
tranquillity and security of the place whereto he had 
removed, he constructed fresh engines in increased 
numbers, collected vast stores of provisions, and made 
every preparation possible for a repetition of his attack 



342 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS. 

and for bringing it to a successful issue. It was not 
merely that his honour was concerned in overcoming 
the resistance offered to him by what had always been 
regarded as no more than a second-rate town — his 
cupidity was also excited by reports of the rich 
treasures that were stored up in the city, and espe- 
cially of those which the piety of successive genera- 
tions had accumulated in the Temple of the Sun. He 
therefore, when his preparations were complete, once 
more put his troops in motion, and proceeded to 
renew the siege with a more efficient siege-train, and 
a better appointed army than before. But the inhabi- 
tants met him with a determination equal to his 
own. They had a powerful cavalry which hung upon 
the skirts of his army and crippled his movements 
in every way, often inflicting severe loss upon his 
foragers ; they were excellent archers, and shot 
further and with greater force than the Romans ; 
they possessed military engines of their own, of no 
contemptible character ; and they had at their disposal 
a particular kind of fire, which did considerable 
damage, and created yet greater alarm. Flames 
believed to be inextinguishable were hurled both 
against the Roman machines and against their soldiers 
with an effect that is said to have been remarkable. 
A great number of the machines were burnt ; and if 
the soldiers were more frightened than hurt, the 
advantage to the defenders was still almost as great. 
Still the Romans persevered. The presence of the Em- 
peror, who watched the combat from a lofty platform, 
encouraged every man to do his best ; and at length 
it was announced that a practicable breach had been 



FAILURE OF THE SIEGE. 343 

effected in the outer wall of the place, and the soldiers 
were ready, and indeed eager, to be led at once to the 
assault. But now Severus hung back. By Roman 
usage a town taken by storm must be given up to the 
soldiery for indiscriminate pillage ; and thus, if the 
soldiers had their way, he would lose the great 
treasures on which his heart was set. He therefore 
refused to give the word, and resolved to wait a day, 
and see whether the Hatreni would not now, seeing 
further resistance to be useless, surrender their town. 
The delay was fatal. In the night the Hatreni rebuilt 
the wall where it had been battered down, and man- 
ning the battlements, stood boldly on their defence. 
Severus, seeing that they had no intention of sur- 
rendering, repented of his resolve of the day before, 
and commanded the soldiers to attack. But the legion- 
aries declined. They probably suspected the Emperor's 
motive. At any rate they were unwilling to imperil 
their lives for an object w^hich but yesterday they 
might have attained without incurring any peril at all. 
Severus, not to lose a chance, commanded his Asiatic 
auxiliaries to see if they could not force an entrance, 
but with no other result than the slaughter of a vast 
number. At last he desisted from his attempt. The 
summer was far advanced ; the heat was intense ; and 
disease had broken out among his troops, who suffered 
from _ drought, from malaria, and from a plague of 
insects. Above all, his army was thoroughly demo- 
ralised, and could not be depended on to carry out 
the orders given it. Severus himself told one of his 
officers that he had not six hundred European troops 
on whom he could place any reliance. The second 



344 VOLOGASES IV. AND SEVERUS, 

siege of Hatra by Severus lasted twenty days, and 
terminated in an ignominious withdrawal. Severus 
returned to Rome with a slur upon his military repu- 
tation which was not regarded as cancelled by all 
his previous successes. 

Still, actual disaster was escaped. Had Vologases 
been an active and energetic prince, or had the spirit 
and audacity of the Parthian nation been such as 
once characterised it, the result might have been 
widely different. The prolonged resistance of Hatra, 
the sufferings of the Romans, their increasing diffi- 
culties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect 
of the summer heats upon their unacclimatised con- 
stitutions, would have presented irresistible tempta- 
tions to a prince, or even a general, of any boldness 
and capacity, inducing him to pursue the retreating 
enemy, to hang upon their flanks and upon their 
rear, to fall on their stragglers, to cut off" their 
supplies, to harass and annoy them in ten thousand 
ways, and render their withdrawal to their own 
territory a matter of extreme difficulty. A Surena 
of the temper and calibre of the general opposed to 
Crassus might not improbably have annihilated the 
Imperial army, and the disaster of Carrhae might 
have repeated itself at the distance of between two 
and three centuries. But Vologases IV. was a 
degenerate descendant of the great Arsacids, and 
remained inert and apathetic when the circumstances 
of the time called for the most vigorous action. 

As it was, the expedition of Severus must be 
pronounced glorious for Rome and disastrous for 
Parthia. It exposed for the third time within a 



CONQUESTS OF SEVERUS. 345 

century the extreme weakness of the great Asiatic 
power. It lost her such treasures as had escaped 
the cupidity of Avidius Cassius. It both exhausted 
and disgraced her. Moreover, it cost her a second 
and most valuable province. Severus was not 
content with fully re-establishing the Roman sway 
in Mesopotamia. He overstepped the Tigris, and 
firmly planted Roman authority in the rich and 
fertile region between that river and the Zagros 
mountains. Henceforth the title of " Adiabenicus " 
became no empty boast. Adiabene, or the tract 
between the two Zab rivers — the most productive 
and valuable part of the ancient Assyria — became a 
Roman dependency under Severus, and continued 
to be Roman till after the destruction of the Parthian 
Empire. For the remainder of the time during 
which Parthia maintained her independence, the 
Roman standards were planted within less than two 
degrees of her capital. 

Vologases reigned for the space of about eleven 
years (a.D. 197-208) after his defeat by Severus. 
Parthian history is for this interval a blank. The 
decline of national feeling and of the military spirit 
went on, no doubt, without a pause, and the power 
of Parthia must continually have grown less and 
less. No pretenders arose, since there was probably 
no one who coveted the position of ruler over a state 
evidently nodding to its fall. Rome abstained from 
further attack, content, it would seem, with the gains 
which she had made, and a brief calm heralded the 
storm in which Parthian nationality was to perish. 



XXI. 

ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS — THE LAST WAR 
WITH ROME— DEFEAT OF MACRINUS. 

The death of Vologases IV. was immediately 
followed by a dispute between his two sons, Volo- 
gases V. and Artabanus V., for the succession. We 
do not know which was the elder ; but it would seem 





COIN OF VOLOGASES V. 



COIN OF Ai^TABANUS V. 



that at first the superiority in the struggle rested 
with Vologases, who was recognised by the Romans 
as sole king in A.D. 212, and must have then ruled 
in the western capital, Ctesiphon. Afterwards Arta- 
banus acquired the preponderance, and from the 
year A.D. 216 we find no more mention of Vologases 
by the classical writers. It is Artabanus who 
negotiates with Caracallus, who is treacherously 

346 



AMBITION OF CARACALLUS. 34/ 

attacked by him, who contends with Macrinus, and 
is ultimately defeated and slain by the founder of 
the New Persian monarchy, Artaxerxes. Similarly, 
the Persian historians ignore Vologases altogether, 
and represent the contest for empire, which once 
more carried Persia to the front, as one between 
Ardeshir and Ardevan. Still, the Parthian coins 
show that Vologases, equally with his brother, both 
claimed and exercised sovereignty in Parthia to the 
close of the kingdom. The probability would there- 
fore appear to be that about A.D. 216 a partition of 
the kingdom was amicably made, and that while 
Artabanus reigned over the western provinces, the 
eastern were ceded to Vologases. 

It was while the struggle between the two brothers 
continued that the Emperor Severus died, and the 
period of tranquillity inaugurated by him, on his 
return from the East in A.D, 198, came to an end. 
His son and successor, Caracallus, a weak and vain 
prince, nourished an inordinate ambition, and was 
scarcely seated on the throne when he let it be 
known that in his own judgment he was a second 
Alexander, and that he was bent on imitating the 
marvellous exploits of that mighty hero. He 
adopted the Macedonian costume, formed his best 
troops into a " Macedonian phalanx," made the 
captains of the phalanx take the names of 
Alexander's best generals, and caused statues to 
be made with a double head, presenting the counte- 
nance of Alexander on one side and his own upon 
the other. As Alexander, he was bound to conquer 
the East ; and, as early as his second year, he began 



348 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 

his predetermined aggressions. Summoning Abgarus, 
the tributary monarch of Osrhoene, or north-western 
Mesopotamia, into his presence, he seized upon, his 
person, committed him to prison, declared his terri- 
tories forfeited, and reduced Osrhoene into the 
form of a Roman province. Soon afterwards he 
attempted to repeat the proceeding with Armenia ; 
but, although the Armenian king was weak enough 
to fall into the trap, the nation was on the alert, and 
frustrated his efforts. No sooner did they learn that 
their king was arrested and imprisoned than they 
flew to arms, placed their country in a position of 
defence, and made themselves ready to resist all 
aggression. Caracallus hesitated, and when, three 
years later (A.D. 215), he sent Theocritus, one of his 
favourites, to effect their subjugation, they met him 
in arms, and inflicted a severe defeat on the utterly 
incompetent general. It was perhaps this disaster 
which suggested to Caracallus a change in his 
method of proceeding. Professing to put away from 
him all thoughts of war and conquest, he propounded 
a grand scheme for the permanent pacification of the 
East, and the establishment of a reign of universal 
happiness and tranquillity. Having transferred his 
residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, the luxurious 
capital of the Roman Oriental provinces, he sent am- 
bassadors with presents of unusual magnificence to 
the Parthian monarch, Artabanus, who were to make 
him a proposal of a novel and unheard-of character. 
" The Roman Emperor," said the despatch in question, 
could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject, or 
accept the position of son-in-law to a private person. 



MAD PROPOSAL OF CARACALLUS. 349 

No one could be a suitable wife for him who was not 
a princess. He therefore asked the Parthian monarch 
for the hand of his daughter. Rome and Parthia 
divided between them the sovereignty of the world ; 
united, as they would be by this marriage, no longer 
recognising any boundary as separating them, they 
would constitute a power which could not but be 
irresistible. It would be easy for them to reduce 
under their sway all the barbarous races on the skirts 
of their empires, and to hold them in subjection by 
a flexible system of administration and government. 
The Roman infantry was the best in the world, and 
in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be allowed to 
be unrivalled. The Parthians surpassed all nations 
in the number of their cavalry and the excellence of 
their archers. If these advantages, instead of being 
separated, were combined, and the various elements 
on which success in war depends were thus brought 
into harmonious union, there could be no difficulty 
in establishing and maintaining a universal monarchy. 
Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs, 
as also the Roman metals and manufactures, would 
no longer need to be imported secretly and in small 
quantities by merchants, but, as the two countries 
would form together but one nation and one state, 
there would be a free interchange among all the 
citizens of their various products and commodities." 
To the Parthian king and his advisers the proposition 
was as unwelcome as it was strange. The whole 
project appeared to them monstrous. Artabanus 
himself misdoubted the Emperor's sincerity, and did 
not believe that he would persevere in it But it 



350 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 

threw him into a state of extreme perplexity. 
Bluntly to reject the overture was to offend the 
master of thirty-two legions, and to provoke a war 
the results of which might be ruinous. To accept it 
was to depart from all Parthian traditions, and to 
plunge into the unknown and the unconjecturable. 
Artabanus therefore temporised. Without giving a 
positive refusal, he stated certain objections to the 
proposal, which made it, he thought, inexpedient, 
and begged to be excused from complying with it. 
" Such a union as was suggested could scarcely," he 
said, " prove a happy one. The wife and husband, 
differing in language, habits, and modes of thought, 
could not but become estranged one from another. 
There was no lack of patricians at Rome, possessing 
daughters with whom the Emperor might wed as 
suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females 
of their own royal house. It was not fit that either 
family should sully its blood by mixture with a 
foreign stock." 

Upon this answer reaching him, Caracallus, accord- 
ing to the Court historian, Dio Cassius, immediately 
declared war, and invaded the Parthian territory with 
a large army. Herodian, however, who seems here 
to be more trustworthy, gives a different account. 
Caracallus, he declares, instead of quarrelling with 
Artabanus for his qualified refusal, followed up his 
first embassy with a second ; his envoys brought rich 
gifts to Ctesiphon, and assured the Parthian monarch 
that the Emperor was serious in his proposals, and 
had the most friendly intentions possible. Hereupon 
Artabanus yielded, either satisfied with the assurances 



FESTIVE MEETING AT CTESIPHON. 35I 

given him, or else afraid to give offence ; he addressed 
Caracallus as his future son-in-law, and invited him 
to come with all speed, and fetch home his bride. 
" And then," continues the historian, " when this was 
noised abroad, the Parthians made ready to give the 
Roman Emperor a fit reception, being transported 
with joy at the prospect of an eternal peace. Cara- 
callus thereupon crossed the rivers without hindrance 
and entered Parthia, just as if it were his own land. 
Everywhere along his route the people greeted him 
with sacrifices, and dressing their altars with garlands, 
offered upon them all manner of spices and incense, 
whereat he made pretence of being vastly pleased. 
As his journey now approached its close, and he 
drew near to the Parthian Court, Artabanus, instead 
of awaiting his arrival, went out and met him in the 
spacious plain before the city, with intent to enter- 
tain his daughter's bridegroom and his own son-in- 
law. Meanwhile, the whole multitude of the bar- 
barians, crowned with freshly gathered flowers, and 
clad in garments embroidered with gold and variously 
dyed, were keeping holiday, and dancing gracefully 
to the sound of the flute, the pipe, and the drum — 
an amusement wherein they take great delight after 
they have indulged freely in wine. Now, when all 
the people had come together, the}^ dismounted from 
their horses, hung up their quivers and their bows, 
and gave themselves wholly to libations and revels. 
The concourse of barbarians was very great, and 
they stood arranged in no sort of order, since they 
did not apprehend any danger, but were all en- 
deavouring to catch a sight of the bridegroom. 



352 ARTABANUS V. AND CARACALLUS. 

Suddenly the Emperor gives his men the signal to 
fall on and massacre the barbarians. These, amazed 
at the attack, and finding themselves struck and 
wounded, forthwith took to flight. Artabanus was 
hurried away by his guards, and lifted on a horse, 
whereby he escaped with a few followers. The rest 
of the barbarians were cut to pieces, since they could 
not reach their horses, which, when they dismounted, 
they had allowed to graze freely over the plain ; nor 
were they able to make use of their legs, since these 
were entangled in the long flowing garments which 
descended to their heels. Many, too, had come 
without quivers or bows, which were not wanted at 
a wedding. Caracallus, when he had made a vast 
slaughter, and taken a multitude of prisoners and a 
rich booty, moved off" without meeting with any 
resistance. In his retreat he allowed his soldiers to 
burn all the cities and villages, and to carry away as 
plunder whatever they chose." 

The advance of Caracallus had been through 
Babylonia, probably along the course of the 
Euphrates ; his return was through Adiabene and 
Mesopotamia. In Adiaben^ he still further out- 
raged and offended the Parthians by violating the 
sanctity of the royal burial-place at Arbela, where, as 
a rule, the Parthian kings were interred. Arbela 
had been regarded from of old as a City of the 
Dead ; and the Arsacidae had made it their ordinary 
place of sepulture. Caracallus caused the tombs to 
be opened, the bodies dragged forth from them, and 
the remains dispersed to the four winds. No insult 
could be greater than this, and the act seems rather 



RETREAT OF CARACALLUS — HIS DEATH. 353 

that of a madman than of a mere ordinary tyrant. 
We are reminded of Aristotle's observation, that 
" famihes of brilliant talents go off after a time into 
dispositions bordering upon madness," and see that 
that of the Antonines was no exception. Caracallus 
can scarcely have been in his senses to have com- 
mitted an action from which no possible good could 
arise, and for which, as he might have anticipated, a 
severe reckoning was afterwards to be exacted. 

Meanwhile, however, he was pursuing his gay 
career, no whit alarmed, and no whit abashed. He wrote 
to the Senate in the lightest possible tone, to declare, 
without giving any details, that the whole East was 
subject to him, and that there was not a kingdom in 
those parts but had submitted to his authority. The 
Senate, though not imposed upon, wrote back in 
flattering terms, and granted him all the honours that 
would have been suitable to a veritable conqueror. 
For his own part, he remained in Mesopotamia, pass- 
ing the winter there, and amusing himself with hunting 
and chariot-driving. There were still lions in the 
Mesopotamian region, as in Assyrian times, and 
the young Antonine, though a poor soldier, seems to 
have been a bold hunter. He had, apparently, 
persuaded himself that no external danger threatened 
him, and was content to idle away his time in the 
grassy Mesopotamian plains, which now — in early 
spring — must have been an earthly paradise. April 
was reached, and it was high time for an active 
commander to have commenced the marshalling and 
exercising of his troops, or even the initiatory move- 
ments of the designed campaign ; but Caracallus con- 



354 ^^^ LAST WAR WITH ROME. 

tinued impassive, occupied in his amusements, his 
suspicions of his officers, and his consultations of 
augurs, magicians, and oracles as to what fate was in 
store for him. He was on his way to visit an oracle 
in the Temple of the Moon-God, near Carrhae, when 
some of his inquiries having leaked out, a conspiracy 
was formed against him in the camp, and he was 
murdered by Julius Martialis, one of his guards, on 
April 8, A.D. 217. 

In the place of Caracallus, a new emperor had to be 
appointed. The choice of the soldiery fell upon Macri- 
nus, one of the Praetorian Prefects, the chief mover in 
the recent conspiracy. His elevation almost exactly 
coincided with the advance of Artabanus, who, having 
reunited and increased his army during the course of 
the winter months, and brought it into excellent con- 
dition, had now conducted it into Roman Mesopo- 
tamia, and was anxious to engage the Romans in a 
pitched battle, in order to exact a heavy retribution 
for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the 
wanton impiety of Arbela. But Macrinus was scarcely 
prepared to meet him. Though Praetorian Prefect, 
he had none of the instincts of a soldier, but was far 
more versed in civil affairs, and adapted to hold office 
in the civil administration or in the judiciary. Ac- 
cordingly, no sooner did he find himself menaced by 
the Parthian monarch than he hastily sent am- 
bassadors to his camp with an offer to surrender all 
the prisoners carried off in the late campaign as the 
price of peace. But Artabanus had higher aims. 
" The Roman Emperor," he said in reply, " must not 
only restore the prisoners unjustly captured in a time 



BATTLE OF NISI BIS. 355 

of peace, but must also consent to rebuild all the 
towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, 
must make compensation for the wanton injury done 
to the tombs of the kings, and must further cede 
Mesopotamia to the Farthians, and retire behind the 
line of the Euphrates." It was morally impossible 
for a Roman Emperor to consent to such demands as 
these without first trying the fortune of war ; and 
accordingly Macrinus felt himself compelled, much 
against his will, to risk a battle. He had with him 
a large army, which, if not exactly flushed with 
victory, had at any rate not known defeat ; and he 
had, besides, the prestige of the Roman name, always 
a source of confidence to those who boasted it, and of 
terror to their adversaries. 

Artabanus, on his part, had done his best to make 
his army formidable. He had collected it from all 
quarters, had made it strong in cavalry and archers, 
and had attached to it a novel force -of considerable 
importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, 
clad in complete armour, and carrying spears or 
lances of unusual length, who were mounted on 
camels. The Romans had, besides the ordinary 
legionaries, in which their strength mainly consisted, 
a large number of light-armed troops, and a powerful 
body of Mauretanian cavalry. The battle, which 
lasted three days, and was fought near Nisibis, in 
Upper Mesopotamia, began at daybreak on the first 
day by a rapid advance of the Parthians, who, after 
saluting the rising sun, rushed with loud shouts to the 
combat, and, under cover of a sleet of arrows, delivered 
charge after charge. The Romans, receiving their 



356 THE LAST WAR WITH ROME. 

own light-armed within the ranks of the legionaries, 
stood firm, but suffered greatly from the bows of the 
horse-archers and from the lances of the corps 
mounted on camels ; and though, whenever they 
could reach their enemy, and engage in close combat, 
they had always the advantage, )'et after a while their 
losses from the cavalry and the camels forced them 
to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground 
with spiked balls (or caltrops) and other contrivances 
for injuring the feet of animals, and this stratagem 
was so far successful that the pursuers soon found 
themselves in difficulties, and the two armies re- 
spectively returned, without any decisive result, to 
their camps. 

On the following day there was again a combat, 
which is said to have lasted from morning till night, 
and to have been equally indecisive with the pre- 
ceding one ; but of this, which is wholly ignored by 
Dio, we do not possess any description. The third 
day arrived, and the fight was once more renewed ; 
but this time the Parthians had recourse to new 
tactics. Hitherto it had been their aim to rout and 
disperse their enemies ; now they directed all their 
efforts towards surrounding them, and so capturing 
the entire force. Their troops, which were far more 
numerous than those of the Romans, spread themselves 
to right and left, threatening to turn the Roman 
■flanks and envelop the whole army. Macrinus, to 
meet these tactics and baffle them, was forced more 
and more to extend his own line, and consequently 
to attenuate it unduly, so that at last it broke up. 
Confusion once begun was speedily increased by the 



TERMS ACCEPTED BY MACRINUS. 257 

cowardice of the Roman Emperor, who was among 
the first to take to flight, and hurry back to his camp. 
As a matter of course his army followed his example, 
and having a refuge so close at hand, suffered no very 
severe losses. The defeat, however, was acknow- 
ledged, even by the Romans themselves ; and, in the 
negotiations which followed the battle, Macrinus had 
to accept terms of peace, which, though less disgrace- 
ful than those at first proposed, must be regarded as 
sufficiently onerous. The cession of Mesopotamia 
was not, indeed, insisted on ; but, besides restoring 
the captives and the booty carried off by Caracallus 
in his raid, Macrinus had to pay, as compensation for 
the damages inflicted, no less a sum than a million 
and a half of our money. The transactions of Rome 
with Parthia were thus brought to an end, after nearly 
three centuries of struggle, by the ignominious pur- 
chase of a peace. Macrinus retired within his own 
frontier in the summer of A.D. 217, and before Rome 
was again called upon to make war in these parts the 
sovereignty of the Parthians had terminated. 




XXII. 

REVOLT OF THE PERSIANS — DOWNFALL OF THE 
PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

The tendency of the Parthian Empire to disin- 
tegration has been frequently noted in these pages. 
From the first there was a want of attachment among 
its parts, and a looseness of organisation which boded 
ill for the prolonged existence of the body politic. It 
was not only that the races composing it were so 
various, the character and conditions of the provinces 
so unlike, the ideas prevalent in different parts so 
diverse, but the entire system by which it was sought 
to give compactness and unity to the disjecta membra 
was so deficient in vigour and efficacy, that a long 
continuance of cohesion was almost impossible. 
" Kingdom-Empires," as they have been called, are 
always unstable ; and, unless the dominant power 
possesses a very marked preponderance, they are 
sure sooner or later to break up. In the widespread 
empire built up by the Arsacidae the Parthians could 
not really claim any very decided superiority over the 
other principal component parts, either in physical or 
in mental characteristics. They were not braver than 
the Medes, the Hyrcanians, the Armenians, or the 



TENDENCY OF THE EMPIRE TO BREAK UP. 359 

Persians ; they were not more intelligent than the 
Babylonians, the Bactrians, or the Assyrians. That 
they had some qualities which brought them to the 
front, cannot, of course, be denied; but these were not 
such as to strike the minds of men very strongly, or 
to obtain universal and unqualified recognition. Their 
rule was acquiesced in so long, rather because the 
Oriental appreciates the advantages of settled and 
quiet government, than because the subject races re- 
garded them as having any special aptitude or capacity 
for governing. Each of the principal nations probably 
thought itself quite as fit to hold the first place in the 
commonwealth as the Parthians ; and under favour- 
able circumstances each secondary monarch was quite 
ready to assert and maintain his independence. 

Revolts of subject kingdoms or tribes were thus 
of frequent occurrence during the entire period of the 
Parthian monarchy ; but, as time went on, they 
became more frequent, more determined, and more 
difficult to subdue. It has been already related how, 
as early as the time of Vologases I., Hyrcania broke 
off from the empire, and was probably not reduced 
subsequently.^ Bactria was also from time to time 
a sort of separate appanage, conceded to a prince of 
the Royal House, who accepted it in satisfaction of 
his claims to the chief authority. Armenia was still 
more loosely attached to the empire, being more often 
and for longer periods reckoned an independent state 
than a subjected one. At one time Babylonia is 
found almost independent under Hymerus.^ The 
single tie of a nominal subjection to a distant 

' Supra, p. 296. = Page 119. 



360 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE, 

suzerain proved a weak bond when any strain was 
put upon it, and there was constant danger of this or 
that province detaching itself from the great mass of 
the empire, and entering upon a separate existence. 

We are thus entitled to say that there was some- 
thing like a general discontent of the provinces with 
their condition und'ir the central government, at any 
rate for the last century and a half of Parthian rule. 
It is difficult, however, to analyse the grounds of this 
discontent, or to decide what elements in it had the 
greater weight, and which were of minor importance. 
An alien rule must always be more or less irksome to 
those who have to submit to it, and must more or less 
chafe and gall them, as they exceed or fall short in 
pride and sensibility. The friction will be increased 
or diminished by the character of the rule, its con- 
sonance with justice, its regard for promises and 
engagements, its care for its subjects, its clemency, 
its power and will to protect, its general fairness and 
equity. It cannot be said that the Parthians fell 
flagrantly short in any of these particulars, or deserve 
to be regarded as either on the one hand weak and 
careless, or on the other harsh, unjust, and oppressive. 
They no doubt took the lion's share of pomp, power, 
and privilege ; but beyond this advantage, which is 
one taken by all dominant peoples, it does not appear 
that their subjects had any special grievances of which 
to complain. The Parthians were tolerant ; they did 
not interfere with the religious prejudices of their 
subjects, or attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or 
worship. Their military system did not press over- 
heavily on the subject races ; nor is there any reason 



CAUSES OF GENERAL DISCONTENT. 361 

to believe that the scale of their taxation was ex- 
cessive. Such tyranny as is charged upon certain 
Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have 
been sensibly felt by the conquered nations, since it 
was exercised on none who were not Parthians. If 
at any time the rulers of the country failed to perform 
the great duties of civil government, it was rather in 
the way of laxity that they erred than of tension, 
rather by loosening the bonds of authority than by 
over-tightening them. 

Some tangible ground for the general discontent, 
beyond the " ignorant impatience " of a dominant race 
which is so usual, may perhaps be made out by careful 
consideration, in two respects, but in two only. In 
the first place, there were times when the Parthian 
government very imperfectly accomplished its great 
duty of preserving internal order and tranquillity. 
The history of Anilai and Asinai, which has been 
dwelt upon at some length in a former chapter,^ 
brings out very strongly this defect in the Parthian 
governmental system, and reveals a condition of 
things which, if it had been permanent, must have 
been intolerable. We can only suppose that the 
anarchical times, of which we have so melancholy a 
picture, were occasional and exceptional, the result of 
internal disorders, which ere long came to a head, and 
then passed away ; or we should have to imagine a 
government, which fulfilled none of the functions of a 
government, lasting for centuries, and some of the 
most spirited nations on the earth submitting to it 
and seeking no better. 

^ Chap. XIV. pp. 246-256. 



362 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

The other failure of the Parthians belongs to the 
later period only of their history. It consisted in the 
general decline of the vigour of the nation, which 
rendered it less competent, than it had been previously, 
to afford adequate protection to the conquered states 
— especially protection against the wholly alien power, 
which had intruded itself into Asia, and which sought 
to bring all the nations of Asia under subjection. 
The suzerainty of Parthia had been accepted by the 
other Asiatic powers as that of the one out of their 
number which was most competent to make head 
against European invaders, and to secure the native 
races in continued independence of an influence which 
they recognised as antagonistic, and felt to be hateful. 
It may well have appeared at this time to the various 
vassal states that the Parthian vigour had become 
effete, that the qualities which had advanced the race 
to the leadership of Western Asia were gone, and 
that unless some new power could be raised up to act 
energetically against Rome, the West would obtain 
complete dominion over the East, and Asia be 
absorbed into Europe, Vague thoughts would arise 
as to which nation might be conceived to be the fittest 
to take the lead, if Parthia had to be deposed ; and 
the instinct of self-aggrandisement would lead the 
more eminent to contemplate the possibility of them- 
selves aspiring to the position, if not even to take 
measures to push their claims. Probably for some 
considerable time before the movement headed by 
Artaxerxes, son of Babek, commenced, such thoughts 
had been familiar to the wiser men among many of 
the Asiatic nations, and a long preparation had thus 



SPECIAL GRIEVANCES OF THE PERSIANS. 363 

been made for the revolution, which seemed to break 
out so suddenly at last. 

If, again, we ask, what peculiar grounds of grievance 
had the Persians above the other subject races, or why 
did the burden of raising the standard of revolt fall 
especially upon them, we have a further difficulty in 
obtaining an answer. There is no appearance of the 
Persians having been in any way singled out by the 
Parthians for oppression, or having had any more 
grounds of complaint against them than any other of 
the subject nations. The complaints which are made 
are negative rather than positive, and amount to little 
more than the following: — i. That high offices, 
whether civil or military, were for the most part con- 
fined to those of Parthian blood, and not thrown open in 
any fair proportion to the Persians. 2. That the priests 
of the Persian religion were not held in sufficient 
honour, being even less accounted of in the later than 
in the earlier times ; and 3. That no advantage in 
any respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest 
of the conquered peoples, notwithstanding that they 
had for so many years exercised supremacy over 
Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic worthies 
such names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis. 
It was thus not because they were worse treated than 
their brother subjects that the Persians were dissatis- 
fied, but because their pretensions were higher. They 
thought themselves deserving of exceptional treat- 
ment, and, since they did not receive it, they murmured. 
In fact, the Persians had at no time ever forgotten 
that they had once been " lords of Asia," and it 
angered them that their conquerors seemed to have 



364 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

forgotten it. They had at all times submitted to 
Parthian hegemony as it were under protest ; now 
they were no longer inclined to submit to it. They 
believed, and probably with justice, that, under the 
changed circumstances of the time, they were better 
suited than the Parthians to direct the affairs of 
Western Asia, and they resolved at any rate to make 
the attempt. Their justification is to be found in 
their success. As the Parthians had no right to their 
position but such as arose out of the law of the 
strongest, so, when the time came that they had lost 
this pre-eminence, superiority in strength having 
passed to a nation hitherto counted among their 
subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of 
authority should shift with the shift in the balance of 
power, and that the leadership of the Persians should 
be once more recognised. 

In one respect the Parthian rule must always have 
grated upon the feelings of their Persian subjects 
more than upon those of the generality, since there 
was in the Parthians an ingrained coarseness and 
savagery which could not but be especially distasteful 
to a people of such comparative refinement as the 
Persians. Persian art, Persian manners, Persian 
literature had a delicacy and a polish which the rude 
Parthians, with their Tatar breeding, could not 
appreciate ; and the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius, 
of Firdausi and Hafiz, must have had an instinctive 
aversion from the nomadic race whose manners were 
still deeply tinged with Scythicism. 

It may also be suspected, though of this there is 
less evidence, that the revolution which transferred the 



PERSIAN RELIGIOUS ZEAL. 365 

dominion of Western Asia from the Parthians to the 
Persians, from the Arsacidae to the Sassanidge, was to 
some extent a religious one. The " Book-Reh"gion " 
of Zoroaster, with its duahsm, its complicated spirit- 
ualism, and its elaborate ritual, was unsuited for the 
rough times through which Western Asia had to pass 
between the invasion of Alexander and the foundation 
of the Neo-Persian state, and it appears to have been 
superseded, except in Persia Proper, by a ruder system, 
of which the principal elements were devotion to the 
Sun and Moon and the worship of ancestral images. 
But the time was now again come when more com- 
plicated ideas were in the ascendant. The various 
forms of Gnosticism show how mysticism once more 
asserted itself among the Western Asiatics in the first 
and second centuries of our era, and how speculations 
were rife which reopened all the deepest problems of 
spiritual religion. The stir had begun which issued 
ultimately in Manicheism, and the Persian aspirations 
after leadership may have been partly caused by a 
desire to push their religion to the front, and to take 
advantage of the popular favour with which dualistic 
tenets were beginning to be regarded. It is certain 
that among the principal changes consequent upon 
the success of the Persians was a religious revolution 
in Western Asia — the substitution for Parthian toler- 
ance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforced 
uniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi 
in power, and the bloody persecution of all such as 
declined obedience to the precepts of Zoroaster. 

The space of about six or seven years seems to 
have separated the conclusion of peace with Rome 



366 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

from the outbreak of rebellion under Artaxerxes. 
During this time the division of sovereignty between 
Artabanus V. and Vologases V. continued without in- 
terruption, and the power of Parthia was still further 
weakened by Arsacid intrigues originating with 
branches of the royal family which were settled in 
Bactria. No doubt internal debility showed itself in 
various ways, and the tributary king of Persia, a young, 
active, and energetic prince, became daily more con- 
vinced of his ability, if not to recover the empire of 
Cyrus, at any rate to shake off the rude yoke which 
had galled and chafed his nation for so many centuries. 
Independence was probably all that he originally 
looked for ; but, in course of time, as the struggle 
went on, wider views with respect to the possibilities 
of the situation opened themselves before him, and 
the contest became one for life or death between the 
two kingdoms. After establishing his authority in 
Persia Proper, he turned his arms eastward against 
Carmania (Kerman), and in a short space of time 
easily reduced that sparsely peopled and not very 
desirable country. He next took in hand a more 
daring enterprise. The valuable and fertile country 
of Media adjoined Persia to the north. Artaxerxes 
proceeded to make war in this quarter, and to annex 
to his dominions portions of the Median territory. But 
this was to attack the Parthian kingdom at its heart, 
since Media, Assyria (Adiabene), and Babylonia 
formed the main strength and the central mass of the 
Empire. Artabanus, who had thought but lightly of 
a Persian revolt, and had probably regarded incursions 
into Carmania with absolute indifference, as concern- 



LAST EFFORTS OF ARTAVASDES. 367 

ing his brother rather than himself, was now effectu- 
ally roused. Collecting his forces, he took the field in 
person, invaded Persia Proper, and engaged in a 
desperate struggle with his rival. Three great battles 
are said to have been fought between the contending 
powers. In the last, which took place, according to 
the Persian authorities, in the plain of Hormuz, 
between Bebahan and Shuster, on the course of the 
Jerahi river, Artabanus was, after a desperate conflict, 
completely defeated by his antagonist (A.D. 226), and 
lost his life in the battle. 

The struggle, however, was not yet over. Arta- 




COIN OF ARTAVASDES. 



vasdes, the eldest son of Artabanus, claimed the crown, 
and was supported by a large number of adherents. 
His uncle, Chosroes, who had received the throne of 
Armenia from Artabanus, espoused his cause, gave the 
Parthian refugees an asylum in his kingdom, and even 
fought a battle with Artaxerxes in their defence. In 
this he was so far victorious that the Persian found 
it necessary to retreat, and retire to his own dominions 
in order to augment his forces. But the struggle was 
too unequal for long continuance. Within a very few 
years of its commencement the contest was everywhere 
ended ; the arms of Artaxerxes prevailed, and the 
Parthian Empire was overthrown. All the provinces 



368 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

submitted ; the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands 
of the Persian king ; and the founder of the new- 
dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule by taking 
to wife an Arsacid princess. 

The duration of the Parthian monarchy was a little 
short of five centuries. It commenced about B.C. 250, 
and it terminated in A.D. 227. It was the rule of a 
vigorous tribe of Tatar or Turkic extraction over a 
mixed population, chiefly of Semitic or Arian race, 
and, for the most part, more advanced in civilisation 
than their rulers. Though its organisation was loose, 
it was not ill -adapted for Orientals, who prefer a flexible 
system to one where everything is " cut and dry," and 
are opposed to all that is stiff and bureaucratic. 
Western Asia must be considered to have enjoyed 
a time of comparative rest under the Parthian 
sovereignty, and to have been as prosperous as at 
almost any other period of its history. The savage 
hordes of Northern Asia and Europe were, in the 
main, kept off; and, though the arms of Rome from 
time to time ravaged the more western provinces, and 
even occasionally penetrated to the capital, yet this 
state of things was exceptional ; for the most part 
European aggression w^as averted, or quickly repulsed ; 
very few conquests were made, and when they were 
made, they were not always retained ; and to the last 
the limits of the Parthian dominion remained almost 
the same as they had been under the first Mithridates. 
Still, there was no doubt a gradual internal decay, 
which worked itself out especially in two directions. 
The Arsacid race, with which the idea of the empire 
was closely bound up, instead of clinging together in 



ITS DURATION AND CHARACTER. 369 

that close " union " which constitutes true " strength," 
allowed itself to be torn to pieces by dissensions, to 
waste its force in quarrels, and to be made a handle 
of by every foreign invader or domestic rebel who 
chose to use its name in order to cloak his own selfish 
projects. The race itself does not seem to have become 
exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the 
throne, never sank into mere weaklings or fainemtts, 
never shut themselves up in their seraglios, or ceased 
to take an active and leading part, alike in civil broils 
and in struggles with foreign princes. Artabanus, the 
adversary of Artaxerxes, was as brave and capable a 
monarch as had ever sat upon the Parthian throne in 
previous ages. But the hold which the race had on 
the population, native and foreign, was gradually 
weakened by the feuds which raged within it, by the 
profusion with which the sacred blood was shed by 
those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of 
knowing which living member of it was its true head, 
and so entitled to the allegiance of all those who 
wished to be faithful Parthian subjects. Further, the 
vigour of the Parthian soldiery must have gradually 
declined, and their superiority over the mass of the 
nations under their dominion must have diminished. 
Marked evidence was given of this when, about A.D. 
75, Hyrcania became independent ; and it is possible 
that there may have been other cases of successful 
rebellions in the remoter eastern regions. Oriental 
races, when they are suddenly lifted to power, almost 
always decline in strength, and sometimes with 
extreme rapidity. The Parthians cannot be said to 
have experienced a rapid deterioration ; but they too, 



370 DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE. 

like the dominant races of Western Asia, both before 
and after them, felt in course of time the softening 
influence of luxury, and had to yield their place 
to those who had maintained manlier and hardier 
habits. 




XXIII. 

PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

" The Parthians," according to one writer of high 
repute, "have left no material traces of their exis- 
tence." I When the Achsemenian Persians were 
struck down by Alexander, " the old arts," he says, 
" disappeared from the Mesopotamian world." It 
would be strange indeed if so broad a statement 
could be justified, when made of any time or of any 
distinguished people. Roughly and coarsely, no 
doubt, it embodies a certain curious and important 
fact — the fact, namely, that the Parthians were, in no 
full or pregnant sense of the terms, either builders or 
proficients in any of the fine arts. But it is an over- 
statement, a very considerable exaggeration. The 
position held by the Parthians in numismatics should, 
alone have been sufficient to save them from the 
undeserved reproach, since numismatists have long 
had under their notice many hundred types of coins 
issued from Parthian mints during the five centuries 
of their sovereignty, and have assigned to several of 
them a fair amount of merit. Careful inquiry shows, 
as might have been expected, that in other branches 

' See Fergusson, " History of Architecture," vol, ii. p. 422. 

373 



PARTHIAN ARCHITECTURE. 373 

of art also, and especially in architecture, Parthia 
made efforts and produced results not wholly des- 
picable. 

The remains at Hatra, or El Hadhr, are the most 
imposing which can reasonably be assigned to the 
Parthian period. Hatra first comes into notice in the 
early part of the first century before Christ, and is 
then a place of no small importance. It successfully 
resists Trajan in A.D. 116, and Severus in A.D. 198. 
It is then described as a large and populous city, 
defended by strong and extensive walls, and contain- 
ing within it a famous Temple of the Sun, celebrated 
for the great value of its accumulated offerings. The 
people are regarded as of the Arabian stock, and 
they have their own kings, who are tributary monarchs 
under Parthia. By the year A.D. 363, Hatra has 
gone to ruins, and it is then described as " long since 
deserted." ^ It plays no part at all in Sassanian 
history, and clearly has for its most flourishing 
period the last century, or century and a quarter, of 
the Parthian rule, from A.D. 100 to A.D. 226. 

The ruins of El Hadhr have been carefully described 
by two English travellers, Mr. Ross and Mr. Ains- 
worth, whose accounts will be found in the ninth 
and eleventh volumes of the " Geographical Society's 
Journal." They have also attracted the attention of 
a professional critic, Mr. James Fergusson, who has 
given a description of them, with one or two wood- 
cuts, in his " History of Architecture." The following 
account rests especially on the two former — the only 
original — authorities. 

' Ammianus Mavcellinus, xxv. 8. 



374 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

The city of Hatra was circular in shape, and nearly 
an English mile in diameter. It was enclosed by a wall, 
ten feet in thickness, built of large square-cut stones, 
and strengthened at intervals of about a hundred and 
seventy yards by square towers or bastions. Its cir- 
cumference considerably exceeded three miles. Out- 
side the bastioned wall was a broad and deep ditch, 

of •tJ^® City o^ . 




and on the further side of the ditch an earthen 
rampart of considerable size and thickness. The 
wall was pierced by four gateways, of which the 
principal faced the east. Two detached forts, situated 
on eminences, commanded the approaches to the city, 
one of them lying towards the east and the other 
towards the north. 



BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HATRA. 375 

Within the walled enclosure the circular space was 
divided into two parts by a water-course, which 
crossed it from north to south, nearly midway in 
the circle, but somewhat more towards its eastern 
portion. The city proper lay west of the water- 
course. Here were the public edifices, and the 
houses of the more opulent inhabitants. The space 
towards the east was used chiefly as a necropolis, 
though a certain number of buildings were interspersed 
among the graves. Almost in the centre of the circle 
stood a walled enclosure, nearly square in plan, and 
fronting the cardinal points, having a length of about 
eight hundred feet from west to east, with a width 01 
about seven hundred. Strong bastions, similar in 
character to those of the outer circle, flanked the wall 
at intervals along its entire course. The space within 
was again subdivided by a wall running north and 
south into an outer and an inner court. The outer, 
which lay towards the east, and was rather the larger 
of the two, was wholly unencumbered by buildings, 
while the inner contained two considerable edifices. 
One of these, and the less important of the two, 
stretched from north to south across the entire 
enclosure, and abutted upon the wall which divided 
the two courts. It was confused in plan, and seems 
to have consisted only of a number of small apart- 
ments, which have been conjectured to have been 
" guard-rooms." The other building was, however, 
one of considerable pretension ; and it is from this 
mainly that we must form our conception of Par- 
thian architecture. 

The great Palace, or " Palace-Temple " of Hatra, as 



3/6 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

it has been called, was an edifice three hundred and 
sixty feet long by two hundred and ten feet broad in 
the broadest part. It consisted of a series of seven 
oblong vaulted halls, placed side by side longi- 
tudinally, with a certain number of smaller apart- 
ments, and one large building at the back. The 
halls were of various dimensions. The smaller ones, 




PLAN OF THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA. 

of which there were four (Nos. I., III., IV., and VI. 
on the plan), measured about sixty feet long by 
twenty wide, and had a height of thirty feet. Two 
of the larger ones (Nos. II. and V. on the plan) 
measured ninety feet in length, and were from thirty- 
five to forty feet broad, with a height of sixty feet. 
One (No. VII. on the plan), with a width of forty- 



BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HATRA. 377 

five, had a length of not much above seventy feet. 
Variety in the size of the halls was thus carefully 
studied, while the shape was almost identical, and 
the plan of construction the same throughout. " All 
the halls were roofed by semicircular tunnel-vaults, 
without ribs or other ornaments ; and they were all 
entirely open in front, all the light and air being 
admitted from the one end." ^ The outer and party 
walls were alike thick ; the doorways connecting 
apartments were awkwardly narrow, and their 
position in the walls which they pierced was irregular 
and unsymmetrical. The small apartments behind 
the halls received no light, except from these narrow 
doorways, and must have been almost absolutely 
dark. 

The large building attached to the series of halls 
at the back lay directly behind the second hall, from 
which there was an opening into it. This building 
consisted of a single chamber, square in shape, and 
measuring about forty feet each way, surrounded on 
all sides by a vaulted passage, into which light 
penetrated from two windows, situated at its south- 
west and north-west angles, and from a doorway in 
the middle of the western wall. The chamber, how^- 
ever, which the passage surrounded, could only be 
entered from the east, where, directly opposite to 
the communication with Hall No. II., was a doorway 
surmounted by a magnificent frieze. Above a row 
of acanthus leaves, delicately carved, was placed an 
ornamentation of inverted gradines, on which followed 
a line of oval rings, each containing an oval ball in the 

^ Fergusson, " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 424. 



SyS PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

centre. Immediately over this was a line of emblematic 
figures — griffins, eagles, human and animal heads, and 
the like — as will be best understood by the accompany- 
ing representation, which is taken from a drawing by 
Mr. Ross. Crowning the whole was a cornice projecting 
slightly, and covered with a sort of arabesque or scroll- 
work. Among the emblematic heads is one, which 
so manifestly represents the Sun-God, that the build- 
ing has been generally recognised as a temple to that 
deity. Mr. Fergusson, however, thinks that it " more 




FRIEZE IN THE PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA. 

probably contained a stair or inclined plane, leading 
to the roof or upper rooms, which almost certainly 
existed over the smaller halls at least." ^ 

The chief ornamentation, however, of the Hatra 
" Palace-Temple " was on its eastern 'facade, which 
was evidently its main front. Here the seven con- 
secutive arches of the basement storey, which is all 
that now exists, formed in themselves no mean adorn- 
ment, and this was heightened in several ways by 
artistic additions. In the first place, the arches 

^ Fergusson's "History of Architecture," vol. ii, p. 424. 



BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HATHA. 2>79 

sprang from pillars, or rather pilasters, having bases 
and capitals of some elegance, the number of such 
pilasters along the entire front amounting to sixteen. 
Secondly, the stones composing the archivolts of the 
arches bore a human head, or mask, under a cornice 
of ovals and acanthus leaves, which gave a very- 
peculiar character to the edifice, and has no exact 
parallel elsewhere. " The only thing known at all 
similar," says Mr. Fergusson, " is the celebrated arch 
at Volterra with three masks ; but here these are 
infinitely more numerous over all the arches, and 
form in fact the principal features of the decora- 
tions." ^ Further, in the spaces be- 
tween the pilasters were, in some 
cases, sculptures representing embla- 
matic figures, as griffins, and the like. 
Internally, the halls had, for the 
most part, no ornamentation. The 
four smaller ones were absolutely stones of archi- 
devoid of it, while even the larger volts. 

ones had only a scanty amount. The longer sides of 
the halls II. and V. were broken by three squared 
pilasters, rising to the commencement of the vaulting, 
and terminated by a quasi-capital of ornamental work, 
consisting of a series of alternate ovals and lozenges, 
each oval containing in its centre a ball of dark stone. 
Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of 
between two and three feet, ran a cornice, which 
crossed the pilasters, and extended the whole length 
of the apartment, sometimes ornamented with flowers 
and half-ovals, sometimes with alternate ovals and 

' Fergusson's " History of Architecture," vol. ii. p. 425. 




380 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 



lozenges. Finally, on the pilasters, immediately 
below the cornice, were sculptured either two or 
three human heads, the length of each head being 
about two feet, and the faces representing various 
types of humanity, some old and some young, some 




PILASTER AT HATRA, WITH CORNICE AND CAPITAL. 

male and some female, some apparently realistic, some 
idealised and more or less grotesque in their accompani- 
ments. The drawing of the heads is said to be full 
of spirit and their general effect lifelike and striking. 
No. VII. had a peculiar ornamentation. In lieu of 



BUILDINGS AT AL HADHR, OR HATHA. 381 

pilasters and cornices, the two side walls appear to 
have been decorated with two rows of eight human- 
headed bulls standing out from the wall as far as their 
shoulders at a distance from the ground of about ten 
feet. Similar figures of lions are found occasionally 
in Phoenicia, but otherwise the ornamentation is very 
unusual. 

It is believed by Mr. Fergusson and others, that 




PROPOSED RESTORATION OF THE HATRA BUILDING. 

the entire edifice, or at any rate the greater portion of 
it, had originally an upper story. At present the 
ruins nowhere attain a height much exceeding sixty 
feet ; but it is thought that this height was, originally, 
at least doubled, either a single story, or two stories, 
containing apartments, being superimposed upon the 
existing range of vaulted halls. One explorer ^ 
thought that he found some remains of the staircase, 
which conducted to these upper apartments, at the 
southern extremity of the building. If we accept 

' Mr. Ross. 



382 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

the view of this traveller, we may suppose, with 
another explorer,^ that the entire eastern fagade of the 
edifice presented some such appearance as shown on 
page 381, and conclude that the type of architecture, 
which is entirely different from any previously known 
in the country, either under the Assyrians, the Baby- 
lonians, or the Achsemenian Persians, was an inven- 
tion of the Parthian period, though whether struck 
out by the Parthians themselves, or by one of the 
nations subjected to their sway, may be doubted. The 
type appears to be the germ out of which the Sas- 
sanian architecture, well known for its magnificence, 
grew up, and may be said to have held possession of 
Mesopotamia and the adjacent countries from about 
A.D. 150 to A.D. 640, when it was superseded by the 
architecture of the Arabs. 

The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been 
said to have been " Roman or Byzantine," and the 
details are declared to be in many cases " almost literal 
imitations of Roman models." ^ This may well be, 
since Rome was, at the time of their erection, 
universally recognised as standing at the head of 
civilisation and the arts, so that the builders of other 
nations naturally went to her for instruction. But the 
plan of the Hatra building is certainly not Roman ; 
and it is allowed that the execution of the ornaments is 
too rude to admit of the idea, that the work was done 
under the superintendence of a Roman artist. Native 
talent alone can have been employed ; and there is 
every reason for considering that we may regard the 

' Mr. Ainsworth. 

^ Fergusson, "History of Architecture," vol. ii. pp. 424-5. 



ARCHITECTURAL FRAGMENTS AT WARKA. 383 

work as a fair specimen of what was achieved by the 
native builders of the Parthian period during the latter 
times of the empire. The palace of Vologases III. 
at Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his 
invasion,! was probably of the same general character, 
a combination of lofty halls, suitable for ceremonies 
and audiences, with small and dark sleeping or living 
rooms, opening out of them, the whole placed in the 
middle of a paved court, with ready access to a chapel 
or temple, where the devotions of the Court might be 
performed. 

It must be added that the halls and rooms of the 
Hatra edifice are divided into two groups. Halls I., 
II., and III, with the apartments in their rear, are 
inter-connected, and form one group. Halls IV., V., 
VI., and VII., form the other. A low fence, starting 
from the wall separating between Halls III. and IV., 
was carried in a straight line, eastAvard, across the 
court in front of the building, to the wall separating 
the inner court from the outer. Thus there could be 
no communication between the two groups of apart- 
ments excepting by making a long circuit round almost 
the entire edifice. It is thought that the two groups 
formed, respectively, the male and the female apart- 
ments. 

Some architectural fragments, discovered by Mr. 
Loftus at Warka (the ancient Erech), in combination 
with a large number of Parthian coins, and therefore 
possessing a claim to be regarded as Parthian, seem 
to deserve micntion in this place. They consisted 
of fragments of cornices, capitals, bases of columns, 
^ See above, p. 326. 



384 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

friezes, fragments of open -screen work, with compli- 
cated geometric designs of different patterns on the 
opposite sides, large flakes of painted plaster, and the 
like. Most of the capitals resembled those of the 
Greek Ionic order, but presented peculiarities in the 
proportions of the volutes and other members. Some, 
however, were of an altogether peculiar type. One in 
particular, which, though square at the summit, must 
have crowned a round column, is especially remarkable. 
" A large and elegant leaf rises from the necking, and 
bends under each corner of the abacus. Springing 




ARCHITECTURAL FRAGMENTS AT WARKA. 

from behind a smaller curled leaf in the centre is the 
bust of a human figure, wearing the same preposter- 
ous head-dress which is characteristic of the (Parthian) 
slipper coffins, and the Parthian coins." ^ Other 
capitals had crowned square pillars, and were orna- 
mented with ovals, and half- ovals, rosettes, leaves 
resembling those of the oak, circles containing geome- 
trical tracery, and. the like. One large fragment of a 
cornice bore, among other devices, a spirited crouch- 
ing griffin, which reminded the discoverer of the 

' Loftus, " Chaldffia and Susiana," p. 226. 



PARTHIAN FICTILE ART. 385 

similar figures sculptured on the Temple frieze at 
Hatra.i Some of the friezes had a decoration con- 
sisting of alternate vine-leaves and bunches of grapes. 

The building, within which these fragments were 
discovered, was a rectangular chamber forty feet long 
by twenty-eight feet wide, the mud walls of which, 
still standing to the height of four feet, had been 
covered originally with painted plaster of various 
hues, and further adorned with small Ionic half 
columns. The columns had half-smooth and half- 
fluted shafts. The lower portion of each was smooth, 
and had been striped diagonally with bands of red, 
green, yellow, and black ;♦ the upper portion was 
fluted, the flutes being painted black, red, and yellow 
alternately, while the level ridges between them were 
painted white. Underneath the floor of the chamber, 
at the depth of six feet, was discovered a " slipper- 
coffin " of the type so common at Warka, bearing em- 
bossed figures on its upper surface of a type generally 
regarded as Parthian. The building would thus seem 
to have been a sepulchral chamber erected over a 
tomb, such as is found so frequently in Phoenicia and 
Egypt. 

The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has 
also received considerable illustration from the re- 
mains discovered at Warka. These included several 
statuettes modelled in terra-cotta ; a vast number of 
slipper-coffins ; many jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in 
earthenware ; some small glass bottles ; and various 
personal ornaments, such as armlets, bangles, beads for 
necklaces and fillets, finger-rings, ear-rings, and toe- 

* Compare above, p. 378. 



386 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

rings. Of the statuettes the most interesting is one 
representing a Parthian warrior, recumbent, and leaning 
upon his left arm, wearing a coat-of-mail or padded 
tunic reaching to the knees, greaves, and a helmet orna- 
mented in front. Others represented females : these 
had lofty head-dresses, which sometimes rose into 
two peaks or horns, recalling the costume of English 
ladies in the time of Henry IV. These figures were 
veiled, and carefully draped about the upper part of 





PARTHIAN JUGS AND JARS. 

the person, but showed the face, and had the legs bare 
from the knee downwards. 

The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in earthenware 
greatly resembled those of the Assyrian and Babylo- 
nian periods, but were on the whole more elegant and 
artistic. The influence of Greek models is apparent 
in them. One jug, the central one of the engraving, 
is of " extremely artistic form," ^ and was placed in 
a recess, within arm's length of a coffin, probably for 



^ Loftus, " Chaldeea and Susiana," p. 213. 



PARTHIAN FICTILE ART 



387 




388 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

the refreshment of the deceased. The lamps repro- 
duce well-known Greek types. 

The " slipper-coffins " found at Warka possess a 
peculiar interest. They are of a very beautiful green 
glazed ware, and vary in length from three feet to six. 
Great skill in pottery must have been required for 
their construction. The upper surface presents at one 
end a large oval aperture, by means of which the body 
was passed into the interior — an aperture which is 
furnished with a depressed ledge for the reception of 
a lid, which exactly fitted it, and was firmly fixed in 
its place by a layer of lime cement. At the lower ex- 
tremity was a semicircular hole, to prevent the burst- 
ing of the coffin by the gases disengaged during 
decomposition. Both the lid which closed the large 
aperture, and the remainder of the upper surface of 
the coffin, were ordinarily divided by elevated ridges 
into small rectangular compartments, each containing 
an embossed figure of a man, standing with his arms 
akimbo and his legs astride, with a short sword hang- 
ing from his belt, and on his head an enormous 
coiffure of a very curious appearance. 

The personal ornaments were in many cases of 
tasteful and elegant design. Tall pointed head- 
dresses in thin gold are said to have been not uncom- 
mon, and one or two broad ribbons of thin gold not 
unfrequently occurred in the tombs, depending on 
either side of the head. Gold and silver finger-rings 
abounded, and some had stones set in them. Bead- 
necklaces were found, together with armlets, bangles, 
and toe-rings of silver, brass, and copper. Many of 
the ear-rings were exceedingly elegant, and small 



PARTHIAN MSTHETIC ART. 



389 



gold plates, which seem to have been strung together 
for necklaces or fillets, were very delicately modelled. 

The glass bottles were perhaps lachrymatories. 
They closely resemble glass-work of the Assyrian 
and Babylonian periods, and exhibit the same irides- 
cent hues which are the result of slow decomposition. 
The commonest shape is a rounded belly, surmounted 
by a short, round neck, having a small handle on 
Qither side of it, but flattened so that the smaller 
diameter of the bottle is less than one-third of the 
greater one. 

In purely aesthetic art — art, that is, into which the 
idea of the useful does not enter at all — the Parthians 




PARTHIAN PERSONAL ORNAMENTS. 



appear to have been very deficient. Beyond the 
statuettes, in clay and terra-cotta, which have been 
already described/ no figures " in the round " can be 
ascribed to them. Nor are there more than three or 
four reliefs which have much claim to be pronounced 
Parthian. One alone is undisputable. At the foot of 
the great rock of Behistun, which exhibits at the height 
of many feet above the plain the long inscription, and 
remarkable sculpture, of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, 
is a much-worn sculpture in a/^o relievo, which is 
proved by the inscription accompanying it to belong to 

^ See above, p. 386. 



390 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

the second reign of Gotarzes (A.D. 46-51), and which 
was almost certainly set up by that monarch after his 
defeat of the pretender, Meherdates.^ It seems to 
have contained a series of tall figures, looking towards 
the right, and apparently engaged in a march or pro- 
cession, while above and between them were smaller 
figures of men on horseback, armed with lances, and 
galloping in the same direction. One of these was 
attended by a Nike, or figure of Victory, floating in 
the air, and about to place a diadem around the rider's 
brow. The present condition of the sculpture is ex- 
ceedingly bad. Time and atmospheric influences have 
almost completely worn away the larger figures, which 
the latest travellers appear not even to have perceived ; 
and a recent governor of Kirmanshah has barbarously 
inserted into the middle of the relief an arched niche, 
in which he has placed a wholly worthless Arabic 
inscription. Under these circumstances, there is a 
difficulty in forming any opinion on the original 
artistic merit of the work ; but the best judges are 
agreed in pronouncing that, even at its best, it must 
have been a work of inferior quality, falling consider- 
ably below the level attained by the Assyrian and even 
the Achaemenian artists. The resemblance is rather 
to the productions of the Sassanian, or New-Persian, 
period. The human figures have aheaviness and clumsi- 
ness about them which it is painful to contemplate ; the 
horses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the 
men who ride them ; the figure of Victory is out of all 
proportion to that of the hero whom she crowns, 
and the diadem which she places upon his head is 

' Supra, p. 267. 



PARTHIAN RELIEFS. 391 

ridiculously large, being almost as big as herself ! On 
the other hand, there is spirit in the attitude both of 
men and horses ; the Victory floats well in mid-air ; 
and the relief is free from the coarse grotesqueness 
which is so offensive in the greater part of the Sassa- 
nian sculptures. 

Another relief, belonging probably to a later 
period, after the Parthians had adopted a Semitic 
instead of the Greek character, has the Sassanian 
defects still more accentuated. It represents a king 
mounted on horseback, and receiving a chaplet at the 
hands of a subject. The king wears a low cap bound 
round with the diadem, the two long ends of which 
depend over his shoulder. He is dressed in a closely 
fitting tunic and loose trousers, and wears also a short 
cloak, fastened under his chin, and reaching nearly to 
the knee. On his right arm he seems to carry a 
bracelet ; and his feet are encased in boots. The 
horse which he bestrides is small but strongly made ; 
the tail is long ; the ears seem to be cropped, and the 
mane plaited. The whole representation is rude and 
clumsy, the forepart of the horse, and the Parthian 
who offers the chaplet, being particularly ill drawn. 
The relief is accompanied by an inscription in the 
Parthian (Semitic) character. 

A series of reliefs, discovered by the Baron de Bode 
in the Bakhtyari mountains in the year 1841, is also 
generally regarded by those best acquainted with 
the subject as Parthian. In one of these a hunter, 
mounted on horseback, and armed with a bow and 
arrows and a sword, or short spear, is engaged in 
combat with a bear, The bear raises itself qu its 



392 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

hind legs to a level with the horse's head, and 
advances boldly to the attack. The hunter, who is 
clothed simply in a long flowing robe, like a dressing- 
gown, and a rounded cap, leans forward on his horse 
to meet the angry animal, and thrusts his sword, or 
spear, whichever it may be, into its neck. The horse 
shows no alarm, but ambles gently to the encounter. 
The execution is somewhat rude, but the figures are 
fairly well drawn, if we except the head of the house. 
Another relief on the same rock shows a female 
figure reclining on a couch, and guarded by three 
male attendants, one at the head of the couch, 
unarmed, and the remaining two at its foot, seated, 
and armed with spears. The female has puffed-out 
hair, and carries in her right hand, which is out- 
stretched, a chaplet or wreath. One of the spearmen 
has a curious rayed head-dress ; the other has a short 
streamer attached to the head of his spear. Below 
the main group are three rudely carved standing 
figures, which represent probably other attendants. 
The third relief of the series is the largest and most 
elaborate. It shows us a personage of importance, 
perhaps a Magus, engaged in what seems to be a 
religious ceremonial, standing with his right arm 
elevated by the side of a cippus, adorned with 
wreaths or chaplets, and mounted upon a threefold 
pedestal. Fifteen spectators are present, arranged in 
two rows, one above the other, and all of them, except 
the first in each row, standing. The first in each row 
sits upon a rudely designed chair or stool. A 
religious function is probably represented. We can 
scarcely fail to recognise in the principal figure, who 



GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THEIR ART. 393 

wears a conical cap, has his hair puffed out in 
enormous masses on either side of the head, Hke the 
kings upon the later coins, and is altogether richly 
costumed, a priest of the Parthian religion, probably 
a great hierarch, engaged in one of the duties of his 
office. Perhaps we may best regard the set of reliefs 
as forming a connected series, No. 1, representing the 
Parthian monarch occupied in the chase of the bear ; 
No. II. the queen awaiting his return on her couch in 
the midst of her attendants ; and No. III. exhibiting 
the chief Magus attached to the Court making prayer 
for the monarch's safety. 

Altogether, the Parthians cannot be said to have 
shown more than a very moderate degree of artistic 
or aesthetic talent. Their architecture is their best 
point ; and even that falls far below the architecture 
of the other dominant races of Western Asia, whether 
before or after them, whether Assyrians, Babylonians, 
Achaemenian Persians, Sassanian Persians, Mongols, 
or Arabs. Their glyptic art is even worse, and, con- 
sidering that they had access, not only to Assyrian 
and Achaemenian, but also, in some degree, to Greek 
models, must be regarded as possessing a very low 
amount of merit. A certain number of their coins are 
fairly good, and one or two of their reliefs, though rude 
and clumsy, have spirit. But, speaking generally, we 
must admit that the vocation of the people was not 
towards the artistic, and that they were probably well- 
advised to employ their energies in other directions. 
The scant remains of their art are an indication that 
they recognised their own deficiencies, and, conscious 
that it was not in their power to excel in the aesthetic 



394 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

field, preferred to occupy themselves in pursuits for 
which they were better fitted, as war, hunting, and 
government. 

Not much can be said on the subject of the 
Parthian religion. It seems probable that, under 
the Achaemenian Persians, they submitted to the 
Zoroastrian system, as maintained by the princes of 
the house of Cyrus from Xerxes downwards ; but, as 
this was certainly not their own ancestral religion, 
they cannot be supposed to have been at any time 
very zealous followers of the Bactrian prophet. As 
age succeeded age, they naturally became more luke- 
warm in their feelings, and more lax in their religious 
observance. . The main characteristic — the essence, if 
we may so call it — of the Zoroastrian belief, was 
Dualism — recognition of Two Great Principles of 
good and evil, called respectively Ormazd and Ahri- 
man. We need not doubt that, with their lips, the 
Parthians from first to last admitted this antagonism, 
and professed a belief in Ormazd as the supreme god, 
and a dread of Ahriman and his ministers. But, prac- 
tically, their religious aspirations rested, not on these 
dim abstractions, but on beings whose existence they 
could better realise, and whom they could feel to be 
less remote from themselves. The actual devotions of 
the Parthians were rendered to the Sun and Moon, to 
deities which were supposed to preside over the Ro3^al 
House, and to ancestral idols, which each family 
possessed, and conveyed with it from place to place 
with every change of habitation. The Sun was 
saluted at his rising, was worshipped in temples, 
probably under the Arian name of Mithra, with 



POSITION OF THE MAGI IN PARTHIA. 395 

sacrifices and offerings ; had statues erected in his 
honour, and was usually associated with the lesser 
luminary.! Xhe deities of the Royal House were 
probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, like the 
bagdJia vithiya of the Persians, or else the ancestors 
of the reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity 
seems to have been assigned in the later times of the 
empire. The Parthian kings usually swore by these 
deities on solemn occasions, and other members of the 
royal family made use of the same oath. The main 
worship, however, of the great mass of the people, 
even when they were of the royal stock, was con- 
centrated upon ancestral images, which had a place 
sacred to them in each house, and received the 
constant adoration of the household. 

In the early times of the empire the Magi were 
held in high repute, and most of the peculiar tenets 
and rites of the Magian religion were professed and 
followed by the Parthians. Elemental worship was 
practised. Fire was held sacred, and there was an 
especial reverence for rivers. Dead bodies were not 
burned, but were exposed to be devoured by birds 
and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones were 
collected and placed in tombs. The Magi formed a 
large portion of the great national council,^ which 
elected, and, if need were, deposed the kings. But, in 
course of time, much laxity was introduced. The 
Arsacid monarchs of Armenia allowed the Sacred 
Fire of Ormazd, which ought to have been kept 
continually burning, to go out ; and we can scarcely 

' See the "Armenian History " of Moses of Chorene, ii. 74. 
' Compare above, Chap. V. p. 78, 



396 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

suppose but that the Parthian Arsacidae were equally 
negligent. Religious respect for the element of fire 
so entirely passed away, that we hear of the later 
Parthians burning their dead.^ The Magi fell into 
disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the 
national council, at any rate found themselves despised 
and deprived of influence.^ The later Parthian 
religion can have been little more than a worship 
of the Sun and Moon, together with a cult of the 
teraphivi, or sacred images, which were the most 
precious possessions of each household. 

The manners and customs of the Parthians may be 
most conveniently considered under the two heads of 
their customs in war and in peace. As they were 
essentially a warlike people, the chief interest must 
attach to their military customs, and to these will 
therefore be assigned the foremost place. It appears 
that, like the European monarchs of the feudal times, 
they did not regard it as necessary to maintain any 
standing army. When hostilities threatened, and 
war seemed likely to break out, the king made his 
immediate vassals acquainted with the fact, and 
demanded from each of them a contingent. A certain 
rendezvous was named, and all were required to meet 
together on a certain day. The troops thus summoned 
were of two kinds, native and foreign. The governors 
of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, 
called out the military strength of their respective 
districts, saw to their arming and provisioning, and, 
marching each at the head of his contingent, brought 
a foreign auxiliary force to the assistance of their 
^ Herodian, iv. 30, ^ Agathias, ii. 26, 



CUSTOMS IN WAR. 397 

suzerain. But the backbone of the army, the 
portion on which alone much rehance was placed, 
consisted of Parthians. Each ParthiaK noble was 
bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm 
and equip them at his own expense, and bring them 
to the general rendezvous by the time fixed upon. 
The number of troops brought into the field by each 
noble varied according to his position and his means ; 
we hear in one instance of their amounting to ten 
thousand,^ while in another recorded case ^ the average 
number which each of them provided did not exceed 
125. The various contingents had their own baggage 
trains, consisting ordinarily of camels, in the propor- 
tion (as it would seem) of one to every ten fighting 
men. 

The Parthian armies, like most others, consisted 
usually of both horse and foot, but in proportions 
which were not common elsewhere. The foot 
soldiers were comparatively few in number, and 
were but very little esteemed. Every effort, on the 
contrary, was made to increase the number and 
improve the equipment of the horsemen who bore the 
brunt of every conflict, and from whose exertions 
alone victory was expected. Sometimes armies con- 
sisted of horsemen only, or rather of horsemen 
followed by a baggage train composed of camels and 
chariots ; but this only happened under special 
circumstances. 

The horse was of two kinds, heavy and light. The 
heavy horsemen (/cara^pa/crot) wore coats of mail 
reaching to the knee, composed of raw hide covered 

^ Plutarch, " Vit. Crass.," i. § 21. ^Justin, xli. 2. 




PARTHIAN HELMET. 



CUSTOMS IN WAR. 399 

with plates or scales of iron or steel, very bright, 
and capable of resisting a strong blow. They had 
their heads protected by burnished helmets of Mar- 
gian steel, whose glitter dazzled the spectator. A 
specimen in the British Museum, figured by Professor 
Gardner, will best convey the shape. They do not 
seem to have ordinarily worn greaves, but had their 
legs encased in a loose trouser, which hung about the 
ankles and embarrassed the feet, if by any chance the 
horseman was induced or forced to dismount. They 
carried no targe or shield, being sufficiently defended 
by their coats of mail. Their chief offensive arms 
were a spear (k6vto<;), which was of great strength 
and thickness, and a bow and arrows of unusual 
dimensions. They likewise carried in their girdle a 
short sword or knife (fxa')(aipa), which was intended 
to be used in close combat. Their horses were, like 
themselves, protected by a defence of scale-armour, 
which was either of steel or of bronze, polished like 
the armour of the men. 

The light horse appears to have been armed with 
the same sort of bows and arrows as the heavy 
cavalry, but carried no spear, and was not encumbered 
with armour. It was carefully trained to the deft 
management of the horse and bow, and was unequalled 
in the rapidity and dexterity of its movements. The 
archer delivered his arrows with as much precision and 
force in retreat as in advance, and was almost more 
feared when he retired than when he charged his foe. 
Besides his bow and arrows, the light horseman 
seems to have carried a sword, and he no doubt wore 
also the customary knife in his belt ; but it was as an 
archer that he was chiefly formidable. 



400 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

During the later period of the monarchy, the 
Parthians, who had always ennployed camels largely 
in the conveyance of stores and baggage, are said to 
have introduced a camel corps into the army itself, 
and to have derived considerable advantage from the 
new arm. The camels could bear the weight of the 
mailed riders and of their own armour better than 
horses ; and their riders were at once less accessible 
in their elevated position, and more capable of dealing 
effective blows upon the enemy. As a set-off, how- 
ever, against these advantages, the spongy feet of the 
camel were found to be more readily injured by the 
tribulus or caltrop than the harder feet of the horse, 
and the corps was thus more easily disabled than 
an equal force of cavalry, if it could be tempted or 
forced to pass over ground on which these obstacles 
had previously been scattered. 

We do not hear of any use of chariots by the 
Parthians, except for the conveyance of the females 
who commonly accompanied the nobles on their 
warlike expeditions. The wives and concubines of 
the chiefs followed the camp in great numbers, and 
women of a less reputable class — singers, dancers, and 
musicians — swelled the ranks of the supernumeraries. 
Many of these were Greeks from Seleucia, Nice- 
phorium, and other Macedonian settlements. The 
commissariat and baggage departments are said to 
have been badly organised,^ but some thousands of 
baggage camels always accompanied an army for the 
conveyance of stores and provisions. Of these a 
considerable portion were laden with arrows, of which 

' Dio Cassius, xl. 15. 



PARTHIAN TACTICS. 40I 

the supply was in this way rendered practically 
inexhaustible. The employment of the elephant in 
war was even more rare in Parthia than that of 
the chariot. Parthian coins occasionally exhibit the 
creature ^ ; so that it was certainly known to the 
people, but its actual employment in warefare is 
mentioned on one occasion only,^ and then we hear 
of only a single animal, which is ridden by the 
monarch. As both the Seleucid princes and the 
Sassanida; made large use of the elephant in their 
campaigns, its entire neglect by the Parthians is 
somewhat remarkable. Probably the unwieldy 
creature was regarded by them as too heavy and 
clumsy to suit the light and rapid movements of 
their armies, and was therefore almost wholly disused 
during the period of their supremacy. 

The Parthian tactics appear to have been of a 
simple kind, and to have differed but little from 
those of other nations in the same region which have 
depended mainly on their cavalry. To surround 
their foe, to entangle him and involve him in diffi- 
culties, to cut of his supplies and his stragglers, 
and ultimately to bring him into a position where 
he might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aim 
of all Parthian commanders of any mihtary ability. 
Their warfare was suited for defence rather than for 
attack, unless against contemptible enemies. They 
were particularly inefficient in sieges, and avoided 
engaging in them as far as possible ; but when cir- 

' Lindsay, " History and Coinage of the Parthians," pi. vii., No. 11 ; 
pi. viii., No. 30: Markoff, " Arsac. Monet." Tab. iii., No. 2, 
^ Tacit., "Ann.," xv. 15. 



402 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

cumstances made it necessary, they did not shrink 
from undertaking the uncongenial operation. Long 
wars were very distasteful to them ; and, if they did 
not find victory tolerably easy they were apt to retire 
and allow their foe to escape, or to baffle him by 
withdrawing their forces into a distant and inaccessible 
region. After their early victories over Crassus and 
Antony, they never succeeded in preventing the 
steady advance of a Roman force into their territory, 
or in repulsing a determined attack upon their 
principal capital. Still they generally had their 
revenge after a little time. It was easy for the 
Romans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it was not 
so easy for them to hold it ; and it was scarcely 
possible for them to retire from it after an occupation 
without incurring disaster. The clouds of Parthian 
horse hung upon their retrea ting columns, straitened 
them for provisions, galled them with missiles, and 
destroyed those who could not keep up with the 
main body. The towns, upon the line of their retreat, 
revolted and shut their gates, defying even such com- 
manders as Severus and Trajan. Of the six great 
expeditions of Rome against Parthia, one only, that 
of Avidius Cassius, was altogether successful. In 
every other case either the failure of the expedition 
was complete, or the glory of the advance was 
tarnished by suffering and calamity during the 
retreat. Other enemies they usually repulsed with but 
little difficulty. 

When the Parthians entered into battle it was with 
much noise and shouting. They made no use of 
trumpets or horns, but employed in their place the 



PARTHIAN TACTICS. 403 

kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the 
field when they made their onset. Their attack was — 
for the most part — furious. The mailed horsemen 
charged at speed, and (we are told) often drove 
their spears through the bodies of two enemies at 
a blow. The light horse, and the foot (when any 
were present), delivered their arrows with precision, 
and with extraordinary force. But if the assailants 
were met with a stout and firm resistance,, the first 
vigour of the attack was rarely long maintained. The 
Parthian warriors very quickly grew weary of an 
equal contest, and, if they could not force their enemy 
to give way, soon changed their tactics. Pretending 
panic, beating a hasty retreat, and scattering in their 
flight, they endeavoured to induce their foe to pursue 
hurriedly and in disorder, being themselves ready at 
any moment to turn and take advantage of the least 
appearance of confusion. If these tactics failed, as 
they generally did after they came to be known, then 
the simulated flight was commonly converted into 
a real one ; further conflict was for the time avoided, 
and the army withdrew itself into a distant region. 

If the Parthians wanted to parley with an enemy, 
they unstrung their bows and, advancing with the 
right arm outstretched, asked for a conference. They 
are accused by the Romans of sometimes using 
treachery on such occasions ; but, except in the single 
instance of Crassus, the charge of bad faith breaks 
down when it is examined into. On solemn occasions, 
when the intention was seriously to discuss grounds 
of complaint likely to lead to war, or to bring an 
actual war to an end by the arrangement of terms 



404 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

of peace, a formal meeting was ordinarily held by- 
appointment between the representatives of either 
side, generally on neutral ground, as on an island in the 
Euphrates, or on a bridge newly constructed across 
it. Here the chiefs or envoys of the respective nations 
met, accompanied by an equal number of guards, 
while the remainder of their forces occupied the two 
opposite banks of the river. Matters were discussed 
in friendly fashion, some language known to both 
parties being employed as a means of communication ; 
after which festivities usually took place, the two 
chiefs mutually entertaining each other, or accepting 
in common the hospitalities of a third party. The 
terms of peace agreed upon were reduced to writing ; 
hands were grasped as a sign that faith was pledged ; 
and oaths having been interchanged the conference 
broke up, and the chiefs with their armies set out on 
their return to their respective countries. 

The wonderful splendour of the Parthian Court is 
celebrated in general terms by several writers, but not 
many particulars have come down to us respecting it. 
We are told that it was migratory, moving from one 
of the chief cities of the empire to another at different 
seasons of the year; and that, owing to the vast numbers 
of the persons composing it, there was sometimes a diffi- 
culty in providing for their subsistence while they were 
upon the road. The Court comprised, of course, the 
usual extensive harem of an Oriental sovereign, con- 
sisting of a single recognised queen, and a multitude 
of secondary wives or concubines. The legitimate 
wife of the prince was with rare exceptions a native, 
and in most cases was a member of the royal race 



CUSTOAIS IN PEACE. 405 

of the Arsacidse ; but sometimes she was the daughter 
of a dependant monarch, and she might even be a 
slave, whom the royal favour had elevated from that 
position. Both wives and concubines remained 
ordinarily in the closest seclusion, and we have but 
little mention of them in the Parthian annals. In one 
instance however, at any rate, a queen, educated in 
the notions of the West, succeeded in setting Oriental 
etiquette at defiance ; she boldly asserted herself, 
took the direction of affairs out of the hands of 
her husband and subsequently ruled the empire in 
conjunction with her son.^ Her name and image 
were even placed upon the coins.^ Generally, how- 
ever, the Parthian kings were remarkably free from 
the weakness of subservience to women and managed 
their kingdom with a firm hand, without allowing 
either wives or ministers to exercise any undue ascen- 
dency over them. In particular, we may note that they 
never, so far as appears, fell under the baleful influence 
of eunuchs, who, from first to last, play a very subor- 
dinate part in the Parthian history. Here the contrast 
is striking between the Parthian and the early Persian 
monarchy. 

The ordinary dress of the monarch was the long 
loose " Median robe " which had been adopted from 
the Medes by the Achsemenian Persians. This robe 
flow^ed down to the feet in numerous folds, enveloping 
and concealing almost the entire figure. Trousers 
and a tunicwere ordinarily, it is probable, worn beneath 

'■ See above, p. 226. 

^Gardner, "Parthian Coinage," pi. iv., Nos. 27, 28; Lindsay, 
" History and Coinage of the Parthians," pi. iii., Nos. 62, 63. 




406 PARTHTAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

it, the latter of linen, the former made of silk or wool. 
As head-dress, the king wore either the 
simple diadem, which was a band or 
ribbon passed once or oftener round the 
head and terminating in two long ends 
which fell down behind, or else a more 
pretentious cap, which in the earlier times 
was a sort of Scythian pointed helmet 
and in the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned 
with pearls or gems. His neck appears to have 
been generally encircled with two or more collars 
or necklaces, and he frequently wore ear-rings in his 
ears. The beard was almost always cultivated, and, 
with the hair, was worn variously. Generally, 
both hair and beard were carefully curled, but some- 
times they hung down in long straight locks. Mostly 
the beard was pointed, but occasionally it was 
worn square. In later times a fashion grew up of 
puffing out the hair extravagantly on either side of 
the head — a practice continued by the Sassanians. 
When he went out to war, the monarch seems to 
have exchanged his " Median robe " 
for a short cloak, reaching halfway 
down the thigh. His head was pro- 
tected by a pointed helmet, without 
crest or plume, and he carried the 
national arm of offence, the bow. 
Under his cloak he wore a coat of 
mail. He usually took the field on horseback, but was 
occasionally mounted on an elephant trained to en- 
counter the shock of battle. Gold and silver were 
lavishly employed in the trappings of his charger and 




SECLUSION OF WOMEN. 407 

on his arms. For the most part he took the command, 
and freely exposed his person in the fight, though it 
was regarded as no disgrace if he preferred to avoid 
the perils of the actual encounter. A bodyguard 
protected his person, surrounding him on ordinary 
occasions, and interposing themselves between him 
and his assailants : he had also attendants, whose 
duty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback, 
and in dismounting, which the armour that he wore 
made no easy business. 

It has been already observed that the queen lived, 
ordinarily, in seclusion. When, however, under 
peculiar circumstances, she emerged from privacy, 
her status and dignity were not much below those of 
the monarch. She wore a tiara far more elaborate 
than his, and one which, like his, was encircled with 
the diadem. Her neck was adorned with a necklace 
or necklaces. In the typical instance of Musa or 
Thermusa, we find her allowed the title of 
"Heavenly Goddess" (GEA OYPANIA). Separate 
apartments were of course assigned to the queen and 
to the royal concubines in the various palaces, which 
were buildings on a magnificent scale and decorated 
with the utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in 
Parthian times (a.d. 172-244), and had a good know- 
ledge of the East, thus describes the royal palace at 
Babylon : " The palace is roofed with brass, and a 
bright light flashes from it. It has chambers for the 
women and chambers for the men, and porticoes, 
partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of-gold 
embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into 
the walls like pictures. The subjects of the em- 



408 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

broideries are taken from the Greek mythology, and 
include representations of Andromeda, of Amymone, 
and of Orpheus, who is frequently repeated. Datis 
is, moreover, represented, destroying Naxos with his 
fleet, and Artaphemes besieging Eretria, and Xerxes 
gaining his famous victories. You behold the occu- 
pation of Athens and the battle of Thermopylai, and 
other things still more characteristic of the great 
Persian War, rivers drunk up and disappearing from 
the face of the earth, and a bridge stretched across 
the sea, and a canal cut through Athos, and the like. 
One chamber for the men has a ceiling fashioned 
into a vault like the heaven, composed entirely of 
sapphires, which are the bluest of stones, and 
resemble the sky in colour. Golden images of the 
gods whom they worship are set up about the vault, 
and show like stars in the firmament. This is the 
chamber in which the king delivers his judgments. 
Four golden magic wheels hang from the roof, and 
threaten the monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he 
exalts himself above the condition of man. These 
wheels are called ' the tongues of the gods,' and are 
set in their places by the Magi who frequent the 
palace." ^ This description must not be taken as 
altogether exact. The tapestries may have repre- 
sented other scenes than those which Philostratus 
imagined ; the ceiling was certainly not " composed 
entirely of sapphires," but either of enamelled bricks 
or plaster painted blue ; and the " magic wheels " are 
questionable ; but the general effect was probably 
very much that which the philosopher of Tyana 

' See Philostratus, " Vit. Apoll, Tyan.," i. 25. 



STATE AND POMP OF THE KING. 4O9. 

portrays, and presented an ensevibk that was curious, 
striking, and magnificent. 

It is probable that the state and pomp which 
surrounded the monarch fell little short of the Achae- 
menian standard. Considered as in some sort divine 
during his life, and always an object of national 
worship after his death, the " Brother of the Sun and 
Moon "I occupied a position far above that of the 
most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchs 
were shocked, when, in times of calamity, the " Great 
King" stooped to solicit their aid, and appeared 
before them in the guise of a suppliant, shorn of his 
customary splendour. Nobles coveted the dignity of 
" King's Friend," and were content to submit to blows 
and buffets at the caprice of their royal master, 
before whom they prostrated themselves in humble 
adoration after each such castigation. The Parthian 
monarch dined in solitary grandeur, extended on his 
own special couch, and eating from his own special 
table, which was placed at a higher elevation than 
those prepared for his guests and retinue. His 
" friend " sat on the ground at his feet, and was fed 
by scraps from his master's board. Guards, ministers, 
and attendants of various kinds surrounded him, and 
were ready at a word, or at a sign, to do his bidding. 
Throughout the empire he had numerous " Eyes " 
and " Ears " — officers who watched his interests, and 
sent him timely notice of whatever touched his safety. 
The bed on which the monarch slept was of gold, 
and subjects were forbidden to take their repose on 
couches of the same material. No stranger could 

^ Ammian. Marcellin. , xxiii. 6. 



410 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

obtain access to him unless introduced by the proper 
officer : and it was expected that whoever asked an 
audience should be prepared with a present of con- 
siderable value. For the gifts which he received the 
monarch made a suitable return, allowing such 
persons as he especially favoured to choose the 
presents that they most desired. 

The Parthian nobles enjoyed a power and dignity 
greater than that which is usually possessed by any 
subjects of an Oriental king. Rank in Parthia being 
hereditary and not simply official, the Megistanes 
were no mere creatures of the monarch, but a class 
which stood on its own indefeasible rights. As they 
had the privilege of electing to the throne upon a 
vacancy, and even the further privilege of deposing 
a duly elected monarch, the king could not but stand 
in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled to 
treat them with considerable respect and deference. 
It is to be remembered, moreover, that they were not 
without a material force calculated to give powerful 
support to their constitutional rights and privileges. 
Each stood at the head of a body of retainers 
accustomed to bear arms, and to serve in the wars of 
the empire. Together these bodies constituted the 
strength of the army ; and though the royal body- 
guard might perhaps have been capable of dealing 
successfully with each group of retainers separately, 
yet such an esprit de ccrtfs was sure to animate the 
nobles generally, that in almost every case they 
would make common cause with any one of their 
number who was attacked, and would support him 
against the Crown with the zeal inspired by self- 



POWER OF THE NOBLES. 4! I 

interest. Thus the Parthian nobiHty were far more 
powerful and independent than any similar class 
under the Achaimenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, 
or Turkish sovereignties. They exercised a real 
control over the monarch, and had a voice in the 
direction of the empire. Like the great feudal 
vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to time 
quarrelled with their liege lord, and disturbed the 
tranquillity of the kingdom by prolonged and 
dangerous civil wars ; but these contentions served 
to keep alive a vigour, a life, and a spirit of sturdy 
independence very unusual in the East, and gave a 
stubborn strength to the Parthian Monarchy, in which 
Oriental states and governments have for the most 
part been remarkably deficient. 

There appear to have been several grades of rank 
among the Parthian nobles. The highest dignity in 
the kingdom, next to the Crown, was that of the 
Surena, or " Field-Marshal " ; and this position was 
hereditary in a particular family, which can have 
stood but a little below the royal house in wealth and 
consequence. The head of this noble house is said 
to have at one time brought into the field as many as 
ten thousand retainers and slaves, of whom a thou- 
sand were heavy-armed. ^ It was his right to place 
the diadem on the king's brow at his coronation. 
The other nobles lived for the most part on their 
domains, but took the field at the head of their 
retainers in case of war, and in peace might some- 
times serve the offices of satrap, vizier, or royal 
councillor. The wealth of the class was great ; ^ its 

' Plutarch, " Vit. Crass.," § 21. - See above, pp. 80 and 397. 



412 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

members were inclined to be turbulent, and, like the 
barons of the European kingdoms, acted as a constant 
check and counterpoise to the royal authority, which 
they often resisted, and occasionally even overthrew. 

After war, the employment in which the king and 
the nobles took most delight, was hunting. The lion 
continued in the wild state an occupant of the Meso- 
potamian river banks and marshes ; and in other 
parts of the empire bears, leopards, and even tigers 
abounded. Thus the higher kinds of sport were 
constantly and readily obtainable. But the ordinary 
practice of the monarch and his courtiers seems to 
have fallen short of the true sportsman's ideal. 
Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds of 
beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with 
them under the conditions designed by Nature, the 
Parthians were generally content with a poorer and 
tamer method. They kept lions, leopards, and bears 
in enclosed parks, or " paradises," and found pleasure 
in the pursuit and slaughter of these denaturalised 
and half-domesticated animals. The employment 
may still, even under these circumstances, have con- 
tained an element of danger which rendered it 
exciting ; but it was a poor substitute for the true 
sport which the " mighty hunter before the Lord " 
had been the first to practise in these regions 
(Gen. X. 9). 

The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was, like 
that of the monarch, a long loose robe reaching to 
the feet, under which he wore a vest and trousers. 
Bright and varied colours were commonly affected, 
and sometimes dresses were interwoven or em- 



ORDINARY PARTHIAN FOOD. 413 

broidered with threads of gold. In seasons of 
festivity it was usual for garlands of fresh flowers to 
be worn upon the head. A long knife or dagger was 
carried at all times, and by all classes, suited for use 
either as an implement or as a weapon. 

In the earlier and simpler period of the empire — 
when the nation was just emerging from barbarism — 
the Parthian was noted as a spare liver ; but, as time 
went on, he aped the vices of more civilized people, 
and became an indiscriminate eater and a hard 
drinker. Game formed a main portion of his diet ; 
but he indulged also in pork, and probably in other 
sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread with 
his meat, and various kinds of vegetables. The 
bread, which was particularly light and porous, seems 
to have been sometimes imported by the Romans, 
who knew it as panis aqiiaticus or panis PartJiicus. 
Dates were also consumed largely by the Parthians, 
and the fruit grew in some parts of the country to 
an extraordinary size. A kind of wine vvas made 
from it ; and this seems to have been the intoxica- 
ting drink in which the nation generally indulged over- 
much. The liquor made from the dates of Babylon 
was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for 
the use of the king, and the higher order of satraps. 
The vulgar herd had to content themselves with 
drink of an inferior quality. Of the Parthian enter- 
tainments music was commonly an accompaniment. 
The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument 
called the sambiica, appear to have been known to 
them ; and they understood how to combine these 
instruments in concerted harmony. They are said 



414 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

to have concluded all their feasts with dancing,^ an 
amusement of which they were inordinately fond ; but 
this was probably the case only with the lower orders 
of the people. Dancing in the East, unless associated 
with religion, is viewed as degrading, and is not 
indulged in by those who wish to be considered 
respectable. 

The Parthians were jealous of their women, and 
the separation of the sexes was very decided among 
them. The women took their meals, and passed the 
greater portion of their lives, apart from the men. 
Veils were commonly worn, as in modern Moham- 
medan countries ; and it was regarded as essential 
to female delicacy that women, whether married or 
single, should converse freely with no males who were 
not either their near relations or else eunuchs. Adul- 
tery was punished with extreme severity ; but divorce 
was obtained without much difficulty, and women of 
rank released themselves from the nuptial tie on light 
grounds of complaint, and with little loss of reputa- 
tion. Polygamy was the established rule ; and every 
Parthian was entitled, besides his chief wife, to main- 
tain as many concubines as he pleased. Some of the 
nobles supported an excessive number ; but the ex- 
penses of the seraglio prevented the generality from 
taking very much advantage of the indulgence which 
the law permitted. It is probable that the bulk of the 
population, as is the case now in Mohammedan coun- 
tries, was monogamous. 

As to the degree of refinement and civilisation 
whereto the Parthians attained, it is difficult to judge 

^ Philostratus, " Vit. Apoll. Tyan.," i. 21. 



DEGREE OF CIVILISATION. 415 

and determine with accuracy. In mimetic art their 
remains (as we have ah-eady seen) do not show much 
taste or sense of beauty. There is perhaps sufihcient 
ground to beheve that their architecture possessed a 
certain amount of merit ; but the existing monuments 
can scarcely be taken as representations of pure Par- 
thian work, since they may have owed their excellence 
— in some measure — to foreign artists, or at any rate 
to foreign influence. Still the following particulars, 
for which there is good evidence, seem to imply that 
the nation had risen in reality far above that " bar- 
barism," which it was the fashion for the Greek and 
Roman writers to impute to it. In the first place, the 
Parthians had a considerable knowledge of foreign 
languages. Plutarch tells us,i that Orodes, the op- 
ponent of Crassus, was so far conversant with the 
Greek language and literature, that he could enjoy the 
representation of a play of Euripides. The general 
possession of some knowledge of Greek — at any rate 
by the kings and upper classes — seems to be implied 
by the use of the Greek letters and language in the 
legends upon coins, and in inscriptions. Other lan- 
guages were also to a certain extent studied and 
understood. The later kings almost invariably placed 
a Semitic legend upon their coins ; and there is at 
least one instance of a Parthian prince adopting an 
Arian legend of the type known as Bactrian.^ Jose- 
phus, moreover, regarded the Parthians as familiar 
with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldee, since he wrote his 
history of the Jewish War in his own native tongue, 

' Plutarch, " Vit. Crassi." § 32. 

* "Numismatic Chronicle," No. vi. p. 104. 



4l6 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

before he put out his Greek version, for the benefit 
especially of the Parthians, among whom he declares 
that he had a large number of readers;^ 

It does not appear that the Parthians had any- 
native literature; v/riting, however, was familiar to 
them, and was widely employed by them in matters 
of business. Not only were negotiations carried on 
with foreign powers by means of written despatches, 
but the affairs of the empire generally were transacted 
by means of writing. A custom-house system was, 
we are told, established along the frontier, and all 
commodities liable to duty that entered the country 
were registered in a book at the time of entry by the 
custom-house officer. In the great cities where the 
Court passed a portion of the year, account was kept 
of the arrival of strangers, whose names and descrip- 
tions were placed upon record by the keepers of the 
gates. The orders of the Crown were signified in 
writing to the satraps ; and they doubtless corres- 
sponded with the Court in the same way. In the 
earlier times the writing material commonly used was 
linen ; but, shortly before the date of Pliny, the Par- 
thians began to make paper from papyrus, which grew 
in the neighbourhood of Babylon, though they still 
continued also to employ, and gave the preference to, 
the material to which use had accustomed them. 

The Parthians had many usages which seem to 
imply a fairly advanced civilisation. There was a 
considerable trade between Rome and Parthia, carried 
on by means of travelling merchants. Parthia im- 
ported from Rome various metals, and a multitude of 
^ Joseph., " Bell. Jud.," Proem, § i and § 2. 



DEGREE OF CIVILISATION, 417 

manufactured articles of a high class. Her principal 
exports were textile fabrics and spices. The textile 
fabrics seem to have been produced chiefly in Baby- 
lonia, and to have consisted principally of silks, 
carpets, and coverlets. The silks were largely used 
by the Roman fashionable ladies. The coverlets, 
which were patterned with a variety of colours, fetched 
enormous prices, and were regarded as fit adornments 
of the Imperial palace. Among the spices exported, 
the most celebrated were bdellium, and the j'tmcus odo- 
ratus, or sweet-scented bulrush. Advanced civilisation 
is also implied in the Parthian tolerance of varieties in 
religion, which has been already mentioned.^ Even 
in political matters they appear to have been free 
from the narrowness which generally characterises 
barbarous nations. They behaved mercifully to 
prisoners, admitted foreigners freely to offices of high 
trust, gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them 
with respect and kindness, were scrupulous observers 
of their pledged word, and eminently faithful to their 
treaty obligations. On the other hand, it must be 
admitted that they had some customs which imply 
that they retained a tinge of barbarism. They used 
torture for the extraction of replies from accused 
persons, employed the scourge to punish trifling 
offences, and, in certain cases, condescended to muti- 
late and insult the bodies of their dead enemies. 
Their addiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. 
They were no doubt, on the whole, considerably less 
civilised than the contemporary Greeks and Romans ; 
but the difference does not appear to have been so 

^ Supra, p. 360. 



4l8 PARTHIAN ART, RELIGION, AND CUSTOMS. 

great as the classical writers would have us imagine 
it. 

We cannot, however, deny, and we do not wish 
to conceal the fact, that the Parthians exhibited, 
especially during the later period of the empire, 
a strong tendency to degenerate. They lost their 
primitive virtues of simplicity and abstemiousness. 
They became luxurious, and to a certain extent 
effeminate. The dash or e7an, which characterised 
their warfare in the earlier times, is " conspicuous by 
its absence " in the campaigns of the later monarchs. 
A decline in art and letters is also observable in the 
Parthian remains that have come down to us, especially 
in the coins, which, after the reign of Gotarzes, pro- 
ceed from bad to worse, and end with presenting to 
us effigies that have neither force nor character, and 
legends that are absolutely illegible. A knowledge 
of Greek is still possessed, the Greek letters being 
employed, and the words, when they can be de- 
ciphered, being clearly intended to be Greek. But 
they are often misspelt ; the forms used are ungram- 
matical ; while, at the last, the letters merely straggle 
over the field of the coin, and are not really formed 
into words. Further, the anomaly is introduced of a 
second legend, which is Semitic both in language and 
character, and reads from right to left. 

Still, to judge fairly of the Parthians, we must view 
them, not in their decline, but rather in the earlier 
stages of their career, before decline had set in. 
Speaking broadly, the position which they occupied 
among the nations of the old world was not very dis- 
similar to that which is held by the Turks in the 



GENERAL SURVEY. 4I9 

system of Modern Europe. They possessed a military 
strength which caused them to be both respected and 
feared, while they were further noted for a vigour of 
administration rarely seen among Orientals. It is 
true that a certain coarseness and rudeness attached 
to them which they found it impossible to shake off, 
and this gave their enemies a plausible ground for 
representing them as absolute barbarians. But we 
must not be led away by the exaggerations of pre- 
judiced writers, who sought to elevate the fame and 
reputation of their own countrymen by blackening the 
character of their chief rivals. Except in respect of 
their military prowess, it is doubtful if justice is done 
to the Parthians by any classical author. They occu- 
pied the position of the second nation in the world 
from about B.C. 1 50 to A.D. 226. They were a check 
and a counterpoise to Rome, preserving a " balance 
of power," and preventing the absorption of all other 
nations into the Tyrant Empire. They afforded a 
refuge to those whom Rome would fain have hunted 
down, allowed a freedom to their subjects which no 
Roman Emperor ever permitted, excelled the Romans 
in toleration and in a liberal treatment of foreigners, 
and gave the East a protection from foreign foes, and 
a government well suited to its needs, for a period of 
nearly four centuries. 



THE END. 



APPENDIX. 

(See p. 132.) 

The king alluded to has been called Mnascires or 
Mnasciras, and was formerly admitted into his list 
of Parthian monarchs by the author, who followed 
Lindsay and others. But Professor Gardner has 
shown that the name, which occurs in no author but 
Lucian, should probably be read as Kamnascires, and 
not Mnascires (kol MvaaKipTj^ 8e being a manifest 
corruption from Ka/uLvaaKiptj^; Se), and that the king 
intended is probably a tributary monarch of the 
Parthian period, well known to numismatologists, 
whose coins bear the legend of BASIAEflS 
KAMNASKIPOY. 




COIN OF KAMNASCIRAS. 



The probable date of the monarch is about that of 
Mithridates I, of Parthia. (See Professor Gardner's 
"Parthian Coinage," pp. 8 and 61,) 

420 



INDEX. 



Abdageses, 244 

Abgarus I., makes alliance with 
Pompey, 151 ; joins Crassus, 
164 ; treachery of, 166 

Abgarus II., joins Meherdates, 
265 

Achjeraenian period, Parthia in 
the, 27 

Achreus, adversary of Antiochus 
the Great, 59 

Adiabene, governed by a Vitaxa, 
80 ; conquered by Tigranes, 
133 ; inhabitants of, placed in 
Tigrano-certa, 134 ; made a 
Roman province by Trajan, 
308 ; relinquished by Hadrian, 
313 ; overrun by Severus, 335 ; 
and made into a Roman pro- 
vince, 345 

Agathias, quoted, 90 

Ak-su, river, 109 

Alani, wild tribes of, 26, 294, 296 

Alarodii, 122 

Alatagh Range, 5 

Albanians, 239, 305 

Albinus, his contest with Severus, 
336 

Alexander Balas, 74 

Alexander the Great, il, 36 

Amu Daria, river, 22 

Andragoras, 49 

Anilai, brother of Asinai, 248 ; 
succeeds him, 250 ; his battles 
with Mithridates, 251 ; his 
death, 252 



Antigonus of Jerusalem, 193 

Antioch, Parthian capital trans- 
ferred to, 39, 40 

Antiochus Hierax, brother to 
Seleucus Callinicus, 54 ; wars 
with Callinicus, 56 

Antiochus of Commagene, 196, 
198 

Antiochus I., 43 

Antiochus II., takes the title of 
" Theos," 44 ; his character, 
ibid. ; revolt of Bactria from, 45, 

Antiochus III., the Great, his war 
with Achaeus, 59 ; attacked by 
Artabanus I., ibid. ; invades 
Partbia, 60 ; his Bactrian expe- 
dition, 61 ; his death, 62 

Antiochus IV. (Epiphanes), his 
unwise policy towards the Jews, 
66 ; his death, 67 

Antiochus V., surnamed Eupator, 
his accession, 67 ; dethroned by 
his brother, Demetrius I., 68 

Antiochus Sidetes, successor to 
Demetrius II. , 94 ; his war with 
Tryphon, ibid. ; his Parthian 
war, 95-100 ; defeated and 
killed by Phraates II., loi 

Anti-Semitic disturbances, 253 

Antoninus, 320 ; death of, 322 

Antony, his war with the "Libe- 
rators," 189, 190; his quarrel 
with Octavian, 194, 293 ; his 
support of Herod the Great, 
196 ; his Parthian expedition, 
206-210; repulsed from Praaspa 



422 



INDEX. 



by the Medians, 209 ; retreat 
of, 211, 212; great losses of, 
213 ; seizure of Artavasdes, 215 ; 
arrangement of the East, 216 ; 
return to Italy, and war with 
Octavian, 217 

Apameia, 192, 198 

Aparni or Parni, no 

Arachosia, subjugation of, 18 ; 
account of, 21 ; conquered by 
Mithridates I., 74 

Arachotus, river, 21 

Araxes (Aras), river, 24, 305 

Arbela, 87, 352 

Arbelitis, 133 

Ardashes, 125 

Aria, subjugation of, 18 ; account 
of, 20 ; conquered by Mithri- 
dates I., 74 

Ariansof Herat, 27, 28 ; attacked 
by Scythic tribes, 109 

Arians, tribes of the, 28 

Ariarathes of Cappadocia, 45 

Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, 129 

Aristonicus of Cappadocia, 127 

Arius, river, 64 

Armenia, description of, 24, 25, 
119: early history of, 122-126; 
held as a Roman province by 
Pompey, 215 ; becomes a 
Parthian subject-ally, 225 ; 
yielded by Parthia lo the 
Romans, 229 ; annexed by 
Artabanus III., 237 ; again 
becomes Roman, 240 ; Tiri- 
dates, king of, 272-279 ; inva- 
sion of by Pffitus, 28j ; Tiridates 
established in, by arrangement 
between Parthia and Rome, 
285 ; made by Trajan into a 
Roman province, 305 ; seized 
by Vologases III., 323 ; 
wrested from Vologases by the 
Romans, 324 ; claims indepen- 
dence, 333 ; but submits to 
Severus, 337 

Armenia Minor, conquered by 
Mithridates of Pontus, 128 

Armenians, personal characteris- 
tics of, 121 ; become allies of 
Mithridates of Pontus, 128; 



defeated by Sulla, 129 ; at- 
tacked by Phraates III., 138 
Armies, Parthian, description of, 

397 
Arrian, quoted, 48 
Arsaces I., establishes Parthian 

independence, 48, 49, 90 
Arsacid intrigues, 366 
Arshag, second king of Armenia, 

124 
Art, general estimate of Parthian, 

393 

Artabanus I., appearance of, 58 ; 
reign of, 59-61 

Artabanus II., Scythian war of, 
115 ; death of, u6 

Artabanus III., Parthian crown 
offered to, 232 ; accepted by, 
233 ; defeats and expels 
Vonones, 233 ; proclaimed 
king, zizd. ; annexes Armenia, 
237 ; attacked by Scythians, 
239 ; loses Armenia, z'did. ; 
attempt to regain it, fails, 240 ; 
flight of, 241 ; return of, 244 ; 
sulMirission to Vitellius, 245 ; 
death of, 258 

Artabanus IV., pretender to 
Parthian throne, 298 

Artabanus V., accession of, 346; 
overture made to him by Cara- 
callus, 348, 349 ; his reply, 350 ; 
he receives Caracallus at Ctesi- 
phon, 351 ; treachery of Cara- 
callus, 352 ; his death, 354 ; 
war with Rome, il^id. ; defeat of 
Macrinus at Nisibis, 355-357 

Artanes of Armenia, 133 

Artavasdesof Armenia, 155; makes 
alliance with Antony, 207 ; con- 
ducts him to Praaspa, 208 ; 
withdraws his troops, 209 ; and 
offends Antony, 214 ; seized 
and put in chains by Antony, 

215 
Artavasdes of Parthia, the last 

king, 367 
Artaxata, 124, 236 
Artaxerxes of Persia, his war with 

Artabanus V., 366, 367 
Artaxias I., first king of Armenia, 



INDEX. 



423 



124; his war with Antiochus 
Epiphanes, 67, 124, 125 

Artaxias III., ruler of Armenia, 
236 

Ashkabad, 19 

Asia Minor, wars in, 43 

Asia, Western, the tiger in, 9 

Asinai and Anilai, Semitic high- 
waymen, 248 

Asinai, robber chief, 248 ; made 
satrap of Babylon, 249 ; poison- 
ing of, 250 

Aspasiacce, the, 54, 69 

Aspionus, province of, 10, 69 

Assyria, description of, 17 ; con- 
quered by Mithridates I., 73 ; 
occupied by Tigranes of 
Armenia, 133 ; recovered by 
the Parthians, 140; see Adia- 
bene 

Atak, the, 5 

Atergatis, Syrian goddess, temple 
of, 152 

Athenaeus, general of Sidetes, loi 

Atropatene, a part of Media, 
description of, 24, 25 ; absorbed 
into Parthia, 24 ; established as 
a separate state by Atropates, 45 

Attalus, 56 

Augustus, 221-234 

Aurelius, 323 

Avidius Cassius, expedition of, 
325, 327 ; revolt of, 329 

B 

Babylon, troubles in, 252 
Babylonia, description of, 14, 15 ; 

submission of, to Parthia, 72 ; 

revolt of, under Hymerus, IT9 
Bactria, description of, 18; makes 

itself independent, 45, 47 ; 

attacked by Mithridates I., 69; 

conquered by him, 73 ; Scythic 

invasion of, 109 ; occasional 

detachment from Parthia, 359 
Balas, Syrian king, 74 
Bambyce, temple at, 152 
Barsemius, king of Hatra, 333 
Behistun, Parthian sculpture at, 

267, 268 
Belik, battle of the, 167 



Berenice, sister of Ptolemy Euer- 

getes, 52 
Bokhara, 19 
Bolor, mountains, 25 

C 
Cabul, 65, 69, 109 
Csecilius Bassus, Pompeian 

general, 189 
Caesar and Pompey, rivals for 

power, 141 ; contest between, 

185; Csesar in Syria, 187; 

murder of, 189 
Cffisennius Psetus, Roman general, 

282 ; intrigues of, 292-294 
Caius, eldest grandson of Augus- 
tus, sent to the East, 225, 227 ; 

holds conference with Phraa- 

taces, 229 ; dies, ilizd. 
Caligula, 245 
Callinicus, see Seleucus 
Candahar, 21, 65 
Canidius Crassus, Roman general, 

206 
Cape Jask, 15 
Cappadocia, 26, 37, 45, 129, 237, 

276, 2S3, 318 
Caracallus, ambition of, 347 ; 

Abgarus made prisoner by, 348 ; 

his overtures to Artabanus V., 

348 ; mad proposal of, 349 ; 

arrival in Parthia, 351 ; treachery 

of, 352 ; his insult to dead kings, 

352 ; death of, 354 
Caria, country of, overrun by the 

Parthians, 194 
Carmania, country of, 366 
Carrhse, city of, 169, 170 
Carrhenes, general of Meherdates, 

267 
Carthage, destruction of, 127 
Caspian Gates, II, 62 
Caspian Sea, the, i, 4, 7, 8, 24, 

25. 30, 274 
Cassius (Avidius), expedition of, 

326 ; strange pestilence in his 

army, 328 
Cassius, Caius, prefect of Syria, 

265 
Cassius Longinus, Roman general, 

sent by Julius Caesar to Crassus, 



424 



INDEX. 



153; his prudent advice, 158; 

his successful retreat, 171 ; his 

later successes, 180, 181 
Cassius, the "Liberator," his 

dealings with the Parthians, 

189- 191 
Caucasus, mountains, 30, 31, 120, 

206 
Celtic cavalry, 167, 212 
Chandragupta, Indian monarch, 

Charax, city of, 10, 62, 64 
Chinese historians, quoted, 107 
Chorasmia, country of, 18 ; 
described, 22; people of, 27, 
28, no 
Chosroes, Parthian general, 323 
Chosroes, Parthian king, accession 
of, 298 ; his affront to Trajan, 
302 ; his Roman war, 306-313 ; 
his friendly relations with 
Hadrian, 313-316; his death, 

317 
Chosroes, uncle of last Parthian 

king, 367 
Cicero alarmed at the Parthian 

victory over Crassus, 182 
Cilicia, country of, 133, 134 ; 

invaded by Parthians, 182, 194, 

198 ; death of Trajan in, 313 
Cimmerians, 105 
Cinnamus, Parthian noble, 258 
Civilisation of the Parthians, 415 

et seq. 
Claudius, Roman emperor, 263, 

292 
Cleopatra, wife of Demetrius II., 

74, 94, 98 
Cleopatra, wife of Mithridates of 

Pontus, 128 
Cleopatra, mistress of Antony, 

192, 215 
Climate of Parthia, 5 
Clodius Albinus, 332 
Colchi, 305 

Colchis, country of, 29, 128 
Comans, people, 105 
Commagene, country of, 195, 196, 

197, 279 
Commodus, reign of, 329; assassi- 
nation of, 332 



Corbulo, Armenian campaign of, 
278 ; Armenia conquered by, 
279 ; his relations with Paetus, 
283-286 ; his peaceful arrange- 
ment with Tiridates, 287 

Corma, river, 266 

Cornelia, wife of Pompey, 186 

Crassus, expedition of, against 
Parthia, 147-173 ; wealth of, 
148 ; career and character of, 
148, 149 ; hesitation of, 153- 
155 ; advance through Mesopo- 
tamia, 158 ; his army, 162 ; 
his battle with Surenas, 166 ; 
his retreat, 169, 17 1 ; his death, 
173 ; treatment of his body, 177 

Crassus, Publius, sent to his father 
by Julius Csesar, 153 ; leads 
charge on the Parthians, 167 ; 
slain, 168 

Creticus Silanus, Roman governor 
of Syria, 234 

Ctesiphon, city of, 34 ; building 
of, 57 ; Jews in, 83 ; chief city 
of Parthia, 86 ; taken by Trajan, 
309 ; by Avidius Cassius, 326 ; 
by Severus, 338 ; approached 
by Caiacallus, 351 

Cyaxares, Median king, 108 

Cyrus, river, 25, 120 

Cyrus the Great, Persian king, 39, 
46, 108, no, 363 

D 

Dacia made a Roman province, 

297 
Dahfe, people, 48, 112, 243, 260, 

273 
Damaghan, city, 2, 8 
Daman-i-Koh, mountains, 4 
Dara, city of, 57 ; called also 

Dareium, ibid. 
Darius Codomannus, Persian 

king, 157 
Darius, Persian king, inscription 

of, 27 ; expedition against the 

European Scyths, 108 ; revolt 

of Armenia from him, 123 
Decebalus of Dacia, adversary of 

Trajan, 297 
Deiotarus of Galatia, 182 



INDEX. 



425 



Demavend, Mount, 4, 8 

Demetrius of Bactria, 65 

Demetrius I. of Syria, 67, 68 

Demetrius II., of Syria, his 
struggle with Tryphon, 74 ; 
defeated by Mithridates III. 
and made prisoner, 75 ; his 
attempts to escape fail, 93 ; he 
is sent into Syria to provoke a 
revolt, 67, 68 

Derketo, Syrian goddess, 152 

Diala, river, 13 

Didius Julianus, Roman emperor, 

33I' 332 

Dio Cassius, quoted, 237, 350, 

400 
Diodotus, first king of Bactria, 

46, 54, 64 
Djuvein, mountains, 5 
Dniestr, river, 128 
Domitian, Roman Emperor, 295- 

297 
Drangiana, account of, 20 
Dress, Parthian, description of, 

405 

E 

Ecbatana, capital of Media, 59, 

70 
Edessa, city, 151, 265, 305, 311 
El Hadhr, modern name of Hatra, 

373 

Elam, country of, 13-17 ; con- 
quered by Mithridates I., 72 

Elburz, mountains, i, 4, 8, 9 

Elegeia, city, 302, 323 

Eleuts, wild tribes, 35 

Elwand, Mount, 70 

Epiphaneia, city, 192 

Erucius Clarus, Roman general, 

311 

Ettrek, valley of, 2, 7 
Eucratidas of Bactria, attacked by 

Mithridates I., 69 ; murder of, 

by his son, 73 
Euemerus, made Viceroy of 

Babylon, 113 ; rebellion of, 119 
Euergetes, expedition of, 52 
Eupator, Syrian king, 67 
Euphrates, The, 14, 25, 26, &c. 
Euthydemus of Bactria, 65 



Exedares, son of Pacorus II., 
299, 300 

F 

Ferghana, 107 

Fergusson, quoted, 372, 377-9' 

382 
F.oods, Parthian, description of, 

'413 
Forum Romanum, 289 
Fronto, quoted, 312 



Gabinius, governor of Syria, 144, 
145, 149 

Galatia, country of, 128, 275 

Callus, Roman general, 212 

Gedrosia, coiintry of, 21 

Georgia, country of, 120, 239 

Germanicus, character and ap- 
pointment of, 235 ; his arrange- 
ment of affairs in the East, 236 

Ghermsir, or " warm country," 15 

Gibbon, quoted, 33 

Gordyene, country of, 130, 133, 
140, 306 

Gotarzes, accession of, 263 ; brutal 
nature of, 264; his war with 
Mcherdates, 265 ; rock tablet 
of, 267 ; death of, 268 ; ill 
effects of his reign, 269 

Goths, 105 

" Great King," title of, 84 

Great Salt Desert of Iran, i 

Greater Zab, river, 96 

Greek art, 33 

Greek towns in Parthia, 75, 81 

Gurghan river, valley of the, 2, 7 

H 

Hadrian relinquishes Trajan's 
conquests, 313 ; sagacity of, 
314 ; his relations with Chos- 
roes, 315, 316 ; his quarrel with 
Pharasmanes, 318; his death, 
320 

Hafiz, Persian port, 364 

Halus, Persian city, 242 

Hamun, Lake, 20, 21 



426 



INDEX. 



Hatra, revolt of, from Trajan, 
310 ; unsuccessful attacks on, 

312,341 
Hatreni, people of Hatra, 343 
Hazaret Sultan range, 25 
Hecatompylos, city of, 50, 57, 

58, 60 
Helena, mother of Izates, 257 
Heliocles, Bactrian king, 73 
Helmend, river, 3, 20, tg 
Heniochi, people, 305 
Herat, city, 20, 28 
Heri-rud, river, 3, 20, 69 
Herod the Great, 196 
Herodian quoted, 350, 396 
Herodotus quoted, ill, 123 
Heruli, people, 113 
Hierapolis, city, 152, 205 
" Hills of ihe Kurds," 3 
Hindu-Kush, mountains, 19, 74 
Hissar, mountains, 19, 25 
Hit, on the Euphrates, 14 
Horace quoted, 190, 204 
Hormuz, plain of, 367 
Hydaspes, river, 73 
Hymerus, 1 13, 359 
Hyrcania, 2 ; description of, 6, 7 ; 

conquered by Tiridates I., 53 ; 

invaded by Antiochus III., 60 ; 

revolts from Mithridates I., and 

is reduced, 71 ; breaks oft" from 

the Parthian Empire, 296, 359 
Hyrcanus, John, Maccabee king, 

96 
Hyrcanus H., 193 
Hystaspes, Persian king, 27 



Iberia, country of, 25 

Ichnse, Greek town in Parthia, 

152, 168 
Indates, Parthian general, 96 
Indo-Scyths, people of, 26 
Indus, valley of, 26 
Ipsus, battle of, 37 
Iran, Salt Desert of, I, 10, II 
Iranian family, the, 28 
Isidore of Charax, quoted, 87 
Ispahan, city, 15 
Istakr, city, ^^ 



Izates, king of Adiaben^, receives 
Artabanus II., 257 ; sends relief 
to Jerusalem, zdi^. ; opposes 
Gotarzes, 262 ; joins Meher- 
dates, 266; deserts him, zl>id. ; 
quarrels with Vologases I., 273 

J 

Jaghetai, mountains, 5 

Jerahi, river, 13, 367 

Jerusalem, revolution in, 193 ; 

receives offerings from Parthia, 

247 
Jewish element in Parthia, 26 
Jezireh, towns on Tigris, 266, 307 
Josephus quoted, 240, 257, 416 
Judsea, revolt of, from Syria, 102 ; 

overrun by Parthians, 193 
Julius Alexander, Roman general, 

Julius Cffisar, 185, 187, 189 

Julius Martialis, 354 

Julius Pelignus, 272 

Justin quoted, 29, 1 15, 119, 397 

K 

Kalmucks, wild tribes of, 35 

Kamnasciras, 135, 420 

Kanats, system of, 12 

Karun, river, 13 

Kasvin, city of, 10 

Kavir, salt efflorescence, 22 

Kerkhah, river, 13 

Kerman, country of, 61, 366; 

desert of, 15, 16 
Khabour, river, 265 
Kharesmian desert, 64 
Khiva, desert of, i 
Khorasan, desert of, i ; province 

of, 2 
King of Kings, title of, 81, 84, 228 
Kissia, country of, 13-17 
Komans, wild tribe, 35 
Kum, city of, 10 
Kurdish tribes, rudeness of, 4 
" Kurds, Hills of the," 3 



Labienus, successes of, 193 ; as- 
sumption of title of " Im- 



INDEX. 



427 



perator," 194 ; capture and 

death of, 195 
Labus, or Labuta, mountain, 3 
Lsetus, officer of Severus, 335, 341 
Lindsay quoted, 1 12, 401, 405 
Longinus, C. Cassius, Roman 

general, 153, 158, 171 
Lucullus, Roman general, 136, 

278 
Lycus river, 96 

Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituraea, 196 
Lysias, regent of Syria, 67 

M 
Macedonian Empire, division of, 

Macheloni, people, 305 

Macrabea range, 5 

Macrinus, elected emperor, 354 ; 

defeated by Artabanus V., 356 
Magnesia, battle of, 124 
Magi, position of, 78, 365, 395 
Manicheism, 365 
Mannai, or Minni, people, 122 
Manners and customs of the 

Parthians. 33, 396 e^ seq. 
Marcellinus quoted, 85, 373, 409 
Mardi, country of, 8, 9; conquest 

of, 62 
Markoff quoted, 401 
Margiana, account of, 19 
Margians, people, 28 
Mark Antony, 145 ; see Antony 
Mashur, 15 
Massagetse, wild tribes of, 25, loS, 

no 
Maximus, Roman officer, 311 
Mazanderan, country of, 8 
Media Atropatene, 11, 24, 45 ; 

see Atropatene 
Media Magna, description of, 1 1- 

17 ; conquered by Mithridates 

I., 70, 71 ; placed under Mithri- 
dates II., 144 
Media Rhagiana, description of, 

9 ; conquest of, 10, 62 
Megistanes, Parthian nobles, 78, 

79, 201 
Meherdates, attempts to depose 

Gotarzes, 265 



Merivale, Dean, quoted, 88, 290, 

297, 314, 328 
Merv, oasis of, 19, 38, 174 
Mesopotamia, 17, 22, 39, 52, 59, 

&c. 
Mithridates of Armenia, 271 
Mithridates I., appointed king, 
63 ; attack on Bactria, 69 ; con- 
quest of Media, 70 ; submission 
of Babylonia to, 72; second 
attack on Bactria, 73 ; defeat of 
Demetrius II., 74; death of, 
76 ; his system of government, 
78 ; " King of Kings," 84 
Mithridates II., the Great, 117; 
defeat of Scythian tribes, iiS; 
personal description of, 130; 
death of, 130 
Mithridates III., accession of, 
143; reign of, 144 ; death of, 
146 
Mithridates IV. of Pontus, 127 
Mithridates V. of Pontus, vast 

empire of, 128 
Mithridates, Parthian satrap, 250 
Mnasciras, supposed Parthian 

king, 135, 420 
Monseses, pretender, revolts 

against Phraates IV., 204 
Monteses, Parthian noble, 281 
Monarchy, second Persian, or 

Sassanian, 26 
Mongols, nation of, 34, 105 
Monobazus, king of Adiabene, 

274, 281, 287 
Mons Masius, 23 
Mount Amanus, 195 
Musa, queen of Parthia, 226, 227 
Music girls, Parthian, 178 

N 

Nearda, city of, 248 

Nero, Tiridates' audience with, 

289 
Nicephorium, city of, 326 
Nicomedes of Bithynia, 128 
Niger, Pescennius, prefect of 

Syria, 332 ; a rival of Severus, 

333 ; death of, 334 
Nishapur, city, 2 ; river of, 3 



428 



INDEX. 



Nisibis, city, 307 ; revolts from 

Trajan, 310 ; recovered 311; 

made a Roman colony, 335 ; 

battle of, 355 
Nomads, northern, barbarity of, 

105 

O 

Ochus, river, 48 

Octavian, rival of Antony, 190, 
203, 217; becomes emperor, 
and takes the name of Augustus, 
221 ; his dealings with Phraates 
IV., 221-225 ; v/ith Phraataces, 
226-229 ; with Vonones, 231 

Octavius, general under Crassus, 

171, 173 ^ , 

Ornaments, personal, of the 

Parthians, 388, 389 
Onones, variant form of the 

name Vonones, 233 
Ornodapantes, Parthian noble, 183 
Ornospades, Mesopotamian satrap, 

241 
Orobazus, 129, 130 
Orodes I., brother of Mithridates 

III., 143 ; his plan of defence, 

160-162 ; jealousy of Surenas, 

180; death of, 201 
Orodes II., accession and death 

of, 230 
Orodes, son of ArtabanusIII., 239 
Orontes, river, 192 
Orosius, quoted, 94 
Ortoadistus, king of Armenia, 125 
Osrhoene, tributary kingdom 

tinder Parthia, 80 ; king of, joins 

Crassus, 151 ; occupied by 

Crassus, 154 ; joins Meherdates, 

265 
Oxus, river, valley of, i8j modern 

name of, 22 



Pacorus I., son of Orodes, 181 ; 

associated by his father, 183 ; 

victories of, 192-194; death of, 

197 
Pacorus 11. , accession of, 296; 

negotiates with Decebalus of 

Dacia, 297 ; his death, 298 



Psetus, campaign of, 282-285 ; 
machinations of, 292, 293 

Pamir, the, 19, 25 

Paropamisus, mountains, i, 11, 
&c. 

Parthamasiris, son of Pacorus II., 
299 ; Trajan's seizure of, 303 ; 
death of, 304 

Parthamaspates, made king of 
Parthia by Trajan, 311 ; de- 
posed by Chosroes, 313; made 
king of Armenia i)y Hadrian, 
315 ; his death, 321 

Parthia, description of, I-5 ; cli- 
mate of, 5 ; productions of, 6 ; 
establishes her independence, 
47-49 ; becomes a Roman ally, 
138 ; wars with Rome, 140, 
152-198, &c. ; attacked by 
Antony, 207 ; architecture and 
art of, 373, ei seq. ; degree of 
civilisation, 415, et seq. ; des- 
cription of its armies, 397 ; 
doubtful period of its history, 
292 ; duration of its monarchy, 
368 ; general survey of, 419 ; 
golden throne of, 316 ; Jewish 
communities in, 83, 246 ; pomp 
of its kings, 409 ; limits of its 
dominion, 4, 23, 368 ; loss of 
power, 345 ; Magi in, 395 ; 
military system of, 199 ; tactics 
of, 401, et seq. ; nobles, 
power of, 411 ; nomadic pres- 
sure on, 104 ; organisation of 
its army, 89 ; religion of, 394 ; 
splendour of Court of, 87 ; pre- 
tenders to throne of, 298, 317, 
320 ; titles of monarchs of, 85 ; 
empire, character of, 369 ; ten- 
dency to break up, 358 ; causes 
of discontent in, 361 ; downfall 
of, 362, 367 

Parthians defeated by Scyths, 
114; governing faculty of, 34; 
manners and customs of, 396, 
405 ; personal ornaments of, 
388 ; savagery of, 364 

Pergamus, kings of, 42, 56, 66 

Persia, description of, 14, 17, 25 

Persian Empire, collapse of, 28 



INDEX. 



429 



Persian Gulf, 14, 15, 26 

Persian, Second, or Sassanian, 

monarchy, 26 ; names, 28 ; rule, 

fidelity of, 28 
Persians, religious zeal of, 365 ; 

special grievances of, 363 ; 

characteristics of, 364 
Pertinax, Roman Emperor, 331 
Pescennius, see Niger 
Pharasmanes I., of Iberia, 239,279 
Pharasmanes II., of Iberia, his 

quarrel with Hadrian, 318 
Pharnaces of Pontus, 187 
Pharnapates, Parthian general, 

195 
Pharsalus, battle of, 186 
Philippi, battle of, 191 
Philostratus, quoted, 408, 414 
Phraataces and Musa, reign of, 

226 ; embassy to Augustus, 

227 ; meeting with Caius, 229 ; 

deposition and death of, 230 
Phraates I., accession of, 61 ; 

conquests of, 62 
Phraates II., accession of, 91 ; 

reign of, 93 ; attacked by 

Antiochus Sidetes, 96 ; clever 

stratagem of, 97 ; plot of, 99 ; 

massacre of Syrians by, 100 ; 

war with the Scyths, 113; death 

of, 114 
Phraates III., accession of, 137 ; 

alliance with Pompey, 138 ; 

attack on Armenia, 138, 139 ; 

quarrel with Pompey, 140-142 ; 

murder of, 143 
Phraates IV., accession of, 203 ; 

wholesale murders by, 204 ; 

attack of Antony on, 208 ; 

quarrel of Median monarch 

with, 213 ; quarrel arranged, 

216 ; insurrection against, 219 ; 

poisoning of, 226 
Pliny, quoted, 297 
Plutarch, quoted, 136, 397, 411, 

415 
Polemo of Pontus, 236, 279 
Polytimetus, river, 109 
Pompsedius Silo, Roman general, 

195 

Pompeiopolis, city of, 236 



Pompey, Roman general, 137- 
142 ; and Caesar, contest be- 
tween, 185 

Priapatius, Parthian king, 61 

Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, 
145 

Ptolemy Euergetes,kingof Egypt, 
34 

Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of 
Egypt, 46, 49 

Q 

Quadratus, Roman general, 276 
Quietus, Lucius, officer of Trajan, 
3" 

R 

Registan, desert of, 21 
Rhadamistus, of Iberia, his murder 

of Mithridates of Armenia, 272; 

ascent of throne of Armenia, 

272 ; driven out by Vologases 

I., 275 
Rhages, city of, 9 
Rhagiana, country of, 9, 10, 62 
Rhodaspes, 223 
Rhodogune, 76 
Roman Emperor, the post sold 

by auction, 332 
Roman invasions of Parthia, 152- 

176, 208-218, 306-312 ; 326, 

327 ; 335-344 ; 350-354 

Romans, military system of the, 
199 

Rome, Armenia a province of, 
305 ; Armenian compromise 
with, 287 ; at peace with 
Parthia, 291 ; first Parthian 
contact with, 127; la<;t Parthian 
war with, 354 ; Parthia seeks 
aid of, 295 ; Parthia an ally of, 
138 

Ross quoted, 381 



Sacarauli, tribe of Scyths, 1 10 
Sacastana, account of, 21, 74, 109, 

118 
Sagartia, account of, 21, 22 
Salt Desert Great, of Iran, i, li 
Samarah, city on Tigris, 14 



430 



INDEX. 



Sanatroeces, reign of, 135-137 

Sarangia, account of, 20, 21 

Sarvakhs, fort, 3 

Sassanian monarchy, 26 

Satraps, revolts of, 44 

SauromatJE, nation of, 305 

Saxa, Decidius, Roman general, 
192, 194 

Scythia, wild tribes of, 26 ; at 
war with Artabanus II., 115 ; 
settle in Affghanistan, 109 

Scythic characteristics, 31 

Scyths, 26, 29 ; description of, 
no; barbarity of, in; at war 
with Phraates II., 1 13; defeat 
him, 114; at war with Arta- 
banus II., 115 

Second Persian, or Sassanian, 
monarchy, 26 

Sebzawur, city of, 2 

Seleucia, city of, 81 ; Jews in, 83 ; 
position of, 86 ; inclined towards 
Rome, 154; Surenas at, 177, 
178 ; massacre of Jews at, 253 ; 
submits to Trajan, 309 ; taken 
by Avidius Cassius, 326 ; by 
Severus, 338 

Seleucid kingdom, organisation 
of, 41 

Seleucid princes, 42-47 

Seleucus I. (Nicator), 37-41 

Seleucus II., 53, 54, 56 

Seleucus IV., reign of, 62 ; son of, 
67 

Selinus, city of, Trajan's death 
there, 313 

Seraspadanes, Parthian prince, 
223 

Severus, Roman Emperor, 331 ; 
rival of Niger, 333 ; crushes 
him, 334 ; crushes his other 
rival, Albinus, 336 ; first ex- 
pedition of against Parthia, 
335 ; second expedition of, 337- 
339 ; unsuccessful siege of H atra, 
341-344 ; conquests of, 345 ; 
death of, 347 

Shah-rud, river, 2 

Shebri-No, town, 3 

Silanus, Governor of Syria, 234 
Sillaces, Parthian general, 180 



Sinnaca, battle of, 17 1 
Sogdians, people, 27 
Sophagasenus, 65 
Statianus, Roman gencal, 209 
Statius Priscus, Roman general, 

324 

Strabo quoted, 6 ; doubtful his- 
torian, 30 

Su, a nomadic race, 107 

Sulla, defeat of Armenians by, 
129 ; embassy of Mithridates 
II. to, ilnd. 

Sura, city of, 326 

Surena, Parthian name for com- 
mander-in-chief, 89, 411 

Surenas, general of Orodes I., 
159 ; character of, 160 ; Army 
of, 164 ; his battle with Crassus, 
166 ; stratagem of, 172 ; farcical 
ceremony of, 177, 178; death 
of, 180 

Susiana, country of, I3-I7r 37 

Sutlej, river, 67 

Syria, Parthian invasion of, 192- 
195 ; recovered by the Romans, 
196 

Syrian gates, 195 

Syrian troops, massacre of, 100 

Syro- Macedonian Empire, 37-44 



Tacitus, quoted, 82, 259, 268, 

277, 401 
Tactics, Parthian, 401 et seq. 
Tadjiks, people, 34 
Takht-i-Suleiman, city, 211 
Tanyoxares, Persian prince, 46 
Tatar races, 104 
Taurus, mountains, 29 
Tejend, river, 3, 18, 20 
Tersheez, town, 2, 3 
Theocritus, Roman general, 348 
Theos, title taken by Antiochus 

II., 44 ; by Parthian kings, 85 
Tiberius, relations with Augustus, 

223 ; retreat to Rhodes, 224 ; 

relations with Artabanus III., 

234-245 
Tigranes I., king of Armenia, 
129; attack on Parthia, 130; 



INDEX. 



431 



capture of Parthian provinces, 
133; flight of, 138; victory 
over his son, 139 ; relations 
with Pompey, 1 38-142 

Tigranes II., son of Tigranes I., 
ally of Phraates III. and Pom- 
pey, 138-140 ; carried to Rome, 
140 

Tigranes III., brother of Artaxias, 
made king of Armenia by 
Tiberius, 223 ; dies, ibid. 

Tigranes IV., made king by the 
Armenians, 224 

Tigranes V., make king by Nero, 
279; attacks Adiabene, 180 

Tigrano-certa, city, built by Ti- 
granes I., 134 ; great strength 
of, 281 

Tigris, river, 13, 81, 120, 153; 
Trajan's fleet on, 309; his 
pleasure voyage on, 310; 
Severus's fleet on, 340 

Tiridates I. , coin of, 50 ; reign of, 
50-58 

Tiridates II., short reign of, 219, 
220 

Tiridates III., pretender, 239, 

241 ; crowned King of Parthia, 

242 ; flight of, 244 
Tiridates, established as king of 

Armenia by Vologases I., 275 ; 
driven out, 279 ; re-established, 
285 ; his compromise with 
Rome, 287 ; his journey to 
Rome, 287 ; his audience with 
Nero, 289 ; defeated by the 
Alani, 295 ; death of, 300 
Tiger, in Western Asia, 9 
Titus, Roman Emperor, 295, 296 
Tochari, people, no, 112, 115 
Trajan, his march on Armenia, 
302 ; his seizure of Parthama- 
siris, 303 ; his invasion of 
Parthia, 306; his retreat and 
death, 313 
Trogus Pompeius, Roman writer, 

56 
Tryphon, Syrian pretender, 74 
Turanian cliaracteristics, 31, 32, 

104 
Turiua, province of, 10, 69 



Turks, resemblance of to Par- 

thians, 35, 254 
Tyre, city of, 193 

U 

Urarda, people, 122 
Urumiyeh, lake of, 24, 121 

V 

Val-arsaces, Armenian king, 125 

Van, lake of, 121, 122 

Vardanes I., accession of, 260 ; 
war with Gotarzes, 260 ; de- 
signs on Armenia, 261 ; murder 
of, 263 

Vardanes 11. , revolt and reign of, 
277 

Ventidius, Roman general, 194, 
206 

Verus, Roman Emperor, expedi- 
tion to the East, 323 

Vespasian, his relations with 
Vologases I., 292, 294-296 ; 
his relations with Csesennius 
Paetus, 292-294 

Vitaxse, the, 81, 249, 273 

Vitellius, governor of Syria under 
Tiberius, 238 ; his war with 
Artabanus III., 240 ; introduces 
Tiridates III. into his kingdom, 
241 ; crosses Euphrates into 
Parthia, 244 ; has interview with 
Artabanus III., and receives 
concessions, 245 

Vologases I. , accession of, 270 ; 
first invasion of Armenia, 272 ; 
dispute with Izates, 273, 274 ; 
second invasion of Armenia, 
274 ; war with Rome, 276- 
279; attempt to recover Ar- 
menia, 281 ; truce with Corbulo, 
282 ; victory over Psetus, 284 ; 
arrangement with Corbulo, 287 ; 
attacked by the Alani, 294 ; 
asks aid of Rome, 295 ; death 
of, 296 
Vologases II., pretender under 
Chosroes, 316, 317 ; reign of, 
318; mistaken policy of, 319; 



432 



INDEX. 



his dealings with Antoninus 
Pius, 320, 321 ; his death, 321 

\'ologases III., accession of, 321 ; 
Armenia seized by, 323 ; de- 
feated by Avidius Cassius, 324 ; 
further victories of Cassius, 326 ; 
dealings of Vologases with Corn- 
modus, 329 ; his death, t'did. 

Vologases IV., accession of, 331 ; 
relations with Pescennius Niger, 
332, 333 ; war with Severus, 
336-345; later years of, 345; 
death of, 346 

Vologases V., disputes succes- 
sion with Artabanus V., 347 ; 
reigns in Eastern Parthia, 347 

Vonones I., accession of, 231 ; 
attempted deposition of, 232 ; 
defeated by Artabanus III., 

233 ; made king of Armenia, 

234 ; death of, 236 
Vonones 1 1. , accession of, 270 ; 

children of, idid. 



W 
Wagises, Parthian envoy to Cras- 

sus, 155 
Wagharshag, early Armenian 

king, 125 
Western Asia, the tiger in, g 
Wilson, H. II., quoted, 107 
Women, seclusion of, in Parthia, 

405, 407, 414 

X 

Xenophon, 213 

Y 
Yezd, country of, 16 
Yue-ehi, wild tribes of, 26, 107, 
112 

Z 
Zab, rivers, 273, 345 
Zagros, mount, 11, 13, 17, 59, 339, 

345 
Zela, battle of, 187, 189 
Zendavesta, 27 
Zoroaster, 365, 394 



Xlbe Stor^ of the IRations. 



Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS take pleasure in 
announcing that they have in course of pubhcation, in 
co-operation with Mr. T. Fisher Unwin, of London, a 
series of historical studies, intended to present in a 
graphic manner the stories of the different nations that 
have attained prominence in history. 

In the story form the current of each national life is 
distinctly indicated, and its picturesque and noteworthy 
periods and episodes are presented for the reader in their 
philosophical relation to each other as well as to universal 
history. 

It is the plan of the writers of the different volumes to 
enter into the real life of the peoples, and to bring them 
before the reader as they actually lived, labored, and 
struggled — as they studied and wrote, and as they amused 
themselves. In carrying out this plan, the myths, with 
which the history of all lands begins, will not be over- 
looked, though these will be carefully distinguished from 
the actual history, so far as the labors of the accepted 
historical authorities have resulted in definite conclusions. 

The subjects of the different volumes have been planned 
to cover connecting and, as far as possible, consecutive 
epochs or periods, so that the set when completed will 
present in a comprehensive narrative the chief events in 



the great Story OF THE NATIONS ; but it is, of course 
lot always practicable to issue the several volumes in 
their chronological order. 

The " Stories " are printed in good readable type, and 
in handsome i2mo form. They are adequately illustrated 
and furnished with maps and indexes. Price, per vol., 
cloth, $1.50. Half morocco, gilt top, $1.75. 

The following volumes are now ready (May, 1893): 

THE STORY OF GREECE. Prof. Jas, A. Harrison. 
" ROME. Arthur Oilman. 
" THE JEWS. Prof. James K. Hosmer. 
" CHALDEA. Z. a. Ragozin. 
" GERMANY. S. Baring-Gould. 
" NORWAY. lijALMAR H. Boyesen. 
" SPAIN. Rev. E. E. and Susan Hale. 
" HUNGARY. Prof A. VAmbery. 
" CARTHAGE. Prof. Alfred f. Church. 
" THE SARACENS. Arthur "Gilman. 
" THE MOORS IN SPAIN. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
" THE NORMANS. S.arah Orne Jewett. 
" PERSIA. S. G. W. Benjamin. 
" ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. Rawlinson. 
" ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. Prof. J. P. Mahaffy. 
" ASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
" THE GOTHS. Henry Bradley. 
" IRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless. 
" TURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
" MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PERSIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
" MEDI/EVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gustave Masson. 
" HOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold Rogers. 
" MEXICO. Susan Hale. 
" PHOENICIA. Prof. Geo. Rawlinson. 
" THE HANSA TOWNS. Helen Zimmern. 
" EARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred. J Church. 
" THE BARB ARY CORSAIRS. Stanley Lane- Poole. 
" RUSSIA. W. R. Morfill. 

" THE TEWS UNDER ROME. W. D. Morrison. 
" SCOTLAND. John Mackintosh. 
" SWITZERLAND. R. Stead and Mrs. A. Hug. 
" PORTUGAL. H. Morse Stephens. 
" THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. W. C. Oman. 
" SICILY. E. A. Freeman. 
" THE TUSCAN REPUBLICS. Bella Duffy. 
" POLAND. W. R. Morfill. 





£^M 


r^^^^^ 


fo^fS^ 


^^kj*"^^^ 


g^M 






/^^^S^^ 


^^^( 




S 


^^^^^S 


£f*i.J%, 


F^Pi^ii^ 


^^^p^^^ 


l^yFj^ 




^^^ 



IDeroes of the IFlations. 

EDITED BY 

EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 



A Series of biographical studies of the hves and work 
of a number of representative historical characters about 
whom have gathered the great traditions of the Nations 
to which they belonged, and who have been accepted, in 
many instances, as types of the several National ideals. 
With the life of each typical character will be presented 
a picture of the National conditions surrounding him 
during his career. 

The narratives are the work of writers who are recog- 
nized authorities on their several subjects, and, while 
thoroughly trustworthy as history, will present picturesque 
and dramatic " stories " of the Men and of the events con- 
nected with them. 

To the Life of each " Hero " will be given one duo- 
decimo volume, handsomely printed in large type, pro- 
vided with maps and adequately illustrated according to 
the special requirements of the several subjects. The 
volumes will be sold separately as follows : 

Cloth extra $i 50 

Half morocco, uncut edges, gilt top . . • i 75 
Large paper, limited to 250 numbered copies for 
subscribers to the series. These may be ob- 
tained in sheets folded, or in cloth, uncut 
edges . . . . . . . • 3 50 



The first group of the Series will comprise twelve 
volumes, as follows : 

Nelson, and the Nax^al Supremacy of England. By W. Clark 
Russell, author of " Tlie Wreck of the Grosvenor," etc. 

Gustavus Adolphus, and the Struggle cf Protestantism for Exist- 
ence. By C. R. L. Fletcher, M. A., late Fellow of All SoulsCoUege, 
Oxford. 

Pericles, and the Golden Age of Athens. By Evelyn Abbott, M.A., 
Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 

Theodoric the Goth, the Barbarian Champion of Civilization. By 
Thomas Hodgkin, author of " Italy and Her Invaders," etc. 

Sir Philip Sidney, and the Chivalry of England. By H. R. Fox- 
Bourne, author of " The Life of John Locke," etc. 

Julius Caesar, and the Organization of the Roman Empire. By 
W. Warde Fowler, M. A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 

John Wyclif, Last of the Schoolmen and First of the English Re- 
formers. By Lewis Sargeant, author of " New Greece," etc. 

Napoleon, Warrior and Ruler, and the Military Supremacy of 
Revolutionary France. By W. O'Connor Morris, sometime 
Scholar of Oriel College, Oxford. 

Henry of Navarre, and the Huguenots in France. By P. F.Willert, 
M.A., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. 

Alexander the Great, and the Extension of Greek Rule and of 
Greek Ideas. By Prof. Benjamin I. Wheeler, Cornell University. 

Charlemagne, the Reorganizer of Europe. By Prof. George L. Burr, 
Cornell University. 

Louis XIV., and the Zenith of the French Monarchy. By Arthur 
Hassall, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford. 

To be followed by : 

Cicero, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. By J. L. Strachan 

Davidson, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Adventurers of England. By A. L. 

Smith, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
Bismarck. Ttie New German Empire : How It Arose ; What It 

Replaced; and What It Stands For. By James Sime, author of 

" A Life of Lessing," etc. 
William of Orange, the Founder of the Dutch Republic. By Ruth 

Putnam. 
Hannibal, and the Struggle between Carthage and Rome. By 

E. A. Freeman, U.C.L., LL.D., Regius Prof, of History in the 

University of Oxford. 
Alfred the Great, and the First Kingdom in England. By F. York 

Powell, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford. 
Charles the Bold, and the Attempt to Found a Middle Kingdom. 

By R. Lodge, M.A., Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. 
John CaWin, the Hero of the French Protestants. By Owen M. 

Edwards, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 
Oliver Cromwell, and the Rule of the Puritans in England. By 

Charles Firth, Balliol College, Oxford. 
Marlborough, and England as a Military Power. By C. W. C. 

Oman, A.M., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

new YORK LONDON 

27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD ST. 34 BEDFORO ST., STRAND 



